Principled Pragmatism : VOC Interaction with Makassar 1637-68, and the Nature of Company Diplomacy by Feddersen, Carl Fredrik

Principled Pragmatism 
VOC Interaction with Makassar 1637-68, and the Nature 
of Company Diplomacy

Carl Fredrik Feddersen
Principled Pragmatism
VOC Interaction with Makassar 1637-68, and the Nature 
of Company Diplomacy
© Carl Fredrik Feddersen, 2017
ISBN: 978-82-02-56660-9
This work is protected under the provisions of the Norwegian Copyright Act (Act No. 2 of May 
12, 1961, relating to Copyright in Literary, Scientific and Artistic Works) and published Open 
Access under the terms of a Creative Commons CC-BY 4.0 License (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/). This license allows third parties to freely copy and redistribute the 
material in any medium or format as well as remix, transform or build upon the material for 
any purpose, including commercial purposes, provided the work is properly attributed to 
the author(s), including a link to the license, and any changes that may have been made are 
thoroughly indicated. The attribution can be provided in any reasonable manner, however, 
in no way that suggests the author(s) or the publisher endorses the third party or the third 
party’s use of the work. Third parties are prohibited from applying legal terms or technological 
measures that restrict others from doing anything permitted under the terms of the license. 
Note that the license may not provide all of the permissions necessary for an intended reuse; 
other rights, for example publicity, privacy, or moral rights, may limit third party use of the 
material.
Cover painting: Romeyn de Hooghe, The conquest of Macassar 1666 to 1669, by Speelman 
From: the Atlas of Mutual Heritage and the Koninklijke Bibliotheek, the Dutch National 
Library. Credit: Wikimedia Commons. 
Typesetting: Datapage
Font: Whitney & MinionPro 
The book is produced with support from University of Agder.
Cappelen Damm Akademisk/NOASP
5Contents
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................19
Summary, English .........................................................................................................21
1 Presenting My Case ............................................................................................... 25
Section 1: Chapter Introduction ................................................................................................... 25
Contents and plan of the chapter ..........................................................................................26
Section 2: A brief chronology of VOC–Makassar interaction, 1603–68 ...........................26
The twin kingdoms of Goa-Tello ............................................................................................26
Actors in the Makassarese political field ............................................................................ 27
Internal tensions in South Sulawesi: The Bugis-Makassar dimension ........................28
The nature of politics ................................................................................................................29
The role of Islam ........................................................................................................................29
The regional dimension ...........................................................................................................30
The Ambonese wars ..................................................................................................................31
Global dimension ...................................................................................................................... 32
The outsiders .............................................................................................................................. 33
Chronological overview of the seventeenth VOC-Makassar interaction ...................34
The monopoly on nutmeg and cloves as the central issue of conflict ......................... 35
The 1637 negotiations and treaty .......................................................................................... 37
From the 1637 peace to war, negotiations, and the 1655 treaty .................................... 37
Tensions 1655–60, and another cycle of war, negotiations, and treaty .......................38
Context and treaty making: The Bugis rebellion in 1660 ................................................ 39
New tensions and decision for war, 1660–66 ....................................................................40
A final cycle of war and treaty, 1667–68 ..............................................................................41
War on and in Makassar, June–November 1667 ...............................................................42
Securing the peace by war and still more treaties, 1667–69 ..........................................42
Section conclusion ....................................................................................................................43
Section 3: Approaches to VOC Diplomacy in the historiography:  
General overview .............................................................................................................................43
Section introduction .................................................................................................................43
General types of approaches ..................................................................................................44
Section 4: Chronological overview of the historiography .....................................................47
Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century historiography ...............................................47
6content s
The Van Leur break and the economic turn in the post-World  
War II historiography ...............................................................................................................48
Revisionist comparative perspectives and views on the nature of interaction..........48
Entering a new millennium: The coming of a “new diplomatic history”? ................... 52
Jurrien van Goor’s positions on Company diplomacy...................................................... 53
Positions and plan of the exposition .....................................................................................54
Van Goor’s positions on the nature of the Company’s diplomacy................................54
Van Goor’s position on the Company’s position in the overseas  
diplomatic systems ................................................................................................................... 55
Accommodation as preferred interaction mode and its implications ......................... 55
Comparative aspects and the issue of commensurability ..............................................56
Comparisons at the macro-cultural level ............................................................................ 57
The singularity of my analysis compared to Van Goor’s positions ...............................59
Bringing it up to date, 2010–14 ..............................................................................................60
Van Meersbergen .......................................................................................................................61
Section 5: Positions on and propositions about law and treaty ...........................................62
The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ...................................................................63
Andaya versus Alexandrowicz ...............................................................................................64
The Paulusz–Arasaratnam exchange on the Westerwolt Treaty ..................................65
Somers ......................................................................................................................................... 67
Somers 2001 ...............................................................................................................................68
On the Company’s assumptions and mode in its diplomatic  
dealings VOC mode ..................................................................................................................70
Somers 2005 ..............................................................................................................................70
Van Ittersum ............................................................................................................................... 72
Positions ...................................................................................................................................... 73
Grotius’s treaty theory: Fraud by law ................................................................................... 74
Summing up: Ittersum .............................................................................................................. 75
Section 6: Summing up the historiography of VOC diplomacy ........................................... 75
2 Positions and Propositions Refined ...................................................................... 79
Section 1: Brief historiography on seventeenth-century Company–Makassar 
interaction, with an emphasis on Andaya’s propositions .....................................................79
Spiritual versus secular conceptions of “treaty” ...............................................................80
South Sulawesian and Western functions of treaty and function  
of state-interaction systems contrasted .............................................................................83
A spiritual conceptualisation of interstate relations: The workings of  
the South Sulawesian system and grounds for structural misunderstandings,  
and conflicting views on the nature and bonds of treaties .............................................84
The concept of siri and the workings of diplomacy and treaty in the  
South Sulawesi states system ................................................................................................85
Miscommunication in treaty making between Makassar and the Company ............86
Exceptions confirming the rule in the Company’s treaty practice ................................ 87
7content s
The 1671 treaties ........................................................................................................................88
The Bongaya Treaty of 1667 ....................................................................................................88
European tunnel vision and lack of understanding of and  
sensitivity to local perceptions in the Company’s treaty making..................................89
Allegations of breach of contract as a cultural misconception .....................................90
Summing up of the subsection .............................................................................................. 92
Andaya’s views on treaty and treaty making in historiographic perspective ............. 92
Concluding remarks .................................................................................................................. 93
Section 2: Resink’s proposition on international law in Makassar  
and its implications for Andaya’s positions ..............................................................................94
Introduction ................................................................................................................................94
Parallelisms .................................................................................................................................94
Institutions of international law in Indonesia ..................................................................... 97
The outsider as a separate category in the Indonesian  
system of maritime interaction ..............................................................................................98
Section conclusion ................................................................................................................... 101
Section 3: Two views on Makassarese dynamism ................................................................ 102
Reid on Makassarese dynamism ......................................................................................... 103
The nature of late sixteenth and seventeenth-century  
leadership in Makassar .......................................................................................................... 105
Pattingalloang ........................................................................................................................... 105
Structural factors ..................................................................................................................... 106
A seventeenth century cultural shift with “modern” implications? ........................... 107
Section 4: The structure of the argument ............................................................................... 108
On the primary sources .......................................................................................................... 113
The nature of the primary sources and method ............................................................... 114
3 The model of overseas diplomacy in the Heeren XVII’s  
Generale Instructies and the advice on Makassar in the particular letters ............. 115
Section 1: Chapter introduction .................................................................................................. 115
Chapter topic ............................................................................................................................. 115
Chapteraim ................................................................................................................................ 115
Chapter propositions ............................................................................................................... 116
Two additional comments ...................................................................................................... 117
A rebuttal to my critics about my interpretation of the role of  
international law in the Company’s diplomacy ................................................................ 117
The Role of Islam in Makassarese political thinking ....................................................... 118
Plan of exposition and analysis ............................................................................................. 118
Method and issues ................................................................................................................... 119
Section 2: The respective General Instructions 1609–50, and  
diplomacy’s role in them .............................................................................................................. 119
The 1609 Instructions ............................................................................................................. 119
Issues, concerns, and diplomacy in the 1609 Instructions ........................................... 120
8content s
The 1613 Instructions Context and general contents ......................................................122
General presentation of the contents in the 1613 Instructions .....................................122
On diplomacy in the 1613 Instructions ............................................................................... 126
Article 8 ..................................................................................................................................... 126
Article 10 ................................................................................................................................... 126
Article 21 .....................................................................................................................................127
Article 22 ................................................................................................................................... 128
Article 23 ................................................................................................................................... 128
Article 26 ................................................................................................................................... 129
Article 33 ................................................................................................................................... 129
The 1617 Instructions.............................................................................................................. 130
Hierarchy of concerns by structure of exposition ............................................................ 131
The role of and approach to diplomacy ..............................................................................132
The 1632 Instructions ..............................................................................................................132
Contents and structure of the 1632 Instructions .............................................................133
The Moluccas ............................................................................................................................133
The treatment of diplomacy in the 1632 Instructions .................................................... 134
The Moluccas: Political concerns and diplomacy ........................................................... 136
The 1650 Instructions .............................................................................................................137
The context of the 1650 Instructions ..................................................................................137
Textual analysis, the 1650 Instructions.............................................................................. 138
The balance between war and diplomacy regarding  
independent Asian princes ................................................................................................... 139
Treaties and negotiations in category 3 ............................................................................. 139
Adaptation, accommodation, and pragmatism as  
the general principle in diplomatic interaction  
with rulers in category 3 ........................................................................................................140
Cultural accommodation ....................................................................................................... 142
The desired quality of personnel ......................................................................................... 143
Means of diplomacy: The diplomatic gift ......................................................................... 144
Notions of cultural relativism and pragmatic  
accommodation to local ways in the pre-1650 General Instructions ........................ 144
International law and “treaty” in the 1609 Instructions ................................................ 146
Conclusion: The Directors’ model of overseas diplomacy  
in the General Instructions, 1609–50 ................................................................................ 149
Section 3: Commerce, diplomacy, and ideology.................................................................... 149
The Company’s success as providential blessing ........................................................... 150
Section 4: Approaches to diplomacy in the entries on Makassar in  
the particular patriase letters to the High Government 1634–1669 ................................ 154
Section introduction ............................................................................................................... 154
Letters containing politico-diplomatic implications or  
direct advice on diplomatic approach .................................................................................155
9content s
The nature of the Directors’ advice on approach towards  
Makassar in the particular patriase letters ....................................................................... 159
Chapter conclusion ................................................................................................................. 159
4 Culture and Treaty: Leonard Andaya’s model of conflicting  
treaty conceptions and the June 26, 1637 treaty between Sultan  
Alauddin and the Company ........................................................................................ 161
Section 1: Presentation of the June 26, 1637 treaty of peace between  
the Company and Makassar ....................................................................................................... 162
Background and context of June 1637 treaty ................................................................... 162
The nature of the 1637 treaty: Historiographic positions and  
my propositions ....................................................................................................................... 163
Plan of exposition .................................................................................................................... 164
Sources ....................................................................................................................................... 164
Section 2: Perspective in South-Sulawesian thinking on diplomacy  
and treaty: Andaya’s positions and my counter-propositions ........................................... 164
Andaya’s structural approach to overseas treaty making ............................................ 164
Local imprints in the Company–Makassar treaty record .............................................. 165
Andaya on the protection of sovereignty as a “typical 
South Sulawesian feature,” and its imprint on the 1637 treaty .................................... 166
Problems in the analysis .........................................................................................................167
Alauddin’s claim of perceptions of perpetuity as typical of the  
South Sulawesi treaty tradition ............................................................................................ 168
Antagonistic notions of “breach of contract”................................................................... 169
Implications of unnumbered articles.................................................................................. 170
The swearing ritual as an example of local imprint ......................................................... 171
Section conclusion ...................................................................................................................172
Section 3: The significance of communicative performance in  
the treaty negotiations ..................................................................................................................173
Brief chronology of events from June 22–June 26 and their implications .................173
Section propositions ................................................................................................................173
Events of June 22: Determining the sultan’s intentions .................................................174
Events of June 23: The Achenese ambassadors as  
communication link and mediators .....................................................................................174
Morning June 23 .................................................................................................................174
Negotiating for negotiations, June 23 .................................................................................176
Initial negotiations on board the ship, June 23 .................................................................177
Events of June 24: A simple “misunderstanding”? ......................................................... 179
Negotiations of substance, June 24 ................................................................................... 180
Alauddin’s first response, June 24 ....................................................................................... 181
Dutch deliberations and swift response on the ship, June 24 ..................................... 184
Alauddin’s amendments and continued negotiations, June 25 ................................... 184
10
content s
Deliberations and decisions on Alauddin’s amendments on board, June 25 .......... 186
The June 26 negotiations ...................................................................................................... 186
The second negotiations, June 26 ....................................................................................... 188
Conclusion, Section 3 ............................................................................................................. 189
Section 4: Text, meaning, and nature of the June 26 treaty ................................................. 191
Section introduction ................................................................................................................ 191
The typical Company treaty as opposed to the South Sulawesian  
tradition, according to Andaya.............................................................................................. 191
Accommodation as the exception to the rule .................................................................. 192
Andaya on antagonistic interpretative frameworks as the rule .................................. 193
The specific regulations of the treaty ................................................................................. 193
Comments: The nature and form of the treaty ................................................................ 196
The issue of “sovereignty” .....................................................................................................197
Explications and implications of secular, defensive “sovereignty” ............................. 198
Chapter conclusion: Treaty compromise by context and  
meaningful communication, not cultural collision and  
miscommunication ................................................................................................................. 201
5 Policy Discussions and the 1655 Treaty with  
Makassar—A Matter of Trust and Belief ..................................................................203
Section 1: Chapter introduction ................................................................................................ 203
The 1655 context .................................................................................................................... 203
Chapter sections and propositions .................................................................................... 204
Sources ...................................................................................................................................... 205
A comment on the Generale Missiven as a source for  
understanding “overseas diplomatic culture” ................................................................. 206
Section 2: Conflicting assumtions of diplomatic performace 1650-1655 ...................... 206
A brief chronology of diplomatic interaction, 1650–55 ................................................ 206
Makassar as a category 3 territory in the 1650 General Instructions ...................... 208
Implications in the Directors’ advice on Makassar, 1650 ............................................. 210
Section 3: The De Vlaming–Maetsuyker Controversy Concerning  
When to End the War: the shared pragmatic mode of thinking about 
overseas diplomacy, and the assumptions in Maetsuyker’s “ 
soft approach” ................................................................................................................................. 211
Section topic and problem ..................................................................................................... 211
Presentation of the two contestants ................................................................................... 211
Maetsuyker: Career and historiographic evaluation ................................................. 211
De Vlaming van Oudshoorn ..................................................................................................212
Propositions ...............................................................................................................................212
Textual analysis, Maetsuyker’s advocacy for the negotiation  
option in the missive of December 24, 1655 .....................................................................213
On De Vlaming’s excessive use of force as counterproductive  
in particular ............................................................................................................................... 214
11
content s
The basic assumptions in De Vlaming’s argument for  
prolonged war until total victory ......................................................................................... 214
De Vlaming’s cost-benefit argument ..................................................................................215
Maetsuyker on De Vlaming’s cost-benefit argument for war ......................................215
De Vlaming and Maetsuyker on whether to trust the Makassarese ......................... 216
Maetsuyker’s counter-arguments to De Vlaming’s “grand strategy” .........................217
De Vlaming’s grand strategy for Makassar rejected—a matter of 
differing expectations ..............................................................................................................217
Rejecting De Vlaming’s war plan as costly, reckless and likely  
counterproductive—advocating soft diplomacy as an alternative ............................. 218
Opposing De Vlaming’s grand strategy for its lack of  
long-term realism .................................................................................................................... 218
Arguing the lack of realism in the belief in obtaining local allies ................................ 219
Arguing permanent residency and information gathering by  
way of treaty as opposed to war ........................................................................................ 220
The concluding appeal to the Directors ........................................................................... 220
Considerations of context primary to considerations of law ........................................221
The significance of dismantled trust after 1655 and its  
significance in interpreting the 1655 context ...................................................................222
Opposing standpoints within a shared conceptual  
framework—the source of differences in policy preferences .......................................222
Section 4: Analysis of the 1655 treaty as a typical product of  
“soft diplomacy” ............................................................................................................................223
Historiographic positions ......................................................................................................223
Propositions, analysis of the 1655 treaty ...........................................................................224
Textual analysis ........................................................................................................................225
Comments, Preamble .............................................................................................................225
Concessions ..............................................................................................................................226
Article 2, 1655 treaty ..............................................................................................................226
Articles 3 and 4........................................................................................................................227
Article 5 .....................................................................................................................................228
A brief speculation on Hasanuddin’s use of the religious  
argument in articles 2–5 ........................................................................................................228
Prestige and religion as motives in Company diplomacy..............................................229
Articles 6 and 7: Regulating relations with the Portuguese  
and other third parties ...........................................................................................................229
Comments on the regulation of the Makassar–Company  
positions in the multilateral interaction regime set down  
in articles 6 and 7 ................................................................................................................... 230
Securing the Company’s monopoly and Sovereignty by treaty:  
Article 8 ......................................................................................................................................231
The conclusion of the 1655 treaty ........................................................................................231
Chapter conclusion .................................................................................................................232
12
content s
6 The Pragmatic Dynamics of the Batavian Diplomatic Mode—Shifts  
and Fluctuations in the High Government’s Approach towards Makassar  
as Presented in the Generale Missiven, 1656–61 ...................................................... 233
Section 1: Introduction to the chapter topic ...........................................................................233
Contextual considerations and factors ..............................................................................234
Propositions ..............................................................................................................................235
Focus and plan of exposition ................................................................................................236
Comments on the sources ....................................................................................................236
Section 2: The missive of December 4,  
1656—blaming Van der Beeck ...................................................................................................237
The 1656 context—the reversal of positive expectations of Hasanuddin ................237
Textual an alysis, Makassar in the missive of December 4, 1656 ...............................237
Comments .................................................................................................................................238
Summing up positions and their implications in the missive of  
December 4, 1656 ...................................................................................................................239
Section 3: The missive of December 17, 1657—full explication of  
an offensive policy towards Makassar .....................................................................................239
Context.......................................................................................................................................239
Makassar in the missive of December 17, 1657 .............................................................. 240
Textual analysis, missive of December 17, 1657: Validating  
Hasanuddin’s hostile intentions and deceitfulness ....................................................... 240
Comment: The emotional aspect of the turn from trust to distrust............................241
Explaining the probability of Makassarese plans for war  
and conspiracy against the Company ................................................................................242
The commercial conspiracy, already at work ...................................................................242
The explanation of the post-1655 strategy .......................................................................243
Arguing the case for war by referring to the deceitful  
nature of Hasanuddin and the Makassarese ....................................................................243
The presentation of Hasanuddin as an unreliable partner  
in treaty making ...................................................................................................................... 244
Assurance of the commitment to fend off a Makassarese attack on  
Ambon and Banda .................................................................................................................. 244
A return to, and turnaround of, the 1655 cost-benefit arguments  
about war ..................................................................................................................................245
Comment ...................................................................................................................................245
The argument concerning the excessive costs of war countered .............................. 246
Reassuring that the security of Ambon and Banda is not jeopardised  
and arguing the soundness of the war plan ..................................................................... 246
Inscribing Makassarese deceit towards the Company as structurally  
embedded .................................................................................................................................247
The cultural-religious argument ..........................................................................................247
13
content s
Comments ................................................................................................................................ 248
Summing up the break with the 1655 assumptions and positions in  
the Generale Missiven of December 1656 and 1657 .................................................... 248
Section 4: The missive of December 14, 1658 .......................................................................249
Context and focus ...................................................................................................................249
The fear of a Makassar–Mataram alliance, and the implications for  
the Spice Islands ..................................................................................................................... 250
Deliberating on the nature of religion in Makassar’s expansion efforts ................... 250
Comment ....................................................................................................................................251
The High Government’s change of view on the mix and hierarchy  
among the pursuits of power, prestige, and profit ..........................................................252
Concluding the analysis of the December 14, 1658 letter:  
The difference of tone in the 1657 and 1658 letters .......................................................253
Shared characteristics of the 1656, 1657, and 1658 missiven  
in contrast to that of 1655 .....................................................................................................253
Section 5: The December 16, 1659 missive: Reporting on  
Negotiations with Low Expectations ....................................................................................... 254
The primacy of contextual considerations ....................................................................... 254
The chronology of the Basting mission ............................................................................. 254
Textual analysis ........................................................................................................................255
Section 6: The December 16, 1660 missive ............................................................................256
Brief diplomatic chronology, January–December 1660 .................................................257
The Bugis rebellion, 1660 ......................................................................................................258
Topics and issues in the missive December 16, 1660 ....................................................258
The contextual imprint in the December 16, 1660 missive  
on Makassar—and the slide from realism towards cynicism ......................................259
Textual analyses, the December 16, 1660 missive on Makassar:  
Defending the decision to go to war ................................................................................. 260
Advocating the grand strategy ........................................................................................... 260
Comment ....................................................................................................................................261
Policy preferences fluctuating as to information about context ..................................261
Comment ...................................................................................................................................262
Bending treaty agreements on Fort Panakkukang in the hope of  
implementing the grand strategy ........................................................................................262
Comments .................................................................................................................................263
Section 7: The Missiven of January 26 and December 22, 1661:  
The grand strategy in a novel design ....................................................................................... 264
The plans for the post-1660 commercial regime and its political implications ..............264
Comments .................................................................................................................................265
Summing up ............................................................................................................................. 266
Chapter Conclusion ......................................................................................................................267
14
content s
7 Learning to contract, 1: From contractual regulations of interaction towards 
construction of a relational regime 1637–1660 ........................................................269
Section 1: Chapter introduction .................................................................................................269
Topic ...........................................................................................................................................269
Propositions ..............................................................................................................................269
Continuities and breaks in the dynamics of treaty making ..........................................270
Plan of exposition .....................................................................................................................271
Section 2: A recapitulation of the 1637 and 1655 treaties as “soft” treaties ...................271
The 1637 and 1655 treaties: Different, but still two of a kind ........................................272
Section 3: The switch to contractual constructivism:  
The dual nature of the 1660 Treaty ...........................................................................................273
Section introduction: Topic and propositions ...................................................................273
Plan of exposition ....................................................................................................................274
Section 4: Textual analysis of the August 1660 treaty .........................................................274
A treaty to be honoured, make no mistake about it .......................................................274
Reconstructing the political regime: 1—Limiting  
Makassarese claims of sovereignty outside Makassar  
to secure the Company’s interests in the Moluccas (articles 1, 2, and 3) ................275
Comment: Idioms of “sovereignty” in articles 1, 2, and 3 and  
diplomatic mode ......................................................................................................................275
Issue: Ambon, the Spice Islands—banning interference and  
restricting sailing rights (articles 4 and 5).........................................................................276
Comments: A further turn towards treaty formulations in  
the concrete and specific ......................................................................................................277
Securing and protecting the Company’s monopoly in the  
Spice Islands (articles 6 -9) ..................................................................................................277
Comment: constructing a defence for the monopoly by treaty ..................................279
Power politics and the expulsion of the Portuguese (articles 9–12) ..........................279
Articles 9–11: Neutralising the threat from the Portuguese in  
Solor and Timor and making it a general rule ................................................................. 280
Summing up: Restrictions on Makassar’s foreign policy and  
autonomy in the precautions to protect the monopoly ................................................ 280
The expulsion of the Portuguese (article 12) ................................................................... 281
A proposition for a reconfiguration of Makassar–Company  
relations following the expulsion of the Portuguese ...................................................... 281
The blame and shame in damages and debt:  
1—Implications of prestige distribution  
(articles 13–15 and 18) ............................................................................................................282
Article 13 ....................................................................................................................................282
Comment ...................................................................................................................................283
Articles 14 and 15 ....................................................................................................................283
Courting Makassar in distrust: Articles 23–26 ............................................................... 284
Article 25: Evacuation of Fort Panakkukang .....................................................................285
15
content s
Correcting the mistakes of 1655: Regulations on  
runaways and converts (articles 16 and 17) .....................................................................285
A 1660 convert concession ................................................................................................. 286
Article 17 ................................................................................................................................... 286
Chapter conclusion .................................................................................................................287
8 Learning to Make Treaties, Two Treaties of Political Hegemony, 1667-68 .......289
Section 1: Chapter introduction ................................................................................................ 289
Section propositions .............................................................................................................. 289
Plan of exposition ................................................................................................................... 290
Section 2: The outer islands treaties January–June 1667:  
Articulation of bonds of vassalage .......................................................................................... 290
Buton as an exception confirming the rule ....................................................................... 291
Securing political dominance and stability in Buton by  
control over succession .........................................................................................................292
Conclusion: Buton and the other outer islands: Exception and rule ...........................293
The meaning of sequence .................................................................................................... 294
Section 3: Company hegemony in the November 18, 1667 treaty  
with Makassar ............................................................................................................................... 294
Presentation of the November 18 treaty .......................................................................... 294
Contents by categories ..........................................................................................................295
Hegemony in the explicit political regulations of the 1667 treaty:  
Getting rid of the other Europeans .................................................................................... 296
Comment: A moral legitimation of politics ......................................................................297
Comment: form and content in the exclusion articles .................................................. 298
Article 10: The regulations for military backup and security ...................................... 298
The outer security circle: Bima ........................................................................................... 299
Article 16: Buton .....................................................................................................................300
Article 17: Ternate ..................................................................................................................300
Summing up and comments: The articles cutting bonds of  
alliance to the Makassarese and transferring them to the Company ........................ 301
Section 4: Restructuring the political geography of  
South Sulawesi by treaty ............................................................................................................ 302
Article 18: Rewards to the Bugis allies and Makassarese  
recognition of autonomy for Bone and Loeboe ............................................................... 302
Article 19: The punishment of Laijo and Bancala for siding with  
Makassar against the Company ......................................................................................... 302
Article 20: Elaborating territorial rearrangements as legitimate  
by rights of war ....................................................................................................................... 303
Summing up: Transfers of sovereignty and territory ..................................................... 303
Sanctions against local petty states that had sided against  
the Company and its allies ................................................................................................... 304
Configuring the respective polities into a hegemonic system (articles 23–25) ..... 304
16
content s
Article 23: Reconfirming the Company’s political hegemony ..................................... 305
Article 24: Incorporating Makassar’s vassalage position into the  
new local and regional treaty system ................................................................................ 306
Article 25: The hierarchy of hegemony ............................................................................ 306
Summing up: The Company as hegemon by treaty ........................................................307
The language of Big Brother ................................................................................................ 308
Section 5: The 1668 treaty with Tello: Paternalism as the  
cement of loyalty .......................................................................................................................... 308
Hegemony by patrimony ...................................................................................................... 309
Section conclusion: The 1667 and 1668 treaties of hegemony ................................... 310
Chapter conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 310
9 The Pragmatic, Empirical Model of Overseas Diplomacy  
in Cornelis Speelman’s Notitie ..............................................................................................313
Section 1: Chapter introduction ..................................................................................................313
The challenge of preserving the Company’s hegemony by diplomacy ......................313
Section 2: Cornelis Speelman, a brief diplomatic- military biography ............................. 314
The Java Campaign ..................................................................................................................317
The conquest of Banten ......................................................................................................... 319
Preliminary negotiations: The issue of letters of delegation ....................................... 320
The 1684 contract ...................................................................................................................323
The Company as the “Good guy” ........................................................................................324
The other foreigners in general and the English in particular as  
the “Bad guys” ..........................................................................................................................324
Tokens of gratitude .................................................................................................................324
Section 3: Analysis, the Notitie On the Notitie as a source for  
Speelman’s thinking about overseas diplomacy ...................................................................327
Propositions ..............................................................................................................................328
A methodological reminder ..................................................................................................328
Plan of exposition ....................................................................................................................328
The limitations of treaty agreements in upholding the hegemonic regime .............329
Speelman’s account of the Company’s interaction with Makassar  
up to 1666—the relative value of treaty regulations to military sanctions.............. 330
Summary: The limitations of treaties .................................................................................332
On diplomacy’s role in upholding the Company’s hegemony in general ........................332
Bugis–Makassar relations .....................................................................................................333
Implications ..............................................................................................................................334
The importance of acquiring precise information on local conditions as  
the general foundation of the Company’s diplomatic performance .................................334
Considerations with respect to the foe: Karaeng Karunrung .............................................336
On Karunrung’s vices .............................................................................................................336
Karunrung’s virtues .................................................................................................................338
Luring Karunrung over to the Company’s side.................................................................339
17
content s
The young king of Makassar................................................................................................ 340
A shared implication in Speelman’s characterisation of  
Karunrung and the young sultan of Makassar .................................................................342
The king of Tello .......................................................................................................................342
Advice on how to approach the king of Tello ...................................................................343
Summing up: The implications of Speelman’s assessments of  
the Makassarese foes............................................................................................................ 344
A return to the information dimension ..............................................................................345
Three aspects of keeping the alliance with Arung Palakka................................................ 346
Legitimacy by dynastic claims and historical tradition ................................................. 346
Surveying local political power relations ...........................................................................347
The concern over Arung Palakka’s lack of legitimate heirs ......................................... 349
Establishing an agreed succession procedure ..................................................................351
Arung Palakka’s personal charisma and the hazards of going  
public with his religious speculations ................................................................................355
Speelman’s handling of the two obstacles and the diplomatic  
mode of empirical pragmatism ............................................................................................358
Section 4: The personal prowess argument ...........................................................................358
Chapter conclusion .......................................................................................................................359
Thesis Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 361
Bibliography...............................................................................................................369
Primary Printed Sources ..............................................................................................................369
Secondary Literature ....................................................................................................................369

19
Acknowledgements
This book is a revised version of my doctoral thesis submitted to the University 
of Leiden September 2016. I have revised the text with a special focus on some 
of the points and objections that were raised during the promotion, such as the 
role of religion in the politics of Makassar, the role of international law in the 
diplomatic thinking of the Company; and enlargement of the historiographic 
section with a special eye to the treatment of Jurrien van Goor.
The thesis has a long history, beginning with my approaches to Professor 
Leonard Blussé in the spring of 1996. For a number of reasons – some of them 
having to do with health – some of them with teaching commitments – it has 
taken me over fifteen years to complete the work. Over these years, four insti-
tutions have made this possible. First, I would like to thank the Research 
Council of Norway for awarding me a Doctoral grant for the years 1997–2000. 
Second, I would like to thank the Department of History of Leiden University 
and the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) at the University of 
Leiden, where a grant enabled me to stay as a guest researcher from 1997–98.
Returning to Norway, my ability to work was hampered by health problems 
over longer periods. This situation was relieved by the University of Agder’s 
willingness to lighten my teaching load, and this meant that I finally could 
finish the thesis. I would like to thank the University of Agder for that and 
especially the then Dean at the Faculty of Letters at that time, Ole Letnes.
Professor Leonard Blussé, who is something of an institution all by himself, 
has guided me through this work with a mix of scholarly suggestions and fri-
endly scolding. He possesses a unique ability to never miss an opportunity for 
presenting anecdotal digressions, where the digressions, paradoxically, were 
always to the point. If it were not for Professor Blussé, there would have been 
no thesis. And, had there been no Blussé, it would not have been half the fun 
writing it.
20
ack nowledg ement s
Many of the people that I met during my year in Leiden have become good 
friends, and more than they probably know, they have been a great support. So, 
a big thank you and a smile go to Martha Chaiklin, Cynthia Vialle, and Paul 
A. Van Dyke. Lincoln Paine corrected my first English draft, and later proo-
freadings have been conducted by translators from the Portal Publishing House 
of Kristiansand. Thanks go to them too.
A special thank you goes to Editor Lars Aase at the Cappelen 
Damm  Akademisk for helping and facilitating in the process of publishing 
my thesis.
At the beginning of the writing of my thesis, and over the years, I have con-
tacted a lot of people for advice. I have never met a person in this field who has 
not been forthcoming and helpful. All deserve my thanks, but I would like to 
mention two especially, Professor Jurrien van Goor of Utrecht University, who 
perhaps without knowing it, helped me pursue the matter, and Professor John 
E. Wills Jr., who helped get the project back on the right track at a time when it 
might have crashed. I have also over the years been in regular contact with 
Professor Peer Vries, and although we have not discussed my thesis in particu-
lar, our exchanges on global history have influenced my thinking about 
history.
A few words must also be said about Agder University and my colleagues 
there. I am grateful for having had the opportunity to discuss drafts of chapters 
with my colleagues at the History department. Special thanks go to Professor 
May-Brith Ohman Nielsen in this connection for her observant reading and 
to-the-point comments. Professor Ole Riis must also be included in this spe-
cial list. I appreciated his merciless critical enthusiasm! Special thanks go to 
Professor Jonathan Baker, for his encouragement during more than three 
decades.
Finally, I would like to thank my three daughters, Kate, Frida, and Birgitte 
Maaike, first for just being there, second for never asking why I kept on doing 
this and just accepted that my writing about the Dutch and Makassar was a 
basic fact of our family life. And not only that; as the work finally started 
rapidly progressing, they showed genuine enthusiasm for it!
Last but far, far from least: My thanks for supportive understanding go to 
my love, Ruth Wangberg.
Kristiansand, July 2017
21
Summary, English
This thesis explores the nature of VOC diplomacy using the seventeenth cen-
tury interaction between the Company and the sultanate of Makassar on the 
western coast of South Sulawesi as its case.
There has, but for some recent exceptions, been a noticeable trend in the 
historiography of the Company’s diplomacy to consider its diplomatic practice 
as based on dogmatic assumptions either of a legalist or cultural-Eurocentric 
nature. Implicit in both is that the diplomatic interaction between the Company 
and its Asian counterparts was a miscommunication as the meeting of the two 
represented a clash of cultures.
Against these propositions I argue that both the Director’s concerns and the 
determining factor in policy decisions in Batavia were predominantly based on 
contextual considerations. By its very nature such an approach begged for pre-
cise and accurate information about local conditions and affairs.
Working top down I start by arguing that the respective Generale Instructies 
sent from the Heeren XVII from the Republic to the High Government in 
Batavia from 1609 to 1650 either implicitly or openly entailed a message to the 
High Government to gather information about be local customs and condi-
tions and base its conduct of diplomacy on such knowledge. This approach is 
also reflected in the Directors’ particular advice on Makassar.
As for the nature of mutual understanding in the diplomatic interaction bet-
ween the Company and Makassar, the negotiations leading up to, and the for-
mulations in the actual contract text of the first treaty between the two in 1637 
bear witness to that the Company were playing the diplomatic game along 
compatible rules.
Turning to discussions on policy within the High Government itself, a disa-
greement arose between Governor-General Maetsuyker and Superintendent 
Arnold de Vlaming in 1655 on whether to take a hard- or a soft stand towards 
Makassar. That the issue was the subject of discussion in Batavia, and that the 
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arguments from both sides were presented to the Heeren XVII, show that the 
Company’s decision process on diplomacy was flexible and reactive rather 
than dogmatic.
As for dynamics and trends in the High Government’s deliberations on 
Makassar, there is a decisive break after 1655 away from “soft diplomacy.” 
After the conclusion of the 1655 treaty there developed a growing belief that 
a lasting contractual order with Makassar could not be established unless 
accompanied by a complete military victory. A close reading of the sections 
on policy towards Makassar in the Generale Missiven after 1655 reveals how 
Batavian decisions on diplomacy towards Makassar formed a “learning 
process” based on shifting interpretations of the situation and Makassarese 
intentions.
When analysing the texts of the treaty record between the Company and 
Makassar, one is struck by an impression that the Company’s diplomatic 
approach is moving in a direction towards a more constructivist perception of 
“treaty” after 1655. This could be seen as an element in the learning process 
that characterised the High Government’s diplomatic practice towards 
Makassar after the 1655 treaty.
The Bongaya Treaty of 1667 and its follow up contracts in 1668 formed 
parts of a treaty complex that included not only Makassar but the other states 
in South Sulawesi and the outer islands. Taken together these treaties made 
up a system whereby the Company attained a hegemonic position in South 
Sulawesi. When looking at the construction of Company as hegemon by con-
tract it is striking that appeals to principles of international law plays a limi-
ted and very narrowly defined role. On the contrary the primary political 
functions of the contracts were formulated not with references to internatio-
nal law, but in detailed, concrete and specific phrases pointing to the relevant 
issues at hand.
In addition to dealing with the Directors’ reflections on diplomacy and 
Batavian reports on and records of treaty making, as well as discussions within 
the Company on policy, and analyses of the implications of treaty formula-
tions, I have also analysed reflections on policy by ‘the man on the spot’, 
Cornelis Speelman who in his memorie van overgave of 1669 pondered how to 
maintain the hegemonic position created by the Bongaya treaty complex. The 
text not only presents us with an implicit model of overseas diplomacy, but 
Speelman’s explicit statements on his diplomatic exploits during his campaign 
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in Makassar 166-68 also show how Company diplomacy was actually perfor-
med by one of the most able practitioners in the field.
Two factors stand out as general traits of Speelman’s approach towards over-
seas diplomacy. Firstly, he advocates a case study approach. Decisions and 
choice of action must be based on as extensive empirical information as pos-
sible. The other trait is his emphasis on agency and personal diplomacy. 
Speelman’s analysis is primarily focused on local power networks and the per-
sonal relations connecting them, and the tactical options that are left for 
Company influence and control. Personality traits of men who are in, or aspire 
to, power therefore form a prominent part in Speelman’s text.
This personalised approach may be explained by the overall purpose of pre-
empting the rise of foes and keeping the bonds of alliance with old and new 
allies in a political environment built on personal charisma and bonds. This 
emphasis on information gathering and the personalised approach seem to 
conform with the mode of diplomacy practiced by Company diplomacy at 
large.
Targeted gathering of information was consistently stressed in the General 
Instructions by the Gentlemen XVII, it was characteristic of the High 
Government’s deliberations on policy in Batavia, and it marked the conduct of 
diplomacy on site. Awareness of and adaptation to local particularities thus 
formed the basis for the conduct of pragmatic diplomacy. The Company’s 
practice of diplomacy towards Makassar conformed to this empirical and fle-
xible rather than dogmatic Real Politik.
Consequently, this thesis refutes the proposition of a structural miscommu-
nication in the Company’s diplomatic dealings with Asian rulers. Obviously 
there occurred some misunderstandings, but these were not of an insurmoun-
table nature, and generally speaking, there was sufficient understanding to 
make functional communication possible. Contributing to this was the fact 
that Makassar, in the first decades of contact and interaction with the Company, 
was ruled by very able and open-minded men, who showed particular interest 
in things European and a very strong will to innovate.
In conclusion, if in the Company’s diplomatic mode, contextual considera-
tions trumped a dogmatic approach to legal principles, this does not mean that 
it resulted in anarchy. What happened was that a pragmatic approach shaped 
the conceptualisation and the application of international law. On the one 
hand, this led to a constructivist perception of “treaty,” whereby treaties were 
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particularly designed for the specific context to which they were applied. On 
the other hand, appeals to general principles of international law were applied 
in instances where this was considered to best serve the Company’s interests. 
In the final instance, both were based on pragmatic considerations. In this 
pragmatic approach was also an element of dynamism.
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Presenting My Case
Section 1: Chapter Introduction
In 2006, Martine van Ittersum could write “With one or two exceptions, the 
VOC’s ideological and political dimensions have been neglected for a long 
time by both Dutch historians and specialists in the history of South East 
Asia.”1 But for some exceptions,2 Ittersum’s statement still holds true. This the-
sis is one of the exceptions. My topic is the nature of the diplomatic mode of 
the Company and I use the Company’s diplomatic interaction with the sulta-
nate of Makassar in the seventeenth century as my case.
Three points need initial clarifications. First, as for the use of the term 
“diplomacy” in the early modern period two explanatory remarks must be 
made. “Diplomacy” and “diplomatic action” will be used in the present context 
to cover any communication between Company officials and local men of 
power concerning specifics or general aspects of their mutual interaction. In 
short, the use of the term “diplomacy” is closer to “negotiations about practical 
matters in reciprocal affairs” than to “political state interaction” in the modern 
sense.3 Still, since the arrangement of reciprocal affairs must be considered 
“political” as it concerned distribution of power, the term “political interac-
tion” too will be used in this broader meaning of “diplomacy”.
Second, the present thesis is not a work of intellectual history, but rather a history 
of assumptions and perceptions characterising the Company’s diplomatic practice. 
Third, the thesis is a case study, using the politico-diplomatic interaction between 
the port principality of Makassar on the west coast of Sulawesi and the Company in 
the period from their first treaty in 1637 until the treaties in 1667–68, which 
1 Martine J. Van Ittersum, Profit and Principle: Hugo Grotius, Natural Rights Theories and the Rise of 
Dutch Power in the East Indies, 1595–1615 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), xliv.
2 See: Section 2, “A brief Chronology of VOC-Makassar interaction”, below.
3 See for instance Leonard Blussé, Tussen Geveinsde Vrunden en Verklaarde Vijanden (Amsterdam: 
Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 1999).
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effectively made the sultanate a dependency of the Company. The actual case, or 
“object of study,” is neither the Company, nor the sultanate as such, nor their inte-
raction as such, which has already been described.4 It is, rather, the interpretative 
implications of the Company’s diplomatic practice in interaction with Makassar.
My main propositions are that at the outset the Company’s diplomatic mode 
was neither Eurocentric, nor legally dogmatic, nor static, as has been claimed 
time and again in the historiography. To the contrary, I propose that the 
Company’s seventeenth-century diplomatic mode, as demonstrated by the 
interaction with Makassar, was programmatically non-Eurocentric, pragmati-
cally orientated, and dynamic.
Contents and plan of the chapter
After these general introductory notes, I shall proceed by giving a historical 
introduction to the kingdom of Goa-Makassar and a chronology of its diplo-
matic interaction with the Company circa 1637– 68, and then present an over-
view of positions in the historiography of VOC diplomatic interaction. These 
positions and my own propositions will be further elaborated in chapter 2.
Section 2: A brief chronology of VOC–Makassar 
interaction, 1603–68
The twin kingdoms of Goa-Tello
The term “Makassar” is originally an ethnic name, and could thus be applied to 
“where Makassarese” resided, but as a historical term it is applied to the twin 
kingdoms Goa and Tello, situated on the southwestern and southern tip of 
Sulawesi respectively. 5 The two kingdoms are recorded as once being one king-
dom, but split in two by a king dividing his kingdom between two of his sons, 
sometime in the fifteenth century, declaring that they should be twin king-
doms “with two lords, but one people.”6
4 I am thinking of F. W. Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag (Groningen: Wolters, 1922) and Leonard Andaya, 
The Heritage of Arung Palakka: A History of South Sulawesi (Celebes) in the Seventeenth Century 
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981), both to be commented on later.
5 Christian Pelras, The Bugis, Oxford, 1996, 116.
6 Ibid. 114. More accurately the formation of the double monarchy of Goa and Tello can be set to 1560, 
see John Villiers, “Makassar: The Rise and Fall of an East Indonesian Maritime Trading State, 
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There was a working relationship between Tello and Goa up to the second 
half of the 17th century where the ruler of Tello would be adviser or first minis-
ter to the king of Goa. In the Dutch records, this arrangement is reflected in 
that the ruler of Tello is designated as the “elder king” and the karaeng (noble) 
of Goa as “the younger king.”7
While some hold forth that the collaboration between Tello and Goa was a 
harmonious affair,8 others surmise that the unity between Goa and Tello, has 
been overdone, and suggest that it should be seen as a reaction to outside pres-
sure, namely the Company’s encirclement by its trading contacts in places such 
as Taiwan, Java, Solor, Timor, Buton, Moluccas, more than as a result of inter-
nal forces.9 In any case in the 1660s political divisions had definitely developed 
between the then Sultan of Makassar, Hasanuddin and Raja Tello.10 But, be that 
as it may for now, what I want to state is that when I in the following use the 
term “Makassar”, it is the twin kingdoms I am referring to unless otherwise 
indicated.
Actors in the Makassarese political field
The late sixteenth and seventeenth century rulers of Goa and Tello, of particu-
lar interest to us, are, beginning with Goa: Tumamenag ri Gaukanna, the sul-
tan Alauddin (ruled 1593 to 15 June 1639), his son: Tumamenang ri 
Papambatuna, who ruled from 1639 to 5 November 1653, under the names of 
Sultan Malikusaid and Muhammad Said, and his son: Tumamenang ri Ballaq 
Pangkana, who ruled as Sultan Hasanuddin from 1653 to 17 June 1669 when 
he abdicated.
In the same period two important rulers of Tello who also functioned as advi-
sers to the rulers of Goa, were: Karaeng Matoaya who ruled from 1593 to 1623, 
and Karaeng Pattingalloang, who ruled from 1641 to September 15 1654.11 
1512-1669”, in: J. Kathirithamby-Wells & John Villiers (eds.) The Southeast Asian Port and Polity, Rise 
and Demise, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990), 147-148.
7 William Cummings, Making Blood White: Historical Transformations in Early Modern Makassar, 
University of Hawai’I Press, 2002, 112.
8 For instance John Villiers, Kathirithamby-Wells & John Villiers (eds.) 1990, 149.
9 Arend de Roever, De jacht op sandelhout, Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2002, 230.
10 Basset, D.K., “English Trade in Celebes, 1613-1677”, Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal 
Asiatic Society, 31/1 1958, 1-39, 35.
11 All based on: William Cummings, Reign List for the Rulers of Gowa and Talloq, in The Makassar 
annals, KITLV Press: Leiden, 2010, 351-52. 
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Of the three Sultans of Goa mentioned, Sultan Alauddin and Hasanuddin con-
cluded the treaties with the Company that I analyse. Of equal importance, if not 
even more, are the two rulers of Tello mentioned, because they helped form 
policy in their function as advisors to Goa. I shall return to them in my discus-
sion of Makassarese dynamism in section 3 in chapter 2, but suffice it for now to 
point to the fact that both Matoaya and Pattingalloang are considered able poli-
ticians; in the words of Anthony Reid they represented an “extraordinary com-
bination of intellectual eminence and political wisdom.”12 Noorduyn for one, 
praises the sensible and pragmatic mode of Matoaya’s policies.13
Added to this, and I shall return to this in more detail, is that both Matoaya 
and Pattingalloang displayed a preoccupation with all kinds of innovations, 
including European ones. Finally, it should be remarked that although Sultan 
Hasanuddin came to end the tradition of appointing the rulers of Tello as his 
advisor,14 two sons of Pattingalloang, namely Karaeng Karunrung and Karaeng 
Sumana came to play important roles during Hasanuddin’s reign, as propo-
nents of an aggressive and accommodating policy towards the Company 
respectively.15
Internal tensions in South Sulawesi: The Bugis-
Makassar dimension
Political life in South Sulawesi centred on the split between four dominant 
ethnic groups, of which the Bugis and the Makassarese were the most impor-
tant.16 These two groups were also politically dominant, occupying as they did 
the most fertile lands and having access to the most favourable harbour sites.17 
As for historical kingdoms in South Sulawesi, the earliest dated from the tenth 
12 Reid, Anthony, “A great seventeenth century Indonesian family: Matoaya and Pattingalloang of 
Makassar”, Masyarakat Indonesia, 8/1, 1-28, 1981, 3.
13 Noorduyn, Jacobus, Een Achtiende-Eeuwse Kronik van Wadjo – Buginese Historiografie, Proefschrift, 
Universiteit te Leiden, ‘S Gravenhage, 1955, 98, emphasising Matoaya’s sensible politics, as for instance 
as seen in his non- offensive, conciliatory policy towards Bone during the Islam-wars.
14 Reid, 1981, 26. 
15 Boxer, C. R., Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo: A Portuguese Merchant-Adventurer in South East Asia, 
1624-1667, Verhandelingen, KITLV, 52, ‘S-Gravenhage-Martinius Nijhoff, 1967, 30. For Karunrung in 
particular, see section the discussion of Speelman’s considerations of him as friend and foe in chapter 9.
16 Leonard Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, The Hague: Verhandelingen van het Instituut voor 
Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 91, 1981, 9.
17 Ibid.id. 9.
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century.18 By the middle of the sixteenth century, Makassar and the Bugis king-
dom of Bone, situated to the east of Makassar stood out as the two most power-
ful in South Sulawesi.19 A series of wars between Bone and Makassar 
characterized the seventeenth century.20
For reasons that we need not go into here, in 1643 Goa, assisted by the Bugis 
states of Wajo and Soppeng (to the north-east and east in South Sulawesi 
respectively) attacked and defeated the Bugis state of Bone.21 The following 
year, after a period of uncertainty about the political standing of Bone, another 
battle was fought, and this time Bone’s relation to Goa was reduced from one 
of “vassal” to “slave.”22 Bone’s defeat in 1644 marks the beginning of the career 
of the Bone Prince Arung Palakka, who was to take a leading role in a Bugis 
rebellion against Makassar in 1660, and after its defeat join with the Company 
and regain the independence of Bone in the joint Company–Bugis campaign 
of 1666–68.
The nature of politics
Originally, political organisation was based on kinship groups and their off-
shoots, held together by origin myths of shared founding fathers.23 This kins-
hip and sacred logic underlay the process when the original small kinship 
groups came to merge into larger confederacies and larger state units.24 An 
integral part of state integration in the seventeenth century was the conversion 
of Goa to Islam in 1608 and the Islamic wars between 1608 and 1611.
The role of Islam
One consequence of Goa’s victory in the “Islamic wars” was the conversion to 
Islam of the Bugis states of Soppeng (1609), Wajo (1610), and Bone (1611). 
The Islamic wars should be fitted into the struggle for hegemony in South 
Sulawesi where Islam gave Goa extra prestige and power, and at the same time 
18 Ibid.id. 17. 
19 Ibid.id. 28. 
20 Ibid.id. 9.
21 Ibid. 41. 
22 Ibid. 42. 
23 Ibid. 10 ff. 
24 Ibid. 13. 
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created new bonds of equality between the conquered and conqueror.25 It also 
gave Makassar status as an exemplary centre in the Archipelago,26 and proper 
Islamic piety became indivisible from political allegiance to Goa.27
Extra potential power was also added to the converted states in that they 
could align with the Islamic powers in the archipelago as well as with the 
Muslim Ottoman and Mughal empires. For Makassar, there was also a com-
mercial aspect to this, as Goa and the port of Makassar now became a link in 
the trade of spices from the Moluccas, which later was to become the main 
cause for friction and conflict with the Company.
With the conversion to Islam there was also a transformation in the institu-
tions of the polity, as Islamic administrative and judicial institutions replaced 
traditional bodies.28 Also, there was an enhancement in the ideological power 
of the ruler as he was now officially regarded as the religious leader of society 
and polity.29 This acquired religious prestige and the position of the sultan as a 
defender of Islam in the Eastern Archipelago would also become an important 
issue in the conflict with the Company. Before we turn to the interaction with 
the VOC, we should take a brief look at Makassar’s’ expansion and role in the 
region outside South Sulawesi.
The regional dimension
Although some would say Makassar did not develop into an important sea 
power until the 1620s,30 already from the late fifteenth century Makassarese 
had diplomatic interactions with rulers of Mataram, Banjarmassin and Johor, 
as well as with rulers of Melaka and Timor.31
However already in 1580 a regional political settlement was reached bet-
ween Makassar and Ternate where it was recognised that Saleyer should belong 
to the sphere of Makassar, but Buton to the sphere of Ternate.32 This did not 
however preclude a “constant Makassar struggle to establish its supremacy in 
25 Noorduyn, 1955, 98, Cummings, 2002, 32. 
26 Cummings, 2002, 154. 
27 Cummings, 2002, 161. See also: 162 and 163. 
28 Andaya, 1981, 28–35. 
29 Ibid. 35. 
30 De Roever 2002, 230. 
31 Cummings, 2002, 27.
32 Pelras, 1996, 133. 
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Buton”, against the claims of Ternate, and later the Dutch.33 Anthony Reid 
claims that in the following period, under Matoaya’s rulership of Tello and thus 
in his period as first minister of Goa, Makassar was the most important power 
between Java and Luzon, with its hegemony over most of Sulawesi, eastern 
Borneo, Lombok and Sumbawa.34
As it was, in the period of Matoaya, and after him up to the second half of 
the seventeenth century, Makassar led expeditions against Sumbawa in 1617, 
1619, 1621 and 1632, against Lombok in 1624, against Buton in 1624, 1633, 
and 1639, and against Timor in 1640,35 while at the same time keeping close 
ties with Ternate and the Banda.36
At this junction in time Makassar’s role as a regional power, and its role as a 
free haven for trade in spices, cloves and nutmegs from Ambon and Banda, 
which the Company regarded as a break of its monopoly rights, became 
enmeshed.
The Ambonese wars
Asian trade in East-Indonesia after 1625 increasingly became a Makassarese 
activity,37 including Makassarese sailings and trade with cloves in the western 
islands in the Ambonese archipelago, which meant breaches of Company con-
tracts of monopoly.38 In reaction to Company efforts to enforce the monopoly 
the Kapitan Hitu, Kakiali and the Kimelaha of Hoamoal, Johu Luhu, sought 
and obtained support from Makassar against the Company, but lost out during 
the Hituese war of 1641-46.39 Because of its defeat to the Company in a decisive 
sea battle in 1642 hardly any cloves were for sale in the market in Makassar 
after that year, and the Company’s realization of the VOC monopoly should 
thus be reckoned from 1642 rather than from 1656 (i.e., the subjugation of 
Hoamoal, see below) or 1667 (the subjugation of Makassar, see below).40
33 Anthony, Reid, “The Rise of Makassar”, Review of Indonesian and Malaysian affairs, 17, 1983, 117-160, 139. 
34 Reid. 1981, 8. 
35 where it came to have a lasting influence on the north coast, see Hans Hägerdal, Lords of the land, lords 
of the sea: conflict and adaptation in early colonial Timor, 1600-1800 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012), 98. 
36 Pelras, 1996, 139. 
37 Knaap, Gerrit, Kruidnagelen en Christenen: De VOC en de bevolking van Ambon 1656-1696, tweede 
herziende druk, Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2004, 24. 
38 Knaap 2004, 27. 
39 Knaap 2004, 28. 
40 Knaap 2004, 28, referring to Basset, 1958.
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Still illicit trade continued to a degree, which led to the Company extracting 
so-called Hongi services from the local population in Ambon to patrol the sea 
lanes for smuggling. The Hongi services meant the bringing together of several 
smaller vessels, kora-koras, by several villages for this purpose.41 This led to 
local resistance and escalated into the so-called “Great Ambon” (or: 
Hoamoalese) war 1651-56.42 In this war the rebel leader Kimelaha Madjira 
received support from Makassar.43
On 29 July 1655, the rebel stronghold Asahudi was conquered by the 
Dutch.44 When the news of the peace between the Company and Makassar, 
concluded later in 1655, reached Ambon in the beginning of 1656, the Ambon 
war was over.45 As can be seen, the Makassar- Company rivalry formed an 
integral part of this struggle.
Global dimension
If there was a regional dimension to the Company’s conflict with Makassar, 
there certainly was a global dimension as well. The confrontation between the 
Company and the Iberian powers of Portugal and Spain [which were united 
(1580-1640)] in the Moluccas can for instance be interpreted as part of the 
larger conflict over the issue of confession between the Protestant and Catholic 
states in Europe.46 And Makassar was also part of this. One of the factors that 
made it essential for Van Diemen and successors to conquer the Spanish 
Moluccas in the 1640s was the trade in Makassar of cloves from the Spanish 
forts in Tidore and Ternate.47 The maritime rivalry in Europe between England 
and the Republic was also, as we shall see, reflected in their rivalry to obtain 
goodwill in Makassar; on a larger scale one might, as Hägerdal for one indica-
tes, follow Anthony Reid, and view the decline of Southeast Asian states such 
41 “Kora-kora en kruitdamp – De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in oorlog en vrede in Ambon”, in 
Knaap, Gerrit, and Teitler (eds.) De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tussen Oorlog en Diplomatie 
(Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2002), 261.
42 Knaap 2004, 29-30.
43 Knaap 2004, 33.
44 Knaap 2004, 34.
45 with the exception of Buru, where peace was not concluded not until 1658, Knaap, 2004, 34.
46 Knaap, Gerrit :«Kora-kora en kruitdamp – De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in oorlog en vrede 
in Ambon», in Knaap, Gerrit, and Teitler (eds.) 2002, 257-279, 258.
47 Basset, 1958, 18.
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as Makassar in the second half of the seventeenth century as part of a global 
seventeenth century crises.48
Whatever the specifics of either the global or the regional dimension, both 
point to the fact that Makassar in the seventeenth century was a cosmopolitan 
harbour city which was part of both regional and global networks. This also 
meant that an increasing number of “outsiders” both visited and came to settle 
in the city too. I shall now take a closer look at these groups.
The outsiders
William Cummings points to the fact that already before the sixteenth century 
there had been centuries of Makassarese contact with Javanese and Malay tra-
ders.49 Still there is no doubt that the expansion whereby Makassar became a 
maritime power by the middle of the 16th century increased its attraction to and its 
reliance on “outsiders.” One such group of growing importance were the Malays.
The fall of Melaka in 1541 had worked as catalyst for a Malay diaspora to 
Makassar,50 and after the conversion to Islam the role of Malays increased both 
at the court of Makassarese rulers, and in the function as teachers and Mosque 
officials.51 Of other Asian visitors, albeit with a lesser internal influence, one 
could mention Chinese junks from 1619, as well as that there were agents from 
Jambi and Golconda in the city.52 As for Europeans, besides the VOC, mention 
must be made of the EIC which established a trading post in Makassar in 1613, 
the Danish India Company which did the same in 1618, and the French fac-
tory from 1622-1625.53 But above all the Portuguese played an important role, 
and particularly so after the fall of Melaka, when the numbers of stable resi-
dents reached up to 3,000 at the highest, and came to represent a “key figure in 
the life of the Sultanate”,54 An indication of the impact of Portuguese influence 
is that Portuguese was widely spoken at the court of Makassar.55
48 Hägerdal, 2001, 12. Referring to Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450 – 1680, 
vol. 2, Expansion and crisis, 1993. 
49 William Cummings, “The Melaka Malay diaspora in Makassar, c. 1500-1669”, Journal of the Malaysian 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 66 (2): 107-122, 108. 
50 Cummings, 1998, 108, 
51 Cummings, 1998, 111. 
52 Reid, 1981, 10. 
53 Pelras, 1996, 141. 
54 Basset, 1958, 18. 
55 Villiers, in Kathirithamby-Wells & John Villiers (ed.) 1990, 155. 
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I shall return to the role of the Portuguese as agents of dynamism and 
innovation in Makassar in section 3, chapter 2 below, but will introduce the 
general argument here. Christian Pelras has argued that innovation was the 
hallmark of Bugis culture.56 This trait was only broken in the nineteenth 
century with the integration of South Sulawesi in industrial capitalism. As 
will be shown in more detail below, the same features of innovation and 
dynamism may be said to apply to Makassar in the late sixteenth and first 
half of the seventeenth century. This dynamism has (particularly by Reid) 
been ascribed to the international trade and maritime rivalry typical of 
those centuries.57 I shall, as mentioned above return to this phenomenon in 
more detail, when I will also point to criticisms of Reid for overdoing the 
effects of international trade. But it will suffice for now to say that there is a 
tradition of singling out a dynamic streak in Makassarese society at the time 
of its rivalry with the Company.
As for the particularity of the historical context of the Makassar– 
Company interaction in the seventeenth century, five major factors should 
be kept in mind regarding the background and standing of Makassar at the 
coming of the Company: firstly that Makassar already was an international 
entrepôt; secondly that it was connected to the spice trade in the Moluccas; 
thirdly that it was a cornerstone of Islam in the region; fourthly that the 
period of the first half of the seventeenth century was a dynamic one; and 
finally that there was latent tension within the realm connected to its con-
quest and subjugation of the Bugis.
Chronological overview of the seventeenth VOC-
Makassar interaction
The first contact between Makassar and the Company took place in 1603,58 
when Company merchants stationed on Banda sent a request to the then 
Sultan Alauddin asking to be allowed into the realm. Permission was granted 
56 Pelras, 1996, 150. 
57 See vol. 2 of Southeast Asia in the age of commerce, 1450 - 1680, Expansion and crisis. And Reid, 
“Pluralism and Progress in seventeenth-century Makassar”, in: Roger Tol, Kees van Dijk and Greg 
Acciaioli (eds.), Authority and Enterprise among the Peoples of South Sulawesi, Verhandelingen, KITLV 
188, Leiden, KITLV PRESS, 2000, 55-73, 57. 
58 Andaya has 1601 for the stationing of a Dutch factory on the invitation of Sultan Alauddin; Andaya 
1981, 45. 
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on condition that the Dutch would come for trading purposes only and not in 
large numbers. On those conditions, the Dutch were also allowed to establish 
a factory for their commerce.59 The sultan’s emphasis on restricting the 
Company’s activities was grounded in his awareness of the ongoing conflict 
between the Dutch and the Portuguese in Asian waters. He did not want to 
become entangled in this intra-European conflict. As time would show, there 
was no way to avoid this.
The Dutch factory was temporarily closed in 1607, for internal Company 
reasons, but it reopened in 1609. Harassment against Company servants by the 
Portuguese, to which the sultan turned a blind eye, did not make life any more 
pleasant for the personnel of the VOC factory, with the result that it was closed 
again in 1615.60 The Company’s departure was accompanied by dramatic inci-
dents that involved the killing of several Makassarese subjects who resisted 
being taken hostage by the Dutch. This was later avenged by the sultan, who 
ordered the killing of fifteen Company sailors after the hostages, among them 
a member of the sultan’s family, had been returned.61 The incidents of 1615 
demonstrates that even before the Company approached the sultan about a 
treaty in 1637 there had been serious tensions between the Company and 
Makassar that had led to outbreaks of violence on both sides.
The monopoly on nutmeg and cloves as the central 
issue of conflict
The core of the conflict between the Company and Makassar lay in the 
sultanate’s infringement of the monopoly rights that the Company began to 
impose on trade in the Spice Islands.62 At the outset, the Banda Islands posses-
sed a monopoly in production and sales of nutmegs and mace because it was 
the only place the nutmeg tree grew. Ships from all quarters flocked to its road-
stead. But the coming of European buyers, first the Portuguese and the 
Spaniards, and in their wake the English and Dutch, resulted in armed rivalry. 
59 F. W. Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië, vol. 3, Amsterdam: Joost van der Vondel, 1939, 
192–93. 
60 Ibid., 193. 
61 Ibid. 193–94. 
62 I lean on Leonard Blussé and Jaap de Moor, Nederlanders overzee: De eerste vijfig jaar 1600–1650 
(Franeker: Wever, 1983), 110–41. 
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The conquest of the islands in 1621 by Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon 
Coen solved the struggle in favour of the VOC.63 The result was that the Banda 
Islands were made a territorial possession of the Company, who deported the 
original population and repopulated the islands with slaves from Sulawesi 
among other places. The Company organised a system for the production of 
nutmeg and mace by the newly imported population.64 The Banda Islands thus 
became an essential part in the Company’s monopoly regime.
I have already accounted for the Ambonese wars, so suffice it here only to 
repeat that the product was cloves, or kruidnagel. When the Dutch began to 
operate in the area in 1599 they were in competition with the English, whom 
they ultimately bested for control of the clove trade. A Company-controlled 
system of production similar to that used on Banda from the mid- 1620s.65
The point of relevance in our context is that the Company’s monopoly rights 
in the Eastern Archipelago were to become the primary source of conflict bet-
ween the Company and Makassar as the latter became a centre for the smugg-
ling of “illicit”66 nutmeg and cloves, and thereby undermined the Company’s 
monopoly.
The fact that the Portuguese, English, and Danes could snap up smuggled 
cloves and nutmeg in Makassar was a steady provocation to the Company.67 
Heaping insult upon injury, these European competitors of the Dutch also 
assisted the build-up of Makassar’s military power.68 A final provocation was 
Makassarese expansionist aggression against the Company’s declared ally of 
Buton. In response to a Makassarese siege of Buton in 1633, the Company sent 
ships to blockade the roadstead of Makassar in 1634, with the orders to destroy 
all local and Portuguese vessels. The Makassarese had anticipated the attack, 
however, and when the Company ships arrived, all Portuguese and local mer-
chant vessels had already been evacuated.
Unable to move his ships closer to the coast, the commander of the 
Company’s fleet had to watch a fleet of Makassarese war vessels bound for the 
Moluccas escape from the mouth of the river into open waters. In May of the 
63 Ibid. 118–23. 
64 Ibid. 123. 
65 Ibid. 138. See also H. J. de Graaf, De geschiedenis van Ambon en de Zuid-Molukken (Franeker: Wever, 
1977), 77–81.
66 “smuggling” and “illicit” in the eyes of the Company, of course. 
67 Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië, 245–46. 
68 Ibid. 246. 
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same year, the Dutch learned that Buton had fallen to the Makassarese. The 
blockade of Makassar continued until August, when the fleet was ordered to 
return to Batavia. Another expedition sent later the same year met with even 
less success. The situation worsened when in 1635 the Company learned that 
the Butonese had started to act aggressively against the Dutch. A Company 
revenge expedition achieved little else but the exchange of prisoners. Such was 
the situation when in June 1637 Governor-General Anthonio van Diemen, 
having re- established peace and order in Ambon, left for Makassar to make an 
effort to end the conflict with the sultanate.69
The 1637 negotiations and treaty
The rebellion on Ambon had been intensifying since 1634 and in December 
1636 Van Diemen, governor-general since January 1 of that year, set forth with 
an expedition to set matters straight. Having accomplished his mission, he left 
Ambon for Batavia in May the following year, but went via Makassar to see if 
difficulties could be overcome and peace concluded there.70 Negotiations bet-
ween Van Diemen and Sultan Alauddin took place between June 23 and 26, 
and resulted in a treaty of June 26.71 These negotiations and the June 26 treaty 
form the subject of chapter 4. Suffice it for now to say that the agreement was 
a peace treaty, negotiated at a time when both parties were under pressure to 
obtain a positive result.
From the 1637 peace to war, negotiations, and the 
1655 treaty
The smuggling of cloves from Ambon via Makassar continued after 1637, and 
when in 1652 one of the Ambonese rebel leaders, a kimelaha (district leader) 
named Madjira, went to Makassar to seek support there, the Company decided to 
send an embassy to Makassar to discourage the sultan from supporting him.72 
69 Ibid. 245–46. 
70 Ibid. 244–45. 
71 Corpus diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum verzameling van politieke contracten en verdere verdragen 
door de Nederlanders in het Oosten gesloten, van privilegebrieven aan hen verleend, enz., edited by J. E. 
Heeres and F. W. Stapel, 6 vols. (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1907–55), 1.303–306. (Hereafter 
Corpus Diplomaticum.) 
72 Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië, 331. 
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An  expedition under the command of Jacob Hustard arrived at Makassar on 
February 1 only to find that Madjira had already left with thirty well-armed war 
vessels with the permission of the sultan,73 thus leaving Hustard’s mission 
pointless.
After Hustard’s return to Batavia, Arnold de Vlaming van Oudshoorn visited 
Makassar on his return trip from Ambon to Batavia, and tried to persuade the 
sultan to send envoys to Batavia for negotiations. His proposal was rejected, but the 
sultan was willing to give De Vlaming a diplomatic letter for the governor-general. 
The sultan’s letter was of a general nature, just stating that he wanted to live in peace 
with the Company, but on condition that the Company allowed the people of 
Ambon and Ceram to live in peace and to practise their religion freely. As the self-
styled protector of those rights, he also gave notice that he had sent envoys to 
Ambon. Batavia considered the sultan’s declaring himself protector and defender 
of peoples who were (by treaty) under the Company’s protection, nothing less than 
a casus belli. At the meeting of the governor-general and Council on October 21, 
1653, it was decided to declare war on Makassar. We do not need to go into the 
details of the campaign here, but will simply state that fighting started at the end of 
the same year, and the war went on until negotiations for peace took place late in 
1655, which resulted in a new treaty dated December 28 of that year.74
As in 1637, the 1653–55 cycle of war, negotiation, and treaty was rooted in 
the issue over what the Company considered Makassarese infringement on its 
monopoly rights in the Moluccas. What distinguishes the 1655 peace from 
that of 1637 was that the former to a large extent came about under pressure 
from the Company directors in the Netherlands, and that it was accompanied 
by a robust internal discussion between Governor-General Maetsuyker and 
De Vlaming van Oudshoorn, who disagreed with the lenient tactics that were 
applied. This discussion forms the topic of chapter 5.
Tensions 1655–60, and another cycle of war, 
negotiations, and treaty
Not long after the conclusion of the peace in 1655, it became clear that armed 
Makassarese vessels again had taken up sailings to the clove islands. In 
73 Ibid. 331. 
74 Ibid. 331–32. 
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response, Governor-General Joan Maetsuyker sent Willem Basting as envoy to 
Makassar with the message that the sailings must stop or Makassar would once 
again find itself at war with the Company.75 The Makassarese response to this 
was a cluster of counterclaims, one of which was that the Company give up its 
fortifications on Menado (in North Sulawesi) because, among other things, it 
was built on lands under the sultan’s sovereignty.76 On receiving these claims, 
the Company once again declared war. The fleet under command of Van Dam 
and Johan Truytman arrived at the roadstead of Makassar on June 6, and enga-
ged in battle immediately.77 Troops were landed on June 12, and Fort 
Panakkukang was seized. Given that loss, the sultan sent out feelers for nego-
tiations, which resulted in a ceasefire. A Makassarese negotiation delegation 
was then sent to Batavia, and a treaty concluded there on August 19.78 The 
treaty was countersigned in Makassar on December 279 the same year.
Context and treaty making: The Bugis rebellion in 
1660
After the Company’s conquest of Panakkukang in June 1660, 10,000 Bugis, 
among them nobles such as Arung Palakka, were ordered to dig a canal to cut 
the fort off from the mainland. They refused to do so and fled back to their 
homeland on August 7.80 Hasanuddin’s preoccupation with laying siege to the 
Company’s garrison in Panakkukang left the Bugis to reorganise and prepare 
themselves for new attacks by the Makassarese.81 During the fall, the Dutch 
were on the verge of being starved out, but were still hanging on, perhaps 
encouraged by news of the continuing rebellion of the Bugis. However, when a 
Makassarese offensive against the Bugis was finally launched, the rebellion was 
quelled in the beginning of October.82
What is of special relevance to us in this context is that the Bugis rebellion 
took place between the sending of Makassarese delegates to negotiate in 
75 Ibid. 332.
76 Ibid. 332-333. 
77 Ibid. 333. 
78 Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.171–77. 
79 Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.177–79. 
80 Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, 49. 
81 Ibid. 49. 
82 Ibid. 50. 
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Batavia in August and the countersigning of the treaty in Makassar in 
December. With the Bugis rebellion, an opportunity opened for the Company 
to renew the war with Makassar in alliance with the Bugis. But, by the start 
of the rebellion, the Company had already committed itself to negotiations, 
and by the time of the countersigning in Makassar in December, the Bugis 
rebellion had been quelled. Still the option of allying with the Bugis made its 
impact on Batavia’s reflections on policy towards Makassar. The impact on 
policy positions by shifting constellations of contexts forms the topic of 
chapter 6.
New tensions and decision for war, 1660–66
Neither a complete stop the illicit traffic with the Moluccas nor the expulsion 
of the Portuguese as were agreed in the 1660 treaty were met in the years to 
follow. The traffic in the Moluccas continued, and even if some of the lower 
strata of the Portuguese left Makassar, the richer merchants stayed on. The lat-
ter filled an important military function, too, in the construction defence 
works.83 Sultan Hasanuddin confided to the Company’s resident Jan Barra that 
a total expulsion of the Portuguese would lead to the destruction of his realm. 
A new Makassarese grievance against the Company was that Bugis rebels had 
taken refuge in Batavia, including the Bone leader Arung Palakka. To these 
grievances were added several lesser complaints that, together with a number 
of other incidents, led to the Company’s decision to start another war on 
October 5, 1666.
It is important to note that before the final decision for war was taken, seve-
ral attempts were made to negotiate a solution. For instance, on October 25, 
1661, the council decided to let the Makassarese who had been held as hosta-
ges as part of the 1660 peace settlement to return to Makassar.84 When on 
November 23, 1663, a decision was made to delegate Jacob Cau and Abraham 
Verspreet to go to Makassar to try to reach an accommodation, it was made 
with the instructions not to mention the continued presence of the Portuguese. 
The ensuing negotiations, taking place in the beginning of 1664, started off in a 
positive atmosphere, but were hampered by both the issue of the Bone refugees 
83 Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië, 334. 
84 Ibid. 334. 
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in Batavia and the accusation of the sultan that the Company had taken sides 
against him in Ternate and Buton.
What turned the atmosphere from tolerable disagreement into open conflict 
was the incident of the yacht De Leeuwin, which shipwrecked on the island of 
Don Duango on December 24, 1664, with 40 dead and 162 survivors, who 
were brought to Makassar. The Company’s resident in Makassar, Verspreet, 
was prohibited from going to the ship to save the money case.85 Shortly after 
the incident, considerable amounts of Dutch money began to circulate in 
Makassar. A party of fifteen men sent to save the rest of the money were attac-
ked and killed. When Verspreet himself later received threats, he saw no other 
option than to lock up the lodge and leave.86
Yet another attempt to reach a peaceful solution by negotiations was made 
when on November 20, 1665 when Receiver-General Joan van Wesenhagen 
was sent to Makassar. No agreement was reached however. Quite the contrary, 
Wesenhagen considered the mood in Makassar bellicose. He sensed a dedica-
tion to war, encouraged by the English there, and noticed signs of preparations 
for a campaign against the Company’s ally, Ternate. Against the background of 
the threatening situation in the eastern quarters, on October 5 of the following 
year the High Government passed a resolution to prepare an expedition against 
Makassar.87
A final cycle of war and treaty, 1667–68
A fleet under the command of Cornelis Speelman sailed on November 24 and 
arrived at Makassar December 19. War started with the bombardment of 
Makassar city in late December, followed by a landing of troops further south. 
Speelman then sailed for Buton, which was besieged and conquered on January 
3, 1667.88 On January 31, a treaty was concluded with the raja in which an 
annual stipend was accorded in exchange for the extinction of the clove trees 
on the island. This arrangement was to form the pattern for the other outer 
islands.89
85 Ibid. 337. 
86 Ibid. 338. 
87 Ibid. 338. 
88 Ibid. 338–39. 
89 See chapter 8. 
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After the successful attack on Buton it was decided that Arung Palakka 
should go to Bone with his fellow Bugis to prepare a general revolt against 
Makassar,90 while Speelman, as instructed by the High Government, should go 
on to inspect the state of affairs in the eastern quarters.91
Speelman left Buton for the eastern quarters in February 1667 and returned 
to Makassar in June. In the Moluccas, Speelman brought about a peace bet-
ween the sultans of Ternate and Tidore and linked them to the Company as 
their overlord and protector, 92 which was of vital importance for the subsequ-
ent campaign.
War on and in Makassar, June–November 1667
In late June 1667, Speelman returned to Makassar, and from July 1 hostilities in 
Makassar began and lasted until a ceasefire was reached at the end of October. 
The signing of a peace treaty, the Bongaya Treaty took place on November 18.93 
I shall analyse the text of the treaty in detail in chapter 8, so suffice it for now to 
say that in essence the treaty recognised the establishment of an autonomous 
Bugis state under Arung Palakka and effectively put the Company as overlord 
over Makassar, both politically and commercially. The Company’s position was 
further secured by the sultan’s cession of Fort Pandang, which was renamed 
Fort Rotterdam and became the Company’s base in Makassar.94
Securing the peace by war and still more treaties, 
1667–69
The news of the Bongaya treaty was received with celebrations in Batavia. A 
public mass of thanksgiving (dankpredicatie) followed by public celebrations, 
including a 200-gun salute, was held on March 14, 1668.95 Yet Speelman did 
not trust the Makassarese and doubted whether they would live up to the agre-
ement.96 Several nobles, for instance, showed considerable opposition to the 
90 Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië, 339. 
91 Ibid. 339–40. 
92 Ibid. 340, see chapter 8. 
93 Ibid. 341. 
94 Ibid. 345. 
95 Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië, 342-343. 
96 Ibid. 345. 
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Dutch and the treaty, and neither the raja of Tello nor Karaeng Linques, another 
prominent noble of Makassar, had signed it.
Even when Speelman had the raja of Tello and Karaeng Linques sign the 
treaty on March 9 and 31, 1668, respectively,97 opposition continued, and open 
conflict broke out again April 12. Abortive peace talks took place in November 
1668 and February 1669. On April 15, having received reinforcements from 
Batavia, the Company started its attack on Goa. The sultan’s palace was finally 
conquered on June 24. The raja of Tello and Linques then signed a treaty con-
firming the one of March 1668, and on December 20, 1669, peace was finally 
confirmed with great pomp and circumstance in Fort Batavia.98
Section conclusion
The Bongaya Treaty and its aftermath marked a break in the nature of the rela-
tionship between the Company and Makassar. The interaction regime now in 
place was a multilateral, hierarchical one, comprising both Makassar and poli-
ties of the Eastern Archipelago, who were all bound together under the overl-
ordship of the Company.
A characteristic trait of the 1666 campaign, and without doubt the one that won 
the day for the Company, was that it was allied to an internal Makassarese opposi-
tion, namely the Bugis coalition under the leadership of Arung Palakka. Reflecting 
this, the restructuring of power relations on South Sulawesi itself was woven into 
the Bongaya Treaty. This guaranteed Bugis independence from Makassar and 
recognised their homelands as an autonomous realm under Arung Palakka.
Section 3: Approaches to VOC Diplomacy in the 
historiography: General overview
Section introduction
The Dutch East India Company was given the power to sign treaties in the 
charter area. Counting from Heeres and Stapel’s compilations,99 over five hun-
dred treaties were concluded between the Company and Asian princes and 
97 Ibid. 345. 
98 Ibid. 346–49. 
99 Corpus Diplomaticum, vols. 1–3. 
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rulers during the Company’s existence. That makes for an average of about 
twenty treaties a year, although the peak years were in the second half of the 
seventeenth century. It goes without saying that the larger part of this contrac-
tual corpus had been preceded by negotiations. We may thus conclude that 
both negotiating for and concluding treaties for political and commercial inte-
raction was an integral part of the Company’s undertaking in the charter area.
In this section, I shall be looking at approaches to the Company’s diplomatic 
interaction with Asian rulers in the historiography from the nineteenth cen-
tury to the present. The section will be divided into three subsections in which 
I first give an overview of some central positions in the interpretation of the 
nature of VOC diplomacy and the nature of the Company’s interaction with 
local rulers in the charter area. I then place various positions and approaches 
along a historiographic timeline more generally, before I turn to a topical dis-
cussion focusing specifically on propositions about the role accorded to “inter-
national law” in the Company’s overseas treaties.
General types of approaches
My typology of general approaches begins with the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries,100 which is characterised by a mixed narrative of commercial 
and political history, but with a bias towards the latter. C. H. Alexandrowicz’s 
An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies (16th, 17th 
and 18th Centuries)101 represents a second approach. He propagates a position I 
term “the system compatibility approach,” which advocates a principled com-
parability and compatibility between Asian and Western systems of state inte-
raction. G. J. Resink holds a modified but similar position. If I would subsume 
Resink in the system compatibility category, he still deserves further com-
ments because of the function his views occupy in my argument by his insis-
tence on compatibility between Makassar’s and Western institutions of 
100 To name some representative works in this tradition: J. K. J. de Jonge, M. L. van Deventer, et al. De 
Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indie. Verzameling van onuitgegeven stukken uit het Oud-
Koloniaal Archief. (’s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1862–1909), both sources and introductory narratives; 
H. T. Colenbrander, Koloniale Geschiedenis, 3 vols. (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1925–26); F. W. 
Stapel, in collaboration with E. C. Godée Molsbergen and H. Terpstra, Geschiedenis van Nerderlansch 
Indië, 5 vols. (Amsterdam: Joost van den Vondel, 1938–40). 
101 C. H. Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies (16th, 17th 
and 18th Centuries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967). 
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diplomatic interaction. Resink also marks a special case in the historiography 
because of his mixed cultural background. He was born in Yogjakarta, served 
in the colonial administration, and did research on Indonesian legal system 
and diplomatic interaction after independence, when he also opted for 
Indonesian citizenship.102
A selection of his essays, published in 1968 by the Royal Tropical Institute of 
Amsterdam as Indonesia’s History between the Myths points back to his article 
“Between the Myths: From Colonial to National Historiography,”103 which 
appeared in 1952. Writing in the immediate postcolonial period, it is sympto-
matic that the myths he warns against are, on the one hand, an overinflated 
emphasis of the historical importance of Dutch colonial presence in Indonesia, 
while on the other hand he is also critical towards an Indonesian-centred 
chauvinistic approach.104 Of special importance in the context of this thesis is 
his article “The law of Nations in Early Macassar,”105 the propositions of which 
serve well to problematize propositions about non-compatibility. Particularly 
Resink’s discussion of Makassarese diplomatic practice highlights problems in 
assumptions that the Makassarese applied the same set of diplomatic standards 
towards foreigners that they did towards fellow South Sulawesian states. For 
now, however, I shall restrict myself to considering Resink as a special case 
under the compatibility category. I will return to his views on international law 
in Makassar in more detail in my elaboration of positions and propositions in 
chapter 2.
Returning to my list of types of approaches, the third is what I call the “cul-
tural embeddedness approach,” which is represented by Leonard Andaya’s arti-
cle “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,”106 and his book on Arung 
Palakka and seventeenth-century South Sulawesi.107 I have also included a con-
troversy between J. H. O. Paulusz and S. Arasaratnam over the Company’s 
102 Foreword, G. J. Resink, Indonesia’s History between the Myths—Essays in Legal History and Historical 
Theory (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1968), v–vi. 
103 First printed in De Nieuwe Stem 7:6 (June 1952). My references are to the reprint in Resink, Indonesia’s 
History between the Myths. 
104 See the editors’ “Foreword” in Resink, Indonesia’s History between the Myths, vi– vii. 
105 Originally written to be given as a lecture at the Faculty of Law in Makassar, first published in Dutch 
as “Volkenrecht in vroeger Makassar,” Indonesië 6:5 (March 1953): 393–410. I use the English transla-
tion in, Indonesia’s History between the Myths. 
106 Leonard Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions: A Case Study from South Sulawesi,” 
Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 134:2/3 (1978): 275–95. 
107 Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, Verhandelingen KITLV 91, Martinus Nijhof, 1981.
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diplomatic interaction in Ceylon.108 Neither should be regarded as a defined type 
in his own right. Paulusz should be considered as part of the late nineteenth- 
early twentieth-century tradition, whereas Arasaratnam’s argument lies closer to 
Andaya’s. I have chosen to include their controversy because it casts light on the 
positions of Alexandrowicz and his critics as well as the prior historiography.
Jan A. Somers’ Thesis: De VOC als volkenrechtelijke actor,109 and his 
Nederlandsch-Indië, Staatkundige ontwikkelingen binnen een koloniale relatie110 
built upon it, are, as the titles suggest, both preoccupied with the legal relations 
between the Republic (and later the Kingdom) of the Netherlands—and 
Indonesia. Somers is included as a fourth type primarily because he occupies 
an ambivalent position between the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
writers and Alexandrowicz on the one side and his critics such as Leonard 
Andaya on the other side. I have called Somers’ position a “legalist-pragmatic 
approach” because he seems to oscillate between assumptions that the 
Company’s actions were determined by legal considerations even as he stresses 
the built-in need for the Company to act pragmatically given the circumstan-
ces of the overseas context. In Somers’ perspective, the Company’s diplomacy 
stands out as a strange combination of both legalist and pragmatic considera-
tions leading to a mixed or ambiguous form of communication.
I have also included Martine Julia van Ittersum’s work Profit and Principle—
Hugo Grotius, Natural Rights Theories and the Rise of the Dutch Power in the East 
Indies (1595–1615).111 Van Ittersum earns her place in the selection because she 
offers an original interpretation of the nature of the Company’s use of law by 
putting it in a broader historical and political context. Her main proposition is 
that the Company’s legal arguments as articulated by Grotius should not be 
separated from considerations of power. In her view, the legal arguments served 
as little more than instruments of pure power. I have therefore termed her posi-
tion “legal cynicism.” Ittersum’s “legal cynicism” transgresses the restricted legal 
108 Respectively, J. H. O. Paulusz, “The 1638 Westerwolt Treaty in Ceylon: Charges of Dutch Deceit 
Disproved,” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde, 136:2/3 (1980): 321–52, and S. Arasaratnam, 
“J. H. O. Paulusz on the Westerwolt treaty in Ceylon: A Rejoinder,” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en 
Volkenkunde, 138:2/3 (1982): 191–205. 
109 Proefscrift, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, juni 2001.
110 Jan A. Somers, Nederlandsch-Indië, Staatkundige ontwikkelingen binnen een koloniale relatie (Zutphen: 
Walburg Pers, 2005). 
111 See note 1. 
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perspective generally dominant in the historiography on VOC diplomatic rela-
tions and practice, with the notable exception of Andaya and, possibly, Somers.
Having outlined these respective types of approaches to VOC diplomacy, I 
shall now turn to placing them in a broad chronological overview, in which I 
shall also include a section on the approach to and handling of the Company’s 
diplomacy in Jurrien van Goor’s writing on the Company’s diplomacy. When I 
devote a separate section to him it is for two reasons mainly, first because he 
occupies a central position in the historiography, and secondly because I share 
his assumptions and propositions to an extent which makes it necessary to 
make clear what distinguishes my analysis from his.
Section 4: Chronological overview of the 
historiography
Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
historiography
Characteristic of the treatment of the Company’s politico-diplomatic interaction 
and treaty making in the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century historiography 
is that the topic was treated chiefly in a descriptive matter, fitted into a chronolo-
gical narrative. A recurring feature is telling the story of how treaties came into 
being and commenting on their essential terms.112 This tradition could be said to 
have been, and was later attacked for, operating from a Eurocentric point of view.
112 The selection and structuring principle of the source extracts in de Jonge, van Deventer, et al., De Opkomst 
van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indie is for instance both based on the Patriase Instructions, treaties 
and reports from Company servants on site to Patria, all centred on Company relations with specific 
places of interaction. In Colenbrander’s three-volume work, only chapters 5–14 in volume 2 (1925) are 
dedicated to the Company period, where three of the chapters are concerned with local Indonesian his-
tory. Still the chapters that are dedicated to VOC interaction in Indonesia are mainly concentrated on the 
history of political events. Volume 3 of Stapel’s Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië of 1939 is organised 
by narrating a chain of events with an emphasis of political relations all structured by chronological time 
periods in respective places of operation, and thus conforms to the history of political events tradition. 
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The Van Leur break and the economic turn in the post-
World War II historiography
J. C. Van Leur113 represented a reaction to the “Eurocentric bias” in the traditio-
nal historiography, and promoted a shift towards a more Asia- centred 
viewpoint. After Van Leur, non-Eurocentric interpretations of Company–
Asian interaction were further developed and refined. In his De Nederlandse 
Koloniën, Jurrien van Goor, for instance, argued a “post-van Leur approach” 
that, in distinction from both the Eurocentric and Asiacentric approaches, 
focused on the interaction between the two. Van Goor’s approach thus aimed 
at escaping both the pre-Van Leur Eurocentrism as well as avoiding the danger 
of underplaying the role of the VOC inherent in the Asiacentric approach.114 A 
perspective of interaction with a focus on the impact of Asian influences on 
the Dutch Republic was more recently applied in Gommans and Emmer’s Rijk 
aan de rand van de Wereld.115
Another trend characteristic of the period after the Second World War was 
a shift of focus away from political interaction to economic history. So, while 
the changes in perspective starting with Van Leur came to relativize the role of 
the Company, with decolonisation the focus shifted away from narrative poli-
tical-diplomatic history towards a more structural economic history.116
Revisionist comparative perspectives and views on 
the nature of interaction
Still, studies either directly or indirectly concerning the political interaction of 
the Company in the Asian arena came increasingly to be published after the 
1970s, predominantly with a revisionist edge against Eurocentrism. Both 
European significance on a global scale and European modernity in global 
comparative perspectives were played down. Perhaps the most prominent 
exponent of this reorientation is Sanjay Subrahmanyam, who rejected both 
113 J. C. van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History (The 
Hague: Van Hove, 1955), printed posthumously. 
114 Jurrien van Goor, De Nederlandse koloniën: geschiedenis van de Nederlandse expansie, 1600-1975 
(Den Haag: SDU Uitgeverij, 1993) 75. 
115 Piet Emmer and Jos Gommans, Rijk aan de rand van de wereld: de geschiedenis van Nederland overzee 
1600-1800 (Amsterdam: Bakker, 2012), 15. 
116 Van Ittersum, Profit and Principle, xlvi. 
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the contrast between Asian stability and “European dynamism”117 as well the 
relative “modernity” of European actors in Asian waters.118 Anthony Reid’s 
magnum opus on South East Asia in the Age of Commerce119 is a typical exam-
ple of how the dynamism of local Asian societies was upgraded. Another, pos-
sibly less known, example is Claude Guillot’s The Sultanate of Banten.120
Approximately ten years after Guillot, Johan Talens’ presented a bleaker eva-
luation of the dynamism and developmental potential of Banten,121 but still his 
approach was non-Eurocentric by his choice of study-object. Also, it should be 
remarked that although apart from Andaya’s contributions little had been writ-
ten on the theoretical dimension of VOC diplomacy, an exception must be 
made for Talens. In an article of 1993, he accords considerable space to proble-
matizing the commensurability and dynamics of conceptualisations of power 
and kingship by the Dutch and the Bantenese.122 This was an invitation for a 
discussion that has not been followed up.
Belonging to the general revisionism that followed Van Leur, but more radi-
cal in its perspective, was a reinterpretation, if not an outright rejection, of the 
idea of the West’s modernising impact on Asian society. For instance, M. N. 
Pearson could write “nor can one see the early European settlements on the 
Indian coast as introducing positive European notions such as the rule of law 
that providing security for property and persons inevitably attracted mer-
chants from the surrounding Asian-ruled, and so implicitly less lawful, areas. 
Quite the contrary.”123
117 See for instance his “Aspects of State Formation in South India and Southeast Asia, 1500–1650,” Indian 
Economic and Social History Review 23:4 (1986): 364–65, and Merchant Networks in the Early Modern 
World, edited by Sanjay Subrahmanyam (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996), xii. 
118 There was thus no break between the era of the Portuguese (16th century) and the 17th-century 
Company period. The Northwest European companies represented no break in mentality, 
Subrahmanyam - 93 p. 272.
119 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680, vol. 1, The Lands Below the Winds 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990) and Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680, vol. 
2, Expansion and Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). 
120 Claude Guillot, Hasan Muarif Ambary, and Jacques Dumarçay, The Sultanate of Banten (Jakarta: 
Gramedia, 1990). 
121 Johan Talens, Een feodale samenleving in koloniaal vaarwater, Staatsvorming, koloniale expansie en 
economisch onderontwikkeling in Banten, West-Java (1600– 1750) (Hilversum: Verloren, 1999). 
122 J. Talens “Ritual Power; The installation of a king in Banten, West Java, in 1691”, Bijdragen tot de de 
Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde 149, pp. 333-335. 
123 M. N. Pearson, “Merchants and States,” in The Political Economy of Merchant Empires: State Power and 
World Trade 1350–1750, edited by James D. Tracy, 41–116 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 108. 
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As for the nature of interaction and the direction of impact, even an inverse 
constellation to Eurocentric assumptions has been argued, as, for instance, by 
referring to the indigenisation of the European colonial enclaves in the eighte-
enth century: “With their endemic family feuds and institutional splits,” Victor 
Lieberman writes, “the communities of 18th century Batavia and Manila resem-
bled indigenous courts more closely than a concern with formal structures 
might suggest.”124
Still, when looking at the historiography of the European impact as a whole, 
Lieberman finds a pattern in which there is a movement away from a 
Eurocentric approach, passing through a revisionist Asiacentric reaction, and 
back to a renewed emphasis on the European impact.125 Lieberman subscribes 
to the relevance of the latter position with the reminder that “the collapse of 
the archipelagic states is inconceivable without the Dutch.”126
It was not until 1999 that the first initiative to open up the study of VOC 
overseas diplomacy as a new field in its own right was taken. In his Tussen 
Geveinsde Vrunden en Verklaarde Vijanden,127 Leonard Blussé lamented that 
there was as yet no new, invigorating study of the diplomatic interaction bet-
ween Western and Asian powers in the early modern period. To remedy the 
situation, he called for a systematic utilisation of the VOC archives to estab-
lish a “new diplomatic history of overseas diplomacy” on a par with Geoffrey 
Parker’s “new military history.” He pointed out that the VOC tuned its diplo-
matic practice throughout the Asian theatre according to existing local norms 
and rituals, and suggested that researchers should pay fresh attention to 
Heeres’ source publications and give them a closer reading.128 Since Blussé’s 
original plea, a number of developments have occurred indicating that such a 
process was in the making. Among these were the conference held in con-
junction with the quadricentennial jubilee of the VOC in 2002 and the resul-
ting conference publication, De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tussen 
Oorlog en Diplomatie,129 as well contributions in the compilations published 
124 Victor Lieberman, “Local Integration and Eurasian Analogies: Structuring Southeast Asian History,” 
Modern Asian Studies 27:3 (July 1993), 568. 
125 Ibid. 557. 
126 Ibid. 554. 
127 Blussé, Tussen Geveinsde Vrunden, 1. 
128 Ibid. 6. 
129 Held in Den Helder and Leiden 2002, the contributions printed by Nederlandse Organisaties voor 
Wetenschappelilijk Onderzoek, 2002. 
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in honour of Jurrien van Goor and Leonard Blussé in 2004 and 2011, respec-
tively.130 Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that as of today the research pro-
gramme that Blussé called for in 1999 has not fully blossomed. Van Ittersum’s 
proclamation in 2006, seven years after Blussé’s original plea, that “the new 
history of international relations in monsoon Asia still needs to be written”131 
still holds true today.
Regarding for instance general works on the Company or Dutch- Indonesian 
relations published from the second half of the 1990s, such as J. J. P. de Jong’s 
De Waaier van het Fortuin: Van handelscompagnie tot koloniaal imperiu; De 
Nederlanders in Azië en de Indonesische Archipel 1595–1959,132 René Barendse’s, 
The Arabian Seas 1640–1700,133 or Els M. Jacobs, Merchant in Asia: The Trade 
of the Dutch East Company during the Eighteenth Century,134 but for Barendse135 
none accorded any significant treatment to the Company diplomacy.136
In brief, Barendse’s view on the nature of the Company’s overseas diplomacy 
which he treats in chapter 4, “Diplomacy and the State”,137 is that European 
overseas diplomacy in general and the Company’s diplomacy in particular do 
not exclusively nor primarily represent a form of Eurocentric legalism, but 
rather a pragmatic configuration of the Asian societies formed to serve 
European purposes:
The problem is not just that Asian states were perceived through the distorted lenses 
of Roman or common law but that the policy of the Company was justified by a pecu-
liar interpretation of Asian societies138.
The pragmatic configuration Barendse has in mind more particularly, is a lack 
of “constitutional safeguards to liberty”, in other words, “despotism.”139 So, on 
130 Namely Elsbeth Locher-Scholten and Peter Rietbergen, eds., Hof en Handel: Aziatische Vorsten en de 
VOC 1620–1720 (Leiden: KITLV, 2004), and J. Thomas Lindblad and Alicia Schrikker, eds., Het Verre 
Gezicht Politieke en culturele relaties tussen Nederland en Azië, Afrika en Amerika (Franeker: Van 
Wijnen, 2011). 
131 Van Ittersum, Profit and Principle, li. 
132 Sdu Uigervers, Den Haag, 1998. 
133 Leiden: CNWS, 1998. 
134 Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2006. 
135 Chapter 4: “Diplomacy and the State” 
136 “diplomacy” is for instance neither in de Jong’s nor in Jacob’s index. 
137 Barendse 1999, 100-126. 
138 Barendse 1999, 104.
139 Ibid. 105, 108. 
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the one hand Barendse supports the legalist Eurocentric assumption with 
modifications by giving it a constructivist twist by referring to how proposi-
tions about “Asiatic despotism” served to legitimate actual European overseas 
practice. The latter proposition in one sense foreshadows implications of cyni-
cism later brought forward by Van Ittersum.140
So where does that leave us as far as the historical writing on the 
Company’s overseas diplomacy after the middle of the twentieth century is 
concerned? First, there was comparably little of it until after the 1970s, as 
the scene before then was dominated by economic history. The little there 
was on political interaction history was to a large degree dominated by a 
variety of revisionist trends. But, it was not until the end of the millennium 
that pleas for a “new overseas diplomatic history” by their own right began 
to make their mark.
Entering a new millennium: The coming of a “new 
diplomatic history”?
The 1990s saw the publication of a number of case studies such as, Reinout 
Vos’ study on VOC diplomatic interaction on the Malay Peninsula,141 and 
Luc Nagtegaal’s study of the intertwining of the Company’s diplomatic and 
commercial interaction on the north coast of Java.142 Indicative of a rene-
wed interest in the cultural dimension of the Company is the work of 
Femme Gaastra, usually associated with studies of the commercial aspect 
of the Company, who at the end of the 1990s published on sociocultural 
aspects.143
While the plea for a new diplomatic history of the European overseas expan-
sion and global interaction originally came from Leonard Blussé, one person 
who has exhibited a consistent interest in the cultural dimension of the 
140 See below. 
141 Reinout Vos, Gentle Janus, Merchant Prince, The VOC and the Tightrope of Diplomacy in the Malay 
World (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1993). 
142 Lucas Wilhelmus Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch Tiger—The Dutch East Indies Company and the Northeast 
Coast of Java, 1680–1743 (Leiden: KITLV, 1996). 
143 Femme S. Gaastra, “Competition or collaboration? Relations between the Duct East India Company 
and Indian Merchants around 1680,” in Merchant Companies and Trade: Europe and Asia in the Early 
Modern Era, edited by Sushil Chaudhuri and Michel Morineau, 189–201 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
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Company and its diplomatic dealings with local rulers deserves to be brought 
forward, namely Jurrien van Goor.
Jurrien van Goor’s positions on Company diplomacy
An increased interest in and emphasis on the cultural dimension characte-
rised the historiography of the Company from the late seventies. Typical 
topics were Asiatic modes of thinking about power and religion, interperso-
nal relations, ceremony and ritual considered both as form and substance, 
and miscellaneous aspects of the Company’s political and diplomatic prac-
tice in Asia.144
These topics could well be described as typical of the historical writings of 
Jurrien Van Goor too. Born in 1939 and teaching at Groningen and Utrecht 
Universities before he retired in 2004, Van Goor is a prominent figure in the 
writing on Dutch colonial history. If we look at a selection of titles from his 
bibliography: Jan Kompenie as Schoolmaster: Dutch Education in Ceylon 
1690–1795,145 Kooplieden, predikanten en bestuurders oversee: Beeldvorming 
en plaatsbepaling in een andere wereld,146 Trading companies in Asia: 1600–
1830,147 his general history of the Dutch expansion and colonies both in Asia 
and the Americas: De Nederlandse Koloniën; Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse 
expansie 1600–1975,148 the bundle: Indische Avonturen: Opmerkelijke ontmo-
etingen met een andere wereld,149 and Prelude to Colonialism: The Dutch in 
Asia,150 where he compares the early modern and modern Dutch expansion 
and colonialism in Asia, and his 2015 biography of Jan Pieterszoon Coen,151 
144 Peter Rietbergen and Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, “Een dubbel perspectief; Aziatiasche hoven en de 
VOC, ca 1620 – ca 1720”, in Rietbergen and Locher-Scholten (ed.) Hof en Handel, Aziatische vorsten en 
de VOC 1620–1720, (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2004), 5. 
145 1978: Jurrien van Goor, Jan Kompenie as Schoolmaster: Dutch Education in Ceylon 1690–1795, 
(Groningen: Wolters Noordhoff, 1978).
146 Jurrien van Goor, Kooplieden, predikanten en bestuurders oversee: Beeldvorming en plaatsbepaling in 
een andere wereld, (Utrecht: HES Uitgevers, Utrecht, 1982).
147 Jurrien van Goor, Trading companies in Asia: 1600–1830 (Utrecht : HES Uitgevers, 1986). 
148 Jurrien van Goor, De Nederlandse Koloniën; Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse expansie 1600–1975, 
(Bielthoven: Sdu Uitgevers, 1994, 1997).
149 Jurrien van Goor, Indische Avonturen: Opmerkelijke ontmoetingen met een andere wereld, 
Indische  Avonturen: Opmerkelijke ontmoetingen met een andere wereld, (den Haag: Sdu 
Uitgevers, 2000).
150 Jurrien van Goor, Prelude to Colonialism: The Dutch in Asia (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verlooren, 2004).
151 Van Goor, 1982, 12f.
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his preoccupation with the cultural and politico-diplomatic aspects of the 
Company becomes clear.
Positions and plan of the exposition
Van Goor raises the same kind of questions and propositions that I do in my 
theses, namely that the Company occupied a position in the various local 
diplomatic system, that its preferred mode of operation was by accommoda-
tion, unless forced by circumstances or particular interests to act otherwise, 
and that both the local parties and the Company managed to come up with a 
functional understanding of the other party’s concerns and intentions. Here I 
agree fundamentally with Van Goor.
Having pointed to these fundamental agreements, there are also some points 
where I do deviate from Van Goor’s propositions and assumptions. My plan of 
exhibition in this section is that I shall first elaborate and define Van Goor’s 
positions, and then will go on to point out what I say that Van Goor does not 
say, and where I disagree with him.
Van Goor’s positions on the nature of the Company’s 
diplomacy
To clarify Van Goor’s positions on the nature of the Company’s diplomacy one 
may start with his more general positions on the Company historiography. 
While on the one hand he expresses support for Van Leur’s Asia-centric turn,152 
he on the other hand also criticises Van Leur for not going into the problem of 
how the Company acquired its prominent commercial and political position 
in the archipelago.153 His criticism of Van Leur on this point reflects his focus 
on the Company’s politics and diplomacy in his own research. Van Goor’s 
basic assumption is namely that close links between trade and politics were 
built into the Company’s dual nature as merchant and king from the start.154 
The more specific questions that arise from this assumption he lists as, first: If 
the Dutch were assigned a position in the local diplomatic system, what was 
exactly their position? Second: Did the local diplomatic systems in the Charter 
152 Van Goor, 1982, 12f.
153 Van Goor, (1993) 1997, 75.
154 Van Goor, 2004, 27, Van Goor 2015, 522.
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area and the Company’s position in them differ from home? Third: If the local 
systems did differ from the European one, did the Dutch adapt, or was the 
Dutch behavior a product of mixed traditions? The third question also entails 
a fourth one, namely whether both parties understood or misunderstand each 
other;155 in other words van Goor implicitly also raises the problem of 
commensurability.
Van Goor’s position on the Company’s position in the 
overseas diplomatic systems
It is Van Goor’s contention that the Company in the archipelago represented a 
new actor playing in an already established game.156 It thus came to form an 
integral part of the local political system.157 In this game the Company could 
be used as a pawn in the local power struggle.158 But, on the other side, the 
Company was also perceived as an attractive ally by local princes,159 a fact that 
Van Goor among other factors attributes to its reliability as a political part-
ner.160 His general proposition on the Company’s position and interaction with 
local rulers is then that there was cooperation and that an aspect of this coope-
ration was that the Company and local rulers could share ideas of mutual 
profit.161
Accommodation as preferred interaction mode and its 
implications
Variations in the mode of the Company’s interaction varied from withdrawal 
to accommodation to resorting to violence. Complete partnership was rarely 
present (zelden anwezig).162 The specific modes of accommodation depended 
on the respective context or forms of imbalance or asymmetric relations of 
155 Van Goor, 2004, 28.
156 Van Goor, (1993) 1997, 75.
157 Van Goor (ed.), 1986, “Introduction”, 16.
158 Van Goor, 2004, 34.
159 Van Goor, “Seapower, Trade and Stateformation: Pontianak and the Dutch”, in Jurrien van Goor (ed), 
Trading Companies in Asia: 1600–1830, 83f. (Utrecht: HES Uitgevers, 1986). 
160 Van Goor, 2015, 522.
161 Van Goor, (ed.) 1986, 104.
162 Van Goor, (1993) 1997, 84, 91.
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power in which they were applied.163 In accommodation lay then an in-built 
drive to understand what to accommodate to. In other words: An incentive to 
learn about the local ways to be able to handle the various challenges that the 
Company faced, be they commercial transactions, or social and political rela-
tions, was an intrinsic element in the accommodating approach.164 Not unex-
pectedly, this meant that the Company’s diplomatic and local diplomatic 
practice came to take on similar traits.
Comparative aspects and the issue of 
commensurability
Regarding the comparative dimension in the diplomatic interaction between 
the Company and local rulers in Southeast Asia, Van Goor finds resemblances: 
“The regional states shared a number of characteristics of the Kompeni state,”165 
and holds that there was a striking resemblance in the diplomatic mode of 
operation too: “In both diplomatic and ceremonial respects, Batavia behaved 
like any other kingdom in the region”.166
What then of the specificity of the Company’s diplomacy? On commenta-
ting on Coen’s “diplomatic mode”, Van Goor characterises it as based on a 
combination of legal arguments, power politics and sensitivity to local condi-
tions.167 As for the nature of the “International law” in question, he describes it 
elsewhere as being based on natural right theories,168 meaning it was of a crude, 
general practical nature. This position is well illustrated by Van Goor’s depic-
tion of the Company’s mode towards Siam. Here the Company’s success was 
based on “political knowhow and accommodation to the context, without 
involving itself too much in internal developments”.169 There was not an abso-
lute divide between the Company and the local diplomatic actors. Pragmatism 
ruled the day. As stated above, by implication this pragmatism rests on an 
163 Van Goor, (1993) 1997, 91.
164 Van Goor, (1993) 1997, 130.
165 Van Goor, (ed.) 1986, 85.
166 Van Goor, 2004, 25.
167 een combinatie van juridische argumenten, machtspolitiek en gevoel voor de lokal omstandigheden, Van 
Goor, 2015, 175 (in conjunction with treatment on how Coen envisaged the Company should acquire 
monopoly).
168 Van Goor, 2015, 460f, and referring to Van Goor 1982, 66–76, and Van Goor 1986, 23–33.
169 Door politieke handigheid en aanpassing aan de omgeving, zonder zich al te veel in te laten met de interne 
ontwikkelingen Van Goor, 1982, 51.
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assumption of commensurability by Van Goor in that pragmatic accommoda-
tion had to be based on an ability by the Company to understand what they 
had to accommodate to.
Comparisons at the macro-cultural level
Returning to the comparative aspect per se, if we move one step higher up the 
ladder to a more general level of comparisons, we find that Van Goor does not 
comply with the view that there was an absolute divide between the Company 
and local perceptions when it came to cultural models at the macro-cultural 
level. More specifically he rejects the assumption of an absolute divide between 
a European rational- and a mythological Asian world view. Quite contrarily he 
finds parallels as well as contrasts when it comes to integrating mythological 
aspects in Southeast Asia and the Republic, and thus recognises a role for 
“magical” interpretations in both places.170
Having pointed out this relativism in Van Goor’s views, it must also be said 
that he still subscribes to the view that there was a difference between the 
Company’s institutional and the local personalised perception of power and 
interstate relations.171 European and Southeast Asian conceptualisations of 
state-interaction are described as based on international (horizontal) law and 
(vertical) conceptions of hierarchies of rank respectively.172 But Van Goor also 
describes the European diplomatic system on a par with his relativistic view of 
the macro-cultural field in a way to make the contrast to the Southeast Asian 
one as of a relative and not absolute kind. For instance, he makes a point that 
one of the defining qualities of the European system, reciprocity, did not lead 
to equality.173 Thus a kind of hierarchical order is a defining feature of both 
European and Asian interstate systems. He also points to similar comparable 
features regarding the exchange of envoys in Europe and Asia in the sevente-
enth century.174 Furthermore he states that status as motive for diplomatic 
170 Van Goor, 2015, 344.  
171 Van Goor, (1993) 1997, 134. 
172 Van Goor, 2015, 460f, referring to Van Goor 1982, 66–76 and Van Goor (ed.) 1986 23–33.
173 Van Goor, 2004, 28.
174 Van Goor, 2004, 35.
58
chap ter 1
exchange was not confined to Asia.175 Another point of similarity put forward 
is the function and meaning in gift-giving.176
In a similar mode, although on a more general level, Van Goor points out 
that the political culture in the Indonesian archipelago often is characteri-
zed as a culture of shame (een schaamtecultuur),177 by which is meant a 
mentality dominated by concerns of prestige and status. But, says Van Goor, 
one must consider that concerns of and sensitiveness to honor and respect 
for rank and status were strong in seventeenth century Europe too, although 
it was even more so in Asia.178 Batavia for one was ridden by concerns of 
status and pride,179 and Van Goor regards concerns of prestige and status 
generally as central in the Company’s diplomatic practice.180
In our context, the significance of Van Goor’s view that there was a 
degree  of commensurability between the Company’s and local modes of 
diplomacy lies in the implication that there was possibility for meaningful 
communication.
As for Van Goor’s view on the particularity of the Company’s mode of 
diplomacy in a European comparative context, and the form of prestige and 
status constituent of it, he makes and important qualification. He on the one 
hand holds that the VOC constituted an Ancien Regime state.181 But at the 
same time he underlines that its mode of diplomacy was characterized by a 
flexibility stemming from its merchant background which was opposed to 
the inflexible honour-mode of diplomats from the nobility.182
Another word for “flexibility”, is “pragmatism”, and on this as a general 
characterisation and the points of view outlined above I am in full agree-
ment with Van Goor. This leaves us with the question as to on which issues 
we do not agree and the nature of our differences, or put in other words: 
What do I do in my thesis which Van Goor does not do?
175 Van Goor, 2004, 40.
176 Van Goor, 2004, 43.
177 Van Goor 2015, 132.
178 Van Goor 2015. 132.
179 Van Goor, 2015, 468.
180 Van Goor, 2004, 24.
181 Van Goor, (ed.) 1986, 85.
182 Van Goor, 2004, 33. 
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The singularity of my analysis compared to Van 
Goor’s positions
If there is one topic, which admittedly is implicit in Van Goor’s discussions, but 
which I make much more explicit, it is the problem of whether and to which 
degree the Company did understand the diplomatic thinking and practices of 
their local partners and antagonists. Analysing this problem necessitates a 
consistent use of textual analysis of the actual wording in the Company’s diplo-
matic exchanges that separates my analysis from Van Goor’s. My proposition 
of commensurability between the Company and its diplomatic partners is thus 
both more consistently pursued and more explicitly advocated by textual ana-
lysis than is the case in Van Goor’s works.
Another difference is that whereas Van Goor often treats the Company’s 
diplomacy in conjunction with other overarching problems, my primary focus 
is and remains the nature of the Company’s thinking about and practice of 
diplomacy. My “topical case” is Company diplomacy. Viewing it from one his-
torical case, Makassar, made it possible for me to analyse the Company’s diplo-
matic practice from different angles and levels, ranging from the advice from 
Patria to the advice from Company servants in Makassar to Batavia and to do 
so, when needed, at the microlevel. Two additional aspects of choosing 
Makassar as my case stand out.
Firstly, in the interaction between the Company and Makassar, we are faced 
with a case of shift of diplomatic approach in that an initial flexible-pragmatic 
approach of peaceful negotiations was abandoned for a strategy to intervene 
militarily directly in the internal politics of Makassar. The latter option arose 
by the possibility to ally with a local actor, also in conflict with Makassar. In 
Batavia, there was debate over strategy in conjunction with this possibility 
which made it possible for me to get a peep into the Company’s internal debate 
on policy.
Case Makassar: then let me analyse and compare the Company’s diplo-
macy in three distinct approaches: Wooing by negotiations with peaceful 
intent, negotiating and warring with the intent of intervention to restructure 
the political order, and tying bonds with a local ally. These variations in 
contexts make Makassar a perfect match for an in-depth analysis of a set of 
complementary aspects of the nature and dynamics of the Company’s 
diplomacy.
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Second, the already existing historiography on Makassar made it possible 
for me to go in depth into and formulate counterpropositions to theoretical 
assumptions of a structural kind of analysis which I hold to contain structural 
weaknesses. In my explicit discussion on these theoretical problems I do 
something which is not openly set out in Van Goor’s works.183,184,185,186
Bringing it up to date, 2010–14
Bringing this overview up to date, but by no means claiming to present an 
exhaustive list, another person who has made a mark in the recent historio-
graphy on cultural contact and diplomacy is Markus Vink.187 Mention should 
also be made of Blussé’s article, “Peeking into Empires: Dutch Embassies to 
the Courts of China and Japan,”188 the essays gathered in The Dutch Trading 
Companies as Knowledge Networks,189 Adam Clulow’s The Company and the 
Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan,190 and Matthias van 
Rossum’s, Werkers van de Wereld; Globalisering, arbeid en interculturele ont-
motingen tussen Aziatische en Europese zeelieden in dienst van de VOC, 
1600–1800.191 As all these contributions were published between 2010 and 
2014, they may represent an upsurge in the study of the cultural and poli-
tico- diplomatic dimension of the Company.
183 Jurrien van Goor, Jan Kompenie as Schoolmaster: Dutch Education in Ceylon 1690–1795 (Groningen: 
Wolters Noordhoff, 1978).
184 Jurrien van Goor, Kooplieden, predikanten en bestuurders overzee: beeldvorming en plaatsbepaling in 
een andere wereld (Utrecht: HES, 1982).
185 Jurrien Van Goor, Prelude to Colonialism: The Dutch in Asia (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2004).
186 See n. 92, above.
187 See, for instance, Markus P. M. Vink, “Images and Ideologies of Dutch-South Asian Contact: Cross-
Cultural Encounters between the Nayak State of Madurai and the Dutch East India Company in the 
Seventeenth Century,” Itinerario 21:2 (1997): 82–123, and idem, Mission to Madurai: Dutch Embassies 
to the Nayaka Court of Madurai in the Seventeenth Century (New Delhi: Manohar, 2012); and numer-
ous reviews. 
188 Leonard Blussé, “Peeking into Empires: Dutch Embassies to the Courts of China and Japan”, Itinerario 
37:3 (2013), pp 13-29. 
189 Siegfried Huigen, Jan L. de Jong, and Elmer Kolfin, eds., The Dutch Trading Companies as Knowledge 
Networks (Leiden: Brill, 2010). 
190 Adam Clulow, The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2014). 
191 Matthias van Rossum, Werkers van de Wereld; Globalisering, arbeid en interculturele ontmotingen tus-
sen Aziatische en Europese zeelieden in dienst van de VOC, 1600–1800 (Hilversum: Verloren, 2014). 
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Van Meersbergen
Finally, in the finishing stages of my own work, I was made aware of Guido van 
Meersbergen’s PhD thesis Ethnography and Encounter: Dutch and English 
Approaches to Cross-Cultural Contact in Seventeenth-Century South Asia.192
Although Van Meersbergen’s work and mine clearly overlap as far as topic 
and issue are concerned, there are also some differences. Van Meersbergen 
presents his analysis of the VOC and EIC documentation as focused on “what 
it reveals about perceptions of Others, categories of human difference, and 
approaches to cross-cultural interaction.”193 Thus Van Meersbergen may be 
more focused on ethnographic assumptions “shaping worldviews” in the gene-
ral, while I focus more specifically on assumptions in the Company’s diploma-
tic interaction. In brief, I may tend to put more emphasis on the context of 
diplomatic interaction whereas Van Meersbergen puts emphasis on cultural 
tradition.
I shall briefly state some points that follow from this difference. First, I hold 
that the Company was not acting on an overarching theory or general assump-
tions of cross-cultural interaction; it primarily relied on casuistic reflections 
and advice. The whole issue of diplomacy was approached practically and 
pragmatically. This is to say—and this may be the main difference between 
Van Meersbergen’s thesis and my own— that I am not convinced that VOC 
personnel brought a set of cultural meta-conceptualisations with them over-
seas that were then used uncritically as a grid through which all their observa-
tions and reflections were processed. The Company’s servants were perfectly 
aware that they were in foreign lands and adopted ways of reflection to adapt 
to that fact.
Second, as for modes of adaptation, Company servants could draw on the 
Portuguese cross-cultural experience, from which they could pick and choose, 
to model their behaviour as outsiders. Third, and this is the view that I shall 
particularly be pursuing in the following, the Company’s overseas experience 
was by itself a learning process by which the Company came up with different 
responses and adjusted them to the overseas challenges.
192 Guido van Meersbergen, Ethnography and Encounter: Dutch and English Approaches to Cross-Cultural 
Contact in Seventeenth-Century South Asia (PhD diss., University College London, 2014). 
193 Ibid. “Abstract,” 5. 
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The present thesis is meant as a contribution to a “new history” of overseas 
early modern diplomacy, by presenting a case study in the Company’s sevente-
enth-century overseas diplomatic practice. In particular, I intend to clarify the 
restricted role of international law, the specific meaning and function of the 
overseas diplomatic treaty, and the rules guiding negotiations for regimes of 
interaction in the Company’s diplomacy.
My reasons for undertaking this project are that I think that the nature and 
dynamics of the Company’s diplomatic practice have been misunderstood or 
distorted. Too much emphasis has been placed on law, too little on the practi-
cal dimensions of diplomacy and negotiations. Before elaborating on my own 
positions on these points,194 I first need to go more into detail regarding the 
historiography on the above issues.
Section 5: Positions on and propositions about law 
and treaty
Nobody denies that exchange of envoys and letters as well as conclusion of 
agreements between rulers took place in both early modern Southeast Asia 
and Europe. Opinion is split, however, as to whether these diplomatic activities 
meant the same in Asia as in Europe and also whether transcultural diplomacy 
in early modern Asia represented a clash of political cultures or an interaction 
between compatible systems.
As these issues go directly to the heart of my thesis, I shall dedicate the rest 
of this chapter to clarifying a variety of positions and propositions on the 
understanding and meaning of “international law” and “treaty” and assump-
tions about compatibility and incompatibility among Asian and European sys-
tems of state interaction. I shall pick my examples from the selection of works 
already mentioned, starting with the “classical” historiography of the ninete-
enth and early twentieth centuries, then turn to C. H. Alexandrowicz’s propo-
sitions.195 I then go on to clarify Leonard Andaya’s refutations of positions in 
the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century historiography, in the general as 
well as his attacks on Alexandrowicz’s assumptions in particular.196
194 See section 4, chapter 2, 108-113, for elaboration.
195 Alexandrowicz, C.H., An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies, (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1967) 
196 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” and The Heritage of Arung Palakka, respectively.
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To accentuate the issues raised by Andaya I shall also include the contro-
versy between Paulusz and Arasaratnam over the Company’s diplomatic inte-
raction in Ceylon,197 because it illuminates the positions of Alexandrowicz and 
Andaya. I conclude with the positions of Somers and Van Ittersum before 
rounding off with a summary comparison of the respective positions.
The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
The historiography of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did not 
understate the fact that there was a difference between the diplomatic habits 
and traditions of the Company and its Asian counterparts, and that this must 
be taken into consideration when analysing the nature of their interactions. 
Heeres, for one, elaborated on the implications of the overseas setting for the 
mode of the Company’s performance in the following manner:
Through the behaviour of its sons in the Orient the Dutch national character has mani-
fested itself in all manners, good and bad, but above all in a specific accentuation exa-
cerbated by the environment in which it interacted, exacerbated by the antagonism 
between white and black, Christian and non-Christian, European and Asian.198
Another characteristic trait of nineteenth- and early twentieth- century histo-
riography is its preoccupation with the Company’s politico- diplomatic and 
military actions.199 As for the nature of communication with the Company’s 
local partners, it was assumed that however unfamiliar the treaty terms were to 
them, they were still, in principle, intelligible.200 The latter view was not only 
held, but accentuated as a basic assumption in C. H. Alexandrowicz’s 1967 book.
Alexandrowicz’s work remains a classic study in seventeenth- and eighte-
enth-century international law and the nature of the diplomatic interaction 
between Europeans and Asians in Asia. Compared to the nineteenth- and 
197 Paulusz, “The 1638 Westerwolt Treaty in Ceylon,” and Arasaratnam, “J. H. O. Paulusz on the Westerwolt 
treaty in Ceylon: A Rejoinder.” 
198 “Het Nederlandsche volkskarakter heeft zich in de daden van Neerlands zonen in het Oosten vertoond 
in al zijn uitingen, in al zijn kanten; goede en slechte. … Maar vooral in zeer bijzondere accentuatie, 
verscherpt door het milieu, waarin het daar optrad, verscherpt in de eerste plaats door de tegenstelling 
van blank en bruin, van Christen en niet-Christen, van Europeaan en Aziaat.” Corpus Diplomaticum, 
2. xvi–xii. 
199 The selection of sources and comments in de Jonge, van Deventer, et al., De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch 
gezag in Oost-Indie and, Stapel’s focus in Geschiedenis van Indië, may serve as exemplary cases. 
200 See the discussion on Andaya’s views on this below. 
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early twentieth-century tradition, Alexandrowicz distinguished himself by his 
principled insistence on an essential similarity, and thus compatibility, bet-
ween the thinking and practise of early modern international law in Asia and 
the West. He starts by admitting that initially there were differences in the 
Asian and Western systems of politico-diplomatic interaction, which origina-
ted in different conceptualisations of the nature of treaty making. For instance, 
the Asian systems and approaches were originally characterised by a “perso-
nal” approach, while those of the West by an “institutional” one.201 However, 
increased contact and treaty making possessed an inherent “law- promoting 
character,”202 so that in the long run, a “depersonalisation” of the Asian concep-
tualisation towards an institutionalised interpretation took place.203 In other 
words, for Alexandrowicz, interaction was a dynamic process by which Asian 
accommodation to Western conceptualisations made their approaches increas-
ingly similar.
A consequence of this was that up to the nineteenth century, the treaties 
between the Europeans and Asian rulers were basically concluded on an equal 
basis.204 It was against these propositions of compatibility and symmetry that 
Leonard Andaya came to launch his attack on what he considered to be 
Eurocentric misconceptions of Asian treaty making and diplomacy.
Andaya versus Alexandrowicz
In his 1978 article, Andaya declared his intention to “provide a fair and balan-
ced analysis of treaty relationships between Europe and non- European states 
prior to the 19th century.”205 In diametrical opposition to Alexandrowicz, his 
main proposition was that European international law is irrelevant to under-
standing the nature of Europe–Asia treaty making before the nineteenth cen-
tury. Rejecting Alexandrowicz’s proposition of a “similarity of ideas of interstate 
relations and a mutual adaptation of legal concepts”206 between the Europeans 
201 Alexandrowicz, Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies, 169. 
202 Ibid. p. 176. For his views on the dynamics and development of politico-diplomatic relations between 
European and Asian rulers, see p. 203–204. 
203 Ibid. 231. 
204 Ibid. 224.
205 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 292. 
206 Ibid. 276–77, quoting Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East 
Indies. 
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and their Asian treaty partners, Andaya argued the opposite position, namely 
that treaty making between Europeans and Asians from the seventeenth to 
nineteenth centuries represented a cultural collision because Asian conceptua-
lisations were incommensurable with the European ones: “treaties between the 
Company and a South Sulawesi state were characterised by conflicting expec-
tations, leading to frustration, then mutual recriminations, and finally war.”207 
A similar clash of positions can be found in an exchange between J. H. O. 
Paulusz and S. Arasaratnam.
The Paulusz–Arasaratnam exchange on the 
Westerwolt Treaty
In his 1980 article, “The 1638 Westerwolt Treaty in Ceylon: Charges of Dutch 
Deceit Disproved,” Paulusz set out to clear the Company of charges of foul play 
in its conflict with the king of Kandy, Raja Singha, in the aftermath of the con-
clusion of the Westerwolt Treaty of 1638. Attacking views put forward by 
Arasaratnam and Goonewardena that the Company was consciously mislead-
ing the king, Paulusz holds that such charges are unfounded, and in fact should 
be reversed. While the Dutch had been “firmly upholding the basic terms of 
the contract against the king,” the king himself had, for instance, been clai-
ming, misleadingly, that he was the “emperor” of the whole of Ceylon.208 When 
the Dutch had been lured to support Raja Singha on such false pretenses, the 
king on his side had proven unable to live up to his promises of military sup-
port to the Company. Neither had he honoured obligations of cinnamon deli-
veries stated in their treaty.209
As a matter of fact, Raja Singha had been in breach of the treaty from the 
very outset as he had presented his motive for entering into an alliance with 
the Company as originating in their common goal of expelling the Portuguese 
from Ceylon.210 Yet, Singha also had another motive that he kept hidden from 
the Dutch, namely to seek support against a personal rival, Vijayapala.211
207 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 291. 
208 Paulusz, “The 1638 Westerwolt Treaty in Ceylon,” 321. 
209 Ibid. 321. 
210 Ibid. 323. 
211 Ibid. 325. 
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As for the treaty concluded after the fall of the Portuguese fort in Batticaloa 
on May 18, the king was given a draft of the treaty text which he spent a couple 
of days deliberating over with his advisors212 before finally signing it on May 
23. The treaty was thus, claims Paulusz, “not a treaty imposed by a victorious 
general on a defeated enemy, but a Contract willingly sealed between brothers-
in-arms.”213 For Paulusz, then, any notions of deceit and fraud by the Company 
are wrong because the treaty was entered into voluntarily by the Ceylonese, 
who were given time to consider its contents.214 For Paulusz, arguing from 
assumptions on a par with Alexandrowicz’s , the Westerwolt Treaty was a sym-
metrical treaty built on universal terms of international law understandable to 
both the Ceylonese and the Company. If there was deceit involved, it came 
from the Ceylonese.
Arasaratnam came to disagree on all counts, and intensely so. Starting by 
referring to the unanimous opinion in the historiography that the Dutch 
“behaved with duplicity,”215 he goes on to claim that Paulusz’s arguments were 
“erroneous in the extreme.”216 Paulusz produced no new evidence to support 
his case, his interpretations of the existing evidence were unacceptable, and he 
revealed an inadequate knowledge of the issues and background of the 
period.217
Arasaratnam calls Paulusz’s interpretation of Singha’s claim to be emperor of 
all of Ceylon fraudulent and an example of Paulusz’s “ignorance of the philo-
sophy and practice of state power in the island of Ceylon.”218 The claim of uni-
versal kingship was “ingrained in Sinhalese kingship” as such.219 Arasaratnam 
also rejects Paulusz’s proposition about Vijayapala, who, he notes, had nothing 
to do with the attack on Batticaloa.220 In other words, according to Arasaratnam 
there was no duplicity involved from Singha here either. After going through 
and rejecting Paulusz’s reading and interpretation of the meanings and 
212 Ibid. 325
213 Ibid. 325
214 Implying that they were thought to be able to comprehend its contents.
215 Arasaratnam, “J. H. O. Paulusz on the Westerwolt Treaty in Ceylon: A Rejoinder,” 191–92.
216 Ibid. 193.
217 Ibid. 193.
218 Ibid. 193.
219 Ibid. 193.
220 Ibid. 194–95.
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intentions in the 1638 treaty point by point, Arasaratnam rounds out his criti-
cism with an appeal for a revisionist, non-Eurocentric colonial history.
Prior historiography he divides into three phases, starting with the writings 
of the original Company administrators, which were taken over by the profes-
sional historians of the colonial era. Both these periods shared the colonizer’s 
perspective, but the latter singled itself out by working professionally with 
colonial sources.221 Arasaratnam calls the third stage, which he dates from the 
1950s, a revolutionary period, because it inaugurated a reaction to the previ-
ous Eurocentrism, a reaction based on a new consensus in that it was “no lon-
ger adequate to write the history of Europe’s expansion in Asia solely as an 
extension of European history.”222 Crucial for this reorientation and pro-
gramme to avoid the pitfalls of the colonial sources, was to apply a more criti-
cal methodology. Paulusz, in Arasaratnam’s eyes, fails to meet this essential 
requirement on all counts.223
I shall not be taking a stand on the Paulusz–Arasaratnam exchange here. 
Their respective positions in the debate primarily go to illustrate two points 
that are particularly relevant to my case. First, Paulusz’s approach generally 
aligns with the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century positions of Company 
observance of international law and treaties, while Arasaratnam’s criticisms 
generally is in accord with Leonard Andaya’s anti-Eurocentric approach. 
Second, when Arasaratnam’s criticizes Paulusz for failing to see the Sinhalese 
tradition and thinking on kingship in their own terms, the implicit assumption 
is that the Dutch not only brought their own standards overseas, but that they 
also operated from them without any effort to try to understand local tradi-
tions. This is an assumption close to Andaya’s radical proposition of Eurocentric 
tunnel vision. One scholar who seems to try to balance these two positions in 
a moderate proposition is Jan A. Somers.
Somers
In this section, I address Jan A. Somers’ positions on VOC diplomacy as put 
forward in his Thesis: De VOC als Volkenrechtelijke actor of 2001, and his book 
partly built on it: Nederlandsch-Indië – Staatkundige ontwikkelingen binnen een 
221 Ibid. 202–203.
222 Ibid. 203.
223 Ibid. 203.
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koloniale relatie of 2005224. The main difference between the two is that while 
Somers presents the whole history of Dutch diplomatic interaction in Indonesia 
from the Company era up to Indonesian [what?] in the latter work, his Thesis 
is restricted to the Company period. Regarding the coverage of the Company 
period, in both works he uses Banten, Mataram, Ceylon and the Moluccas as 
his cases.
I shall briefly point to Somers’ positions regarding international law and the 
conceptualisation of treaties in the Company period as they are depicted in 
both works. In general, I hold that Somers represents a view of the Company’s 
diplomacy as pragmatic, although his view on this may be said to be more 
explicitly voiced in the 2001 Thesis than in the 2005 book. It should also be 
said, that although I endorse his views on the nature of VOC diplomacy, 
Somers is more preoccupied with the formally legal aspect of the interaction 
than with the actual practice of diplomacy, as for instance in negotiations, than 
I am. I shall treat the two works in chronological order.
Somers 2001
The volkenrechtelijke actor comprises twelve chapters in all. Chapters 1-7 deal 
with the conceptual framework and the historical background of the VOC up 
to the establishment of Batavia in 1619. In chapters 8-11 VOC diplomatic inte-
raction with Banten and Mataram, the Moluccas, Ceylon and Cape the good 
hope, are analysed as cases of Company diplomatic interaction from the per-
spective of international law. In the final chapter, chapter 12, the conclusions 
are summed up chronologically.
Somers’ focus is primarily on the way the Company saw itself as a diploma-
tic actor in various and changing contexts. Concerning the Banten case, 
Somers for instance distinguishes between two separate phases, namely the 
period between the establishment of Batavia in 1619, and the period after 
Banten’s submission to the Company in 1684. In the period up to 1684 the 
Company viewed its contracts with Banten as concluded between the 
224 Somers, Jan A., De VOC as volkenrechtelijke actor, Proefschrift Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Juni 
2001, and Nederlandsch-Indië – Staatkundige ontwikkelingen binnen een koloniale relatie, Zutphen: 
Walburg Pers, 2005). From now on: Somers, volkenrechtelijke actor, 2001, and Somers, Nederlandsch 
Indië, 2005, respectively.
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governor-general as representing the Company, whereas after 1684 the 
governor-general acted as representing the States–General and the Prince225.
Mataram proves a contrary case to Banten, in that the Company never acted 
in the name of the States-General towards it, as it did towards Banten. Somers 
attributes this difference in approach to a difference in context and challenge. 
The need to keep European rivals out, i.e. the English from Banten, made 
stronger formal bonds necessary than in relations with Mataram, where no 
such external threats existed.226
Regarding the Ceylon case, the Company acted as instrument of the States-
General in its contracts with the kingdom of Kandy, and again this is explained 
by the presence of a European rival, in this case the Portuguese.227 The Moluccas 
represented a special case compared to the three above because of the frag-
mented and weaker political structure dominating there, but as in the case of 
Banten and Ceylon, there were European rivals to be taken into account, 
namely the Spanish and Portuguese as well as the English.228 In the Moluccas 
the Company originally acted as an instrument of war on behalf of the States-
General. But from 1651, with the signing of contracts of submission and the 
end of war with Spain from the second half of the 17th century, the Company 
should no longer be considered as an actor in international law in the area229. 
Cape the good hope is included in Somers’ sample as a case of res nullius, 
and thus falls outside international law from the beginning. The Company per-
sonnel there acted solely as administrators on behalf of Batavia.230
The résumé of Somers’ sample of cases above has been given to illustrate two 
general traits about his approach: Firstly, that his preoccupation lies with for-
mal legal aspects of the Company’s diplomacy, and secondly the formal legal 
interaction is considered in historical context. What is particularly relevant to 
my own topic in this connection is Somers’ evaluation of the Company’s 
assumptions and mode in its diplomatic dealings.
225 Somers, volkenrechtelijke actor 2001, 244.
226 Somers, volkenrechtelijke actor 2001, 245.
227 Somers, volkenrechtelijke actor 2001, 245.
228 Somers, volkenrechtelijke actor 2001, 246.
229 Somers, volkenrechtelijke actor 2001, 246.
230 Somers, volkenrechtelijke actor 2001, 247.
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On the Company’s assumptions and mode in its 
diplomatic dealings VOC mode
It is basic for Somers that in the Company’s diplomatic world de facto power 
held primacy over formalities of contract. This came from the fact that the 
diplomatic challenges that the Company was confronted with in Asia were 
never foreseen in 1602. The Company’s diplomatic mode developed sui gene-
ris.231 Also, as for the Company’s view on the function of contracts, Somers 
stresses that the Company hardly paid attention to the aspects of international 
law in the treaties: De Compagnie had meestal geen behoefte aan formeele vol-
kenrechtssubbjectiviteit; de inheemse vorsten werden echter gefronteerd met, ver-
gezeld van gangbare rituelen.232 It was this pragmatic view that made the 
Company able to navigate flexibly among the various customs of the respective 
courts it was dealing with.233
Somers 2005
In the 2005 book Somers starts his narrative of the Company period by stating 
that with the establishment of Batavia, the Company came to be perceived as 
and acted as an independent sovereign state in Asian waters.234 As for the 
nature of communication with the locals, he asserts that the Company came to 
encounter a “totally different cultural environment” in Asia.235 Regarding the 
kinds of states encountered in Asia, he notes that different typologies built on 
categories such as “agrarian,” “harbour polities,” or “communal states,” or other 
ways of characterising them as, for instance, “feudal” or “patrimonial- bureau-
cratic,” do not frame the problem adequately.236 He prefers to look upon them 
as “network states,” understood as various nodes and concentrations in 
networks of commercial and diplomatic interaction that reached from Arabia 
to China and Japan.237 He also takes care to stress the variety among Asian 
actors operating on the diplomatic stage, as for instance between Mataram and 
231 Somers, volkenrechtelijke actor 2001, 247.
232 Somers, volkenrechtelijke actor, 2001, 247.
233 Somers, volkenrechtelijke actor 2001, 247.
234 Somers, Nederlandsch-Indië, 2005, 25.
235 “een volstrekt andere culturele omgeving.” Nederlandsch-Indië, 2005, 25.
236 Somers, Nederlandsch-Indië, 2005, 33.
237 Somers, Nederlandsch-Indië, 2005, 34.
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the harbour states of Indonesia and the village communities of the Moluccas.238 
Asian states prior to the coming of the Europeans all bore individual 
characteristics,239 but whatever their particularities, Somers’ point is that these 
states had all long before the European maritime expansion upheld interstate 
contacts and interactions that were operated in a way that deserves to be con-
sidered as “international law.”240
This proposition of general similarity, and by implication of Eurasian com-
patibility, is one that Somers shares with Alexandrowicz. But to a greater degree 
than Alexandrowicz, Somers points to the difference between the pre- and 
post-nineteenth-century periods in holding up the early modern system in 
Asia as “incomparable” to the modern one.241 On this point Somers is closer to 
Andaya’s positions than those of Alexandrowicz. On the other hand, he leans 
on the Eurocentric side when he judges the conceptualisation of treaty obliga-
tions of the Asian princes, as a “concession they could withdraw at will.”242 
Unlike Andaya, Somers does not elaborate on the possible Eurocentric cul-
tural foundations for such a judgement. He simply states that facing such dif-
ferences in conceptualisations and practices, the VOC diplomatic mode had to 
be, and indeed was, accommodating and pragmatic.243
All in all, Somers’ recognition of particularities and differences never glides 
into a position of incompatibility as far as communication between Company 
and local polities or Company and rulers is concerned. Where Andaya sees a 
breakdown in Company–Makassar communication, Somers points to accom-
modation as, one must assume, a relative successful communicative means 
employed by the Company. Similarly, Somers explicitly subscribes to 
238 Somers, Nederlandsch-Indië, 2005, 33–34.
239 “De volkenkundige constellatie in Azië, voorafgaand aan de Europese expansie, was vol eigenaardige 
aspecten, die doorwerkend in het Indisch staatsrecht, mede een stempel hebben gedrukt op de staa-
tsvorming.”, Somers, Nederlandsch-Indië, 2005Ibid. 35.
240 “Bovendien bleken de machthebbers onderling betrekkingen te onderhouden, zich te erdragen als vol-
kenrechtssubjecten.” Somers, Nederlandsch-Indië, 2005 Ibid. 34–35.
241 “In de toenmalige volkenrechtelijke constellatie, onvergelijkbar met de huidige internationale verhou-
dingen.” Somers, Nederlandsch-Indië, 2005, 63.
242 Somers, Nederlandsch-Indië, 2005, 58.
243 “Wel heeft de Compagnie altijd getracht de door machtsverhoudingen feitelijk onstane situatie in te 
kaderen.” Somers, Nederlandsch-Indië, 2005, 41, and “De Compagnie paste zich als koopman/vorst in 
het sociale en diplomatieke verkeer binnen de Zuidoost-Aziatische volkenrechtelijke constellatie vol-
ledig aan bij de binnen de vorstenhoven heersende gewoonten.” Somers, Nederlandsch-Indië, 2005, 63.
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Alexandrowicz’s proposition of functional understanding and increasing 
secularisation.244
To sum up, Somers does not advocate a position of structural blockage for 
communication, but points out that the Company often had to accommodate 
the other side for practical reasons. But still, if Asian and European concepts of 
international law were not instantly compatible, and European law consequen-
tly had to be accommodated to local standards, the question that needs to be 
answered is which factors shaped the accommodation of the Company’s diplo-
matic practice and thus gave it a typical overseas “twist”? Alas, that is a ques-
tion that Somers never really addresses. In his survey of the legal aspects of the 
VOC diplomacy and state interaction in Asia, the answer to this issue fades 
into the background.
Van Ittersum is the one in my sample who comes closest to offering a cha-
racterisation of VOC diplomacy in practice within a broader historical fram-
ework. She proposes that the Company’s legal theory was but a vehicle for 
politics of power. According to her, the Company not only held a pragmatic 
view on the use of law overseas, but an outright cynical one.
Van Ittersum
One of Van Ittersum’s objectives is to remedy what she considers to be short-
comings in the Cambridge school of political thought. Although the school 
must be credited for having disclosed “the dark side of rights theories,” such as 
demonstrating the thinking of Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke as “building blocks 
of Western Imperialism,245 its approach still has clear deficiencies. For one “its 
methodology does not always seem compatible with its self-proclaimed mis-
sion to write the history of political thought.”246 Instead, it seems to be locked 
within the confines of philosophical study.247 What are lacking, claims Van 
Ittersum, are an awareness of historical context and an analysis of “the histo-
244 Somers, Nederlandsch-Indië, 2005, 46, referring to Alexandrowicz, Introduction to the History of the 
Law of Nations in the East Indies, 89. 
245 Van Ittersum, Profit and Principle, xxxvii. 
246 “If the Cambridge school is gradually broadening its scope … its methodology does not always seem 
compatible with its self-proclaimed mission to write the history of political thought.” Ibid. xl. 
247 “remains preoccupied with the canon of Western philosophy.” Ibid. xli. “Although the Cambridge 
School continues to maintain a refreshingly critical stance towards the cannon of Western philosophy, 
it refuses to abandon the notion of a canon as such.” Ibid. xlii. 
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rical events that inspired or provoked the writings of early modern theorists 
and that these theories themselves hoped to influence.”248 What she advocates 
is an analysis of the “interrelationship between politics and political theory,”249 
and this is what she herself sets out to do in Profit and Principle, which exami-
nes the relationship between Grotius’s legal theories and the Company’s enter-
prise and interests.
Positions
The point of departure for Van Ittersum is that Grotius’s legal theories were 
intrinsically bound to the interests of the Company. For its part, the VOC con-
text was marked by the world of aggressive military and naval strategies in 
which the Republic was born,250 and run by capitalist directors who were them-
selves cynical and opportunistic.251 For all the sophistication of form and level 
of abstraction, Grotius’s thinking was part and parcel of this world. “Even 
though he conceptualised this material at a higher level of abstraction than 
anybody else,” writes Van Ittersum, “his theoretical concerns were always sub-
ject to the VOC’s political needs and commercial interests.”252 When Grotius 
was bound by and committed to the interests of the Company in this way, his 
text must also be interpreted in that context: “Grotius did not philosophize for 
philosophy’s sake. He wrote De Jure Praedae and published chapter 12 as Mare 
Liberum to safeguard the VOC’s commercial interests and political needs.253 In 
other words, Grotius’s legal theories constituted a “key component of Western 
imperialism and colonisation in the early modern period.”254 His theories were 
thus not only contemporary with, but intrinsically built into and directly 
instrumental to the venture of early modern mercantile expansion: “Grotius’ 
rights and contract theories were not just coterminous with the rise of global 
248 Ibid. xliii. 
249 Ibid. xliii. 
250 “The VOC itself was a product of the aggressive military and naval strategies of the Dutch Republic at 
the start of the seventeenth century.” Ibid. lii. 
251 VOC directors: “hard-headed capitalists and opportunistic to the core.” Ibid. lii. 
252 Ibid. liv. 
253 Ibid. lxi. 
254 Ibid. lxi. 
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trading empires in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but made them 
possible in the first place.”255
It is a central proposition for Van Ittersum that once Grotius is identified as 
a Company spokesman and agent, his cynicism comes clearly to the fore. For 
example, De Jure Praedae was written in defence of Van Heemskerck’s capture 
of the Portuguese ship Santa Catarina at the explicit request of the VOC direc-
tors.256 Likewise attached to Company interests, and thus opportunistic, was 
Grotius’s defence of “the Black Legend,” which he used for all it was worth to 
legitimize Dutch privateering against the Iberian enemy.257 Van Ittersum’s most 
prominent proposition about Grotius’s cynicism is however the nature of his 
contract theories, which she considers a kind of fraud by law.
Grotius’s treaty theory: Fraud by law
Grotius’s contract theory rested on the recognition of the local parties as legi-
timate legal subjects. Therefore, they were by natural law free to sign treaties 
with whomever they wished, but once a treaty had been signed, they were 
committed to keep their obligations by the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
(agreements must be kept). Thus, the VOC’s monopoly treaties “contained no 
escape clauses. Once signed, the local signatories were obliged to ensure that 
their subjects sold their manufactures to the VOC in perpetuity.”258 During the 
London conference in 1613 and 1615, in which Grotius negotiated for the 
Company, he systematically defended the right to take up arms to defend the 
monopoly treaties, even if it meant taking up arms against the local popula-
tion. 259
The trick here, holds Van Ittersum, is that Grotius does not bring the imba-
lance in strength into the reckoning. Because of its relative weakness of power, 
the Spice Islands in practice “had little choice but to renew their contracts with 
the VOC year after year. They simply lacked the military means to dislodge the 
Company from their countries. Grotius blatantly ignored these power diffe-
rentials in his rights and contract theories.”260
255 Ibid. lxi 
256 Ibid. lv.
257 Ibid. lv.
258 Ibid. xxii. 
259 Ibid. xxii.
260 Ibid. lx-lxi. 
75
pre sent ing my c a se
Grotius’s rights and contract theories served two purposes: To undermine 
Iberian claims to the extra-European world and to legitimize Dutch participa-
tion in the age-old trading systems of the Indian Ocean and the China Seas.261 
In the latter area, more specifically the Indonesian archipelago, the Company’s 
tactics and mode of operation were to lure or pressure local rulers into treaties 
that were beneficial to the Company. When the former came to realise that the 
treaties ran contrary to their own interests, the Company could defend them 
on Grotian principles by claiming that they were entered into without coercion 
by autonomous subjects of law, and thus were legally binding and had to be 
observed.
Summing up: Ittersum
Grotius is the “villain” in Van Ittersum’s story as he is the one who gave the 
Company the legal theory to justify their behaviour after the fact. In other 
words, he provided the opportunity to suppress local states by legal trickery. 
One assumption Van Ittersum shares with Andaya is that local people had an 
imperfect understanding of the implications of agreeing to treaties with the 
Company. But Van Ittersum’s emphasis is different. It is not the miscommuni-
cation in itself which is her point; it is the fraudulent way in which the com-
pany manipulated partial understanding or misguided interpretations in its 
treaty practice. This point also contrasts with the approach of the nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century tradition, as well as Somers’ view, in that Van 
Ittersum primarily analyses law in terms of power relations and as a means of 
extortion. When and where power relations were asymmetrical to the advan-
tage of the Company, “law” could and did become a cynical instrument for 
achieving the Company’s ends.
Section 6: Summing up the historiography of VOC 
diplomacy
Five approaches to the understanding of the nature of seventeenth- century 
VOC diplomacy and the nature of its interactions in Asia have been identified 
above. The classical approach of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
261 Ibid. lxi. 
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recognised differences in conceptualisations and practice, but still assumed a 
functional understanding between the Company and its Asian partners. The 
“the system compatibility approach” represented by Alexandrowicz advocated 
both a level of compatibility in thinking about international law at the outset as 
well as cumulative cross-cultural understanding by increased interaction. 
Andaya heavily attacked this approach, and advocated a cultural embedded-
ness approach that emphasized conceptual incompatibility and structural mis-
communication as typical of pre nineteenth century East- West state 
interaction. Somers’ “legal-pragmatic approach” may be regarded as a variant 
of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century approach, though it should be 
distinguished from the former by being more explicit about its emphasis on 
cultural differences. Van Ittersum for her part shares the preoccupation with 
law with both classical historiography and Somers, but marks herself off by 
analysing law as primarily an instrument of power. The discussion between 
Paulusz and Arasaratnam marks no original positions on its own, but is prima-
rily used to clarify the difference in positions between Andaya on the one hand 
and the nineteenth- and twentieth-century historiography and Alexandrowicz 
on the other.
I propose that the approaches I have treated here, with the possible excep-
tion of Van Ittersum, and with some modifications for Somers, “over-focus” on 
law as far as the nature of the Company’s diplomacy is concerned. By that I 
mean that they all seem to assume a direct and decisive impact of concepts of 
European international law on the Company’s diplomatic practice. I suggest 
not only that this was not the case, but that this misapprehension leads to a 
distortion of a relevant conceptualisation of Batavia’s diplomatic practice pro-
per, by underplaying both its thoroughly pragmatic and case-oriented charac-
ter and, not least, its dynamic nature.
There are some propositions in the above survey with which I particularly 
differ. I hold Andaya’s assumptions and propositions about the Eurocentric 
nature of VOC diplomacy to be anachronistic in that he seems to transfer 
nineteenth-century conceptualisations of treaty law to a seventeenth-century 
world of commerce by treaty. This has in its turn implications for his proposi-
tions about the structural misunderstanding in communications between 
Makassar and the Company. I think Andaya wrongly rejects the reciprocal 
understanding there was and underrates the dynamics of the Company’s 
understanding. I also object to the all- embracing pretensions that seem to be 
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implied in Van Ittersum’s propositions about the Company’s cynical applica-
tion of treaties. It may fit well in the smaller states in the Moluccas, but proba-
bly not in the Moluccas in general, and certainly not in the charter area as a 
whole. And, as a generalisation, it is contradicted by the instances of idealism 
that can be found in the Company treaties.
In the next chapter, I shall first analyse propositions about the nature of 
VOC diplomacy particularly as they come forth in Andaya’s analysis of seven-
teenth-century VOC–Makassar diplomatic interaction, and then elaborate on 
my own propositions.
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2 
Positions and Propositions 
Refined
In this chapter, I turn specifically to the historiography on Makassar. I shall start 
by briefly introducing F. W. Stapel’s now classic thesis of 1922 before concentra-
ting on Andaya’s views on the contrasting nature of South Sulawesian and 
European diplomacy. In a separate section, I contrast Andaya’s views to Resink’s 
view on Makassarese international law to clarify my own positions. Finally, I 
present the structure of my argument and plan of exposition in the empirical 
chapters, before I round off with some comments on sources and method.
Section 1: Brief historiography on seventeenth-
century Company–Makassar interaction, with an 
emphasis on Andaya’s propositions
F. W. Stapel’s Het Bongaais Verdrag1 is a monograph on the Company’s interac-
tion with Makassar from the early seventeenth century up to the Bongaya 
Treaty. Stapel focuses on the political and diplomatic interaction, and the text 
is organised in a chronological narrative with analytical comments inserted. 
However, the analytical implications are more often hinted at than fully expli-
cated. Typical is Stapel’s remark that the behaviour of the Makassarese “did not 
come as a surprise to those who knew their nature.”2 This should not be read as 
a racist remark; “the nature of the Makassarese” should more likely be read as 
“culture” or “habitual way of doing things.”
However, the remark leaves some assumptions uncommented. It combines 
an explicit proposition of difference and the implicit assumption that the 
1 F. W. Stapel: Het Bongaais Verdrag, PhD diss., Leiden University, 1922.
2 “voor hem, die den aard der Makassaren kende.” Ibid. 34.
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Company in spite of such difference, had been able to decipher the Makassarese 
code of conduct. In other words, Stapel operates from assumptions that there 
were differences in codes of behaviour between the Company and Makassar 
but that they did not prevent the Company from having a functional under-
standing of the situation. In other words, their respective systems of interac-
tion and communication were compatible to a degree that enabled the 
Company to have a meaningful interpretation of the Makassarese system. Such 
propositions of compatibility and the possibility of functional understanding 
came to form the main targets of Leonard Andaya’s two publications on the 
diplomatic interaction between Makassar and the Company,3 which appeared 
almost fifty years after Stapel’s work.
In his analysis of the VOC’s diplomatic interaction with Makassar, Andaya 
vehemently rejects Stapel’s assumption that the Company’s personnel were 
capable of understanding the nature and therefore the “ways” of the 
Makassarese. On the contrary, he holds that for South Sulawesians and the 
Company, the meaning of state interaction and treaty were totally incompati-
ble. Thus, there was no foundation for meaningful communication between 
the two. The diplomatic communication between the Company and Makassar 
represented a structural miscommunication grounded in antagonistic political 
cultures and perceptions.
I shall clarify Andaya’s positions about the incompatibility between South 
Sulawesian and European diplomatic conceptualisations with a focus on his 
propositions and assumptions about the nature of the VOC’s overseas diplo-
macy primarily using his 1978 article as my reference.
Spiritual versus secular conceptions of “treaty”
The basic difference between the Dutch and South Sulawesian conceptions of 
how treaties functioned was that while the Western tradition operated within 
a secular, rational logic, the South Sulawesian tradition was confined within 
sacred, mythical beliefs and perceptions. Andaya builds to a large degree on 
Noorduyn’s Een Achtiende-Eeuwse Kronik van Wadjo – Buginese Historiografie.4 
Hans Hägerdal and William Cummings represent more recent elaborations of 
3 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” and The Heritage of Arung Palakka.
4 Proefschrift, Universiteit te Leiden, ‘s Gravenhage, 1955.
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similar views.5 Writing about Timor and the eastern Indonesian archipelago 
Hägerdal for instance prefers the terms “princedom” or “domain” instead of 
“kingdom” to cover the non-bureaucratic nature of the polities there,6 and 
points to Henk Schulte Nordholt’s use of the term “Mandala state.”7 Hägerdal 
himself uses the term “kingdom of word” to describe the “spiritual or symbolic 
essence of such polities),8 Immanent in the “symbolic” conceptualisation of 
power is also a conceptualisation of “history” that is different from the modern 
Western standard. In the “sacred world view”9 there was no term for “myths”, 
indicating the nonexistence of the Western distinction between “myth” and 
“fact.”10 The Solorese, in the words of de Roever thus had no “history” in the 
Western sense, only oral, “mythological history.”11 It is with this background 
that we must view William Cummings’ statement that “no Makassarese (histo-
rical) chronical ever set out to rewrite or interpret what had been set out in a 
previous text.”12
Gerrit Knaap is also pointing to the same logic when he characterises the 
mentality on Ambon as backwards-looking with an emphasis on honouring 
the tradition with a belief in spirits in the guise of forefathers to guard and 
protect it.13 The “conceptual package this springs from is one where everything 
is interpreted as “signs” and “warnings.”14
Having demonstrated that Andaya both stands in a tradition preceding him 
of emphasising the peculiar sacral or mythological foundations of society and 
polity in maritime Southeast Asia him and that this tradition is still vital, I shall 
return to his treatment of it as a determining factor in the understanding of the 
logic of state-interaction and diplomacy in the region.
5 Hägerdal, Hans, Lords of the land, lords of the sea: conflict and adaptation in early colonial Timor, 
1600-1800 Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012, and: Cummings, W., Making Blood White: Historical 
Transformations in Early Modern Makassar. Honululu: University of Hawai’I Press, 2002, respectively.
6 Hägerdal 2012, 5, n. 7.
7 Hägerdal 2012, 171 n. 76.
8 Hägerdal 2012, 61 and 69-70.
9 Hägerdal, 2012, preface, xi.
10 Hägerdal 2012, 74.
11 de Roever, 2002, 20.
12 Cummings, 2002, 48-49.
13 Gerrit Knaap, Kruidnagelen en Christenen: De VOC en de bevolking van Ambon 1656-1696, tweede 
herziende druk Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2004, 90.
14 Knaap 2004, 91.
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Andaya considers what he calls “the spiritual element” of the treaties, “as 
important as the political to South Sulawesi states.”15 In fact, he asserts that a 
predominantly “spiritual” orientation as opposed to a this-worldly approach 
formed the defining trait of South Sulawesian diplomacy and treaty making up 
to the twentieth century: “A South Sulawesi ruler prior to the 20th century was 
also a product of his culture and time, and while he was mindful of the secular 
world, he was equally, if not more so, responsive to the spiritual one.”16
In introducing this statement, Andaya also warns that such a mythological 
worldview or mode of perception is hard to grasp for “the cynical modern-day 
observer … tempted to see everything in terms of Realpolitik.”17 Andaya’s 
implicit historical comparative argument is that in the seventeenth and eighte-
enth centuries, European treaty partners with Sulawesian states did not under-
stand the kind of logic and mentality the local actors were operating from, set 
as they were in their own kind of rational thinking and rational tradition. 
When Europeans met with the spiritual South Sulawesian tradition, it was a 
clash of cultures, a confrontation between two incompatible worldviews.18
The “cosmological,” “sacred,” and ritual nature of South Sulawesian diploma-
tic treaties was embedded in oral traditions and lived on when these were writ-
ten down. This can be seen in the “ritual-like repetition of certain phrases,”19 and 
the phrases used for “treaty,” such as “to give one’s word of honour,” “to uphold 
or support one’s word,” and the like.20 The introduction of the written treaty was 
thus simply seen as “an extension” of the older, oral tradition.21 The logic and 
meaning of the oral tradition was thus carried over to and came to be contained 
in the written tradition. The essential point that Andaya wants to make is that 
the act of putting treaties into writing did not mean a transition into a new con-
ceptualisation, but a continuation of the sacred logic in a new form.
The sacred or “cosmological” conceptualisation of treaty making in the 
South Sulawesian tradition also revealed itself in the ritual modes of confir-
ming treaties, and the sanctions invoked for breaking them. The traditional 
confirmation ritual by drinking palm wine that had been stirred by the 
15 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 283.
16 Ibid. 283, emphasis added. See also Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, 9, 17.
17 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 283.
18 See section on “misunderstandings,” below.
19 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 278.
20 Ibid. 278-279, for the same views in a more recent work, see for instance: Cummings, 2002, 11, 41.
21 Ibid. 278.
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overlord’s kris or sword of state reflected, for instance, the perception that the 
kris was believed to imbue the potion with its powers.22 When treaty obliga-
tions as a rule were made binding for present, as well as future generations, it 
pointed in the same direction of a magical worldview.23 Also, making the 
extinction of lineage the ultimate sanction for breaking the treaty underlined 
the “immense importance attached to the survival of the king’s line.”24 The 
threat at least reflected the lineage logic in South Sulawesian society, where 
lineage formed the basic social and political structure.25 It was with such 
notions of spirituality and collective survival that South Sulawesian states 
made treaties with each other, and—this is the basic assumption in Andaya’s 
argument—it was with such conceptualisations and expectations that Makassar 
concluded treaties with the Company, and which lay at the heart of their 
miscommunication.26
One should note that Andaya’s proposition of an antagonistic difference bet-
ween the South Sulawesian and European conceptualisations of state interaction 
rests on two basic assumptions. The South Sulawesian religious or sacred concep-
tualisation and mode of operation stood in such absolute contrast to those of 
secular Europeans as to make meaningful communication or interaction between 
the two impossible. Furthermore, Andaya does not consider the possibility that 
either party could apply modes of thinking and operation that differed from those 
inscribed in their respective cultural models of state- interaction. Both were loc-
ked within and unable to transgress their respective monolithic cultural models.
South Sulawesian and Western functions of treaty and 
function of state-interaction systems contrasted
The point of departure in Andaya’s comparison between treaty making in Europe 
and South Sulawesi is that while the Western tradition operated within a secular, 
rational logic, the South Sulawesian tradition was confined within sacred, mythical 
beliefs and perceptions. From this it follows that the concrete form and function of 
treaty making was basically different, too. For instance, the South Sulawesi treaties 
22 Ibid. 279.
23 Ibid. 281.
24 Ibid. 279–80.
25 Ibid. 283–84.
26 See also “miscommunication”, below.
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had a particularly localised function and meaning that could be found in the 
preamble, where the “precise relationship of the treating parties was declared in 
purely conventional terms.”27 These “precise relationships” ranged from full equa-
lity to master–slave relationships.28 These hierarchical relations were expressed in 
terms of closeness of family relations, like father and son, elder and younger brother 
and so forth.29 This system further meant that once the type of hierarchical relation 
was given, it became “superfluous to mention particular details already implied in 
the conventional phrases.”30 This mode of giving the specific obligations and rights 
by inference from hierarchical relations, with “no possibility of ambiguity” accor-
ding to Andaya,31 stood in diametrical opposition to the typical European mode, in 
which rights and obligations were expressively stated in the specific: the Dutch and 
the native states] differed fundamentally in the manner in which they invoked the 
treaty as a legitimising document. Whereas the Dutch would cite a specific provi-
sion within the detailed Bongaya treaty, the native states would simply refer to ‘the 
treaty’ without mentioning any specific clause.”32 In the South Sulawesian percep-
tion and practice, stating specific rights and obligations was superfluous. In the 
European perception, such specifics were the primary task of treaty making. These 
conflicting technical modes of treaty formulations accordingly reflected conflicting 
modes of perception as to what a “treaty” really meant. At the heart of the matter lay 
the basic difference between the South Sulawesian and the Western traditions 
where the former was of a “spiritual-” and the latter of a secular nature.
A spiritual conceptualisation of interstate relations: 
The workings of the South Sulawesian system and 
grounds for structural misunderstandings, and 
conflicting views on the nature and bonds of treaties
The spiritual primacy in treaty conception meant that no treaty once concluded was 
ever considered totally dead and done with. On the contrary, it was thought of as a 
perpetual part of the sacred lineage heritage: “The words and oaths of the ancestors 
27 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 280.
28 Ibid. 280.
29 Ibid. 280.
30 Ibid. 280.
31 Ibid. 281.
32 Ibid. 278.
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contained in the treaties became a moral and supernatural sanction which adum-
brated all interstate relations.”33 This conceptualisation not only provided stability”34 
but also gave flexibility and dynamism to the interstate-system in South Sulawesi. 
For, when actual power centres changed and prior alliances were broken and new 
formed, obsolete treaties were relegated to the shadows of the new ones, but with the 
possibility of re-emerging should changes in the actual power relations require it: 
“Once a treaty had been agreed upon, it remained a permanent agreement which 
could be resurrected and renewed or allowed to recede into the background in face 
of other superior political and spiritual forces.”35 The notion of treaties as “enduring 
sacred documents” was thus no impediment to stability or dynamic readjustments; 
quite the contrary, it served as a facilitating factor for both: “The treaties, oaths and 
the whole treaty making procedure were part of a continuing process of reassess-
ment of political and spiritual affiliations to assure the establishment of a hierarchy 
of states which accurately reflected the power situation in South Sulawesi.”36
As for flexibility, Andaya goes so far as to rank the South Sulawesi states 
diplomatic system as superior to the Company’s, because in the latter, treaties 
were used and functioned as “instruments of oppression,”37 whereas in the for-
mer they served as “a means of establishing proper and peaceful relations.”38 
Leaving aside the ranking and the moral context that Andaya puts it in here, 
his explanation of motivating forces and the driving factor “” in the South 
Sulawesian system demands comment. Unique moral conceptualisations of 
“honour” (siri) and “dignity” (pesse) formed the underpinnings of the South 
Sulawesian states system, and represented a logic that stood in diametrical 
opposition to the European diplomatic system.
The concept of siri and the workings of diplomacy and 
treaty in the South Sulawesi states system
Distribution of siri, a concept that may be translated as “shame,” “self- respect,” 
or “self-worth,”39 was what the typical South Sulawesi system of treaties was 
33 Ibid. 283–84.
34 Ibid. 284.
35 Ibid. 284.
36 Ibid. 284.
37 Ibid. 284.
38 Ibid. 284.
39 Ibid. 284. See also: Pelras, 1996, 206 and Cummings, 2002, 164.
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about. Diplomacy was a mechanism by which proper and peaceful relations 
with other states were established by distribution and redistribution of it.”40 At 
the personal level, siri worked as motivational factor. To have siri meant “to 
know one’s status and place in one’s society,” and a person would “defend his 
self-respect to the death if necessary.”41 The struggle for recognition of siri, and 
conversely the fear of being deprived of it at the personal individual level, was 
replicated in the political life of interstate relations. The instrument in which 
political siri was gained was the treaty: “A similar philosophy appears to have 
underlined the concept of treaties in South Sulawesi. A state’s understanding 
of its proper status in relation to all other states was determined by the treaty.”42
Recognising the siri mentality as the driving factor in the South Sulawesian 
interstate system has serious implications for the understanding of the particu-
lar logic of treaty making in South Sulawesi, because the siri-logic meant that 
the primary goal of the treaty was to preserve social harmony: “The efficacy of 
the treaty lay, as with ‘siri,’ in the universal acceptance in South Sulawesi of its 
legitimate function in preserving harmony in the society.”43 The implicit con-
trast is with the Western treaty as a zero-sum game in which one party always 
must lose. So, for Western Europeans and South Sulawesians, the purpose and 
way of treaty making constituted a binary, contrasting pair not only at the con-
ceptual level, but also for their inherent logic and motivating factors. 
Furthermore, in Andaya’s view, these were not differences of degree but of 
kind. As such, they constituted a structural impediment to meaningful com-
munication, and hence for systemic misunderstanding between the Company 
and South Sulawesian states like Makassar.
Miscommunication in treaty making between 
Makassar and the Company
The seventeenth-century contractual record between Makassar and the 
Company up to and including the Bongaya Treaty serves as Andaya’s main 
example of systemic misunderstanding. It is central to his argument that the 
Makassarese were inexperienced in the Western mode of treaty making. Thus, 
40 Ibid. 285. For these concepts, see also Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, 15 ff.
41 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 284.
42 Ibid. 284.
43 Ibid. 284–85.
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he stresses that there is no evidence of any treaty making with the Portuguese, 
and that the treaties with the VOC of 1637, 1655, and 1660, represented the 
only three previous occasions in which the sultanate had entered into “a formal 
treaty arrangement with a European power prior to the one of 1667.”44 Likewise 
important to Andaya’s proposition of structural misunderstanding is that there 
was no learning either. Andaya regards the Bongaya Treaty as exemplary when 
it comes to structurally conditioned misunderstandings originating from the 
underlying divergence in the way the Company and South Sulawesian states 
understood the concept of the treaty.45 To the degree that there were excep-
tions, these can be explained as exceptions that prove the rule.
Exceptions confirming the rule in the Company’s 
treaty practice
The Company, says Andaya, “was not unaware of the existence of local treaty 
traditions in South Sulawesi as it “actually became party to such treaties.”46 But 
special contextual factors go to explain the rare instances where the Company 
made concessions to local norms. Accommodation to indigenous treaty tradi-
tions happened in cases where the Company was weak, such as when conclu-
ding the 1655 treaty with Makassar,47 or in dealings with native states from 
which the Company had nothing to fear, such as four treaties concluded in 
December 1671 with minor South Sulawesi states the Company considered 
insignificant.48 Andaya’s explanation of these exceptions is that the Company 
would depart from its own contractual tradition either when it felt itself bar-
gaining from a weak position, or from a position of disproportionate strength 
in its favour.
Looking at Andaya’s use of the 1655 treaty as an example of Company 
accommodation to local standards in more detail, one of the accommodations 
he sees is that although “the framework of the treaty is borrowed from the 
Western European practice of including each new subject in separate 
44 Ibid. 289 (referring to Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 33–34, 53, 66–77).
45 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 289.
46 Ibid. 286.
47 December 28, 1655 treaty with Makassar, see analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.
48 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 287.
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numbered articles, the contents read like a typical South Sulawesi treaty.”49 The 
local imprint by contents is demonstrated in three articles safeguarding the 
autonomy of Makassar.50 As for form, local influence shows itself in general or 
imprecise phrasings of the treaty clauses, which only in article 851 does “again 
revert to the precision of a European document.”52
The 1671 treaties
In cases where the Company felt it held the upper hand, accommodation to 
local forms concerned the vassal–overlord relationship, in which the Company 
was recognised as ruler in the “traditional South Sulawesi treaty idiom.” 
Another example Andaya uses is the fact that the swearing of the treaty also 
took the traditional form by swearing on the Koran and drinking the ritual 
palm wine “all in the traditional fashion.”53 But all in all, apart from the 1655 
and 1671 examples, both of which were marked by exceptional circumstances, 
the general rule was that the Company’s ideas about Asian rulers and treaty 
making with them were locked in Eurocentric perceptions and practices. 
However, local contractors interpreted these Eurocentric treaties in terms of 
local idiom. Andaya uses the Bongaya Treaty as a prominent example of both.
The Bongaya Treaty of 1667
After demonstrating how Arung Palakka perceived the Bongaya Treaty in 
terms of local conceptions and how he continued to act in accordance with 
these conceptions vis à vis the Company,54 Andaya goes on to argue that this 
was the general South Sulawesi interpretation of the Bongaya Treaty. Arung 
Palakka and his allies thus viewed their relationship with the Company as “a 
favoured child to the mother”55 and according to local tradition, this type of 
relationship carried certain obligations for the “mother” as the person respon-
sible for the protection and welfare of its “child”: “When the South Sulawesi 
49 Ibid. 287.
50 Ibid. 287.
51 Art. 8 is the final one of the treaty.
52 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 287.
53 Ibid. 287.
54 Ibid. 290.
55 Ibid. 291.
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states accepted their subordinate relationship to the Company in the Bongaya 
treaty, they fully expected the Company to accept its responsibilities as mother/
master and guarantee the sovereignty of all its children /slaves in the traditio-
nal South Sulawesi overlord-vassal relationship.”56
When the Company, acting on their own set of conceptions, failed to meet 
local expectations, the South Sulawese considered the treaty to have been bro-
ken: “But this expectation turned to bewilderment and anger when the 
Company failed to adhere to the proper code of behaviour expected of an 
overlord.”57
The examples that Andaya uses to illustrate the Company’s failure to meet 
South Sulawesians’ expectations mainly concern Sulawesian fears of the 
Company’s infringements on local autonomy.58 Over this issue, there was a 
constant struggle in which the Company tried to “force” the South Sulawesi 
states into the European conceptions of treaty.59 But these states “never relin-
quished their traditional belief that any treaty guaranteed a state’s right to its 
own adat and bicara.”60 Basically, this too was a conflict caused by incompatible 
expectations grounded on conflicting assumptions about the meaning of 
“treaty” and, no less important, how treaties function.
European tunnel vision and lack of understanding of 
and sensitivity to local perceptions in the Company’s 
treaty making
Andaya describes the Company’s approach to its Asian counterparts as based 
on three features: A principled lack of intention to understand the local treaty 
traditions; an all-embracing dominance of the “European” model in the 
Company’s treaties with states in South Sulawesi; and a lack of interest in 
accommodating local practices. “There is little indication that any effort was 
made to understand the whole intent of local treaties,” he writes. “Almost the 
entire corpus of the treaties between the Company and the South Sulawesi 
56 Ibid. 291.
57 Ibid. 291.
58 Ibid., 291
59 Ibid. 291
60 Ibid. 291, “customary law” and “autonomy.”
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states was framed in the Western European tradition of treaty making, with 
little or no attempt to accommodate local practices.”61
Andaya’s message is clear: Company servants suffered from a form of 
Eurocentric tunnel vision. They brought with them a Western model of “treaty” 
to Asia and made no adjustments when applying it in the Asian context. Given 
that the “European beliefs and concepts” brought overseas were in total oppo-
sition to local perceptions, the treaty making by necessity had to end in a clash 
of cultures. I shall end my exposition of Andaya’s viewpoints by demonstrating 
how conflicting conceptualisations of “treaty” lay at the heart of the Company’s 
recurring complaints about “breaches of contract” by its South Sulawesian 
opposites.
Allegations of breach of contract as a cultural 
misconception
As we have seen, Andaya claims that the difference between the Company and 
its South Sulawesian counterparts’ conception of what a treaty was can be 
ascribed to the fact that the Company’s intention was to establish regulations 
on specific issues to which both parties agreed, whereas the South Sulawesian 
intention was to signal positions within a hierarchy of implicit, but still specific 
reciprocal obligations. A divergent view of what constituted a breach of con-
tract was thus built in at the outset. For the Company, it followed that any fai-
lure by the treating parties to honour the explicit regulations agreed to in the 
treaty was considered a violation of its terms. From the South Sulawesian point 
of view, however, such explicit and specific regulations were peripheral to the 
intention of entering into a treaty at the outset, as the centrality of the agree-
ment lay in its function as a regulator of a given state’s position and thereby 
implicit rights and obligations within a hierarchy of states. In South Sulawesi 
the state interaction system was set in a mental framework in which “the local 
states viewed the treaty not in its individual parts, but as a total document.”62 It 
all meant a deep-seated difference between the South Sulawesi states and the 
Company regarding the view of what constituted breach of contract. In South 
Sulawesi, “the treaty represented an open declaration of a shift in the spiritual 
61 Ibid. 287-88.
62 Ibid. 288.
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and political power relationships in the area, and … when circumstances 
demanded it, the ruler felt free to re-examine his alternatives and to make 
necessary realignments to reflect the new power relations.”63 By the Company’s 
particularistic standards, however, such rearrangements came to be regarded 
as “breaches of contract.64 It all boiled down to the essentially antagonistic con-
ceptualisation of the meaning and function of treaty as respectively a secular 
political or spiritual political entity.
To the local South Sulawesi treaties represented a mechanism for the distri-
bution of political and spiritual “capital.” To the Company, these treaties were 
intended as a political means for acquiring profit: “The treaties between the 
Company and the native states were … always basically commercial with the 
foremost aim being the acquisition of trading advantages for the Company.”65 
The South Sulawesi treating parties did not put much emphasis on commercial 
matters, which were always secondary and instrumental to political and spiri-
tual concerns or considerations about hierarchical position.66
In general, Andaya purports that the very idea of entering into treaty rela-
tionships for commercial purposes was not an integral part of the South 
Sulawesian perception of “treaty”: “Such a treaty whose central concern was 
trade was totally alien to the concept of treaties in South Sulawesi.”67 So, not 
only were the European and South Sulawesian treaty traditions different in 
form and content, they served fundamentally different purposes.
Besides that, the wording of the Company’s treaty regulations was formula-
ted so intricately that the local ruler was left with no other option but to protest 
against the most “outrageous” of them, while leaving the rest in the belief that 
“all things would find their proper place according to well-known traditional 
practices.”68 The latter assumption was an expectation that sprang from the 
Sulawesian tradition, in which it was assumed that the commercial or econo-
mic arrangements would find their solution within a framework of reciprocal 
rights and obligations that did not compromise any of the party’s 
sovereignty.69
63 Ibid. 288
64 Ibid. 288
65 Ibid. 288.
66 Ibid. 288.
67 Ibid. 288.
68 Ibid. 288.
69 Ibid. 288.
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Summing up of the subsection
Whatever the contextual reasons Andaya offers to explain the exceptions to the 
VOC’s mode of treaty making, in the main he offers a structural explanation 
for the typical meaning and mode of diplomatic practice by both the Company 
and the South Sulawesi polities. Because these meanings and modes sprang 
from incompatible conceptualisations, there was no real communication bet-
ween the two. Such diplomatic interaction as occurred was based on mutual 
misunderstanding.
Andaya’s views on treaty and treaty making in 
historiographic perspective
Andaya’s analysis is as I have pointed out, to a large degree built on Noorduyn, 
and assumptions supporting his propositions have been shared by more recent 
authors. Yet, at the end of this section I would like to draw attention to some 
interpretations that complement or modify Andaya’s view. Noorduyn for 
instance draws attention to what he calls “pragmatic opportunism” as a feature 
of the Bugis political system by the fact that people would back the person 
considered to manifest the greatest concentration of power as leader. This con-
vention thus represented an additional source of flexibility to the enduring life 
of treaties to be brought back and forth according to the demands of situation 
and context.70 Christian Pelras on the other hand seems to stress other factors 
than the sacred conceptualization of cosmos more than Andaya, pointing to 
that although the ruler ruled by sacred legitimation or divine origin, power 
was also conceptualized as a contractual relationship between ruler and the 
people which could be broken if the obligations were not met.71 Yet another 
latent source of flexibility in other words.
Anthony Reid takes this a step further in pointing to the fact that despite 
the sacred and binding nature of oaths taken before the spirits of the ancest-
ors, there are plenty of examples where these were broken,72 which also 
might be considered a source for flexibility. In a somewhat different 
70 Noorduyn, Jacobus, “The Wajorese merchants’ community in Makassar”, in: Roger Tol, Kees van Dijk 
and Greg Acciaioli (eds.), Authority and Entreprise among the Peoples of South Sulawesi, Verhandelingen, 
KITLV 188, Leiden, KITLV PRESS, 2000, 95-121, 116.
71 Christian Pelras, The Bugis, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996, 106.
72 Anthony Reid, “The Rise of Makassar”, Review of Indonesian and Malaysian affairs, 17, 1983, 117-160 136.
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direction, Reid points out that this was closely related to the readiness of 
Bugis and Makassarese communities to regulate their affairs by contracts 
between two parties, each recognising the other’s rights.73 Because the con-
cept of contract meant trust, there might have been greater respect for 
mutual contracts than for the authority of kings.74 I shall elaborate more on 
this in subsection 3 below. But before that, a conclusion on Andaya’s posi-
tions is necessary.
Concluding remarks
There is little space left for dynamism in Andaya’s analysis. Both the 
Company and the South Sulawesian states acted on their cultural structures 
well up into the twentieth century. Diplomatic interaction between the two 
was consequently a continuous process of repeated misunderstandings and 
conflict.
The picture of seventeenth-century South Sulawesian diplomacy Andaya 
draws also rests on the basic assumption that even in communication with 
European outsiders the South Sulawesians applied their traditional logic and 
approach to state interactions. Likewise, regarding the Company, Andaya’s 
proposition is that it applied its heritage of European diplomatic means and 
modes without adjusting its expectations to the Asian context. I shall argue 
that Andaya’s static assumptions are historically wrong for both parties. 
Diplomatic interaction between Makassar and the Company represented a 
dynamic process. My counterproposition can be illustrated by comparing 
Andaya’s assumptions to those of G. J. Resink’s interpretations of seventeenth-
century international law in the Indonesian archipelago and Makassar. I shall 
go through Resink’s points of view, and their implications for Andaya’s assump-
tions, mainly relying on Resink’s analysis in The Law of Nations in Early 
Makassar.75 After that I pursue the topic of Makassarese dynamism, briefly 
introduced above.
73 Reid, in Tol et al. eds., 2000, 64.
74 Reid in Tol et al. eds., 2000, 66, 70.
75 First published as “Volkenrecht in vroeger Makassar”, Indonesië, IV, v (March, 1953). My references are 
to the English version: “The Law of Nations in Early Makassar”, in Resink: Indonesia’s History between 
the Myths, (The Hague: W. van Hoeve Publishers, 1968)
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Section 2: Resink’s proposition on international 
law in Makassar and its implications for Andaya’s 
positions
Introduction
In The Law of Nations in Early Makassar Resink states that he set himself two 
goals, firstly to point out parallels between Makassarese notions of internatio-
nal law as compared to the Company’s (or Western) notions, and secondly to 
identify incorporations or adaptations of local elements in the Company’s 
diplomatic practice. Resink’s project thus builds on two basic propositions that 
run contrary to Andaya, namely that there was a kind of international law in 
Makassar which for all its particular differences was compatible with Western 
notions of international law. In other words, Resink’s assumptions are diame-
trically opposed to Andaya’s propositions about the absolute singularity of 
Makassarese tradition and the incompatibility of Makassarese and Company 
approaches to diplomatic relations.
I shall first treat Resink’s identifications of constitutive institutions in the 
Makassarese variant of international law and then look at the instances where 
he singles out particular traits or variances in the Makassarese system. 
Finally, I shall sum up the instances where he finds integration of Makassarese 
elements into the Company’s mode of diplomacy. My discussion follows a 
pattern where I first expose Resink’s positions and then contrast them to 
Andaya’s proposition with focus on the implications of Resink’s view for 
Andaya’s argument. Before I go on to the analysis, it should be mentioned 
that Resink’s argument rests on empirical research at the time of writing.76
Parallelisms
Whereas Andaya points to the difference in meaning and intent in concluding 
interstate treaties in Europe and South Sulawesi, Resink starts his argument by 
stating that there was a long-established tradition for concluding diplomatic 
treaties in South Sulawesi. Examples of such contracts, such as the ulukanaya, 
76 In particular A. A. Cense, “Enige aantekeningen over Makassars-Boeginese geschiedschrijving,” BKI 
107 (1951): 42–60, and V. E. Korn, “Problemen der Makassaars-Boeginese samenleving,” BKI 108 
(1952): 17–35.
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a collection of treaties concerning Goa’s political relations with its dependen-
cies and other Indonesian states, could for example be regarded as a “Goan 
Corpus Diplomaticum.”77 As Resink finds no need to qualify the parallelism 
with respect to differences in meaning and intention in the South Sulawesian 
treaties, the implication must be that he finds no essential difference between 
the European and Asian treaties.
The same goes for the perception of boundaries and territories. Pointing to 
studies by Van Vollenhoven and Korn, Resink claims the existence of “fixed 
boundaries” for the Makassarese and Buginese principalities “with frontiers 
sedulously described and delineated ages ago.”78 As such, a delineation of fixed 
borders also implies a secular trait shared by people in South Sulawesi and 
Europe—one that stands in indirect opposition to Andaya’s proposition about 
an absolute contrast between a sacred conceptualisation of statehood in South 
Sulawesi and a secular conceptual framework in Europe.
Resink finds a similar modern and secular trait in the Makassarese concep-
tualisation of international law in the field of maritime territorial rights. In the 
treaty of 1637 with the Company for instance, one finds “recognition of mari-
time authority in the customary sense of territorial waters.”79 This is but a 
reflection of the general rule that principalities of southern Sulawesi had such 
defined “marine belts.”80 Note that Resink seems to suppose that the clause was 
included by the initiative of the Makassarese. However, of greater importance 
in my context is the implication that the Company and Makassar worked wit-
hin a shared perceptual framework regarding this matter.81
Given this background, Resink believes the conflict between Makassar and 
the Company in the seventeenth century can be seen as a struggle over this 
kind of maritime authority “in the broader sense.”82 This proposition is impor-
tant to note, because it signals quite a different interpretation of the nature of 
the conflict between the Company and Makassar than Andaya’s view that it 
arose from a structural miscommunication between incompatible parties pur-
suing different goals. For his part, Resink is quite clear that Makassar and the 
77 Resink, Indonesia’s History between the Myths, 41, referring to Cense, “Enige aantekeningen.”
78 Ibid. 43, referring to Vollenhoven and Korn.
79 Ibid. 45. For an analysis of the making of the treaty and its contents, see chapter 4.
80 Ibid. referring to Vollenhoven.
81 See chapter 4 for my further corroboration of this point.
82 Resink, Indonesia’s History between the Myths, 45.
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company was pursuing the same goals: “Macassar … with a large-scale transit 
trade in spices from the Moluccas had no choice but to resist the efforts of the 
Company to force through treaties banning shipping, transportation and trade 
on the part of others to promote the monopoly which it desired for itself in the 
nutmeg and clove trade.”83 From this perspective, Resink logically comes to 
view Makassar as a de facto champion of mare liberum84, but, contrary to 
Andaya, assuming that it was acting on secular, commercial motives.
According to Andaya Makassar and the Company were pursuing quite dif-
ferent goals. While the company sought profit, Makassar was interested in pre-
stige. The root of the conflict for Andaya lay in the Makassarese pursuit of the 
recognition of overlordship in areas where the Company had vested monopoly 
claims.85 So, while for Resink the conflict between the Company and Makassar 
over the Moluccas was one in which both struggled to get a share of the com-
mercial prize,86 for Andaya the conflict represented yet another example of 
misunderstanding due to the incompatibility between the worldviews of 
Makassar and the Company. The sultan was not a champion of an “open sea”; 
he was protecting his pursuit of prestige by a proxy argument. His “real” inter-
est lay in the accumulation of prestige, which he could acquire by acting and 
being recognised as a protector and defender of the faith and overlordship in 
the Moluccas. Mare liberum was conceived in terms of notions of prestige, not 
commercial terms in Makassar.87
For Andaya, the conflict over the Moluccas between the Company and 
Makassar sprang from the fact that the one could not have its wishes fulfilled 
without trespassing on the interests of the other. But they did not have shared 
interests. The conflict originated in different motivations, namely Makassar’s 
quest for prestige and the Company’s for profit. What caused the clash was the 
fact that control over the Spice Islands served as means to both ends.
For Resink, the conflict between the Company and Makassar over the 
Moluccas was a conflict over shared interests, as the core of the conflict was 
that the Company’s monopoly claims ran counter to Makassar’s economic 
83 Ibid. 45.
84 Ibid. 45.
85 Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, 46.
86 Reid for one, shares the impression of Makassar as a champion of an open door policy of free trade, Reid 
1981, 10.
87 Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, 46.
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interests. Thus, when Makassar applied an open seas argument, it did so to 
protect its interests as a transit harbour, while the Company tried to protect its 
monopoly interests by outlawing the transit traffic from the Moluccas on 
Makassar. In other words, they were both trying to protect their respective 
commercial interests. The conflict lay in the Makassarese refusal to recognise 
or adhere to the Company’s monopoly claims: “What the Dutch looked upon 
as Makassarese smuggling … was perfectly legal trade in the Makassarese view. 
Hence the (Makassarese) struggle for the mare liberum and against the 
Company … was even from the Dutch point of view a struggle against the 
injustice of the closed seas attempted and perpetrated by the Company in 
Indonesia.”88 In other words the struggle between Makassar and the Company 
was primarily a conflict over a common goal: economic resources.89 For that 
reason, the struggle was also fought with a shared rhetoric.
Institutions of international law in Indonesia
The institution of diplomatic envoys, for one, was one of long standing in 
Indonesia,90 pointing to the existence of a system of diplomatic interaction 
with similar age-old roots. If this was an institution found in both Indonesia 
and Europe, there were also specialist institutions in Indonesia primarily 
meant to facilitate maritime trade. Resink draws special attention to the insti-
tution of the sabannara, the Makassarese translation of shahbandar, a local 
administrative office that can be translated as “harbourmaster” and which was 
meant to serve the special needs of the maritime states in South East Asia.91 
The shahbandar was responsible for receiving foreigners and bringing them to 
the ruler, but there are several instances in which the shahbandars also exerci-
sed jurisdictional authority over foreign traders. Resink’s point is that states 
such as Makassar whose income derived largely from maritime trade needed 
an institution to facilitate and regulate that trade.92
88 Resink, Indonesia’s History between the Myths, 46.
89 Compare “This essentially economic struggle,” ibid. 45.
90 Ibid. 48.
91 This is institution is also treated by Cummings, who traces it back to the 1539s, and notes that the 
institution was never occupied by high ranking nobles, indicating that it did not have particularly high 
prestige. See Cummings 2002, 29 and 111 respectively.
92 Ibid. 48–50.
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Resink finds similarities between the sabannara or shahbandar and the 
European medieval institution of consul de la mer, but prefers to regard the 
shahbandar as a uniquely Indonesian institution because of the shahbandar’s 
function as administrator of international law: “Though all this suggests that 
the sabannara might in a way be compared to the medieval consul de la mer, it 
would seem more satisfactory to view him as a quite distinct Indonesian legal 
functionary who was endowed with both administrative power and regulatory 
and judiciary authority in the sphere of international law.”93
Whatever the particularities of the institutions of the sabannara/shahbandar 
the point to notice is that the institution and the powers attached to it are indi-
cative of the international nature of the harbour states. Symptomatic of the 
functionality of the institution is that the Company came to adopt it, under the 
name of license master.94 In both cases, the institution points to a context of 
(maritime) interaction where a diplomatic repertoire confined to a “landloc-
ked” tradition would be insufficient. Another functional necessity of the mari-
time interaction system was that it had to make structural space for foreigners 
or outsiders.
The outsider as a separate category in the Indonesian 
system of maritime interaction
Referring to A. A. Cense, Resink states that “Makassarese and Buginese 
manuscripts time and again contain regulations defining the rights and duties 
of foreigners, and thus: “in Makassar there must have been a fairly well-defined 
status for aliens.”95 In actual fact, Resink holds that Makassar was not only typi-
cal, it was an extraordinarily typical example of how a particular defined place 
for the outsider was designed, as Makassar “saw and drew the lines between 
the status of aliens and that of subjects more clearly than was customary and 
necessary at the time.”96 The mental division between insiders and various out-
siders was well entrenched and there was a “vivid awareness of what or who 
were Makassarese on the one hand and Dutch, English, Danish, Spanish, 
93 Ibid. 51.
94 Ibid. 50. Referring to Pieter van Dam’s use of the term.
95 Ibid. 47.
96 Ibid. 47.
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Portuguese, Ternatan, Tidorese, Batchanese and so forth on the other.”97 This 
awareness and the legal demarcation between Makassarese subjects and outsi-
ders have serious implications for Andaya’s propositions about the nature of 
Makassarese diplomacy.
As we have seen, Andaya pays no attention to specific regulations for outsi-
ders in Makassar. His argument of incompatibility between the Makassarese 
and the Company’s modes of diplomacy rests on the assumption that the 
Makassarese applied the same diplomatic approach towards the Company that 
they would to a neighbouring South Sulawesi state. In other words, Andaya’s 
proposition of incompatibility and structural misunderstanding rests on the 
assumption that Makassar saw the coming of and contact with the Company 
as it was approached by a South Sulawesian insider, while in fact there was a 
special category reserved for the treatment of outsiders. Recognising the fact 
that the Makassarese had every reason to hold the Company at arm’s length, 
this is hardly convincing. The Company was an obvious candidate to be treated 
as an “outsider,” both by definition, as well as for tactical considerations.
Furthermore, when Resink points to that the Makassarese system contained 
a separate category particularly designed for the “outsider,” it undermines the 
foundation of Andaya’s dichotomy between the Makassarese and Company’s 
system of interaction, because the very existence of such a category raises the 
possibility of a plurality of regulatory forms. More specifically, Andaya’s 
assumption that Makassar would simply apply endogenous traditions establis-
hed to handle interstate affairs in South Sulawesi to its dealing with outsiders is 
not credible. There were alternative modes reserved precisely for such cases, 
and common sense suggests that Makassarese rulers would have found these 
far more attractive than treating the Company as a South Sulawesian “insider.”
The presence of outsiders in the Makassarese community further necessita-
ted internationally organised administration of justice at the individual level.98 
Resink finds examples of this in the 1637, 1660, and 1667 Bongaya Treaty.99 We 
need not go into details here, but besides demonstrating the existence of speci-
fic institutions arising from the cosmopolitan nature of Makassar, it is impor-
tant to note that the Company would fall under this category.
97 Ibid. 47.
98 Ibid. 51. 
99 Ibid. 52.
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Besides the identification of both similarities and differences of internatio-
nal law in Makassar and Europe, Resink also points to instances of Company 
adoption of local institutions and usages. One I have mentioned already, 
namely the appointing of a license master to meet the function of the shahban-
dar. Another example to which Resink draws attention is the habit of naming 
the treaty after the name of place where it was concluded100, which is a weaker 
case, considering that this was a European custom too. But another feature 
pointed out, namely the gradation of different types of relationships between 
treaty partners101 is particularly interesting when placed alongside Andaya’s 
propositions. Referring to Cense, Resink states that in the Makassarese system, 
“relationships could range from a “footing of equality” to various degrees of 
subservience and dependence.102 That the Company adopted this system is evi-
dent from the Company’s subsequent practice of employing the same variety 
of relationship types in its treaties with other local rulers.103
As we have seen, Andaya emphasises that South Sulawesian treaties typi-
cally specified the nature of the relationship between the treating parties in the 
preamble. The fact that naming the type of relationship also made further 
explication of the reciprocal rights and obligations redundant further distin-
guished the South Sulawesian tradition from the European. Resink’s demon-
stration of the Company’s adoption of certain local treaty elements, however, 
weakens Andaya’s argument about the absolute dichotomy between the 
“Western and South Sulawesian treaties.” If elements from one tradition could 
be integrated into the other, there must have been some sort of compatibility. 
Such part-by-part adoption is blocked in Andaya’s structural assumptions.
It is important to note the contrast between Resink’s and Andaya’s views on 
the possibility of cultural exchange more generally, as they represent diametri-
cally opposite approaches. By proposing an absolute antagonism between the 
South Sulawesian and Western European modes of conceptualisation, Andaya 
presupposes an insurmountable barrier to learning by exchange between the 
two modes. Resink’s proposition of compatibility opens the possibility that 
such cultural exchanges could in fact take place. To which degree the Company 
adopted local practices I shall not consider here, but I would argue for a 
100 Referring to Cense, “Enige aantekeningen,” and using the Bongaya Treaty as a prime example.” Ibid. 42.
101 Ibid. 42–43.
102 Ibid. 42.
103 Ibid. 42–43.
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broadening of Resink’s implicit proposition of cultural borrowing in a general 
direction, and propose that adaptation to Asian contexts was a hallmark of the 
Company’s diplomacy.
Section conclusion
Resink sums up the aim of his article in the following manner: “that a know-
ledge of the history of non-European international law thus in this case the 
specific international law of Indonesia … can in its turn help to free our know-
ledge of the history of international law in general from its emphatically 
European stamp.”104 This is a statement of a programmatic anti-Eurocentric 
comparative methodology.
Andaya is also anti-Eurocentric, but from diametrically different compara-
tive assumptions. Resink identifies both similarities and differences between 
the systems and practices of international law in early modern Europe and 
Indonesia, and operates from assumptions of compatibility that allow for an 
analysis of mutual influence. The latter is barred in Andaya’s contrasting 
approach of structural incompatibility. Which point of view encourages the 
most fruitful interpretation of the nature of the Company’s diplomatic method, 
and which is the more fruitful in analysing the nature of Makassar-Company 
interaction? I shall restrict myself to summarising how my own propositions 
look if we take the contrast between Resink’s and Andaya’s positions as our 
point of departure.
First, the examples of similarity in Resink’s comparison weaken Andaya’s 
propositions of an absolute dichotomy between the Company’s and local per-
ceptions of diplomatic interaction. Second, the particular institutions of inter-
national law that Resink identifies in the Makassarese system lessen the 
likelihood that it would have restricted itself to local endogenous models of 
interaction in its dealings with the Company. Third, the Company’s adoption 
of local elements of international law could probably be regarded as examples 
of a policy of Company accommodation rooted in a general pragmatic 
approach.
In the following, I build on all these propositions. There was some compati-
bility between the Makassarese and the Company’s perceptions of 
104 Resink, Indonesia’s History between the Myths, 56.
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international law, and thus structural space for meaningful communication 
between them. Makassar was not confined to one single model as far as its 
dealings with the Company went. As a harbour state, the Makassarese had 
developed a system of international law that offered structural space and insti-
tutions in which the Company could be categorised as an “outsider” on par 
with other outsiders. But it was neither the first nor the most important one.
Section 3: Two views on Makassarese dynamism
In this section I present two views on Makassarese dynamism, mainly repre-
sented by William Cummings and Anthony Reid. The former holds that there 
was dynamism in early modern Makassar, particularly embedded in the 
coming of writing, whereas the latter also subscribes to that there were dyna-
mics and change, but primarily sees this in conjunction with expansion in 
trade and cultural contacts. More importantly the two differ in the contents 
and nature of the dynamics. Whereas as Cummings sees it as a change that 
gives a new forms and meanings to existing “traditional” structures, Reid 
interprets the changes he finds as parts of a process towards more “modern” 
structures. I shall clarify their respective positions, with a particular focus on 
Reid and the implications his positions on dynamics of modernity has for 
Andaya’s propositions.
Cummings is not alone in countering propositions of societies in the Eastern 
archipelago as “self-perpetuating systems.” Hans Hägerdal for one has argued 
change and dynamism in Timor, subscribing it to increased income from tra-
de.105 Gerrit Knaap has done the same for Ambon, subscribing increasing 
dynamism to increased outside contacts and the number of people with expe-
rience with the outside world.106
Cummings singles himself out in that he declares himself in opposition to 
the all-embracing and exclusive status he thinks Reid gives to commerce as the 
driving force of historical dynamics.107 He sets out to analyse the beginning of 
written manuscripts in the beginning 16th century, as the motor of a particular 
social and cultural change, or as he calls it: “a shift in historical consciousness.”108 
105 Hägerdal 2012, 55.
106 Knaap 2004, 12-13.
107 Cummings, 2002, 127.
108 Cummings, 2002, 12.
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With the introduction of writing, custom was now no longer perceived as 
resting with the elders, but in written manuscripts.109 Thus “custom” was codi-
fied into “culture.”110 Cultural codification along with an increased strengthe-
ning of the social hierarchy and political centralisation were the big processes 
that were facilitated by literacy.111
As one of the changes brought with the transition to literacy was an increa-
sed importance put on ancestors or the written past, with it came a new emp-
hasis on genealogies.112 A curious by-product of this was the creative 
fabrications of them where parents for instance would put Arung Palakka into 
their genealogies.113
On a more general level the changes that writing brought to Makassarese 
society were firstly, an enhanced authority to those who possessed written 
texts, be it genealogies or histories, and a change of view on past and present 
(by the enhanced weight put on genealogies for instance, and that the past 
came to be viewed as something that could be possessed (by manuscripts or 
objects). Put together these changes extended and refined the social hierarchy 
in a direction that later came to be viewed as “classical.”114 That proposition is 
the key point in my context. For, if literacy brought about profound changes in 
Makassarese mentality, perception and world view,115 it was a change that 
cemented structures that were still “traditional” in the sense that it was looking 
backwards into a reconstructed past. For Cummings, the Makassarese dyna-
mics lay in the increased emphasis and reconstruction of that past. As already 
stated, Reid’s interpretation of the early modern dynamics in Makassar is that 
it is “modern”, in the sense that it is perceived in perceptions about the future.
Reid on Makassarese dynamism
Christian Pelras stresses as characteristic of the Bugis their ability in cultural 
borrowing of novelties from the outside, particularly brought about by exter-
nal contact and trade which up to the 19th century “produced by a continuous 
109 Cummings, 2002, 169, 170, 172.
110 Cummings, 2002, 177.
111 Cummings, 2002, 195.
112 Cummings, 2002, 104.
113 Cummings, 2002 106.
114 Cummings, 2002, 126.
115 Cummings, 2002, 11.
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process of change.”116 This dynamics by cultural borrowing concerned almost 
every area of Bugis life – customary law, socio-political rules, customs, rites 
and creeds.117 
Reid points to similar dynamic traits, although possibly more restricted to 
the ruling elite, but nonetheless depicted as a general trait in Makassar from 
the end of the sixteenth until the second half of the seventeenth centuries. As 
examples of innovations and changes in this dynamic period Reid mentions 
that in the wake of an incident with the Dutch in 1615 the then sultan Alauddin 
and his first minister Matoaya118 started to build brick walls for defence purpo-
ses. It was done in a European fashion which marked “a sharp break with older 
Indonesian methods of warfare.”119 Matoaya also had the forts Ujung Pandag 
and Pannakkukang built, and there were innovations in the manufacture of 
cannons and small muskets, as well as technical innovations in shipbuilding. 
There were also innovations in the minting of gold and lead.120 Supporting the 
picture of an innovative culture and inquisitiveness was that there were trans-
lations into Makassarese of technical treatises from Spanish, Portuguese, 
Turkish, and Malay authorities, as well as map making.121 Reid also holds forth 
that the shift to Islam should be regarded as a (cultural) innovation.122
With respect to the population growth in Makassar, the rise is estimated to 
be from only a few thousands in the 1590s to about 25,000 in 1615 and 
100,000 at its peak 1640-1660, and is taken as an overall indication of the 
seventeenth century’s economic growth and dynamism.123 On the one hand it 
is clear that this growth can be considered part of the general growth in mari-
time Southeast Asia in the early modern period,124 the question is how the 
inventiveness of the Makassarese can be explained. According to Reid it 
sprang from the nature of the Makassarese leadership at the time, which 
116 Pelras, 1996, 149.
117 Pelras, 1996, 150.
118 See: section 2, chapter 1.
119 Reid, Anthony, “A great seventeenth century Indonesian family: Matoaya and Pattingalloang of 
Makassar”, Masyarakat Indonesia, 8/1, 1-28, 1981, 11.
120 Reid, 1981, 12.
121 Reid in Tol et al., eds., 2000, 60.
122 Reid, 1981, 13.
123 Reid inTol et al., eds., 2000, 58.
124 See: Reid, Anthony, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680, vol. 2: Expansion and Crisis, 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.
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demonstrated an “unusual aptitude …. for adopting new ideas and 
technologies.”125
The nature of late sixteenth and seventeenth-century 
leadership in Makassar
As for Matoaya, ruler of Tello and chancellor of Goa 1593-1637, Noorduyn 
praises his sensible politics as for instance in his non- offensive, conciliatory 
policy towards Bone during the Islam-wars.126 It is also necessary to notice that 
Sultan Alauddin was both a nephew and pupil of Matoaya.127 Reid evaluates 
both Matoaya and his son Pattingalloang as possessing an extraordinary com-
bination of intellectual eminence and political wisdom.128 While a lot of the 
innovations mentioned above can be ascribed to the initiatives of Matoaya, as 
for intellectual orientations and cultural openness Pattingalloang deserves 
some more detailed comments.
Pattingalloang
Indicative of Pattingalloang’s openness and intellectual curiosity is that he was 
exceptionally fluent in Portuguese and Spanish, and had a library of European 
books. He also showed an interest in applied mathematics.129 In Reid’s evalua-
tion it is certain that Pattingalloang’s role in Makassar, seen in the light of his 
interest in European science, mathematics, and astronomy, “influenced the 
culture of Makassar in this period, and lay behind many of the innovations to 
which it gave rise.”130 Also by the VOC there was appreciation of this man of 
the “Makassarese enlightenment”, as Reid calls him.131
After Pattingalloang’s death in 1654 and with the succession of Sultan 
Hasanuddin, according to Reid, there was a change of system of government. 
125 Reid in Tol et al., eds., 2000, 58.
126 Noorduyn, 1955, 98.
127 Pelras, 1996, 135.
128 Reid, 1981, 3.
129 Reid, 1981, 20-21.
130 Reid, 1981, 22. I should also make a reference to Tristan Mostert’s contribution: “Ik vertrauwe dat de 
wereldtbhem naar dien twee polen keert” in Lodewijk Wagenaar (ed): Aan de opverkant: Ontmoetingen 
in dienst van de VOC en WIC, 1600-1800 (Leiden: 2015), 77-96, who paints a vivid picture of 
Pattingalloang’s quest for knowledge.
131 Reid in Tol et al., eds., 2000, 60. “a man of great knowledge, science and understanding.”
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Goa and Tello were unable to agree who should be the Chancellor, Hasanuddin 
himself, or one of two of the sons of Pattingalloang, Karaeng Sumana or 
Karaeng Karunrung.132 In the end Hasanuddin decided to be his own chan-
cellor, which meant the end of the division of Sultan and chancellor in 
Makassar.133 Reid reckons Hasanuddin to be a “weak” character and he marks 
the beginning of his reign as the start of the demise of Makassarese dyna-
mism.134 But returning briefly to the role of the exceptionally able rulers and 
advisors just discussed, I shall now turn to the structural factors that Reid 
points to as crucial for explaining Makassarese dynamism during their reigns.
Structural factors
Besides the luck of quality in the two chancellors, Matoaya and his son 
Pattingalloang, Reid primarily points to the capacity to attract trade and tra-
ders; by providing security of life and property and by offering an open society 
as structural factors behind Makassarese dynamism.135 There were also other 
structural factors such as the concept of contract as being closely related to a 
typical pluralistic political assumption, which gave the Bugis and Makassarese 
communities the readiness to regulate their affairs by contracts between two 
parties, each recognising the other’s rights.136 The position and role of the 
Portuguese may serve as an example in both the general openness and security 
of property and business transactions.
There is no doubt that the Portuguese in Makassar were the main providers 
of arms and gunpowder and the main agents of diffusion of Western written 
books and on such various subjects as fort building, artillery, mathematics, 
astronomy, geography and cartography, some of which were translated into 
Makassar and Bugis.137 When the Portuguese in Makassar chose to stay on, it 
seems reasonable not only to contribute this to the security provided for pro-
perty and business, but also to an environment of religious toleration.
132 Reid in Tol et al., eds., 2000, 70-71.
133 Reid, 1981, 26.
134 Reid in Tol et al., eds., 2000, 70.
135 Reid in Tol et al., eds., 2000, 61.
136 Reid in Tol et al., eds., 2000, 64.
137 Pelras, 1996, 141.
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After the shift to Islam there was toleration of Portuguese Christian wors-
hip, four new places,138 as well as the presence of Franciscans, Jesuits and 
Dominicans.139 According to Reid, Makassar stands out as “the most striking 
example of religious tolerance in a generally tolerant archipelago.”140 This tole-
ration he proposes could be regarded as an aspect of Makassar’s general wel-
come to foreigner traders.141
A seventeenth century cultural shift with “modern” 
implications?
Reid’s positions on Makassarese dynamism, is that it on the one hand formed 
part of a pattern of global integration where Southeast Asia as other cultures 
after 1500 came into continuous contact with each other “with an intensity not 
previously imagined.”142 By an unusual luck of able leaders, and wise policies 
establishing structural conditions promoting trade and technological as well as 
cultural innovations, a dynamism sprang forth which made the Makassar 
chronicle read like a “litany of innovations.”143
Reid clearly indicates that these innovations might be part of a greater shift 
in mentality, and then in the direction of “modernity” in a broad definition of 
the term which would include a direction towards a more pragmatic approach 
to myth and religion. Models taken over from the Dutch, under Pattinggaloang, 
in the writing of “state diaries”, which recorded state events, chronologically, 
with dates both in the Christian as well as the Islamic form, Reid takes as an 
example of this.144 But the phenomenon was by no means entirely new: The 
chronicles of Tello and Goa reveal that the authors had no doubt about the 
concept of progress, states Reid145 and goes on to label the nature of the histo-
rical writing of Tello and Makassar as an indicator of the open nature of 
Makassarese society in the seventeenth century: “If one of the key features of 
138 Reid, 1983, 139.
139 Reid, 1981, 18, and Reid in Tol et al eds., 2000, 60.
140 Reid, 1981 18.
141 Reid in Tol et al., eds., 2000, 58.
142 Reid: “Early Modernity as Cosmopolis: Some Suggestions from Southeast Asia”, in Sven Trakulhum 
and Ralph Weber (eds.), Delimiting Modernities - Conceptual
143 Reid, 2015, 135.
144 Reid, 2015, 136.
145 Reid in Tol et al., eds., 2000, 59.
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an “Open society” is historical writing concerned to preserve past events rather 
than to construct a state mythology, to portray the dealings between states 
rather than asserting the superiority of one of them, to record disasters as well 
as triumphs, the chronicles of Goa and of Talloq get high marks.”146
The picture that Reid paints of Makassarese dynamism stands in opposition 
to the tendencies towards a new and enhanced “traditionalism” portrayed by 
Cummings. One may thus wonder whether Knaap’s criticism that Reid is 
making it “too macro economically rational”147 when describing the motives of 
Southeast Asian leaders when engaging in war - whether he is not making the 
same anachronistic misjudgement in describing Makassarese dynamism.
I shall not approach this issue on a general basis, but point by way of exam-
ple that even if Cummings is right on the general level, Reid’s propositions 
about seventeenth-century Makassarese dynamism are primarily about mem-
bers of the leadership in a restricted period of time. For all its merits or faults 
the argument is of vital importance in our context because these were the peo-
ple that the Company was negotiating and concluding treaties and waging war 
and concluding peace with. It simply strongly implies that the Makassarese 
leadership had a certain grip on the motives and modes of operation of their 
Dutch adversaries.
Section 4: The structure of the argument
In chapters 1 and 2, I have introduced my topic and presented propositions in 
the historiography as well as stated my own positions. The remaining chapters 
are dedicated to an empirical analysis of the Company’s diplomatic thinking 
and practice. Chapter 3 introduces my empirical counter-argument to catego-
risations of VOC diplomacy as “Eurocentrically dogmatic” by demonstrating 
that, even in the Republic people were aware that European concepts and stan-
dards of diplomacy did not necessarily apply in the charter area. On analysing 
the respective Generale Instructies sent from the Heeren XVII in the Republic 
to the High Government in Batavia, with an emphasis on the last and final 
instruction of 1650, my conclusion is that not only the latter, but all these 
146 Reid in Tol et al., eds., 2000, 61.
147 Knaap. Gerrit: “Kora-kora en kruitdamp – De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in oorlog en vrede 
in Ambon”, in Knaap, Gerrit, and Teitler (eds.) De Verenigde Oost- Indische Compagnie tussen Oorlog 
en Diplomatie (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2002), 257-279. 279.
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instructions either imply or openly stress adaptation to local modes and cir-
cumstance in a way that defies any categorisation of them as dogmatically 
Eurocentric. The key message in the Heeren XVII’s General instructions to the 
High Government is one of awareness of local particularities as the basis for 
the conduct of pragmatic diplomacy. In a brief section on the Directors’ parti-
cular patriase letters on Makassar I demonstrate that these conform to the 
general picture.
The encounter between the Company and Makassar in 1637 that ended up 
with the first treaty between the two forms the topic of chapter 4. Here I refute 
Andaya’s argument of structurally conditioned diplomatic miscommunication 
between the Company and Makassar. By analysing Van Diemen’s report on the 
encounter and process of treaty making with Sultan Alauddin, I demonstrate 
that the Company’s approach in the negotiations was one of adaptive pragma-
tism. Not only that, the Makassarese reactions and proposals bear witness to the 
fact that there was functional communication between the two parties. Although 
the 1637 encounter was characterised by mutual suspicions and uncertainty, 
Sultan Alauddin and Van Diemen were in essence playing a diplomatic game by 
compatible rules, and both seem to have been were well aware of it.
In chapter 5, I turn to the discussion on policy within the High Government 
itself. The topic is the disagreement between Governor- General Maetsuyker 
and Superintendent Arnold de Vlaming in 1655 on whether to take a hard- or 
a soft stand towards Sultan Hasanuddin. The analysis is primarily based on 
Maetsuyker’s presentation of the reasons for his rejection of De Vlaming’s 
hard-line approach to the Heeren XVII in Maetsuyker’s general letter of 
December 24, 1655.148
In his defence of the soft approach, Maetsuyker systematically presents De 
Vlaming’s arguments point by point. Ironically, the discussion on the one hand 
gives us an insight into their disagreement on policy, but although the two men 
disagreed, they also shared some basic tenets, for example about the goals. The 
disagreement was over assumptions and means, and was based on diametri-
cally different perceptions of Sultan Hasanuddin’s character and plans. 
Maetsuyker trusted that Hasanuddin had learnt his lesson and would not 
148 December 24, 1655, in W. Ph. Coolhaas, Generaele Missiven van Gouverneurs- Generaal en Raden aan 
Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, vol. 3, 1655–74 (’s Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1968), 4–8. 
(Hereafter GM.)
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interfere in the Moluccas anymore, while De Vlaming, distrusting the Sultan, 
was convinced that he would.
Equally important, the very existence of this disagreement and discussion 
weakens propositions about the Company as a monolithic body. The fact is 
that the issue of whether to take a “soft” or a “hard” stand against Makassar was 
the subject of discussion in Batavia, and that the arguments from both sides 
were presented to the Heeren XVII, shows that the Company’s diplomacy was 
flexible and reactive rather than dogmatic. Moreover, both sides based their 
arguments on contextual considerations rather than fixed legal principles.
As for dynamics and trends in the High Government’s deliberations on 
Makassar, there is a decisive break after 1655 away from “soft diplomacy.” With 
the disillusionment after the conclusion of the 1655 treaty there came a gro-
wing belief that a lasting contractual order with Makassar could not be estab-
lished unless it was preceded by a complete military victory. I elaborate on this 
shift in chapter 6, where I treat the change in policy assumptions from 1656 to 
1661 as they can be read from the Generale Missiven in that period. A close 
reading of the sections on policy towards Makassar reveals how Batavian deci-
sions on diplomacy towards Makassar formed a “learning process” based on 
experience on the ground. This runs counter to propositions of fixity, whether 
of a cultural-conceptual or legalist-dogmatist kind. The Company was able to 
both learn from experience and readjust its approach according to lessons 
learned. The determining factor in policy decisions and shifts of approach in 
Batavia lay predominantly in changing assessments of tactical opportunity and 
other constraints. In other words, policy deliberations in Batavia were based 
on evaluations of context more than legal text. Flexibility moulded by contex-
tual considerations stand out as a characteristic of the High Government’s 
decisions on policy.
In chapter 7 I pursue the argument about the contextual focus and dynamic 
nature of the Company’s diplomatic approach presented in chapter 6, albeit 
from a more concrete and specific point of view. Contrasting the treaties of 
1637 and 1655 on the one hand and the treaty of August 1660 on the other, I 
demonstrate how the general learning and adjustment process outlined in 
chapter 6 is reflected in a move towards a more constructivist perception of 
“treaty” by the High Government after 1655.
Chapter 8 takes this one step further in that it analyses the construction of 
Company hegemony treaty in the respective post-1660 treaty texts up to and 
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including the Bongaya Treaty of 1667 and the one with Tello in 1668. By situa-
ting the treaties analysed in both these chapter in their respective contexts and 
varying expectations towards the Makassarese, I demonstrate three essential 
interconnected characteristics of Batavia’s treaty making. First, legal thinking 
and appeals to principles of international law played a limited and very nar-
rowly defined role in all these treaties. Second, the difference between the con-
tracts, both in the selection and contents of the regulations, as well as in the 
mode of formulating the clauses, can all be explained by variations in the 
appreciation of the context and changes in the Company’s expectations towards 
Makassar.
Symptomatic of Batavia’s devaluation of its trust in the Makassarese after 
1655 is that not only was the number of clauses of the 1660 treaty increased 
significantly, they were far more detailed and specific than they had been pre-
viously. This elaboration would reach its acme with the Bongaya Treaty. These 
traits, including an almost ritually repetitive insistence on the binding nature 
of the treaty, do not reflect a “legalist obsession” on the part of the Company; 
they were meant as safeguards against a breach of contract. The contents and 
form of the 1660 treaty thus reflect a move towards a more realistic and pos-
sibly cynical perception of treaty making compared to the High Government’s 
assumptions and beliefs in 1655.
The difference between the 1660 and 1667 contracts reflects the fact that the 
latter was drafted in the aftermath of a total military victory for the Company 
and its allies and the unconditional surrender of the Makassarese. The Bongaya 
Treaty was part of a treaty complex that included not only Makassar but the 
other states in South Sulawesi and the outer islands. Together this treaty com-
plex made up a system whereby the Company was hegemon. The 1660 treaty 
on the other hand was a bilateral one that represented a “middle ground” as far 
as the Company’s political status was concerned.
Speelman’s reflections on how to maintain the hegemonic position created 
by the Bongaya treaty complex, as recorded in his Notitie of 1669,149 forms the 
149 Cornelis Speelman: Notitie dienende voor eenen corten tijt en tot nader last van de Hooge Regeeringe 
op Batavia, tot naarrigtinge van de Onderkoopman Jan van den Oppijnen, bij provisie gesteldt tot 
Opperhooft en Commandant in ‘t Casteel Rotterdam, op Maccasser, en van den Capitain Jan Fransz; 
als hoofd over de Militie, mitsgaders die van den Raadt, anno 1669. VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek 
Makassar 1671, fols. 684–1007 (Hereafter “Notitie.”) I have had immense help by comparing the origi-
nal source with the typed manuscript undertaken by W. Ph. Coolhaas and Dr. H. J. de Graaf in 1949–
50, now at the KITLV (Nr. H 802).
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topic of chapter 9. The Notitie, some 600 folio pages long, contains both a 
broad and detailed geographical and political mapping of Sulawesi and the 
outer islands, as well as detailed instructions on the running of the Company’s 
colonial headquarters, Fort Rotterdam. I shall be concentrating on Speelman’s 
presentation of the challenges of hegemonic rule and his advice on how to 
meet them as his reflections on these points mainly cover surveys of who is 
and is not trustworthy and recommended modes of diplomatic action. Chapter 
9 constitutes a reconstruction of Speelman’s “overseas diplomatic model” with 
a focus on these aspects of it.
“Reconstruction” is the keyword here, because one of my basic points is that 
Speelman worked on a case-by-case basis and never presented a general model 
of overseas diplomacy. His “model of diplomacy” thus must be constructed 
from his specific advice.
It is also important to note that Speelman’s case-based approach was depen-
dent on getting precise and accurate information about local affairs. The Notitie 
typically abounds with an insistence that good overseas diplomacy depend on 
obtaining accurate information. This insistence on basing decisions and choice 
of action on extensive empirical information is one of two factors that stand 
out as general traits of Speelman’s approach towards overseas diplomacy in the 
Notitie. The other is his reliance on agency and personal diplomacy. Clearly 
working from, but never elaborating on, the assumption that local diplomacy 
had a strong personal bias, Speelman’s analysis of local power contexts and the 
tactical space it left for Company influence and control is focused on the per-
sonality traits of men who are in, or aspire to, power. The personalised approach 
may be explained by the overall purpose of preempting the rise of foes and 
keeping the bonds of alliance with old and new allies in a political environ-
ment built on personal charisma and bonds.
Context also played a part in Speelman’s political perspective, though it 
seems to be subsidiary to agency. Chapter 9 consequently has two parts. In the 
first, I analyse Speelman’s thinking regarding the institutional dimension of the 
hegemonic order, and in the second I look at his recommendations vis-à-vis 
personal diplomacy. Both sections reveal an “open” and unprejudiced approach 
towards overseas diplomacy. With ups and downs, and some counter-cases, I 
still hold that this attitude and approach stands out as a general, but increas-
ingly marked feature of the Company’s diplomatic performance towards 
Makassar between 1637 and 1667.
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On the primary sources
The material I use for my reconstruction of the Company’s model of overseas 
diplomacy comprises documents that were produced at various levels of, and 
served separate functions in, the Company hierarchy. The reconstruction of 
diplomatic mode as initially devised by the Heeren XVII, the patriase model of 
overseas diplomacy, which is dealt with in chapter 3, is primarily based on the 
General Instructions from the Heeren XVII of 1609, 1613, 1617, 1632, and 
1650, as well as a selection of comments on Makassar in their particular letters 
to the High Government.150 The discussion of the nature of the Company’s per-
ceptions about Makassar, and the nature of the communication between 
Makassar and the Company, analysed in chapter 4, are primarily based on Van 
Diemen’s report on the negotiations in Makassar, June 24– 26, 1637,151 and 
secondarily on the treaty text itself, as compiled by Heeres.152 For the discussi-
ons over policy towards Makassar and the policy assumptions of the 1655 
treaty, I rely mainly on the advice concerning Makassar in the Heeren XVII’s 
General Instructions of 1650. For the difference of opinion between Maetsuyker 
and De Vlaming, I rely on Maetsuyker’s Generale missive of December 24, 
1655.153
As for the shift after 1655 from the optimistic view that the Makassarese 
could be trusted not to interfere in the Moluccas, to the more realistic view that 
the Makassarese would interfere if not deterred, analysed in chapter 6, I rely 
mainly on the information on Makassar found in the Generale Missiven of the 
period 1656–61.
150 “Instructie voor Pieter Both, Gouverneur Generaal en die van den Raad van Indiën,” November 14, 
1609; 
 “Ordonnancie en Instructie voor den Gouverneur Generaal en den Raden van India,” August 22, 1617; 
“Punten en artikelen, in Forma van Instructie, voor Hendrik Brouwer, Gouverneur en Generaal en de 
Raden van Indië,” March 17, 1632; and “Punten en artikelen in form van Generale Instructie voor den 
Gouverneur Generaal en de bijvoegde Raden,” April 26, 1650, all in Pieter Mijer, Verzameling van 
instructiën, ordonnanciën en reglementen voor de regering van Nederlandsch Indië, vastgesteld in de jaren 
1609, 1617, 1632, 1650, 1807, 1815, 1818, 1827, 1830 en 1836, met de ontwerpen der Staats-commissie 
van 1803 en historische aanteekeningen (Batavia: Lands-drukkerij, 1848).
151 “Verhaell vant gene d’Heer Generaall van Diemmen wedervaren is zyjne Amboijnesche voijage int 
weder keeren voor Macassar,” June 22–26, 1637, in Dagh- register gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant 
passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India. Anno 1637, edited by H. T. Colenbrander 
(’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1899), 280–89. (Hereafter, DRB.)
152 “Treaty of peace between the king of Makassar and the noble Gentleman General Governor Antonio 
van Diemen, June 26, 1637.” Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.303–306.
153 December 24, 1655, GM 3.4–8.
114
chap ter 2
The nature and dynamics of the High Government’s treaty making with 
Makassar in the period 1637 to 1668 in chapters 7 and 8 are based on the texts 
of the contracts, as compiled by Heeres and Stapel in the Corpus Diplomaticum 
Neerlando-Indicum. The ninth chapter in which I reconstruct the diplomatic 
model implicit in Cornelis Speelman’s advice for his successors as the 
Company’s leading representative in Makassar is wholly based on his Notitie.
The nature of the primary sources and method
The sources on which I base my analysis range from the Directors’ orders sent 
from the Republic to the on-the-spot decisions and deliberations on policy in 
Batavia. The documents span from Instructions from the Heeren XVII to the 
Company’s authorities in Asia, to reports from Company servants in the char-
ter area (octrooigebied) to Batavia. And not the least, my sources include the 
product of these diplomatic negotiations, the written contracts or treaties 
themselves.
The sources I use have admittedly all been used before, but not for the same 
primary purposes, and neither have they been used in the way that I have. I do 
not intend to use my sources as building blocks in a general reconstruction of 
interaction. That has been done before. I treat and analyse my relevant docu-
ments to find indications about a mode of thinking about diplomatic practice 
in a cross-cultural setting. Therein lies the originality of this study. The method 
that follows from this approach is to read these documents closely to see what 
they may reveal about the Company’s diplomatic mind. There is nothing fancy 
about my method. It is simply based on close reading of meaning and intent in 
these official documents with the aim to establish characteristic traits and typi-
cal dynamics in the Company’s assumptions and thinking about its diplomatic 
practice towards Makassar in the seventeenth century. Using Company–
Makassarese interaction as a case study, it goes by definition that I also intend 
to say something about the nature of the Company’s seventeenth-century 
overseas diplomacy on a more general level.
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The model of overseas 
diplomacy in the Heeren 
XVII’s Generale Instructies 
and the advice on Makassar 
in the particular letters
Section 1: Chapter introduction
Chapter topic
During the Company’s existence, five sets of General Instructions were sent 
from the Heeren XVII in the Republic to the High Government in the charter 
area, namely the Generale Patriase Instructies of 1609, 1613, 1617, 1632, and 
1650, respectively.1 These were meant to serve as general manuals for the 
Company’s operations in Asia. The 1613 Instructions is reprinted in the third 
volume of Pieter van Dam’s Bescryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie,2 and 
all the others have been preserved and compiled by P. Mijer.3
Chapteraim
All these instructions were primarily concerned with the conduct of trade, but 
the Company’s trade was always intertwined with politico- diplomatic impli-
cations. Advice on how to act towards local rulers in the charter area was thus 
1 See “On the primary sources”, above.
2 F. W. Stapel (ed.) 's Gravenhage, Matinus Nijhoff, 1943, 544-556.
3 In: Mijer, Verzameling van instruction, 1848.
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also offered in the instructions. The General Instructions may therefore serve 
as a source of the Directors’ ideas about the politico-diplomatic dimension of 
trade. My aim in this chapter is to reconstruct how the Directors’ thinking on 
overseas diplomacy was reflected in their explicit advice and implicit assump-
tions in their comments on how the High Government should act when dea-
ling with respective rulers and states in Asia. As for the Directors’ comments 
on Makassar in their particular letters, I have primarily checked these to see to 
what degree they conform to the thinking in the general instructions.
Chapter propositions
Already in 1965, Charles Boxer noted of the 1650 Instructions that in the areas 
where the Company held no territorial rights or privileges by exclusive treaty, 
which comprised by far the largest part of its area of operation, the Company 
was instructed to proceed in a conciliatory and accommodating manner.4 In 
this chapter I propose that pragmatic adjustment to local conditions and con-
text constituted the basic approach not only in the advice on diplomacy in the 
1650 Instructions, but was a recurring feature in all the instructions from 1609 
to 1650. Not only that, I argue that the imperative to act pragmatically and 
accommodate grew proportionally with the expansion of the Company’s trade 
area. Implicit in this proposition of pragmatism is a relative devaluation of the 
role of international law in the Company’s overseas diplomacy.
I argue that the Directors accorded a restricted and specific role of not only 
international law but also European legal concepts in their thinking and advice 
on overseas diplomacy. Legal theory was reserved as rules of conduct or legiti-
mising devices in two specific areas: Relations with other Europeans, and legi-
timation of the Company’s position as a territorial sovereign and exclusive 
privileged party. Elsewhere, one had to improvise without being legally com-
promised. The General Instructions consistently advocate a flexible and 
accommodating approach to overseas diplomacy based on an assumption that 
we now would label “cultural relativism.”
Pragmatism goes together with dynamics. The Directors’ “model” of  overseas 
diplomacy became increasingly insistent on the need for an open, flexible approach. 
Conversely, the stress on the need to adhere to principles of international law 
4 C. R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600–1800 (London: Hutchinson, 1965), 106.
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became more and more restricted. This tendency seems to have been proportional 
to the expansion of the Company’s area of operations, and thus invites the proposi-
tion that even in the Netherlands, views of overseas diplomacy reflected a learning 
process in which experience rather than legal theory explained the dynamics.
Two additional comments
Before I go on to present the structure of my argument, I would like to com-
ment on two points of criticism that were raised during my promotion.
A rebuttal to my critics about my interpretation of the 
role of international law in the Company’s diplomacy
In conjunction with my defense it was argued that the VOC acted as a macht-
staat in the Charter area, and that its empire in Asia was in fact an empire of 
law. The argument ran, in other words, that international law played a greater 
role than I was willing to admit. Neither at the time was I, nor am I as of today, 
willing to concede this point, or to moderate my propositions, at least not wit-
hout qualifications.
The validity of the proposition in which I underplayed the role of internatio-
nal law in the Company’s dealings with its local Asian partners all depends on 
what is meant by the concept “international law”. If by it we understand a sys-
tem of bi- or multinational agreements or treaties between two parties of a 
state nature, the VOC’s trade in Asia was certainly based on it, and on no point 
has my intention been to reject such a proposition.
The proposition I reject is a proposition of the nature of the body of the 
VOC treaty or contract practice with Asian counterparts, holding that it was 
based on particularly European principles of international law in a subtle way 
to make it generally unintelligible to the Company’s Asian partners. It is this 
interpretation of the Company’s use of “international law” as legally subtle and 
its propositions of incommensurability that I argue against. My argument 
about the pragmatic approach of the Company as well as my proposition about 
the functional understanding between the Company and the Makassarese rest 
on the propositions that the Company’s diplomatic practice, including its 
treaty-making, was pragmatically adapted to local circumstance, which in its 
turn made reciprocal understanding possible.
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The Role of Islam in Makassarese political thinking
Another point of criticism that was raised was that I underrated the influence 
of Islam in the political thinking of the Makassarese elite. The numerous 
appeals made to Islam by the Makassarese in the negotiations with the 
Company and the references to Islam in the contracts to support claims by the 
former could point to this. However, religion and politics were difficult to 
disentangle in seventeenth century maritime Islam.5 There is thus reason to 
claim that the Makassarese references to Islam equally probably sprang from 
concerns of power and prestige as from a genuinely religious mental matrix. In 
other words, the Makassarese religious claims could be understood as a politi-
cal message, and not exclusively as manifestations of a metaphysical or religi-
ous mentality or worldview. I thus propose that there was a secular, political 
dimension to the religious appeal by the Makassarese which constituted a sha-
red ground for understanding between the Sultanate and the Company. My 
point is that the religious dimension in the thinking of the Makassarese did not 
block such understanding and meaningful communication.
Plan of exposition and analysis
My analysis is split in two main parts. In the first part of the chapter I give an 
overview of context, general concerns, and the relative position of diplomacy in 
each of the General Instructions. In the second part, I conduct a more detailed 
textual analysis of the advice on overseas diplomacy in the 1650 Instructions, 
which ends up by pointing to continuities and changes as compared to prior 
ones. I have also added a brief section on the Directors’ comments on relations 
with Makassar in their particular letters to the High Government. I conclude by 
summarising the nature and dynamics in the Directors’ advice on diplomacy, 
ending up in a clarification of to what extent and under which conditions we 
may legitimately speak of a “diplomatic model” in the General Instructions.
Finally, I discuss whether it is possible to reconstruct an “ideological super-
structure” by which the Company’s commercial activity was legitimised by the 
non-commercial values of the Directors. Affirming this, I give some tentative 
5 Anthony Reid, “Islamization and Christianization in Sou theast Asia: The Critical Phase, 1550-1650”, 
in Reid (ed.), Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power, and Belief (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1993), 173. 
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characteristics of the nature of this ideological superstructure and its implica-
tions for the conduct of diplomacy.
As for my selection of examples of diplomatic interaction in the General 
Instructions, the Banda Islands and Ambon, as conquered Company possessi-
ons, fall outside diplomacy proper. The diplomatic interaction with other 
European parties could be viewed as “inter- European practice and parlour” 
brought overseas, and thus also falls outside the bounds “cross-cultural diplo-
macy” proper. I shall, therefore only briefly account for the advice given with 
respect to the Moluccas and relations with European enemies and rivals, and 
concentrate the analysis on the Directors’ advice concerning the interaction with 
independent Asian rulers. Regarding the comments and advice on Makassar in 
the particular patriase letters, I have placed these at the end of the chapter.
Method and issues
As for method, particularly in the textual analysis of the Instructions, I mainly apply 
close reading: What was the Directors’ meaning and intention in saying what they 
did - or did not say - regarding diplomatic interaction with Asian princes and rulers? 
From what assumptions about overseas diplomacy did these utterances spring?
Section 2: The respective General Instructions 
1609–50, and diplomacy’s role in them
The 1609 Instructions
The General Instructions of 1609 were written the same year that Habsburg 
Spain and the Dutch Republic signed the Twelve Years’ Truce. The final agre-
ement on the Dutch trade in Asia in the Twelve Years’ Truce was that the Dutch 
were allowed to trade anywhere outside the domains of the united Spanish-
Portuguese crown. In the Dutch Republic, however, there was little faith that 
the Spanish would honour this agreement. Besides, the agreement was not to 
become known in the charter area until one year after its original signing. In 
short, the 1609 General Instructions, although written at the outset of an 
armistice, were conceived with an eye to a condition of war with the Iberian 
powers.6 The situation during the Twelve Years’ truce has been called “an 
6 Mijer, Verzameling van Instructiën, viii.
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armed peace in Europe, and endemic conflict in Asia,”7 Another significant 
contextual factor should be mentioned: By 1609, the Company had not yet 
established an administrative bridgehead, a “general rendezvous” for Dutch 
merchants comparable to Portuguese Goa in the charter area.
Seen in terms of the Company’s internal development, the historical impor-
tance of the 1609 Generale Patriase Instructies is that they laid down the admi-
nistrative structure that was to last throughout the Company’s existence. 
Whereas before 1609 the final responsibility had lain with the admirals of the 
respective fleets, the 1609 Instructions introduced the institutions of the 
governor-general and the Council of the Indies.8 As far as the Directors’ hand-
ling of the topic of diplomacy in the 1609 Instructions was concerned, it can be 
split in two: Advice on how to handle European enemies and rivals, and advice 
on how to handle relations with Asian rulers. Neither of the two was given a 
separate heading, nor was “diplomacy” as such.
Issues, concerns, and diplomacy in the 1609 Instructions
The General Instructions of 1609 comprised forty-two articles in all. Articles 1 
through 7 laid down the institutional structure and procedures for the admi-
nistration of the Company in Asia. Articles 8–10 come the closest to offering 
general advice on diplomacy, covering both relations with local kings and 
princes as well as with the Portuguese. Article 8 introduces a section of advice 
on various specific issues; whereas article 9 deals with measures to be taken in 
Banten, then the centre of the VOC’s activities in Asia. Tellingly the emphasis 
is on information gathering, repeated in article 10 which calls for the pursuit 
of information on local affairs in general and the situation of the Portuguese in 
particular.9 Articles 8–10 could be regarded as an introductory section to the 
main body of advice on managing affairs in the places that the VOC operated 
in the charter area. The topical consistency is, however, interrupted by three 
articles concerning the nature of the “general rendezvous” and the role 
of  “predikanten,”10 and a longer section on private trade and the correct   
 keeping  of books.11 The latter is succeeded by a section comprising 
7 Blussé and de Moor, Nederlanders Overzee, 119.
8 See 1609 Instructions, arts. 1–8, Mijer, Verzameling van instructiën, 5–7.
9 1609 Instructions, arts. 8–10, ibid. 7–8.
10 1609 Instructions, arts. 11–13, ibid. 9–10.
11 1609 Instructions, arts. 14–19, ibid. 10 – 13.
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articles 22–37,12 which, except for two articles that give instructions on how to 
behave towards the Portuguese,13 are all devoted to specific advice on various 
places of operation. This section thus comprises by far the lengthiest part of the 
1609Instructions, as it would in the later ones. The focus of the final four arti-
cles turns to the running of the factory in Banten.14
Although the successive General Instructions after 1609 were to become 
increasingly encompassing and more structured, a general pattern of organisa-
tion is visible already in those of 1609, namely in the general division between 
matters of internal administration and order, and particular advice on respec-
tive places of operation. The section on particular places of trade always remai-
ned the largest, and although we find articles that include comments on 
overseas diplomacy in general, most of the advice on diplomacy is found in the 
respective sections on particular places of trade.
Recommendations for dealing with the Portuguese are a recurrent subject. 
In the 1609 Instructions the subject is treated in separate articles,15 but, more 
often than not, the subject of the Portuguese is treated in conjunction with the 
Moluccas or other areas of contest between the Company and the Portuguese. 
In none of the Instructions is diplomatic performance as such accorded a sepa-
rate section. If the advice on diplomacy in this sense bears a casuistic imprint,
the Directors also give clear note, that as for actual performance in diplo-
macy with local kings and princes, as in the case of trade, it must be up to the 
High Government to take the final decision. Thus reads, for instance, the mes-
sage in article 8, which makes the topical bridge between the section on the 
administration of the Company’s headquarters and the section on particular 
places of operation: “Regarding how you choose to handle other matters 
(i.e.  other than internal administration) government, trade, and alliances 
with  the Kings and Potentates in Asia, we cannot give you any standing 
 instructions, but only advise, instruct, and partly command as follows.”16
12 1609 Instructions, arts. 22–37, ibid. 13–19.
13 1609 Instructions, arts. 28–29, ibid. 16.
14 1609 Instructions, arts. 38–42, ibid. 19–21.
15 The 1609 Instructions marks an exception here, which must be explained by the particularity of the 
1609 context.
16 “Aangaande hoe gij U in andere zaken, de regering, commercie, trafique, mitsgaders de alliantiën met 
de Koningen en Pottentaten van Indië betreffende, zult hebben te gedragen, daaop kunnen wij U geene 
faste ordre stellen, maar alleen raadgeven, instrueren ok eensdeel ordonneren als volgt.” 1609 
Instructions, ibid. 7. For the same contents, see art. 21, ibid. 13.
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When the Directors proclaimed not to be in the position to offer specific 
advice on how to behave towards independent Asian rulers it was most likely 
because of a felt lack of information. Pointing in that direction is that they 
consistently stressed the need to gather information about local rulers and 
their external relations, particularly with the Portuguese.17 In this respect the 
Directors’ approach towards independent Asian rulers could be seen as “over-
seas diplomacy in the making.” If fragmentary and lacking in specificity, one 
permanent feature was established: Diplomatic performance had to be based 
on optimum knowledge of local goings-on.
The 1613 Instructions Context and general contents
Much of what applied to the 1609 instructions applied to the 1613  instructions, 
too. In the negotiations which ended in the twelve years armistice between the 
Republic and the Iberian powers the Directors had both been pressing for the 
conclusion of as many treaties of alliance with Asian princes as possible, as well 
as plans for a consolidation of the Company’s structure in the Charter area.18 The 
concerns for internal administrative consolidation is reflected in the 1613 
Instructions for instance in the relative number of articles related to the internal 
administration of the Company, which comes close to two thirds of the total (22 
out of 36 articles). Elsewise explicit concerns about forging alliances with Asian 
princes, implicitly also evident in the encouragement to gather information 
about local political affairs to that purpose, and lastly instructions to stand firm 
against the Iberian powers are main topics in the 1613 Instructions that all fall in 
line with the Directors overreaching aims in the first years after 1609.
General presentation of the contents in the 1613 
Instructions
The 1613 Instructions comprise thirty-six numbered articles,19 where the first 
article lay down rules for the constitution of the Council of the Indies, and the 
17 See particularly arts. 9 and 10, ibid. 7–9, see below for textual analysis.
18 J. van Goor: De Nederlandse Koloniën: Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse expansie, 1600-1975, Sdu 
Uitgevers, (1994) 1997, 46.
19 All the references to the General Instructions of 1613 are to the reprint of it in: F. W. Stapel (ed.): Pieter 
van Dam: Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie, Deerde boek, ‘S-Gravenhaage, 1943, 544-56. 
From now on: Stapel (ed.), 1943.
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final one simply declares the completion of the Instructions. The remaining 
thirty-four articles concern various topics as the authority of the governor-
general and the Council, to the maintenance of the Company’s ships. I shall 
briefly point out the issues and concerns in the respective articles before I go 
on to analyse comments made on diplomacy in the text more specifically.
The first article lays down the rules for the constitution of the Council of the 
Indies (note: 545),20 whereas article. 2 establishes the authority of the governor-
general and Council who are free to appoint the personnel, i.e. commanders, 
captains and soldiers at the respective forts. Article 3 concerns the administra-
tion of internal justice, whereas article 4 regulates the handling of fines and 
confiscations.21 Articles 5 and 6 concerns respectively, the oath of loyalty to be 
sworn by all officials22 and arrangements to be made when Company officials, 
governors etc., would come visiting where the governor-general might reside, 
or vice versa when the governor-general visited such authorities at their place 
of residence,23 whereas article 7 returns briefly to the administration of inter-
nal justice.
After having thus delimited various aspects of the Company’s internal orga-
nisation in Asia in the first seven articles, article 8 demonstrates the great space 
of authority placed in the hands of the governor-general and Council by the 
Directors, in that as for the issues to be treated in the rest of the Instructions, 
be they about other items of internal government, trade and diplomatic rela-
tions with kings or potentates in Asia, the Directors did not consider themsel-
ves in a state to give general orders, but would offer advice in the specific,24 
Article 9 instructs the governor-general and Council to obtain as updated and 
comprehensive information as possible on the state of affairs, and particularly 
the performance of the personnel in the Company’s service at respective other 
factories, outside Banten,25 and thus concerns the relationship between the 
governor-general and Council in Banten and the other factories.
The conduct of commerce and diplomatic dealings with Asian princes in 
general is mentioned in article 8 (546), as topics on which, as we saw above, the 
20 Stapel (ed.), 1943, 544-45.
21 Stapel (ed.), 1943, 545.
22 Stapel (ed.), 1943, 545-46.
23 Stapel (ed.), 1943, 546.
24 geen vaste ordre stellen, maar alleen raet geven, instrueren, oock eensdeel ordonneren als volght, Stapel 
(ed.), 1943, 546.
25 Stapel (ed.), 1943, 546.
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Directors considered themselves not to be able to offer general advice. Still, in 
article 10, diplomacy with the Asian rulers with whom the Company did trade 
is presented as a topic on its own, although not entirely, as the Asian princes’ 
relations with the Portuguese and thus the Company-Portuguese is the domi-
nant topic. I shall treat both these aspects of instructions on the Company’s 
diplomacy in more detail below.
To continue listing the content of the articles, article 11 covers the inter-
nal, administrative structure in a narrower perspective as it deals with the 
issue of where the Council should make its headquarters,26 whereas article 12 
concerns the internal running and coordination of the Company’s business, 
with instructions that when where to establish the headquarters has been 
decided, copies of the letters from the Directors in Patria should be sent to 
all the other Company factories in the Charter area.27 Article 13 treats 
another internal aspect of the Company’s settlement, namely where to post 
the respective schoolmasters and preachers sent over.28 A quite different 
matter, the overseeing of the respective factories, is the issue of articles no 14 
and 15, where a request to make an inventory of all the factory’s assets, and a 
general accounting book, is given with specifics in detail.29 Article 16 again 
deals with practical matters, but of a different nature, namely the loading and 
arrangements for placing the goods on the return fleet and how to avoid 
damages.30
In article 17 the Directors ask to be informed about the state of the Company’s 
ships and the eventual need for more ships in Asia, which is followed up by 
repeating the ban on private trade and sanctions for those breaking it in article 
18.31 The following article is about proper maintenance of the ships, which is 
followed up by an article on a quite different subject, as it gives instructions on 
how to go about trade, and also contains a paragraph regarding boosting 
morale and dedication to the Company’s cause.32
Article 21 will be analysed in more detail below as it exclusively and explicitly 
gives advice on how the Company should act towards Asian princes and thus on 
26 Stapel (ed.), 1943, 547
27 Stapel (ed.), 1943, 547-48.
28 Stapel (ed.), 1943, 548.
29 Stapel (ed.), 1943, 548-49.
30 Stapel (ed.), 1943, 549.
31 Stapel (ed.), 1943, 549.
32 Stapel (ed.), 1943, 550.
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the mode of the Company’s overseas diplomacy. The same goes for article 22 as 
it, in addition to dealing with the relations with Banten and complaints about the 
high tariffs demanded by the rulers of the Sultanate, also expresses concerns 
about what this harassment might do to the prestige and standing of the 
Company and thus indirectly comments on overseas diplomacy.
Advice on the diplomatic approach with respect to specific places and in 
conjunction with the approach of trade is also given in article 23, whereas the 
treatment of trade with China, in article 24, is solely focused on the possibili-
ties of trade and trade relations.33
Article 25 is another article that concerns a purely practical topic, namely an 
instruction to unload and fit out for return the ships coming in from Patria as 
quickly as possible because of the wear and tear on both ships and equipment 
when in Asian waters.34 The following article, article 26, is again about diplo-
macy, but not with Asian princes, as it returns to relations with the Portuguese 
and Spaniards. I shall treat this and all the other articles concerned with diplo-
macy in a separate section on diplomacy below.
Articles 27 and 28 establish the unrestricted authority of the governor- 
general and Council,35 which is logically followed up in article 29 by the requi-
rement that as the Governor-General Reynst had sworn to uphold the 
regulations in the Instructions before leaving Patria, the members of the 
Council, not yet having done so, should do likewise on arrival in Asia.36 Articles 
30 and 31 concern the reorganisation of the sailings for trade with Ambon and 
Banda, as well as China,37 whereas article 32 gives encouragements about the 
prospects for trade in sandalwood in Timor.38
Article 33 concerns an incident of the murder of a Company servant in 
Surat and how the Company should respond, but as this topic leads to reflec-
tions that carry advice on the mode of diplomacy, I shall analyse this aspect 
and article 33 in conjunction with the other articles which do the same.
In articles nos 34 and 35, the focus is again on internal issues as these  articles 
provide instructions on the succession procedure in case of the death of the 
33 Stapel (ed.), 1943, 551.
34 Stapel (ed.), 1943, 551-52.
35 Stapel (ed.), 1943, 552-53.
36 Stapel (ed.), 1943, 553.
37 Stapel (ed.), 1943, 553-54.
38 Stapel (ed.), 1943, 554.
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Governor-General Reynst, and practicalities concerning provisions for former 
members of the Council.39
On diplomacy in the 1613 Instructions
From the overview of topics given in the above paragraph, it could be said that 
as for relative volume, diplomacy plays a secondary role compared to the mat-
ters concerning the running and consolidation of the Company’s presence in 
the archipelago. But still there are some features in the treatment of diplomacy 
in the 1613 Instructions well worth commenting upon.
In chronological order, diplomacy, whether it is with Asian princes or the 
Portuguese or the two viewed together, appears in the 1613 Instructions in 
articles 8, 10, 21, 22, 23, 26 and 33. I shall first treat them in chronological 
order, and then see whether some general traits can be drawn from the parti-
cular advice given. Still, to begin with, I would like to point out that the bundle 
of advice on diplomacy that we do find is not grouped in a separate section of 
the Instructions, and as often as not, it crops up as afterthoughts on other sub-
jects, instead of being treated as a separate subject.
Article 8
The first time the topic of diplomatic dealings with Asian princes in the general 
is mentioned is in article 8, but there is little else to remark on it than that it 
juxtapositions trade and diplomacy.40
Article 10
Article 10 on the other hand is more specific in that it requires the obtaining of 
precise information about the standing and attitude towards the Company of 
all the princes and peoples that the Company had dealings with in all quarters 
of the Company’s area of operation.41 In addition one should also in particular 
39 Stapel (ed.), 1943, 554-55
40 Compare the formulation: Aangaende hoe ghy in alle andere saken en regieringe, de commercie en traf-
fique misgaders de alliantiën met de coningen en potentaten van Indiën, sult hebben te gedragen. . .Stapel 
(ed.) 1943, 546.
41 Pertinentelijck informeren op de genegentheden, affection ende gunsten van alle ende iegelycke koningen, 
natiën, ende volkeren van de gantsche quartieren van India. Stapel (ed.) 1943, 547.
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determine the position of these local princes and rulers towards the Portuguese, 
currently, as well as before the coming of the Dutch.
In this connection, international law is brought into the picture in that one 
is asked to find out who were friends and who were enemies of the Portuguese, 
and in particular to clarify the legal standing of the Portuguese in relation to 
their Asian friends.42 An imperative to access and communicate information 
to the Directors regarding trade relations as well as the judicial standing of the 
Company with Asian princes and rulers likewise required this for the 
Company’s Asian contacts.43
Overseas diplomacy is the implicit topic of article 10, in the request to gather 
information about the attitude of local princes towards the Company and the 
Portuguese, but it must be added that possibly the issue is understood prima-
rily in conjunction with the Company’s relationship with the Portuguese. One 
trait is worth noticing regarding the relative weight put on the legal side of the 
matter. I am inclined to argue that getting to know what the legal standing of 
the Portuguese was with Asian princes, must be interpreted as a survey of the 
possibilities for the Company to make their own alliances and block the 
Portuguese. Anyway, in the next article where diplomacy is treated, article 21, 
international law is given a more universal quality.
Article 21
Article 21 starts by emphasising the importance of maintaining steady correspon-
dence with Asian princes as a necessary support for keeping up and expanding 
trade.44 “Correspondence” in this context should be understood as the exchange of 
diplomatic letters. The Directors also have some advice as to how to go about this 
task. One must proceed wisely with care and discretion (wijsselijck en gantsch 
discretelijck) so as to maintain good relations, and must pay close attention to who 
might be considered as potential friends as well as foes.45 After having laid down 
42 wel examinerende wie vrienden of vyanden mette Portuguesen sijn, omme wat redenen ende op wat 
consideratie van state alle ‘t selve gegrondet en gevestight is. Stapel (ed.), 1943, 547.
43 Men overal goede intelligentie magh hebben, ende sooveel mogelijck is te vermeerderen; te oordelen en 
wetenen wat state des Compagnies saecken staan, op wat pointen van state, alsmede van trafique en 
handel deselve rusten Stapel (ed.), 1943, 547.
44 alle goede correspondentie, met de koningen van Indiën …een groot deel van de conservatie van den 
Indischen handel voor ons en onse nakomelingen gelegen is. Stapel (ed.) 1943, 550.
45 wel overleggende wie…uwe vrienden ofte vyanden behoeven of behoren te sijn. Stapel (ed.) 1943, 550-51.
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these rules, the Directors again stress international law as the basis for the conside-
rations on relations and treaties.46 The actual treaties, be they of a political or com-
mercial nature, must however also be concluded with an eye to the glory of God, 
the welfare of the Republic and the Company’s best, the article concludes.47 Possibly 
at a risk of exaggerating, the juxtaposition still leads to the thought that internatio-
nal law was regarded as an instrument which furthered both the heavenly and 
earthly goals of the Company.
Article 22
As mentioned above, article 22 deals at the outset with complaints about the 
ruler of Banten imposing new and too high tariffs and tolls on the Company. But 
concerns are voiced in conjunction with these complaints about the negative 
effects of these actions. They might lead to a loss of the Company’s prestige with 
other rulers. The Bantenese action was thus not only insulting but could result in 
serious loss for the Company.48 The remedy offered is too keep up good appea-
rances, while at the same time gather information, and if possible, apply counter-
measures secretly.49 The comments on diplomacy in article 22 demonstrate the 
secretive side of diplomacy, beneath the legal and formal level.
Article 23
Article 23 says nothing about the conduct of diplomacy, but encourages keep-
ing or establishing friendly relations with, engaging in trade with, and estab-
lishing factories in Johor, Patani, and other places. The instruction is formulated 
generally to “maintain and establish new alliances of friendship and trade and 
establish factories wherever possible,50 with the additional instruction that this 
46 op dat stuck en die overlegginge uwe consideratie in materie van state gegrondet hebbende…Stapel (ed.) 
1943, 551.
47 daarna alle alliantiën en verbonden, soo op ‘t stuck van materie van state, als van proffitelycke traffique 
met deselve maeckende, …tot Godes eere, der landen welvaart en des Compagnies profijt gevordert. Stapel 
(ed.) 1943, 551.
48 niet alleen schadelijck, maar oock schandelijck tot kleynaghtinge van onse natie, ‘t welck by alle andere 
koningen een quade consequentie soude mogen causeren en ons schade, schande en groot nadeel mogen 
gedyen. Stapel (ed.) 1943, 551.
49 moet men haar voor onse uyterlycke beeste en erste vrienden houden, waartegens soovel met contraprac-
tycquen en secrete inteeligentiën gearbeyt worden als mogelijck is sonder noghtans de uytterlycke vreede 
en rulers of vrientschap eeninghsints te breecken of te alteren, Stapel (ed.) 1943, 551.
50 onderhouden en maecken alliantie van vrientschap en traffique, en overal comptoiren en commissen leggen 
Stapel (ed.) 1943, 551.
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be done according to an evaluation of what would serve the Company best. 
The article does not say anything about the mode of diplomacy; once again it 
primarily demonstrates the intertwining of diplomacy with trade.
Article 26
The subject of article 26 is the relations with the Iberian powers and thus 
strictly speaking it falls outside of my field, as it does not say anything about 
Asian rulers. Suffice it therefore to say that here the Directors warn that 
Portugal and Spain certainly will try to harass the Company, which on its side 
should seek to deter the Iberians in every possible way. However, if 
the Portuguese and Spaniards should forget and [breach treaties?] then repara-
tions must be sought. 51
Article 33
Article 33 represents an example where the article starts by commenting on a 
concrete-specific case and then evolves into more general advice, in this case 
on diplomacy. This issue at the outset is retaliation against Surat because of an 
incident including the murder of a Company servant there. The instruction is 
to retaliate by any means possible.52 But, a diplomatic concern is added as a 
necessary precondition: One must retaliate in such a manner so as not to pro-
voke Company-friendly Asian rulers.53
To my mind, the latter modification sums up the essence of the advice on 
diplomacy in the 1613 Instructions. The Company should approach Asian 
rulers with the aim to increase its influence and trade, and should do so by 
relying on treaties according to international law. But this may also turn to 
violence, as seen in the instructions with respect to the Iberian powers as well 
as in the instruction on retaliation against Surat. Still, above all, as is implicit in 
the emphasis put on acquiring information on local affairs and political rela-
tions, and as explicitly stated as concerns in article 22 on Banten and no 33 on 
Surat, the primary function of diplomacy remained to establish friendly 
51 met alle mogelycke middlen soecken te weren, Stapel (ed.) 1943, 552.
52 sult pogen by alle mogelycke wegen sooveel schepen, goederen en personen van Suratte onder uw gewelt te 
krygen als immermeer mogelijck wesen sal. Stapel (ed.) 1943, 554.
53 sonder alteratie van onse gunstige koningen en volckeren van Indiën. Stapel (ed.) 1943, 554.
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relations and possibly alliances to facilitate the conduct of trade. Knowledge of 
local affairs and knowledge of how not to provoke, which was the same as to 
say knowledge of local manners, were essential constituents in this part of the 
package.
The 1617 Instructions
Mijer characterises the 1617 Instructions as more encompassing, more deter-
mined in tone, and more structured in the ordering of issues than the prece-
ding ones.54 It is also significant that the 1617 Instructions were confirmed and 
included in both the 1632 and 1650 Instructions.55
Besides the obligatory section on particular places of operations, the 1617 
Instructions covered a number of topics such as administration of internal jus-
tice, the promotion of the Christian creed, conditions for allowing private 
trade, as well as the promotion of settler-colonisation by free burghers.56 The 
Moluccas was the pressing the issue as far as the Company’s external challen-
ges were concerned. In 1615, Governor- General Reynst had decided to settle 
the score with the Portuguese by conquest, but the expedition under his perso-
nal command failed. It was left to Jan Pieterszoon Coen to complete the task. 
Appointed bookkeeper-general in Banten by Pieter Both in 1613, Coen wrote 
several letters to the Heeren XVII offering advice on the Company’s strategy 
before he was named governor-general in 1619. The most famous is his 
Discourse aen de Edele Heeren Bewindhebberen, toucherende den Nederlandsche 
Indischen Staet (Memoranda to the honourable Directors concerning the state 
of affairs in the Netherland’s Indies) of 1614, in which he advocates a decisive 
stand and firm action against both European rivals and local rulers who were 
undermining the Company’s monopoly.57 The issues that Coen raised were 
included in the 1617 Instructions, but the policy recommended against intru-
sion by rival Europeans and the measures to be taken against local breaches of 
monopoly agreements were less militant.58
54 Ibid. Inleiding p. ix.
55 Ibid. Inleiding, p ix.
56 Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië, 3.123.
57 Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlansch Indië, 118, 121.
58 Compare particularly arts. 35 and 45, Mijer, Verzameling van instructiën, 1617 Instructions, 34 and 37 
respectively.
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Hierarchy of concerns by structure of exposition
The 1617 Instructions comprised eighty articles, almost double those of the 1609 
Instructions, and well over double of the Instructions of 1613. The subjects can 
be grouped into issues in the following order: Articles 1 through 6 covered the 
administrative structure of the factory in Banten, including the order of succes-
sion in case of the death of the governor- general, the enlargement of the Council 
of the Indies from five to nine members,59 and the distribution of administrative 
tasks among the councillors.60 Articles 7–34 concerned the organisational 
structure and running of the Company’s operations in the charter area, covering 
both political and commercial issues, as well as instructions about “education” 
and missionary work in the Moluccas.61
Articles 35–44 covered miscellaneous topics such as how to handle third-party 
intrusion into the Company’s monopoly possessions,62 instructions for the return-
fleet,63  and regulations for private trade.64 Articles 45–47 started with the general 
recommendation to stick to peaceful relations and avoid war with Asian rulers.65 
This obviously has diplomatic implications, but it is succeeded by the issue of eli-
minating or reducing tolls paid in Banten and elsewhere,66 how to proceed in 
expanding trade with China,67 and the issue of military provisions for the fort of 
Ambon.68 The relations with Banten and China required negotiations and diplo-
macy. In the case of Banten, the High Government was instructed to avoid any 
cause for war.69 Regarding China, the instructions counselled conducting trade in 
such a way that relations might improve.70 One may see articles 45–47 as a body of 
diplomatic advice concerning interactions with independent Asian rulers; but if 
so, the general message and particular advice offer little more guidance than to 
avoid war. War was also the implicit issue in the next seven articles71 concerning 
59 1617 Instructions, arts. 1 and 3, ibid. 25–26.
60 1617 Instructions, art. 4, 1617, ibid. 26.
61 1617 Instructions, art. 34, ibid. 34.
62 1617 Instructions, art. 35, ibid. 34.
63 1617 Instructions, arts. 36–40, ibid. 36.
64 1617 Instructions, arts. 40–44, 1609, ibid. 37.
65 1617 Instructions, art. 45, 1617, ibid. 37.
66 1617 Instructions, art. 46, 1617, ibid. 37.
67 1617 Instructions, art. 47, ibid. 37.
68 1617 Instructions, art. 48, ibid. 37.
69 1617 Instructions, art. 46, ibid. 37.
70 1617 Instructions, art. 47, ibid. 37.
71 1617 Instructions, arts. 49–45, ibid. 38–39.
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the defence of the Company’s position in the Moluccas and measures to be taken 
against the Iberian powers.
The next seventeen articles all concern regulations on private trade.72 Of the 
remaining articles of the 1617 instructions, one single article is dedicated to 
the settlement of expatriate Chinese in Company- controlled areas.73 The issue 
of provisions for the overall importance of the defence of the Company’s pos-
sessions in the Moluccas is emphasised in article 75.74 The next two articles 
express the need to establish an independent rendezvous and the requirements 
that had to be met for it.75 Article 78 returns to the issue of war with the 
Portuguese with instructions to undertake a maritime campaign against them 
on an annual basis.76 The two concluding articles both confirm the powers and 
prerogatives of the High Government.77
The role of and approach to diplomacy
Although we may agree with Mijer that there is a more defined structure in the 
1617 Instructions than there is in those of 1609 and 1613, we should at the 
same time notice that diplomacy is not accorded a section of its own in the 
1617 Instructions, either. It is treated in conjunction with respective relevant 
cases. These comments demonstrate a defined contrast. Advice on perfor-
mance towards independent Asian princes recommends accommodation. 
Recommendations on how to approach the Iberian powers, which occur 
mostly in conjunction with the advice on the Moluccas, are bellicose, comple-
tely unlike the approach to the former. This pattern we have already seen in 
embryo in the 1609 Instructions and fully articulated in the Instructions of 
1613, and it is repeated in those of 1632 and 1650.
The 1632 Instructions
Of special interest in our context is that the Instructions for Governor- General 
Hendrik Brouwer and the Council of the Indies dated March 17, 1632, were 
72 1617 Instructions, arts. 56–73, ibid. 39–43.
73 1617 Instructions, art. 74, ibid. 43.
74 1617 Instructions, art. 75, ibid. 43.
75 1617 Instructions, arts. 75 and 76, ibid. 44.
76 1617 Instructions, art. 78, ibid. 45.
77 1617 Instructions, arts. 79 and 80, ibid. 45.
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the first after the Company had established Batavia as its Asian headquarters. 
It is thus not surprising that almost half of the ninety-six articles are dedicated 
to the administrative and judicial running of the Company’s headquarters in 
the charter area. The 1620s had witnessed a phase of geographical expansion 
of Company-trade, which is reflected in the more extensive advice on conduct 
in particular places of trade in the 1632 Instructions. Growing self-confidence 
given the successful repulsion of the attacks on Batavia in 1628 and 1629 must 
also be taken into account regarding the background of the 1632 Instructions. 
Fear of rising defence costs is a prominent topic in the 1632 Instructions,78 
though not when it concerns the defence of the Company’s possessions and 
monopoly rights in the Moluccas.79
Contents and structure of the 1632 Instructions
The 1632 Instructions have an even more defined structure than the preceding 
one. They can be split in three main parts. The first thirty-nine articles all con-
cern the running of Batavia as a colonial institution, with articles 1-3 covering 
the administration of justice and the rest are devoted to various practical mat-
ters related to the daily running of Batavia. The next forty-six articles80 deal 
with the commercial regime and conduct of trade in the charter area. Particular 
instructions as to the Moluccas make up a considerable part of this section.
The Moluccas
Articles 63 to 80 are all dedicated to the Moluccas81 and cover such diverse 
issues as the repair and upkeep of defence works,82 measures to be taken against 
the illegal sale or production of cloves,83 and measures to be taken against 
Makassarese “smuggling” and influence in Ambon.84 This section also includes 
a proposal to replace the original population on Banda with slaves, a plan 
78 For warnings against unnecessary defence costs, see arts. 19 and 33, Mijer, Verzameling van instructiën, 
54, 56
79 See below, 88-89.
80 1632 Instructions, arts. 40–86, Mijer, Verzameling van instructiën, 57-67.
81 1632 Instructions, arts. 62–65, ibid. 62-63.
82 1632 Instructions, arts. 63, 72, 69, and 79, ibid. 62-63, 64, 66. Art. 69, on Ambon, is on the reduction 
of the garrison, to economise the Company’s expenses there.
83 1632 Instructions, arts. 65, 73, and 78, ibid.63-64, 65, 66.
84 1632 Instructions, arts. 66–68, and 80, ibid. 64, 66.
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based on the assumption that, given their “inherently defect” human nature, 
trying to change the character of the Bandanese by schooling or religious 
instruction was useless.85 As the policy on private trade from the 1617 
Instructions had been reversed, a section of the 1632 Instructions includes six 
articles on the prohibition of private trade and sanctions to be used against 
those breaking it.86
There follow five articles that cover “miscellaneous” issues as the inspection 
of the factories outside Batavia,87 prohibitions on offering sea-transport to 
anyone who had travelled overland to Asia,88 and worries about the cost of 
keeping excessive numbers of slaves.89 The concluding article ends with an 
instruction to get rid of unqualified personnel, and a “mobilising appeal” to 
renew the Company servants’ dedication to the Company.
The treatment of diplomacy in the 1632 Instructions
Diplomacy is not accorded a subsection in its own right in the 1632 
Instructions. There is, for instance, no general formulation on “foreign 
policy” stating that international law is the foundation for overseas diplo-
macy equivalent to the statement in article 1, which declares “the laws and 
practices in the United Provinces” to be the basis of the judicial regime in 
Batavia.90 A parallel formulation explicating the legal foundations and gene-
ral principles of diplomatic interaction with Asian princes seems alluringly 
close, but, as in its predecessors, the comments on diplomatic interactions 
with locals and approaches to rival Europeans are mixed with  particular 
advice on the conduct of trade.
The 1632 Instructions, the sheer volume of advice on places of commercial 
operations in the second section taken into account, contains broader and 
richer material regarding explicit and implicit advice on diplomatic conduct 
85 Het aanhouden van scholen aldaar, nademaal het naturel van de Bandanezen bevonden woort zoo 
kwaadaardig te zijn, dat er geen hoop is om deselve te verwinnen … en daarom oordelen de 
kwaadaardige Bandanezen te versenden.” 1632 Instructions, art. 75, Mijer, Verzameling van instructiën, 
65–66.
86 1632 Instructions, arts. 84–90, ibid. 67-68.
87 1632 Instructions, art. 90, ibid. 67–68.
88 1632 Instructions, art. 94, ibid. 69.
89 1632 Instructions, art. 95, ibid. 69.
90 “eene regtmatige justitie …mag worden bediend volgens de instructien en praktijken in de Vereenigde 
Nederlandsche Provinciën doorgaans.” 1632 Instructions, art. 1, ibid. 47.
135
The model  of  over se a s d iplom ac y in  the H eeren X VI I ’s
than the predecessors. I shall give some examples on the  treatment of diplo-
macy to illustrate the complexity of the overseas diplomatic challenges, and 
the Directors’ empirical and pragmatic approach to how to handle the 
Company’s diplomatic challenges.
The section on the conduct of trade covers the Company’s commercial 
operations from Persia to Japan. The articles concerning trade in Persia 
instruct how to deter the recurrence of English influence91  and how to 
present the Persian ruler with a “substantial gift” (eerlijke veerering) to 
improve bilateral relations.92 In three articles on trade between China and 
Japan via Formosa,93 the Directors approve a proposal suggesting submis-
sion to (demping) rather than accommodation with (onder sauvegarde) 
pirates in the South China Sea to get better access to trade in China. In that 
connection, it was deemed necessary drive the Spanish out of their strong-
hold on Formosa.94 Instructions for the use of violence against the 
Portuguese are repeated in article 62, which calls for systematic attacks on 
the Portuguese ships sailing between Japan and Macau.95 Both these arti-
cles primarily concerned access to trade. The common denominator regar-
ding relations with the Asian states in question was accommodation, in the 
case of the Persians, gifts, and in the case of the Chinese, abstention from 
behaviour that might provoke retaliation. The advice on behaviour towards 
other Europeans was to minimise their local activities and influence, as in 
the case of the English in Persia, or to regularly oust them by military 
means, as with the Spanish in Formosa. This piece of advice summarises 
the Heeren XVII’s general principle of overseas diplomacy with indepen-
dent Asian polities of size and power well: Maximise friendly relations with 
the former, minimise the influence held by Europeans, and fight the latter 
when necessary. In the case of the Moluccas, the balance between the rose 
and the nailed glove was somewhat different. But both applied in the 
Moluccas too.
91 1632 Instructions, art. 40, Mijer, Verzameling van instructiën, 57.
92 1632 Instructions, art. 43, ibid. 58.
93 1632 Instructions, arts. 56–58, ibid. 61.
94 1632 Instructions, art. 57, ibid. 61.
95 “om den Portuguesen dien handel infructueus te maken”, 1632 Instructions, art. 62, ibid. 62.
136
chap ter 3
The Moluccas: Political concerns and diplomacy
The Moluccas fell under the category in which third-party influence had to be 
countered given the Company’s sovereignty and monopoly rights on Ambon 
and the Banda islands. As we have seen, this meant military concerns of terri-
torial defence and the ability to protect the Company’s monopoly rights by 
force. But it also meant keeping a sharp eye on the other island polities in the 
Eastern Archipelago, and if possible trying to make alliances with them. 
Ternate was the obvious ally in the Eastern Archipelago in blocking Makassarese 
influence and actions in the archipelago. The 1632 Instructions offered a 
lengthy passage on how to sustain the alliance with Ternate. Article 64, on 
relations with the king of Ternate, reads:
Despite the fact we consider all this behaviour feigned, and try to keep him estranged 
from the Spanish, and support him with courteous compliments, under no circums-
tance must we, except for reasons of utmost importance, fall into conflict with him, 
which would jeopardise the cause of the Company and only serve the interests of the 
enemy.
Therefore, one must post rational, reasonable, and wise men there who would know 
how to defend the interest of the Company with competence … because if we from 
our side act properly, we may to expect them to act in an obliging manner.96
If the stakes were higher in the Moluccas, the instructions on Ternate were in 
line with the advice on trade on Persia and China above. The latter two 
reflected a context where European rivalry meant a kind of “diplomatic com-
petition” for local goodwill. That logic required men of tact and competence 
to handle relations with local power-holders more than intimate acquain-
tance with international law. This approach can be found as an assumption in 
all the General Instructions, but was explicated to the fullest in the 1650 
Instructions.
96 De koning van Ternate “niettegenstaande Wij al zijn doen voor geveinsd, en hem vervreemd van 
den Spanjaard houden en met hoofsche complimenten onderhouden, en men geene, als om 
hoogwigtige redenen in rupture van vrede met hem te vervallen, waardoor de zaken van de 
Compagnie al te zeer verachteren en den vijand te groot voordeel op Ons krijgen zoude. 
Verstandige, kloeke vredzame persoonen, het regt van De Compagnie met goed beleid wetende 
te  defenderen, dienen aldaar, zoo als hiervoor gezegd is, want als Wij van Onze zijde wel 
doen,  kunnen van hen afvorderen ’t geen zij schuldig zijn te presteren.” 1632 Instructions, art. 
64, ibid. 63.
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The 1650 Instructions
A tripartite order of the Company’s diplomatic position and subsequent approach 
was formalised in the 1650 Instructions. The three categories were areas where 
the Company held sovereignty rights, areas where it held exclusive contracts, 
and areas where it had to trade on equal terms with other parties.97 Although an 
explicit formalisation of these categories was written down for the first time in 
the 1650 Instructions, the tripartite division is also discernible in prior 
Instructions. After all, the arrangement was taken over from the Portuguese.98
The 1650 Instructions can be regarded as the richest source of information 
about the Heeren XVII’s model of overseas diplomacy of all the General 
Instructions, not only for its explication of the Company’s overseas diplomatic 
system, but for its sheer length—164 articles in all, covering places of opera-
tion across the whole charter area. Still the 1650 Instructions conform with 
their predecessors in that no one section or group of articles deals strictly with 
how to conduct bilateral diplomacy. Except for the article on the tripartite sys-
tem, the advice on diplomatic mode was given in conjunction with specific 
cases. Not only did this case approach still apply, but as Mijer stresses, one of 
the peculiarities of the 1650 Instructions was its enhanced casuistic nature, 
which went both for approach and style.99 Still, it holds true that the 1650 
Instructions also contained general observations and advice on the mode of 
the Company’s operations, but as in the prior ones, such general advice appears 
in conjunction with or as generalisations from case comments.
Its comprehensive and practical nature helps explain why the 1650 
Instructions was the last body of General Instructions for the Company. As 
late as 1746, they were still acknowledged as the basis for the Company’s ope-
rations in the charter area.100
The context of the 1650 Instructions
The years between 1632 and 1650 were the “dramatic period” of Van Diemen’s 
governor-generalship,101 with its offensive against the Portuguese and bold 
97 1650 Instructions, art. 18, ibid. 76.
98 C. G. Roelofsen, “De periode 1450-1712,” in Compendium volkenrechtsgeschiedenis, edited by A. C. 
Eyffinger and C. H. Bezemer, (Deventer: Kluwer, 1991), 58.
99 Mijer, Verzameling van instructiën, “Inleiding,” xi–xii.
100 Ibid. Inleiding, xiii.
101 Governor-General 1636–45.
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 territorial expansion. With the death of Van Diemen and appointment of 
Van der Lijn as governor-general in 1646102 and the peace of Münster in 
1648, the Company was in for the less “dramatic” reign of Joan Maetsuyker 
(1653–78), characterised more by consolidation and securing prior gains 
than acquiring new ones. It should also be added that by 1650, peace had 
been concluded with Batavia’s two territorial neighbours on Java, Banten, 
and Mataram.103 A more immediate concern for the Directors in 1650 was 
about the moral fibre and conduct of their servants in the East, more speci-
fically the twin problems of private trade and corruption.104 This went all the 
way to the very top, and perhaps proportionally so. Governor-General Van 
der Lijn was for instance allowed to seek retirement in an act of grace, but his 
second in command, Director-General Francois Caron, was called back to 
The Netherlands in 1650, on accusations of corruption.105 Thus rather than 
expansion, consolidation, both internal and external, was the keyword for 
the 1650 Instructions.
Textual analysis, the 1650 Instructions
As the 1650 General Instructions offer the richest material for a reconstruction of 
a Patriase model of diplomacy of the four extant Instructions, I shall analyse them 
in detail to demonstrate that, while the Directors’ approach towards diplomatic 
performance should be viewed as pragmatic at the outset, this pragmatism became 
ultimately more embedded and increasingly explicit in the 1650 Instructions. 
I start by giving an overview of the relative position of international law, and 
the advice on the relative position on the use of force versus accommodations 
and negotiations regarding the three categories of the 1650 Instructions. Here 
I draw particular attention to the emphasis that the Directors put on acquiring 
information about local conditions and affairs. After reviewing the “diplomatic 
model” of the 1650 Instructions, I return to its predecessors with an eye to 
demonstrating the extent to which the pragmatic model of diplomacy was 
developed or foreshadowed in these. I conclude by discussing whether, and on 
which grounds, it is fair to speak of a non-commercial ideological dimension 
102 To be followed by Carel Reynierzoon in 1650.
103 In 1645 and 1646, respectively.
104 Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië, 285.
105 Ibid. 285.
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in the Directors’ General Instructions that may have implications for the inter-
pretation of its approach to and conceptualisation of overseas diplomacy.
The balance between war and diplomacy regarding 
independent Asian princes
As in all the General Instructions, the Company’s possessions in the Moluccas, 
namely the areas that had been won by the sword and areas where the Company 
held contracts of exclusive privilege (covered in categories 1 and 2 of the 1650 
division) were also to be defended by the sword.106 This relative position bet-
ween diplomacy and war was inverted in category 3. The advice about Persia is 
quite explicit that war should only be resorted to as defensive retaliations and 
only when there were no other options at hand: “Our military might must only 
be applied against violence and injustice done against us, and then only when 
the grievances cannot be solved by peaceful means.”107 The principle goal of the 
mercantilist diplomacy articulated in category 3, where the Company held no 
special privilege, was to set down the terms for a treaty of trade. Its preferred 
means was peaceful negotiations. War was a means of last resort.
Treaties and negotiations in category 3
To understand the meaning of “treaty” in the nexus between the VOC and 
independent Asian states, one must first repeat the obvious: These contracts 
were vehicles for profitable trade. Where political matters were regulated, they 
were regulated with the intention of facilitating trade. It therefore seems more 
relevant to analyse these treaties as commercial contracts in which legal and 
political issues were addressed pragmatically as a means to secure profit rather 
than principally to secure an international order in its own right. At best, inter-
national law was a means to legitimise a political trading regime. But it did not 
form it. This is not to say that “law” had nothing to do with it, but in the process 
of the actual treaty making, it was secondary. The Directors’ primary concern 
regarding the High Government’s performance was that the latter negotiate 
the most profitable treaty possible. Their basic concern about the treating 
106 1650 Instructions, arts. 19 and 20, Mijer, Verzameling van instructiën, 76.
107 “Onze magt en wapenen…alleen gebruikt moeten worden tegen geweld en ongelijk, dat Ons aangedaan 
wordt, als hetzelve met vrede niet uit den weg kan gelegd worden.” 1650 Instructions, art. 72, ibid. 89.
140
chap ter 3
parties was that they honour their contractual obligations. This latter concern 
really amounted to a feeble hope that they could be trusted to do so. The diffi-
culty of establishing contractual arrangements in Persia, for instance, was 
attributed to an inherent lack of trustworthiness on the part of the Persian 
people. Contracts with the Persians had “always been renewed under the most 
difficult and arduous conditions, due to the devious, proud nature of that 
people.”108
By implication: To get a bilateral treaty with local rulers—and not least to 
convince them to stick to it—took both knowledge and skills. This is a point 
that is stressed repeatedly in the Instructions’ advice on particular places of 
trade, far more often than specific comments on legal aspects per se. For one 
simple reason, I propose, the legal dimension lay in the right to conclude con-
tracts of trade or make alliance bonds. The rest was left to improvisation. 
Guidelines for how this improvisation should proceed were offered in the 
Directors’ advice on overseas diplomatic interaction but these were precisely 
general guidelines advocating contextual adaptation and pragmatism.
Adaptation, accommodation, and pragmatism as the 
general principle in diplomatic interaction with rulers 
in category 3
The heterogeneity of the overseas context in category 3, which comprised 
polities of such different size and power as Tokugawa Japan, China, the 
Mughal, and Safavid Empires, on one hand, and lesser states and port poli-
ties in southern Indian and the Indonesian archipelago on the other, meant 
that the diplomatic mode had to be adjusted to a variety of local conditions 
and circumstances. This in turn begged for an awareness and appreciation 
of the particularity of context and local conditions and modes. In other 
words, diplomatic interaction in category 3 posed a challenge that by its 
very composite nature opposed a generalised “Eurocentric mode of thin-
king,” if the Company should reach its goals. Here, the Company’s submis-
sive approach to defend their position in Japan is often pointed to.109 But 
108 “Zoodanige contracten altijd vernieuwd geweest zijn met vele moeijelijkheden en vexatiën, naar den 
aard van die schrapende, superbe natie.” 1650 Instructions, art. 67, ibid. 88.
109 See for Instance, Blussé and de Moor, Nederlanders Overzee, 227–28, and Van Goor, De Nederlandse 
Koloniën, 106–107.
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Japan was but one extreme case where the Directors’ advice ran along the 
principle of “approach- diversification” dictated by particularities of local 
context. The 1650 Instructions actually propagate an advice that pragma-
tism must generally prevail.
The particular advice on the conduct of trade in Persia in the 1650 
Instructions illustrates both the point of a case approach, and the way specific 
advice on a case could slide into more general ideas on transcultural diplo-
macy. Here the Directors’ shifted their focus from particular advice to advoca-
ting a pragmatic, even cultural relativistic approach as a first principle of 
overseas diplomacy. They emphasise that the High Government must not try 
to enforce European standards in places where they “find the law and do not 
bring it.” The only permissible principle is to adhere closely to local norms and 
rules: “The abovementioned trade cannot be pursued by applying our own 
standards or by use of force, as we (in these places) must adapt to existing laws, 
and not bring it.”110 Intriguingly this relativistic and pragmatic stand is given a 
pedagogic counter-illustration by the Heeren XVII: Imposing one’s own norms 
on autonomous Asian princes would be just as unacceptable as if outsiders 
should claim the right of interference in areas where the Company held legiti-
mate control: “Just as the Company in the places under its jurisdiction would 
not tolerate it should any (outside) nations dictate its manner of operation by 
their own laws.”111
The recommended cultural relativism argued above was at the outset condi-
tioned by the relative imbalance of strength in favour of the Safavid Empire. 
So, even though it could be argued that the above examples do not explicitly 
point to “cultural relativism” (an anachronistic term, in any case) as a general 
principle in the Directors’ thinking, what stands out as the general rule is that 
the Company was instructed to assess local norms and follow them as far as 
need be. Different terms, same substance. The practical consequence of this 
pragmatic advice was cultural accommodation.
110 “Den vornoemden handel Ons op eigen concepten niet toeeigenen en zoodanige natiën met magt 
daartoe mogen constringeren Alwaar Wij de wetten vinden en niet brengen moeten.” 1650 Instructions, 
art. 71. Mijer, Verzameling van instructiën, 89; emphasis in the original.
111 “Gelijk de Comp. ook niet verstaan zoude kunnen, dat op plaatsen onder haar gebied sorterende, 
andere natiën op de manier van handelen haar de wet zoude willen stellen.” 1650 Instructions, art. 71, 
ibid. 89.
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Cultural accommodation
Article 53 of the 1650 Instructions underlines the accommodating approach to 
be applied, taking particularly the pride of the people in the overseas areas into 
consideration. The article starts with a reminder of how misconduct has previ-
ously damaged the interests of the Company:
The differences regarding the relative value accorded to prestige by the Dutch and the 
Asian peoples must be taken into account in all the Company’s dealings in the East … 
the debauches of many Company servants in many quarters of India has caused set-
backs in their daily dealings, whereby it is important to take into consideration that 
Asian peoples are very sensitive as to respect, and therefore harbour little affection 
for the Dutch nation.112
Put between the advice particular to Malacca and Sumatra, the generality of 
the message is all the same clear: Lack of appreciation of local ways and sensi-
tivities was counterproductive to the goals of the Company. The way to further 
these goals was accommodation to local standards. The message was repeated 
in conjunction with the advice on Tonkin. “Take care not to cause the slightest 
offence to the king or his nobles”113 ran the counsel regarding North Vietnam.
Tonkin was of a strategic commercial importance in that it delivered silk that 
could be traded for silver in Japan. Its relation to the Company represented a 
typical category 3 constellation in that the Dutch could have no realistic hope of 
forcing their own conditions of trade upon the local rulers. The instructions on 
the Tonkin trade represent yet another example where the Directors go on to 
enunciate a principle of cultural relativism as the basis of Company diplomacy in 
places where it could not itself make the rules: “There is no alternative but to play 
the game according to local rules, especially in places where we are in no posi-
tion to change things, but must conduct our trade on the basis of local laws.”114
112 “Dat de debauche van vele Compagnie ministers in verscheiden kwartieren van Indië extraordinaire 
verachtering in de dagelijksche affaires geeft, waarbij geconsidereerd, dat de Indische natiën zeer 
gevoelig van hun respect zijnde, daardoor kleine affective tot de Nederlandsche natie zetten.” 1650 
Instructions, art. 53. ibid. 84.
113 “Onze ministers zich voor al wachten moeten, om den Koning en den grooten van’t rijk eenige de 
minste offensie te geven.” 1650 Instructions, art. 116, ibid. 100.
114 “Niet anders te doen is, als anderen met gelijke munt te betaalen, zonder te denken op feitelijke 
resistentiën, inzonderheid op plaatsen, daar wij niets te zeggen hebben, maar ons naar de wetten van 
die landen op het stuk van den handel reguleren moeten, 1650 Instructions, art. 116, ibid. 100.
143
The model  of  over se a s d iplom ac y in  the H eeren X VI I ’s
The Directors’ reasoning regarding interaction with cases in category 3 was 
then that in some, if not most, of those places, “rules were different.” As the 
Company was neither in a position, nor had the legitimate grounds, to change 
the rules, it must and should play by the local ones. But to do that, one needed 
Company servants who were culturally observant and knew how to “play the 
game” by the local rules.
The desired quality of personnel
General human qualities such as the ability to observe and accommodate local 
norms were the qualities that counted in the kind of personnel the Directors 
wanted to be appointed to positions in the places where the Company could 
dictate neither the law nor customs. “Do primarily base your conduct on 
modesty, humbleness, politeness, and amity; always acknowledging your infe-
rior position,” ran the advice to the governor in Deshima in the 1650 
Instructions.115 Although Japan represented an extreme case, as already noted, 
in essence this advice represented the norm more than the exception with 
respect to desired personal conduct in category 3. Neither the 1609 nor the 
1617 Instructions had such explicit remarks on “modesty” as a preferred qua-
lity, but the 1632 Instructions did. Regarding whom to appoint as governor of 
Ambon, for instance, the Directors stressed that he must be: “good natured, 
not arrogant; forthcoming towards the (local) inhabitants, and able to spot 
their sensibilities and accommodate them in minor matters.”
Admittedly, Ambon was not an independent state, but the qualities and 
mode of performance sought for in prospective governors fit perfectly well 
with the recommendations for personal qualities and mode of performance 
in diplomatic interaction with independent states offered in the 1650 
Instructions. The advice essentially came down to this: do not stir feelings of 
discontent or disrespect, accommodate to local standards, and be pragmatic 
so long as it serves the interest of the Company. This “principled pragma-
tism” also stands out as a defining trait in the Directors’ advice on the respec-
tive means of diplomacy at hand in dealing with the Asian rulers in category 
3 of the 1650 Instructions.
115 “Compagnie’s ministers …vooral gewapend moeten gaan met modestie, nederigheid, beleefdheid en 
vriendschap, altijd de minste zijnde.” 1650 Instructions, art. 114, ibid. 99.
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Means of diplomacy: The diplomatic gift
Gift exchange and diplomatic missions were constituent elements in the diplo-
matic interaction in early modern Southeast Asia as it was in Europe.116 
The exchange of gifts and, to a lesser degree, paying homage stand out as the 
two most important means for establishing or maintaining peaceful relations 
in both regions. In the overseas setting such gift giving and embassies were 
considered political “overhead” for the conduct of commercial transactions. In 
the advice on relations with Siam, the function of the gift as “grease money” is 
made quite explicit. Gifts must be seen as politico-diplomatic overhead to 
secure the prospects of profits from the trade in Siam: “In order to get the 
goodwill of the king and foreign minister of Siam, it is necessary to offer them 
annual gifts with compliments to their liking, and, given the great profits for 
the Company resulting from the trade there, no pettiness must be allowed as 
far as the costs are concerned.”117 In other words: Today’s politico-diplomatic 
investment is tomorrow’s commercial gain, and the two must be calculated in 
relation to each other.
Notions of cultural relativism and pragmatic 
accommodation to local ways in the pre-1650 General 
Instructions
Article 10 of the 1609 Instructions illustrates how pragmatism was built into 
the Directors’ perception of overseas diplomacy from the start. The article sta-
tes that the Company must gather information on Asian princes and their 
ways of trade and on the standing of the Portuguese; but it also puts emphasis 
on the need to gather information about the political situation in different 
ports of call. The article opens with an order to “accurately inform the Directors 
of the circumstances, the feelings, and approach of “each and every single one” 
116 For a balanced comparison between European and Asian diplomatic systems and modes in the Early 
modern period, see Jeremy Black, A History of Diplomacy (London: Reaktion Books, 2010), 33 ff.
117 “De gunst van de grooten te mogen capteren, de Koning en Berquelang met jaarlijksch vereering, hun 
aangenaam zijnde, begroet moet worden; welcke kosten, ten aanzien van de groote commoditeit 
daaruit voor de Compagnie resulterende, op profijt aangelegd worden, en derhalven niet te menage-
rende mogen zijn.” 1650 Instructions, art. 85, Mijer, Verzameling van instructiën, 92.
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of the kings, nations and peoples over the whole of Asia where the Company 
conducts or is licensed to conduct trade.”118
The pursuit of information must be understood as being sought after because it 
was instrumental to trade, but the desired knowledge was not restricted to matters 
of commerce alone. Included was information about the diplomatic relations bet-
ween local rulers, as well as their relations with other Europeans. The governor-
general and Council were instructed to take note of Asian princes’ relations with 
the Portuguese and others: Who were their enemies? Who were their friends? And 
what were the legal foundations and considerations of their relationships? The 
quest for this kind of information was obviously motivated by the Company’s 
struggle to wrest control of the trade dominated by the Portuguese. Still, in the 
overseas context, this struggle was a triangular affair with the commercial pro-
spects and political stand of Asian trading states as one of the dimensions. To get a 
better idea of the Asian dimension, the Directors asked for information not only of 
the current state of politico-diplomatic stands of the Asian princes, but also about 
their political and economic power and diplomatic performance towards the 
Portuguese and the Dutch in the past. The article goes on to specify the kind of 
information one should look for. Information about Asian polities was thus not 
restricted to trade relations, it was meant to serve the purpose of establishing and 
easing the Company’s diplomatic relations with them:
“One therefore must seek information about domestic politics: such as “specifically 
by whom and in what manner all the respective states were governed in all matters, 
(and) by which means to communicate and establish relations with them, and consis-
tently increase the Company’s pool of knowledge.”119
What is being demonstrated here is that already in the first of the General 
Instructions, the Directors regarded information on local conditions of power, 
politics, and policy as the foundation for the Company’s success when interacting 
with independent Asian rulers. Although the implications for diplomatic practice 
could have been more explicit, the message is nonetheless clear: The Directors 
118 “Zult gij U pertentelijk informeren op de genegenheid, affection en gunsten van alle en een iegelijke 
koningen, natiën en volken van de gansche kwartieren van India … om te weten, welcke gunst en 
genegenheid dezelve koningen, natiën of volken tot den handel met die van de Compagnie zijn heb-
bende.” 1609 Instructions, art. 10, ibid. 8.
119 “als te weten: hoe, bij wie en welke personen alle zaken in de resp. Rijken gereegeerd worden; wat 
middel, om communicatie en access hij dezelve te hebben, aangewend moet worden, … goede 
intelligentie …zooveel mogelijk is te vermeerderen.” 1609 Instructions, art. 10, ibid. 8.
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were not ethnographers, they were men of business, and the information they 
sought served the purpose of establishing and preserving profitable trade relations. 
No sane person with that intention would go about it by breaking local customs 
and rules or challenging the local rulers and authorities. The pragmatic approach 
and accommodating mode outlined in the 1650 Instructions is implicitly precon-
ceived in the emphasis laid on the importance of gathering information about 
Asian rulers, their politics, and their policies in the 1609 Instructions.
Squeezed between an article on the general conduct of trade and particular 
advice on the trade in the Moluccas,120 article 21 of the 1609 Instructions entails 
a formulation that comes as close as it can to a full enunciation of pragmatism 
and accommodation in diplomatic relations: “As for good correspondence with 
the kings in Asia,” the Directors wrote, admittedly making no reference to 
diplomatic correspondence in particular, but implicitly including it, they consi-
dered themselves unable to give any specific advice, but would in general 
remark that the perseverance of the Company’s trade in Asia now and in the 
future depended on such contact. Therefore, the governor-general and Council 
was advised to “proceed with caution and act discretely” in deciding whom to 
befriend and whom to consider the Company’s enemies, whether from con-
cerns about trade or for other reasons.121 I take this to foreshadow the more 
explicit elaborations of a culturally accommodated approach in the 1650 
Instructions.
International law and “treaty” in the 1609 Instructions
The 1609 Instructions state that law was the foundation upon which to build 
the Company’s interaction with Asian rulers. Having considered who to fight 
and who to make friends with “on the basis of law” (materie van state), all con-
tracts of friendship relations or alliances guaranteeing the Company free access 
to trade had to be based on the same legal footing. The Directors do not use the 
phrase regt van alle volkeren or any other seventeenth-century synonym for 
“international law,” but what they had in mind must have been the universal 
120 1609 Instructions, arts. 20 and 22, respectively, ibid. 13.
121 “Belangende alle goede correspondentiën met de koningen van Indië te houden, daarop kunnen Wij U 
geen particulariere vaste instructie geven, maar in ‘t generaal zeggen, dat aan ‘t zelve een goed deel van 
de conservatie van den handel voor Ons en Onze nakomelingen gelegen is, zulcks gij U dienshalve zeer 
wijselijk, voorzigtelijk en gansch discretelijk moet gedragen,  wie om haar profijt of uit haar eigen 
belang Uwe vrienden of vijanden behoeven of te zijn.” 1609 Instructions, art. 21, ibid. 13.
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right to trade, given by the principles of natural law,122 as the basis for bilateral 
treaties to regulate conditions for and terms of trade. But of the two, the latter 
took precedence, and besides that, the treaty was but the tip of the iceberg fol-
lowing negotiations or war. The diplomatic effort proper lay in the challenge of 
getting a treaty.
International law primarily came into the picture as a basis for the appeal to 
get it, and the defence of it in the case of third party intrusion. Still bilateral nego-
tiations centred on the treaty were thus the crux of the Company’s overseas 
diplomacy. This explains the emphasis on information about local context and 
conditions. Assessing the prospects for securing a treaty and the right perfor-
mance in getting it were dependent on accurate assessments of local conditions. 
Implicitly contextual awareness and cultural sensitivity were vital to successful 
diplomatic performance. This is the same kind of configuration between infor-
mation-gathering and pragmatic diplomatic performance and treaty making 
that we find fully elaborated in the 1650 Instructions.
This “pragmatic package” can also be found in the 1613, 1617 and 1632 
Instructions, as we have seen, articles no 21 of the 1613 and no 45of the 1617 
Instructions more or less repeat the wording of article 21 of the 1609 
Instructions by stating that the High Government must keep its correspon-
dence and make friendships and alliances with “all the kings, princes, repu-
blics, and men of power” in Asia with all due discretion and caution,” yet again 
leaving the actual decisions about how to proceed up to the High Government, 
as it “thought best in the interest of the Company.”123 Significantly, however, 
the 1617 Instructions add, like those of 1613, that the Company’s performance 
on the ground must generally be conducted in a manner “not to offend anyone 
or to run into conflict and war with anyone over petty matters.”124 If the term 
“accommodate” was not used, that was still the core of the message.
Although the Directors’ basic approach regarding the purpose and mode of 
diplomacy remains the same in 1617 as in 1609 and 1613, there are differences. 
The naming of the Asian counterparts in general terms as “the kings, nations, 
and peoples” in 1609 and in the same general terms in 1613 is replaced by a 
more nuanced terminology in 1617 which then included “kings, princes, 
122 Roelofsen, “De periode 1450-1712,” 91–92.
123 1613 Instructions, art. 21, Stapel (ed.) 1943, 550-51, 1617 Instructions, art. 45, Mijer, Verzameling van 
instructiën, 37.
124 Ibid. 37.
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republics, and men of power.”125 One should be careful to read too much into 
such differences but still the difference might be taken as an indication of 
growth of knowledge about the Asian counterparts that had taken place in the 
eight years between the two sets of instructions. If this is correct, the difference 
in wording supports the proposition that the Directors’ understanding of over-
seas diplomacy was subject to a dynamic learning process. Another difference 
is that the 1609 and 1613 explicit insistence on law as the basis of interaction 
and relations with Asian rulers was left out in 1617. Possibly the formal legal 
footing went without saying, but it might also reflect that legal justifications 
did not constitute the primary challenge in making treaties.
In the 1632 Instructions, regarding trade on Siam, an appeal for accommo-
dation and pragmatism is made explicit. To get a firm foothold in the Siam 
trade, the Directors had discussed whether to approach the king directly or to 
approach subaltern ministers responsible for the trade126 in a specific area. It 
was stressed that, if, and when doing so, one should at the same time take care 
to stay on good terms and conduct regular correspondence with the kings’ 
ministers at court.127 The advice sprang from fear that a direct approach to the 
king’s ministers at the regional level might cause royal offence. The Directors 
ended up by stating that the advice regarding Siam could serve as a general 
example, in that the governor-general and Council must “seek to have all disa-
greements that may prop up tackled in a way that would best serve the interests 
of the Company.”128
In this case the Directors did not consider it sufficient or relevant to act 
dogmatically and try to force the Company’s rights by reference to internatio-
nal law. The process of negotiating terms of access to, and rules for the conduct 
of trade was far too concrete and specific than to be handled by in general 
terms of law in the final instance. The Directors knew this in 1632, as they did 
in 1609, 1613 and 1617, even if they would most unequivocally express it in 
1650. If cultural sensitivity, accommodation to local norms and pragmatism in 
negotiating the political terms of trade with independent Asian rulers were 
125 “Alle koningen, prinsen, republikeinen en heeren.” Ibid. 37.
126 “gedelibereerd zijnde, of met den handel met den koning of met particuieren … stabiliëren zoude.” 
1632 Instructions, art. 41, ibid. 57.
127 “Houdende nietteminmet Malambeek en alle andere van den koning dependererende goede 
vriendschap en correspondentie.” 1632 Instructions, art. 41, ibid. 57.
128 “Alle openstaande dissentiën ten meesten dienste van de Compagnie zoude zoeken af te handelen.” 
1632 Instructions, art. 41, ibid. 58.
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only fully explicated in the 1650 Instructions, these precautions were no doubt 
all foreshadowed and if not fully expressed in the preceding Instructions.
Conclusion: The Directors’ model of overseas 
diplomacy in the General Instructions, 1609–50
Pragmatism was the Directors’ recommended means to get what the Company 
wanted in a political environment different from their own. International law 
could only do so much: Give legitimacy to the claim to trade on par with third 
parties in category 3, and legitimise sovereignty and exclusive monopoly rights 
in the Moluccas, that is categories 1 and 2 of the 1650 Instructions. But this is 
where the function of international law stopped. The basic building block of 
the Company’s overseas interaction regime remained the bilateral treaty con-
cluded on site and designed to meet the requirements defined by local condi-
tions and policies. That is why the Directors’ General Instructions bore the 
stamp of a principled pragmatism. That in its turn was founded on an assump-
tion of cultural difference.
Section 3: Commerce, diplomacy, and ideology
I have so far treated the Directors’ advice on diplomacy as embedded in a prag-
matic, commercial logic. I think that was the core of it, but this still does not 
give us the whole picture. There was also an idealistic—and not necessarily 
ideological— dimension as far as values and motives were concerned.
Configuring a hierarchy of values or means-to-an-end relations in the General 
Instructions on one hand puts one in the position of repeating the obvious. The 
Company was a commercial institution, and its primary purpose was to con-
duct profitable trade: “De eenige ziel van’s Comp. lichaam zijnde.”129 By simple 
inference, diplomacy and treaty making served the purpose of facilitating profi-
table trade first and foremost. But the question remains whether “profit” was the 
sole motive or reigned supreme in the Directors’ worldview. The evidence 
strongly suggests that commercial concerns were not only intermixed with non-
commercial concerns, but that some of the latter were treasured as values by 
their own right. Pride in power and prestige are two candidates that stand out.
129 1650 Instructions, art. 123, particular advice on Coromandel, Ibid. 102.
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Qualifying the proposition that the pursuit of the “Glory of the Company” 
may have been a motive by its own right for the Directors is that such appeals 
may well have been instrumental to the accumulation of diplomatic capital. 
Still, my point is that whatever the exact configuration of the relationship bet-
ween means and ends with respect to concerns other than profit, a survey of 
the more encompassing package of mixed concerns that I do find points to the 
fact that the Directors’ perspective was broader than the proposition of a sin-
gular and all dominating profit motive suggests.
I shall narrow the problem down to how non-commercial concerns were 
presented in the Directors’ General Instructions. Whether they served legiti-
mating purposes or were conceived as values in themselves is difficult to tell, 
but generally, my proposition is that the rational “Reasons of Company” thin-
king was supplemented by “idealistic,” moral-religious, and even emotional 
dimensions.
The Company’s success as providential blessing
As for the evidence of religious appeal in the Directors’ General Instructions, I 
have tried to leave out the instances where references to “higher powers” (God) 
are purely conventional. My focus will be on instances where  the Directors 
depict the venture of the Company as part of a “greater plan” and interpret its 
successes as a sign of “providential blessings.” Such  appeals are particularly 
found in the closing paragraphs where the Company’s secular success is por-
trayed as evidence of providential  blessings for a righteous, “higher” cause. The 
two are depicted as two sides of the same coin.
The concluding article of the 1650 Instructions130 for instance is clearly 
intended as an ideological spur to the High Government’s total commit-
ment to the cause of the Company. It starts with a reminder to the mem-
bers of the High Government that they “may every day dedicate all of your 
thoughts and interventions to the general and particular workings of the 
Company.”131
The commitment of the High Government is then put into a religious per-
spective. All their efforts “will fall upon them lightly, especially as God himself, 
130 1650 Instructions, art. 164, Mijer, Verzameling van instructiën, 115–16.
131 “Dat Ued. Alle Uwe gedachten en mediatiën op het generaal en particullier werk van de Comp. 
dagelijks latende gaan.” 1650 Instructions, art. 164, ibid.
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who knows what is best for man, will give the work his blessings.”132 The “con-
ceptual figure” or “moral lesson” here is that there exists a heavenly ordained 
symmetrical relation between worldly efforts and returns on earth. Dedicated 
work brings its reward by God’s blessing–a Company variety of Devotio 
moderna, or a connection between “the Protestant ethic and a “Spirit of 
Company”, if you wish. In the following paragraph from article 164, however, 
it is not so much heavenly returns that are stressed, but the more mundane 
returns for the Company to be earned by a collective high moral standard and 
the dedication of its servants in all fields of office:
But, as all good deeds finally depend on the moral example of the persons in charge, 
must we remind you members of the High Government and the Councillors of the 
Indies to serve collectively as an exemplary model in all your domains of office, exe-
cution of justice, law-enforcement, trade and all other matters.133
One should of course be careful not to read too much into such formulations. 
Cynically read, the text might basically mean, “Stop your individual smugg-
ling.” But what is also clear is that the Directors’ stress that just as righteous 
conduct has rewards and blessings at the individual level, so does the Company’s 
success as a corporate body depend on the virtue and moral conduct of the 
High Government as a collective body.
In the final paragraph of article 164, a unity of morals at the individual- and 
at the corporate level is linked together. Committed service to the Company 
according to the “laws of God” would bring it secular rewards guaranteed by 
providential blessings:
That you Councillors of the Company should take the interest of the Company so to 
your heart that the long-awaited fruits may be anticipated, for which we pray to the 
Lord that you jointly, will be spared all ‘misfortunes,’ and that he will bless trade more 
and more under his long continuing blessings and protection.134
132 “zeer ligt en onbezwaard toevallen zal, inzonderheid als God de Heere, die weet wat den mensch nut 
is, ‘t zelve gelieft te zegenen.” 1650 Instructions, art. 164, ibid.
133 “Maar gelijk alle deugden haar gevolgen krijgen uit goede opperhoofden en voorgangers wordt UEd. 
En den Raden van Indië geszamentlijk, als een lichaam representerende, ten hooghste gerecommandeerd 
med goede exempelen in de justicie, policie, handel en al hetgeen daarvan verder dependert, te toonen.” 
1650 Instructions, art. 164, ibid. 116.
134 “Dat Ued. Het welvaren van deze loffelijke Nederlandsche geocrtoijeerde Oost- Indische Comp. zoo te 
harte gaat, dat daarvan de lang verwachte vruchten te gemoet mogen zien waartoe wij God den Heere 
bidden, Ued. te zamen en in het bijzonder voor alle ongeluk en onheil te bewaren, den handel van 
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The same linking of God and the Company’s success is found, although in a 
somewhat different form, in article 10 of the 1609 Instructions, which summarises 
the general aim and purpose of the Company as being “Not only to continue, but 
to seek to increase and broaden the commercial activities in the name of Christ, to 
the salvation of the non-Christian peoples, to the honour and respect of our Nation 
and to the benefit of the Company, in all possible ways.”135
As it stands, it is not explicitly made clear what the priorities among mis-
sion, national glory, and profitable trade should be. In fact, article 10 could be 
read to mean that trade was instrumental to mission (den handel tot verbrei-
ding), but this was quite simply not the case, for the Company’s commercial 
mission was restricted to areas conquered from the Portuguese, and colonisa-
tion schemes such as that on the island of Formosa were the exception.
We find a more secular “trinity” in article 20 of the 1609 Instructions, which 
concerns the Company’s intra-Asian trade. The Directors do not find themsel-
ves in position to give specific advice on this, but in general the trade must be 
conducted to “serve the Republic, accrue profit to the Company, and protect 
and defend the honour of the Company.”136 “God” re-enters the trinity in the 
following article, however, at the expense of the Company’s honour: “Our fri-
endship and trade must be promoted and carried out to the glory of the Lord, 
the well- being of the country, and the profit of the Company.”137
In the concluding article of the 1632 Instructions, heavenly providence and 
corporate commitment are called upon in the following manner: “That the 
prosperity of the honourable United Company so goes to your heart that we 
may reap the fruits, for which we pray God to spare you from all mischiefs and 
accidents, (and) to preserve the trade of the Indies.”138
Inidië onder Ued. beleid meer en meer te zegenen, en onder Zijne heilige bescherming lang voorspoedig 
te willen houden.” 1650 Instructions, art. 164, ibid. 116.
135 “Om den Oost-Indischen handel tot verbreiding van den naam van Christus, zaligheden der 
onchristenen, eere en reputatie van Onse natie, ten profijt van de Comp. niet alleen te continueren, 
maar bij alle mogelijke middelen en wegen te vergrooten.” 1609 Instructions, art. 10, ibid. 8., and is 
repeated almost word by word in article 10 of the 1613 Instructions, Stapel (ed.) 1943, 547.
136 1609 Instructions, art. 20, Mijer, Verzameling van instructiën, 13.
137 “Onzen voet in Indië vast, Onze vriendschappen en de trafique tot Godes eere, der Landen welvaart, 
en den Comp. Profijt bevorderd en gedreven mag worden.” 1609 Instructions, art. 21, ibid. 13.
138 “Dat U.Ed. het welvaren van de loffelijk Vereenigde Geooctroieerde Oost Indische Comp. Zoo ter harte 
gaat, dat daarvan de vruchten zullen mogen tegemoet zien, waartoe God bidden U.Ed. voor alle 
onheilen en ongelucken te bewaren, den handel van Indie te willen onderhouden.” 1632 Instructions, 
art. 96, ibid. 70.
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Here, then, we encounter the same configuration as in the 1650 Instructions: 
Individual commitment to the Company is likened to taking part in an endea-
vour for a collective body under heavenly blessings.
References to “God” or appeals to a “higher order” are also invoked as a 
source of consolation and encouragement in the face of hardship. In the con-
cluding paragraph of article 72 of the 1650 Instructions (concerning trade with 
Persia), the High Government is instructed not to retaliate violently to local 
injustice or harassment, unless clearly provoked to do so, and then only as a 
last resort. The sufferings and injustice that may be inflicted upon the Dutch 
should instead be viewed with calm and as being temporary. At the end of the 
day, seen from the perspective of cosmological justice, the wrongdoers would 
be punished and those showing restraint and righteous conduct rewarded: 
“Just as one must never lose confidence in the justice of God, it is our aim that 
those who follow evil ways will receive punishment, just as those who follow 
the righteous path in this behaviour can expect God’s blessings.”139
There is a common denominator in all these references to the providential 
dimension to the Company’s venture. Divine blessing is consistently linked to the 
secular success of the Company, which again is combined with an implicit or 
 explicit appeal to individual commitment and dedication to the execution of work 
in the Company’s service. What is particularly relevant in this context is the 
 relationship between means and ends; in the final instance providence and indivi-
dual morale are both seen as means to the Company’s collective success. This is, 
I  think, as far as we can get in trying to establish a more general worldview or 
 ideological framework from the Generale Instructiens. It represents a raison de 
compagnie argument, mixed with corporate pride, and a sense of belonging to the 
happy few. This has implications for the understanding of the Directors’ diploma-
tic model in the sense that it is hard to imagine that diplomacy was perceived as 
being extrinsic to moral standards or void of emotions or motives of prestige and 
pride. I would thus propose that although the Directors’ thought in pragmatic 
terms, their thinking also had an idealistic component. However, the idealistic 
dimension mentioned to in the above, is less evident in the advice on Makassar in 
the particular letters from the Directors to the High Government.
139 “Gelijk aan Gods rechtvaardigheid geenzins getwijfeld mag worden, zoo gaat ook zeker, dat degenen, die 
onregtvaardig wegen inslaan, de straffen daarvan gevoelen zullen, maar degene den regten weg in 
hunnen handel volgende, Gods zegen daarop te verwachten hebben.” 1650 Instructions, art. 72, ibid. 80.
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Section 4: Approaches to diplomacy in the entries 
on Makassar in the particular patriase letters to 
the High Government 1634–1669
Section introduction
All in all, nineteen entries were made about Makassar in the particular 
patriase letters to the High Government in the period covered by my 
study140. The first is a comment on illicit trade via Makassar in a letter of 
September 3, 1634,141 and the final ones are two comments in a letter of 
May 9, 1669142 on the situation after the various peace settlements with 
Makassar 1667-68.
The Directors’ remarks and advice on Makassar cover a wide range of 
issues such as smuggling of spices via Makassar, as in the letters of September 
2, 1634, April 21, 1635143 and September 25, 1642,144 or where to buy sap-
panwood of the best quality145. Whereas one entry occupies itself with taking 
actions to secure the supply of rice from Makassar,146 another concerns 
technical details on modes of payment and credit147 and yet another gives 
orders not to enter “imaginary profits” into the bookkeeping.148 None of the 
above entries will be analysed here however, as I shall concentrate on com-
ments which contain implicit perceptions or explicit remarks on policy and 
mode of diplomacy towards Makassar.
140 The sources consulted in this subsection are respectively: Johan van Hoorn’s book of extracts of letters 
by the XVII to the GGs 1629-1697: Notulen getrocken uijt de brieven van de Heeren Bewindhebberen 
van de Generale Nederlandsche Geoctroijeerde Oostindische Compagnie ter Vergadering vande 
Seventienen: Beginnende met die van den 28 Augustij anno 1629 en Eijndigende met die van 27 
December 1697, KITLV, collection H 45, from now on: “Van Hoorn, Notulen“, and the original letters 
in the NA: VOC, 1.04.02, Invnrs. 316-319.
141 Patriase letter, September 3, 1634, Van Hoorn, Notulen, fol. 7: NA, Inv.nr. 316 fol. 45b.
142 Patriase letter, May 9 1669, two entries, Van Hoorn, Notulen, fol. 108b and 113b respectively. NA, Inv.
nr. 319, unf.
143 Patriase letter, April 21, 1635, Van Hoorn, Notulen, fol. 7b, NA, invnr. 316, fol. 67b.
144 Patriase letter, September 25, 1642, Van Hoorn, Notulen, fol. 14b, NA, invnr. 350, fol. 380-380b.
145 Patriase letter April 7, 1663, Van Hoorn, fol. 74. NA, invnr. 318, fol. 591.
146 Patriase letter September 21, 1644, Van Hoorn, fol. 17., NA, invnr. 317, fol. 3b-4.
147 Patriase letter April 29, 1664, Van Hoorn, Notulen, fol. 78 b, NA, invnr. 351, fol.666-667.
148 Imaginereede winsten de boeken te brengen, Patriase letter 7 November 1665, Van Hoorn, Notulen, fol. 
89, NA, invnr 351, fol. 814.
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Letters containing politico-diplomatic implications or 
direct advice on diplomatic approach
The particular patriase letters containing direct and specific advice on policy 
and mode of diplomacy towards Makassar are in chronological order the 
 letters of: September 22, 1648, October 13, 1656, October 9, 1657, August 23, 
1661, August 24, 1663, October 23, 1666, May 14, 1667, August 22, 1668 and 
of May 9, 1669, already mentioned.
In their letter of September 10, 1650, the Directors called upon the High 
Government to “evict all Portuguese from Batavia and close all other Company 
residencies to them as their presence was “bad for the Company.”149 Considering 
the strong Portuguese position in Makassar, this obviously indirectly had to do 
with Company relations with Makassar, but the entry contained no further 
explicit advice on how the High Government should act towards the Sultanate 
or the Portuguese there, and thus falls outside the sample of policy advice con-
cerning Makassar.
Within the sample of advice on policy towards Makassar proper, the series 
of letters up to October 23, 1666 is broken by insertions of advice on practical 
and commercial matters as already noted above. But in the letters after the 
sending of Speelman’s expedition in 1666 up to and including the ones of May 
9, 1669 the patriase comments on Makassar form an unbroken chain of reflec-
tions and advice. I shall analyse the Directors’ view in the whole sample with 
an eye to how it fits in with or contradicts my findings in the analysis of the 
Directors’ model of diplomacy in the General Instructions.
I have not been able to find any comments by the Directors on the 1637 
Treaty. The first entry containing direct advice on mode of diplomacy is thus in 
the letter of September 22, 1648, where the subject is whether the Company 
should go to war or find peaceful solutions with Makassar. The Directors come 
up with a strong advocacy for the latter: a war against Makassar is hard to win, 
and one should strive to maintain the friendship so as not to end up with even 
more enemies. The ideal situation was to continue “trading in peace”150.
149 Batavia en alle andere residentien van de Comp: Van de Portuguesen Suyveren, en deselve aldaar geen 
toegange meer geven … als quaat voor de Comp., Patriase letter, September 10, 1650, Van Hoorn, 
Notulen, fol. 32, NA, Invnr. 317, fol. 89b.
150 om met selver (Makassar) in vriendschap te blyven om geen meer vyanden op onsen hals te hebben … 
vreedsame negotie, Patriase letter, September 22, 1648, Van Hoorn, fol. 25b, NA, Invnr. 317, fol. 111.
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The letter of October 13, 1656 also concerns the issue of war and peace, but 
this time in a more immediate context, because of the Directors’ fears that the 
Company might become involved in a war with Mataram and Banten. The 
High Government is therefore recommended to keep peace with Makassar to 
avoid a situation where the Company is “threatened from all sides”151.
When in the letter of Oct. 9, 1657, the High Government is reminded by the 
Directors to just keep an eye on Makassar with no other specific instructions,152 
it falls in line with the fears of falling into war and the wish to avoid it as 
expressed in both 1648 and 1656.
The comments on Makassar in the patriase letter of August 23, 1661, written 
in the aftermath of the successful campaign against Makassar in 1660, are 
more specific than the prior ones. The Directors start by expressing their joy 
over the victory in the general and the destruction of Portuguese ships at the 
Makassarese roadstead in particular. Then they go on to emphasise that when 
the Makassarese had been forced to conclude “such an advantageous peace”, it 
contributed to increasing the Company’s reputation in the area153. But except 
for the congratulations on the victory and the comment regarding the increa-
sed standing the victory gave the Company, no concrete advice or instructions 
on policy were offered.
More concrete and specific advice was given in the letter of August 24, 1663, 
however, where the High Government was asked to approach and invite the 
Sultan of Ternate’s brother, Calamatta to Batavia instead of having him walk 
freely in Makassar which meant “running the  risk that he might conspire with 
the English.”154 This advice thus conforms to the cautious reminders we saw in 
the letters of September 22, 1648, October 13, 1656, and Oct. 9, 1657, except 
that in 1663 the caution took the form of preempting tactics to guard against 
any third party scheming to undermine the peace with Makassar.
151 den Mataram ende Bantam ….ons van alle kanten op luyf souden vallen, Patriase letter, October 13 
1656, Van Hoorn, Notulen fol. 48, NA, Invnr. 317, fol. 450.
152 To keep an eye on the goings on in Makassar, Patriase letter Oct. 9, 1657, Van Hoorn, Notulen, fol. 52b, 
NA, Invnr. 317, fol. 508b-509.
153 (de vrede) nu soo avantagieus gesloten zynde, sal het selve geen kleyne luyster aan ‘t Comp. Reputatie 
d’omleggende gewesten geven, Patriase letter of August 23, 1661, Van Hoorn, fol. 65b. NA, Invnr. 318, 
fol. 406-407.
154 dan pericuel te lopen darby op Macassar blyvende ofte sigh onder Engelse begevende, Patriase letter 
August 24, 1663, Van Hoorn, Notulen fol. 76, NA Invnr. 351, fol. 611.
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In the letter of October 23, 1666, the Directors state that they are awaiting 
what will eventually happen regarding the relations with Makassar, but repeat 
their general advice to stay out of trouble and conflict, while at the same time 
stressing that the High Government must consolidate the Company’s position 
in the Eastern quarters.155 In other words the Directors’ comments reflect a 
combination of calling for caution and advising that necessary precautions be 
taken. In the former respect the advice represents an echo of prior ones.
Even more so does the following letter of May 14, 1667, where the appeal to 
seek peaceful solutions once again is voiced. In 1667 the appeal for peaceful 
solutions starts by the Directors expressing their hopes that relations with 
Makassar would improve, and that the Company would soon be allowed to 
trade there again.156 Then an implicit statement of recommended policy is offe-
red by stating that “lately the Company had had good profitable trade and 
made advances in Makassar”157. The implication is clearly that because of the 
war, trade had suffered and that the Directors were looking forward to an 
ending of the war so that peaceful relations and thereby profitable trade could 
be resumed.
With the news of Speelman’s victories in the fall of 1667158 the Directors’ 
cautious tone changed somewhat, but not without qualifications. The section 
on Makassar in the letter of August 22, 1668 started with the Directors’ cong-
ratulations on Spellman’s “great victory”, and then went straight on to express 
the wish for the conclusion of an “honourable peace.” The latter point was 
expressed as a matter of some urgency however, as the Directors expressed 
their doubts as to whether the Company would have the necessary military 
might to keep the Makassarese suppressed for long.159 Unnecessary continua-
tion of the war would in addition mean a non-wished for draw on limited 
155 blyven de Heeren afwagten, met recommandatie om met dat ryk (Makassar) buyten werveyderinge en 
hostiliteyten te blyven, …. in de oosterse quartieren te consolideren, Patriase letter October 23, 1666, 
Van Hoorn, Notulen fol. 91b, NA Invnr. 319, unf.
156 Hopen dat de saken met Maccassar ten beter sullen uytvallen, en wy daar verder geadmittert, Patriase 
letter May 14, 1667, Van Hoorn, Notulen fol. 93. NA Invnr. 319, unf.
157 geen vordeligh … een considerable negotie en… goede advancen gehad, Patriase letter May 14, 1667, 
Van Hoorn, Notulen fol. 93. NA Invnr. 319, unf.
158 See chapter 1 and on the Bongaya treaty in chapter 8.
159 dat hierop een honorable vrede gevolgt was, alsoo ‘t niet apparent is, wy met continuatie onser wapenen 
met voordeel, de Makassaren geheel t’onder sullen brengen, Patriase letter August 22, 1668, Van Hoorn, 
Notulen fol. 105.: NA Invnr. 319, unf.
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resources that were needed elsewhere, for instance Ceylon, they pointed out.160 
In support of establishing a final peace settlement as soon as possible, the 
Directors also argued that the Company in dealing with the Makassarese was 
“dealing with people of a stubborn nature.”161 A prolonged war might thus well 
mean that the Makassarese would become even more dedicated in their 
struggle against the Company.162
The Directors’ comments on how to deal with Makassar after the victories of 
1667 thus on the one hand expresses pride in the Company’s victories but on 
the other hand also worries that a final settlement be established as quickly as 
possible so as not to jeopardize the Company’s current advantageous position. 
This ambiguity signals that the Directors in autumn of 1668 perceived the 
Company’s position in relation to Makassar had not been radically changed so 
as to call for a reconstruction of the political map of South Sulawesi with the 
Company as hegemon, which in fact became the de facto result of the war. 
The Directors’ mode of arguing in August 1668 however much jubilant, was 
still one basically characterised by caution and restraint.
There are two entries about Makassar in the patriase letter of May 9, 1669. 
The first entry is based on news in a letter from Speelman that the Makassarese 
have guns and are able in using them. Apart from worries over this fact, the 
Bewindhebbers state that victory over Makassar depends on the support of the 
Bugis.163 The tone in the entry that followed is far more optimistic, here the 
Directors express their surprise that the High Government had been able to 
humiliate the Makassarese to accept such a “dishonourable and unfavourable 
contract of accommodating submission.”164
The two entries on Makassar in the May 1669 letter must have been entered 
respectively before and after knowledge of the contracts with Prince Tello and 
Karaung Linques in Mars 1668, which finally secured the settlement of the 
160 daar ….op Ceylon soo noodige is, Patriase letter August 22, 1668 Van Hoorn, Notulen fol. 105.: NA 
Invnr. 319, unf.
161 uit een hartneckigh wolck te doen heben, Patriase letter, August 22, 1668, Van Hoorn, Notulen fol. 105. 
NA Invnr. 319, unf.
162 de Makassaren by langere continuatie van den Oorlog …dardor te stoutmoedigen worden, Patriase 
letter, August 22, 1668, Van Hoorn, Notulen fol. 105. NA Invnr. 319, unf.
163 Patriase letter, May 9, 1669, in Van Hoorn, Notulen, Folio 108b and and 113b, NA Invnr. 319, unf.
164 hadden noit gedagt dat wy Makassar tot sulken vernedringe souden hebben konnen brengen dat 
hy tot het aangaan van sulcken disreputatien en nadeligen contract, in genoegsame submissie 
soude hebben konnen verstaan, Patriase letter, May 9, 1669, Van Hoorn, Notulen fol. 113b. NA 
Invnr. 319, unf.
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Bongaya treaty165. This chronology would explain why the first one reflects the 
same kind of worries about the final outcome as the letter of August 22, 1668, 
whereas the second entry signals unrestricted joy over final victory with no 
remarks of caution.
The nature of the Directors’ advice on approach 
towards Makassar in the particular patriase letters
Speelman’s was praised for his outstanding performance in the middle of the 
dehumanising effects of war, a war which he had brought to a happy conclusion 
by his vigilance, dedicated effort and bravery.166 Still it remains a fact that the 
jubilant reaction in the May 9 letter forms the exception to the rule. The Directors’ 
advice on diplomacy towards Makassar generally conveys a message to tread 
lightly and above all to seek to avoid or to end wars at the earliest possible 
moment. In this regard the advice in the particular patriase letters falls in line 
with the model of pragmatic approach in the Directors’ General Instructions.
Chapter conclusion
Strictly speaking, the “Patriase model of overseas diplomacy” in the General 
Instructions issued between 1609 and 1650 can hardly be called a “model” at 
all, if by “model” we mean an explicit set of general principles from which are 
deducted more elaborately defined rules. Advice on diplomacy there was, but 
the process of formulating advice was not a deductive one, it was an inductive 
one. The predominant body of advice on diplomatic performance offered by 
the Directors reflected a pragmatic approach by which a recommended line of 
action was suggested, where the actual implementation of it to a large degree 
was put in the hands of the Company’s authorities in Asia. From time to time, 
the Directors’ particular advice would slide into more general reflections, but 
the point of departure was in the final instance case-bound. In other words, the 
Directors’ “model” of overseas diplomacy must be reconstructed from this 
165 See chapter 8.
166 de chandelycke, en mensch verslindende oorlogh…, de vigilantie, en onvermoeylycken arbeit, voort dap-
perheyt en goede conduite den E. Cornelis Speelman … Patriase letter, May 9, 1669, Van Hoorn, Notulen 
fol. 113b. NA Invnr. 319, unf.
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bundle of practical advice and general elaborations originating in specific 
cases.
Three characteristics of this “model-in-the-making” stand out: the way by 
which it testifies to a general pragmatic approach towards overseas diplomacy 
at the outset; how appeals to take a pragmatic stand were implied or explicitly 
inscribed in the texts of the Instructions; and an inherent drive to acquire as 
precise information about local conditions as possible. To assume that princi-
ples of international law directed the Company’s overseas diplomacy is misgui-
ded at best. The evidence in the General Instructions, as well as the in the 
Directors’ particular advice on Makassar suggest that their approach towards 
overseas diplomacy was neither Eurocentric, nor legally dogmatic, but cultur-
ally sensitive and inter-culturally pragmatic.
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Culture and Treaty: 
Leonard Andaya’s model 
of conflicting treaty 
conceptions and the June 26, 
1637 treaty between Sultan 
Alauddin and the Company
In this chapter, I shall discuss Andaya’s propositions about the cultural bias 
and incommensurability of treaty conceptions using the Company’s treaty 
with South-Sulawesi of June 26, 1637 as my case.
The background before Van Diemen’s expedition to the Moluccas 1637 was 
that after kapitan Hitu had approached Makassar in 1633, and because of 
Dutch counter actions in the following year, by 1636 almost the entire land of 
Hitu had risen against the Dutch.1 Also the Christian population of Ambon 
had started protesting the increasing burden of services (Herendienst) deman-
ded by the Company.2
In addition, on western Java war with Banten had broken out in November 
1633, but negotiations for settlement were opened in March 1636 and a truce 
signed between the Sultanate and the Company.3 Van Diemen’s expedition, in 
1 Knaap, 1992, 5.
2 Knaap 2004, 27.
3 J. Kathirithamby-Wells, “Banten: A West Indonesian Port and Polity During the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries”, in Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers (eds.): The Southeast Asian Port and 
Polity, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990, 107- 127, 115.
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other words, took place at a time when Makassar was continually expanding4, and 
the Company was under pressure both in the Eastern archipelago and on Java.
Section 1: Presentation of the June 26, 1637 treaty 
of peace between the Company and Makassar
In conjunction with his 1637 campaign against the rebels in Ambon,5 
Governor-General Van Diemen anchored in the roadstead of Makassar on 
June 22 with the aim of concluding a treaty of peace and friendship. After four 
days of intricate negotiations, the Company and Sultan Alauddin of Makassar 
concluded a peace treaty.6
The 1637 treaty was primarily a political treaty. Of the twelve regulations 
only one dealt directly with bilateral trade between the Company and 
Makassar.7 The other eleven banned Makassarese residents from sailing to 
Malacca and Ceram,8 outlined rules of conduct and responsibility regar-
ding conflict between the Company and other European nations in 
Makassarese waters,9 and regulated bilateral political interactions between 
the Company and Makassar10. The rest of the clauses concerned miscellane-
ous practical issues such as the reciprocal obligation to hand over runaways,11 
and the reciprocal recognition of the freedom to practise one’s religion.12 
All in all, then, regulation of political interaction—bilateral as well as with 
third parties—were the dominant issues in the June 26, 1637 treaty.
Background and context of June 1637 treaty
The immediate background of the 1637 treaty was Van Diemen’s expedition to 
Ambon and the Moluccas. The raison d’être of the treaty was to stop the 
4 D. K. Basset, «English Trade in Celebes, 1613-1677”, Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal 
Asiatic Society, 31/1 1958, 1-39, 10-11.
5 See “section 1”, chapter 1.
6 1637 treaty, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.303–306.
7 Specified rates of export tolls to be paid to the Sultan, 1637 treaty, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304–305.
8 1637 treaty, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304.
9 1637 treaty, unnumbered arts. 4–5 and 7–9, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304.
10 1637 treaty, unnumbered arts. 1–3, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.303–304.
11 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 11, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.305.
12 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 12, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.305. Both standard VOC treaty regulations.
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“smuggling” of cloves from the Eastern Archipelago via Makassar.13 In other 
words, the 1637 treaty was a political device intended to protect the Company’s 
monopoly rights. It reflected a conflict of interest between Makassar and the 
Company, as the Makassarese profited both from their sultanate’s position as 
an entrepôt as well as its collaboration with non-VOC Europeans at its road-
stead. To stop or at least lessen this, the Company would have to establish a 
lodge in Makassar, which became an issue during the negotiations.14
The nature of the 1637 treaty: Historiographic 
positions and my propositions
One important feature of the 1637 treaty is that some of the articles in the final 
text were proposed by Sultan Alauddin.15 Heeres, for instance, points to the final 
ordering of the respective articles as coming from the Makassarese.16 Andaya, 
on the other hand, sees it as a predominantly European kind of treaty, although 
with some distinctive South Sulawesi imprints.17 Neither one, and in particular 
Andaya, analyses the treaty as the result of a dynamic process of give-and-take.
What I aim to demonstrate in this chapter is that the 1637 treaty in fact 
represented a product of negotiated compromises between competing inter-
ests. Contrary to Andaya, I also claim that there was “real” communication 
between the two negotiating parties in the sense that they both had a realistic 
grip on the issues at hand and that they understood each other’s positions. In 
short, they were negotiating within a shared conceptual framework.
The negotiations and final formulation of the terms of the 1637 treaty was 
thus a result of a tug of war in which both parties demonstrated a functional 
understanding of the other’s intention and motives. The nature of the 1637 
treaty as a negotiated compromise between antagonistic secular interests that 
presupposed a kind of functional communication is symptomatically lost in 
Andaya’s structural approach.
13 For the background, see Menno Witteveen, Antonie van Diemen: De opkomst van de VOC in Azië 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2001), 215–19.
14 For the negotiations on the issue, see section 2; for the formulation of the compromise reached, see 
section 3.
15 See sections 2 and 3, below.
16 Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304n1, referring to Van Diemen’s report, DRB June 22–26, 1637, 286.
17 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 289.
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Plan of exposition
The analysis has three main sections. In the first, I discuss Andaya’s general 
argument about the cultural collision between European and South Sulawesian 
treaty concepts and his views on the 1637 treaty in particular. In the second, I 
analyse what actually took place during the negotiations leading up to the 
treaty, with a focus on the nature of the issues and the exchanges that led to the 
compromises accepted by both parties. In the third, I analyse the formulations 
of the regulations agreed to in the 1637 treaty, arguing that both the substance 
of the issues and the formulation of them demonstrate a shared ground of 
understanding in the Company–Makassar treaty making at the time. The 
negotiations and final text of the treaty reflect pragmatism on both sides as 
they struggled to advance and protect their respective secular interests.
Sources
The analysis mainly rests on the VOC sources, namely Van Diemen’s report on 
the negotiations in Makassar June 24–26, 1637,18 and Heeres’ edition of the 
1637 treaty.19
Section 2: Perspective in South-Sulawesian 
thinking on diplomacy and treaty: Andaya’s 
positions and my counter-propositions
Andaya’s structural approach to overseas treaty 
making
For Leonard Andaya, the treaty making between the Company and Makassar in 
general represented a continuous miscommunication as the expectations and 
concepts of the two parties sprang from a “fundamental difference in cultural 
attitudes,”20 or incompatible mental frameworks. Whereas the South Sulawesi 
treaty was situated in a “spiritual” conception of treaty, and concerned exchanges 
of spiritual power, the Company’s perceptions and beliefs sprang from a 
18 “Verhaell vant gene d’Heer Generaall van Diemmen wedervaren is zijne Amboijnesche voijage int 
weder keeren voor Makassar.” DRB June 22–26, 1637, 280– 89.
19 “Treaty of peace between the king of Makassar and the noble Gentleman General Governor Antonio 
van Diemen, June 26, 1637.” Corpus Diplomaticum,1.303–306.
20 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 288.
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European, rational- legalistic framework,21 and concerned specific regulations on 
trade.22 This meant that the very process of treaty making between the two took 
place between two parties with diametrically opposing intentions and pursuits.
Stemming from antagonistic and deeply embedded cultural perceptions and 
expectations, the mutual misunderstandings between the Company’s servants 
and South Sulawesi states constituted a constant feature and caused endemic 
friction and eventually ended in war between the two: “treaties between the 
Company and a South Sulawesi state were characterised by conflicting expecta-
tions, leading to frustration, then mutual recriminations, and finally war.”23
This friction was present from the first treaties with the Company in the 
early seventeenth century and persisted well into the colonial period.24 Still 
Andaya does find some local imprints in the Company- Makassarese treaty 
record, which raises the question of how and why these were included.
Local imprints in the Company–Makassar treaty record
Andaya points to instances of local influence in some of the treaties between 
the Company and Makassar, especially in the 1655 treaty,25 but also in the 1637 
treaty. I shall analyse his propositions on this point in some detail, and will 
argue that these imprints were less culturally and more contextually embedded 
than Andaya assumes. If so, none of these local imprints would have been 
unintelligible to the Company’s negotiators.
Andaya claims that: “There is little indication that any effort was made to 
understand the whole intent of local treaties. Almost the entire corpus of the 
treaties between the Company and the South Sulawesi states was framed in the 
Western European tradition of treaty making, with little or no attempt to 
accommodate local practices.”26
I reject this on two grounds. First, the 1637 treaty basically focuses on the 
regulation of specific, concrete issues that were not formulated in Western legal 
parlance. Second, the Makassarese did not meet the Company’s demands by 
retreating to their local practices or modes of thinking. Therefore, the Dutch 
21 Ibid. 286, 288.
22 Ibid. 288.
23 Ibid. 291.
24 Ibid. 291.
25 Ibid. 287.
26 Ibid. 286–87.
166
chap ter 4
did not need to familiarise themselves with deep-seated cultural conceptions, as 
these were not particularly relevant in the Makassarese dealings with a European 
company. What the Dutch needed to understand was the tactical intent behind 
the Makassarese suggestions and proposed revisions, as secular interests were 
primary concerns in these, too. In other words, I shall be arguing that a more 
contextual and secular interpretation of the Makassarese actions and their mea-
ning might be as plausible as Andaya’s structural cultural interpretation.
Andaya on the protection of sovereignty as a 
“typical South Sulawesian feature,” and its imprint 
on the 1637 treaty
One imprint of the typical South Sulawesi conception of the protection of 
sovereignty in the 1637 treaty was, according to Andaya, that it “forbade the 
Dutch from continuing their hostilities against the enemies in the lands and 
seas belonging to the ruler of Goa, and explicitly stated that the enemies of one 
would not become the enemies of the other.”27 This regulation “asserted the 
sovereignty and power of Goa in the traditional fashion.”28 The key qualifica-
tion is “in the traditional fashion.”
At the outset, it is hard to accept that concern about autonomy by itself was 
peculiar to South Sulawesians. Just a brief look at early modern European history 
suggests otherwise.29 But Andaya’s argument for a dichotomy between European 
and South Sulawesian conceptions of “autonomy” is based on a proposition of an 
absolute difference in meaning, nature, and intent in the pursuit of “sovereignty.” 
This kind of conceptual antagonism is what caused the mutual misconceptions. 
Andaya’s line of argument is based on his proposition about the spiritual concep-
tion of ruler-lineage-state and treaty in South Sulawesi.30 Two questions arise. 
First, if, for the sake of argument, we accept Andaya’s assumptions, how incom-
prehensible would the South Sulawesian conceptions have been to Europeans, 
who at least shared the historical experience of contests over sovereignty? And, 
second, why would the Makassarese apply their local tradition in disputes with 
27 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 289.
28 Ibid. 289.
29 See, for instance, M. S. Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919 (London: Longman, 1993), 
chapters 1 and 2.
30 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 278–86; see chapter 1, above.
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an outsider party like a European company? Only one response is possible to the 
latter question: they were “culturally blindfolded” and thus unable to apply an 
alternative set of thoughts and actions. I reject both the assumption of incompa-
tibility and the proposition of “cultural block.”
Problems in the analysis
Andaya’s structural line of argumentation for one presupposes that when dealing 
with Europeans, Alauddin in the 1637 case, and his successors in negotiating for 
the other treaties, were unable to switch their approach to negotiation from a 
fixed local mode. But how sure can we be that the Makassarese considered their 
dealings with the Dutch from a “metaphysical” or “spiritual” point of view, and 
did not apply a more “realist,” secular approach in these cases, which definitely 
did not form part of the internal South Sulawesian hierarchy of power? Secondly, 
Andaya does not take into account the existence of a category for state interac-
tion particularly designed for outsiders, pointed out by Resink and others.
Speaking for the realist alterative as the relevant interpretation key for the 
1637 negotiation is that power relations in the secular sense were a preoccupa-
tion for the Makassarese during the treaty negotiations.31 Furthermore, if we 
assume that the pragmatic model of diplomacy that, as we have seen, underlay 
the Directors’ General Instructions already in 1609, constituted a norm, how 
plausible is it that the Company’s servants overseas, and an experienced one 
like Van Diemen at that, would stick to a blueprint of European concepts and 
procedures of treaty making in their overseas practice?
Lastly, there is a comparative argument that undermines Andaya’s insistence 
on incommensurability. Let us again accept that conceptions, practices, and 
institutions of diplomacy differed in early modern Europe and Southeast Asia. 
The key question remains whether such differences made for systematic mis-
communication. As for Andaya’s example of “sovereignty,” I do not think there 
was. Sovereignty issues in their general form—that is autonomy of territorial 
decision making—represented a type of conflict that was well known in both 
Europe and Southeast Asia. So, there are a number of reasons why we should 
not at the outset accept that Alauddin and the Dutch negotiators were caught 
in a game of mutual misunderstanding.
31 See section 2, below.
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Nor should we assume that the treaty itself contained two distinct and sepa-
rate parts, one Eurocentric treaty blueprint and one typical South Sulawesian 
component. If there was a kind of mutual understanding and haggling over 
conflicts over shared issues, the miscellaneous regulations might just as well be 
seen as products of compromise on secular issues with differences in the colou-
ration of meaning, but nonetheless mutually comprehensible.
My own proposition is that such was the case in this instance: The 1637 
treaty represented a negotiated compromise between actors who did commu-
nicate with each other in a meaningful way, and the resulted compromise 
entailed a mix of concessions and wins on both sides.
Alauddin’s claim of perceptions of perpetuity as 
typical of the South Sulawesi treaty tradition
When Sultan Alauddin insisted that the 1637 treaty was binding not only for 
the present, but for future governors-general,32 Andaya holds that this repre-
sents another local cultural imprint of the South Sulawesi conception of treaty 
“in conformity to local practices.”33 What it conforms to is that in the South 
Sulawesian tradition a treaty was never seen as being terminated, but existed 
for perpetuity: “Once a treaty had been agreed upon it remained a permanent 
agreement which could be resurrected and renewed or allowed to recede into 
the background in the face of other superior political and spiritual force. The 
enduring sacred documents were made once and for all.”34
So, according to Andaya, the perpetuity claim in the 1637 treaty originated from 
the South Sulawesi tradition even if it was presented “in the form of a European 
treaty.”35 It entails two alternative assumptions. It might mean that the Makassarese 
really wanted to integrate the VOC into the South Sulawesian political and spiri-
tual hierarchy, although this is contradicted by the Makassarese stand during the 
negotiations.36 Alternatively, it might mean that the Makassarese were mentally or 
culturally incapable of applying any approach other than the local model, although 
they were dealing with an outsider. The latter is Andaya’s position.
32 As an emended note, included in the treaty text on Alauddin’s insistence, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.305 
(see section 3).
33 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 289.
34 Ibid. 284.
35 Ibid. 289.
36 See section 3, below.
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As for the possibility of Makassarese familiarity with the European treaty 
tradition, Andaya holds that they could not have gained any knowledge or 
experience in European treaty making from the Portuguese, as there simply is 
no evidence of any treaty making with them.37 The VOC treaties of 1637, 1655, 
and 1660 represent the only occasions in which Makassar entered into a for-
mal treaty arrangement with a European power.38 The Makassarese, according 
to Andaya, then entered into all these negotiations equipped only with their 
local conceptions. The proposition rejects cultural dynamics in response to 
novel contextual challenges. It represents another assumption that I reject on 
grounds of the Makassarese negotiation performance.
Antagonistic notions of “breach of contract”
One consequence of the divergent meanings of the perpetuity of a treaty in the 
European and South Sulawesian traditions is that the notion of “breach of con-
tract” did not really exist in the South Sulawesian tradition. Whereas in the 
European sense breach of contract was conceived as specific actions that ran 
contrary to specific terms in the treaty, the South Sulawesian conception of treaty 
allowed for shifts in alliances reflecting changes in the real world without consi-
dering such shifts a breach of prior treaties. The treaties were still considered 
valid, as an integral part of the realm’s living tradition. When actual power cen-
tres changed and old alliances were broken and new ones formed, the de facto 
obsolete treaties fell into the shadow of the new ones, but always with the possi-
bility of reactivation should further changes in power relations or spiritual pre-
stige require it: “Once a treaty had been agreed upon, it remained a permanent 
agreement which could be resurrected and renewed or allowed to recede into the 
background in face of other superior political and spiritual forces.”39
The notion of the treaties as “enduring sacred documents”40 was no impedi-
ment against stability or dynamic readjustments. Quite the contrary: it facilita-
ted both: “The treaties, oaths and the whole treaty making procedure were part 
of a continuing process of reassessment of political and spiritual affiliations to 
37 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 289.
38 Ibid. 289.
39 Ibid. 284.
40 Ibid. 284.
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assure the establishment of a hierarchy of states which accurately reflected the 
power situation in South Sulawesi.”41
On this background Andaya ranks the South Sulawesi states’ diplomatic 
interactions as superior to that of Europeans or the Company in this regard, 
the latter representing a use of treaties as “instruments of oppression,”42 the 
former “a means of establishing proper and peaceful relations.”43
Leaving the moral contest aside, the problem with Andaya’s contrast here, as 
in the above, is that it rests upon the assumption that the Makassarese would 
apply their local conceptions and norms of treaty making in their dealings 
with a non-local, outside party that was not an integrated part of the South 
Sulawesian hierarchy.
The convention of insisting on the perpetuity of the treaty, in the sense of “endu-
ring” (eeuwige), was an integral component of the Company’s contractual reper-
toire. The phrase functioned as a formal guard against breaches of contract. If in 
concluding the treaty Alauddin felt that he had got the best terms he could, all 
things considered, his insistence on perpetuity might just as easily be explained by 
contextual factors as by cultural ones. He might, in fact, have had every reason to 
have the final treaty confirmed as a fixed agreement.
Implications of unnumbered articles
Andaya points out that the typical form for a Company (and by extension the 
typical “Western European”) treaty was to number the treaty clauses and 
reserve one single issue for each respective article.44 This convention runs 
counter to South Sulawesian conceptions of “treaty.” “The local states viewed 
the treaty not in its individual parts, but as a total document,” he writes, 
and where “the treaty represented an open declaration of a shift in the spiritual 
and political power relationships in the area.”45 The difference between numbe-
ring and not numbering for Andaya springs from the antagonism between the 
“treaty” conceived of as a list of specific agreements in the European tradition, 
as opposed to a general act of symbolic bonding in the South 
41 Ibid. 284.
42 Ibid. 284.
43 Ibid. 284.
44 Ibid. 287.
45 Ibid. 288.
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Sulawesian tradition. In the latter, the nature of the relationship between the 
treating parties was already regulated in the implications of the preamble. 
There was no need for explicating specific regulations at all; they were already 
implicitly stated.46
The regulations of the 1637 treaty are not numbered, and the absence of 
numbering could then be taken as a Company concession to South Sulawesian 
tradition. But to conclude that is simply wrong. The treaty clauses, although 
not numbered, are all one-issue regulations, starting with “that”—twelve in all. 
Moreover, as we shall see, there is a consistent logic in the chronology of the 
unnumbered clauses. So, disregarding the absence of formal numbering, the 
treaty is, in Andaya’s view, a typical Western treaty. By implication, it should 
therefore be “foreign” to Alauddin in the sense that it was culturally incompre-
hensible. Again, the counter-argument can be made that several of the specific 
points were raised by Alauddin himself, and the final formulation of these 
points came about as results of revisions proposed by Alauddin.47 So, even if 
the Dutch treaty proposal differed compared to those found in the local South 
Sulawesian tradition, it was neither incomprehensible nor incompatible with 
it, at least not to a degree that prevented Alauddin from formulating changes 
to defend his interests. Alauddin’s negotiation performance does not conform 
to an assumption about his ignorance of what was going on.
The swearing ritual as an example of local imprint
A final example of a local trait from South Sulawesian treaty making was the 
mode of swearing on it. Here, Andaya points to the ritual drinking of palm 
wine stirred with a kris, and taking an oath on the Koran.48 In the case of the 
1637 treaty, no such ritual took place. The signing of the treaty by both parties 
was accompanied by a conventional exchange of gifts.49 Should we take this to 
mean that the Company overran the Makassarese with their own secular mode 
of ritual confirmation of treaty? Two arguments speak against this: First, there 
is no reason to assume that Alauddin would want the Company to take part in 
a Sulawesian ritual of oath taking, as it would imply that the Company was 
46 Ibid. 280–81.
47 See sections 2 and 3 below.
48 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 287.
49 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 22–26, 1637, 289–90.
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being integrated into the South Sulawesian hierarchy of states. His behaviour 
during the negotiations clearly indicates that he was striving to minimise the 
Company’s presence and influence.50 As for the Company, its representatives 
might well have agreed to such an act, because allowing the locals to swear 
according to their local practices was an established Company practice. This 
concession may have represented no more and no less than an implementation 
of the advice from the home country to accommodate local practices.
Section conclusion
The examples that Andaya gives of local imprints in the 1637 treaty do not 
shake his conviction that it represented a European type of treaty. Following 
Andaya’s assumption of mutually incompatible conceptions regarding con-
tracts, the negotiations represented a miscommunication between the 
Company negotiators and the Makassarese. Seen from the South Sulawesi side, 
the specific regulations in the Company’s proposed treaty were regarded as 
unimportant, and their implications were not fully understood by the 
Makassarese. This proposition assumes that both parties were “prisoners” of 
their respective traditions, which blocked functional communication.
Illustrative of this view is that as late as the Bongaya Treaty, Andaya holds 
that the Company and Makassar “differed fundamentally in the manner they 
invoked the treaty as a legitimizing document.”51 Even in the post-Bongaya 
period, there were conflicts between the Company and the South Sulawesian 
states: “except for certain exceptions, the difficulties stemmed basically from 
the conflicting South Sulawesi and European conceptions of treaties and 
treaty-making.”52 As for the exceptions, specifically those instances in which 
the Company gave concessions to local practice, as in the 1655 treaty, it did so 
because of its weak bargaining position, or because the treating parties were 
themselves of minor importance to the VOC.53
Andaya concedes then that the Company’s negotiators were neither una-
ware nor totally ignorant of the local mode of local treaty making.54 But the 
50 See section 2, below.
51 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 278.
52 Ibid. 278.
53 Ibid. 287.
54 Ibid. 286.
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model they generally applied in their own treaty making was generally “fra-
med in the Western European tradition of treaty-making with little or no 
attempt to accommodate local practices.”55 Makassar, however, did not adopt 
“the content or intent of the European treaty” in the contracts of either 1637 or 
1655.56 The evidence of the negotiations for and the final text of the June 26 
treaty strongly suggests otherwise, both for the Company’s as well as the 
Makassarese understanding of its partner’s respective motives and modes.
Section 3: The significance of communicative 
performance in the treaty negotiations
Brief chronology of events from June 22–June 26 and 
their implications
The events from the arrival of Van Diemen’s fleet outside the roadstead of 
Makassar on June 22 and up to the signing of the treaty on June 26 can be split 
into two main phases. From June 23 to the afternoon of the 24th was spent on 
establishing contact with Alauddin, and seeking out his position on entering 
into a treaty with the Company. Having received an affirmative reply about this 
(via middlemen), the Company’s conditions for the treaty were presented to 
the Makassarese envoys on June 24. This was the start of the real negotiations. 
All that happened from then on followed a pattern in which the Dutch presen-
ted conditions and propositions for the treaty, which were reviewed by 
Alauddin and members of his court. In this process, the sultan came up with 
revisions and amendments, which in their turn were reviewed jointly by the 
Company’s chief negotiators, Anthony Caen and Van Diemen, aboard ship. 
Caen would then return to shore with the revised propositions, which again 
were reviewed by Alauddin. This “ping-pong” game of treaty bargaining took 
place June 24–26. I shall analyse both phases in detail.
Section propositions
My proposition is that the conclusion of a treaty between Sultan Alauddin and 
the Company on June 26 was the result of a process of actors communicating 
55 Ibid. 288.
56 Ibid. 289.
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and bargaining within a shared framework of conceptions. This was so because 
the treaty communication was determined neither by European conceptions 
brought from overseas by the Company nor the Makassarese acting from 
genuinely South Sulawesian conceptions. The negotiations took place in a 
mutual understanding of the issues and their implications for both parties. 
This interpretation finds corroboration in the actual chronology of events 
from the time Van Diemen anchored outside the roadstead of Makassar up to 
and including the signing ceremony.
Events of June 22: Determining the sultan’s intentions
On June 22, Van Diemen’s fleet anchored off Makassar. The first observations 
noted were an Achenese vessel in the roadstead, the flags of the English and 
Danish lodges inside the city, and more significant, five “blood flags” flying 
from various Makassarese fortifications.57 Van Diemen deliberated with his 
next in command, Anthony Caen, and a decision was made to show signs of 
their peaceful intentions.58 A white flag was hoisted and a salute of five cannon 
shots given. The Makassarese response was to lower their flags, but no salute 
was given. During the evening, however, the Dutch noticed that the guard on 
the beach had been strengthened.59
This ambiguity of this response must have fitted well with the Dutch expec-
tations. When arriving at Makassar, Van Diemen did not know whether to 
expect hostile actions or a willingness to negotiate. So far, Van Diemen and 
Alauddin could be said to have behaved like dogs meeting not yet knowing 
whether to bark, bite or wag their tails.
Events of June 23: The Achenese ambassadors as 
communication link and mediators
Morning June 23
Two immediate tasks presented themselves after the first encounter June 
22, namely to find out Alauddin’s intentions and if they were friendly, 
determine how to establish a communication channel with him. As it 
57 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 22, 1637, 280.
58 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 22, 1637, 281.
59 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 22, 1637, 281.
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turned out, both tasks were solved with the assistance of the Achenese 
anchored at the roadstead. As no Makassarese vessel had approached the 
Dutch by the following morning, a decision was made at the ship’s council 
to launch a smaller vessel, carrying a white flag to approach the Achenese 
in order to get information about the state of affairs in Makassar and to see 
if the Achenese would be willing to act as go- betweens and bring a mes-
sage of the Company’s intentions of peace to Alauddin.60 The Dutch got 
almost more than they could have hoped for. After half an hour, the sloop 
returned carrying four Achenese with it. These Achenese had been serving 
as envoys to Alauddin, and so they volunteered to act as messengers to him 
for the Company.61
Their report on Alauddin’s feelings concerning the arrival of the Dutch 
explained both the ambiguous actions the evening before as well as the absence 
of any vessels to greet them that morning. According to the Achenese envoys, 
Alauddin was fearful of Dutch intentions and had forbidden any ship to 
approach the Dutch vessels. Furthermore, Makassar had recently been hit by a 
plague with a death toll of a “hundred thousand,” obviously implying that the 
Company had arrived at a difficult time in Makassar.62 From the Dutch point 
of view, this might seem an opportune time to strike a deal.
Having in any case cleared up the reasons for the absence of any Makassarese 
initiatives for contact so far, as well as having acquired a clearer indication of 
Alauddin’s situation, it was time for the Dutch to act. Van Diemen asked the 
Achenese to inform the sultan that the Dutch had come with peaceful intentions, 
and therefore wanted to send envoys ashore. For this to take place, the sultan 
must indicate his intentions for peace by hoisting a white flag as the Dutch had 
done.63 The Achenese agreed to act as middlemen conveying the message to the 
sultan. The Achenese were then brought back to their own ship, alongside which 
came a Makassarese longboat.64 Having been informed about the Achenese talks 
with the Dutch, the Makassarese longboat returned to shore. Before long, 
another Makassarese boat set out for the Achenese vessel, presumably carrying 
Alauddin’s response to the Dutch initiative. After another Makassarese visit to 
60 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 22, 1637, 281.
61 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 22, 1637, 281.
62 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 22, 1637, 281.
63 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 22, 1637, 281.
64 “duijsentbeen.” Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 22, 1637, 281.
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the Achenese, it was reported to Van Diemen that Alauddin’s response to the 
Dutch overture was that he himself was inclined towards peace, and that he had 
expected Dutch envoys to come ashore the day before. Not long after that, the 
Dutch saw a big white flag flying at the main Makassarese fort.65
It is worth noticing that up to and including the hoisting of the flag of peace, 
all communications between the Company and Alauddin had been either by 
signals or via third parties. I take this as indicative of both Van Diemen’s and 
Alauddin’s doubts about each other’s intentions at the time. It seems plausible 
to argue that had it not been for the Achenese middlemen, the whole commu-
nication could be viewed as “dumb barter” diplomacy.
With the Makassarese hoisting of a white flag, the next step was to prepare 
for direct negotiations. As it turned out, these were a no less complicated affair 
than establishing communications had been. The negotiations were characte-
rised not so much by misunderstandings springing from cultural incompatibi-
lity as by mutual suspicion of each other’s intentions and motives, and by 
conflicting interests.
Negotiating for negotiations, June 23
With the goodwill sign given by Alauddin, around noon a five-man Dutch 
delegation, including a “halberdier” and a trumpeter, was sent ashore to estab-
lish a procedure for the negotiations.66 Besides again declaring the Company’s 
desire for peace, the Dutch proposition was that the sultan should send envoys 
to the governor-general’s ships the following day, to have the Company’s inten-
tion for peace verified and hear its initial conditions. As security, the Dutch 
would offer hostages to be held ashore while the negotiations aboard ship were 
going on.
The Dutch mission was received by Sultan Alauddin, his father, and nobles 
of the realm. The Dutch delegation placed themselves with legs crossed “accor-
ding to the customs of the land.”67 They then observed while Alauddin read 
their letter and conferred and deliberated with his father, the prince of Tello, 
and other nobles. Alauddin’s response was clear: He declared himself in favour 
of a peace, and added that he would send two of his ambassadors to the 
65 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 22, 1637, 281.
66 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 22, 1637, 282.
67 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 22, 1637, 281.
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Company’s ship as requested. As a gesture of his good intentions, the offer of 
hostages was declined. Two of the sultan’s envoys were then sent to the ship in 
the company of the Dutch delegation for preparatory talks concerning the 
negotiations of the treaty.
Initial negotiations on board the ship, June 23
When Alauddin’s two envoys boarded the Company’s ship around five in the 
afternoon, it had already been decided that Anthonie Caen, being fluent in 
Malay should do the talking.68 “Having now (at last) entered into communica-
tion,” as Van Diemen comments,69 Caen explained the Dutch objectives in 
coming to Makassar. First, the Dutch fleet intended to attack two Spanish 
 galleons that were believed to have sought refuge in Makassar, but as that infor-
mation had proven to be false, this point was withdrawn for the time being.70
The plan to attack the Spanish galleons at the Makassar roadstead clearly 
presupposed the sultan’s acceptance of the Dutch waging war against their ene-
mies in Makassarese waters. Whether aware of it or not, it is clear that Caen’s 
opening statement in the preliminary talks entailed a position that could be 
taken as a provocation by Alauddin. That it was a delicate issue can clearly be 
seen from the wording about this in the final treaty.71 Although the matter was 
dropped in this first meeting, a controversial issue had been raised, namely the 
Company’s right to pursue its enemies in Makassarese waters, and the issue 
was to reappear in succeeding sessions. Although he did not press the point 
any further in this first meeting, Caen went on to explain the second objective 
of the Dutch presence, namely to conclude a treaty of “peace and friendship”72 
with the sultan. He then listed the Company’s conditions for such a peace.
It is noteworthy that the Company’s initial intentions were presented as not 
only seeking a treaty of peace, but one of peace and friendship. In standard VOC 
diplomatic terminology, that meant treaty of alliance. What the Company in the 
final end got was a peace treaty.73 One article in the final draft declared a bond 
68 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 22, 1637, 283.
69 “dat nu in passant comende.” Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 22, 1637, 283.
70 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 22, 1637, 283. 
71 The issue was more generally covered but modified in the final treaty text. See 1637 treaty, unnumbe-
red art. 7, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304. See also section 3, below.
72 “vreede ende ende vruntschap.” Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 23, 1637, 283. 
73 The title of the 1637 treaty began “Condition for peace…” 1637 treaty, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.303.
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of alliance in the sense that both parties obligated themselves not to conspire 
with the other party’s declared enemies, and if that one was attacked by such, the 
other would come to their aid.74 There is a telling insertion of praise for the uni-
que qualities of the Company as an alliance partner in this clause, possibly with 
an implicit threat against those who would choose to side with the Company’s 
enemies, however, “keeping in mind that the Dutch would always feel obligated 
to protect their allies from all unreasonable actions.”75 Still, what the Company 
got in the end from Makassar was less than what they initially hoped for.
Regarding the Company’s conditions for the peace, the only one presented 
by Caen at the preliminary meeting of June 23 was that the sultan should not 
allow his subjects to trade in “enemy places” such as Malacca and the coast of 
Ceram.76 The condition is easy to explain from the Company’s point of view; it 
was intended to prevent the “smuggling” of cloves. But the condition also had 
further political implications for the relationship between the Company and 
Makassar. Because of its close connection with the Portuguese and the vital 
role of the Portuguese community in Makassar’s commercial life, Alauddin 
could hardly afford to side openly with the Company against them. But this is 
clearly what the Dutch expected. As we shall see, Alauddin solved this issue in 
the final treaty by allowing the Company to pursue their aims in this matter, 
but at the same time diminishing his own responsibility by leaving the enfor-
cement of the sailing ban exclusively to the Company, while simultaneously 
forbidding the Company to pursue their enemies in Makassar roadstead.77
The demand for sailing restrictions concluded Caen’s list of the Company’s 
conditions for a treaty. Caen then went on to discuss the procedure for further 
negotiations. If the Dutch conditions were accepted, the Dutch proposition 
was that negotiations should take place the following morning. The proposed 
procedure was that Alauddin should notify the Dutch, who would then send 
“competent persons and an honourable delegation”78 to “conclude the peace in 
the appropriate manner.”79 The two Makassarese envoys then took leave with 
74 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 8, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304; see analysis in section 3.
75 “Behoudens dat de Nederlanders t’allen tijde haere geallieerde tegens onbehoorlijcke overlast moeten 
protegeren.” 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 8, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304; see section 3.
76 Van Diemen, Report, DRB June 23, 1637, 283.
77 1637 treaty, unnumbered arts. 3 and 6, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304.
78 “Een ander gequalificeert person ende aensinnelijcke swiette.” Van Diemen’s report, DRB June 23, 
1637, 283.
79 “om den vreede in behoorlycke forme te sluiten.” Van Diemen’s report, DRB June 23, 1637, 283.
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the letter in which the Dutch declared their intentions and conditions. They 
promised to return with the sultan’s reply the following morning.
What had the Dutch achieved in their second day of negotiations? Quite a 
lot actually: Not only had they been received with apparent goodwill by the 
sultan, but they had also entered into direct negotiations and had presented 
their claims. What, then, were their further expectations for the negotiations 
to follow? Clearly that the treaty would be agreed on, signed, and sealed the 
following day! It was not to be that simple, however.
Events of June 24: A simple “misunderstanding”?
The agreement with Alauddin’s two envoys on the afternoon of June 23 was 
that if Alauddin accepted the Company’s conditions, he would give notice the 
following morning for the Dutch delegation to come ashore to conclude the 
treaty. But as morning came, there was no sign of messengers from the sultan. 
Van Diemen then again turned to the Achenese for information as to what was 
happening. The Achenese explained that the sultan had been waiting for the 
Dutch to come ashore for quite a while. When informed about the Dutch 
expectations, Alauddin had declared his intentions and wish for peace, and 
had been expecting the Company’s envoys already the day before. He proposed 
that the negotiations should proceed as originally suggested by the Dutch.80
It is probably indicative of Van Diemen’s doubts about the sultan’s real inten-
tions that he sent no delegation ashore right away. Instead, it was decided that a 
message be sent to the sultan to inquire if an audience now was convenient.81 
Whether this procedure had an ironic element in it is impossible to say, but what 
is clear is that the letter that this “preliminary” delegation brought with them was 
not without the implicit reproach of the sultan and a hint of self-righteousness 
for the Company. Assistant Merchant Van Collster, who led this mission to find 
out whether Alauddin was ready for negotiations, was instructed to ask the sul-
tan whether he would receive a Dutch delegation because the Dutch “had been 
waiting for an answer as promised by him.”82 The sultan met Van Collster in a 
conciliatory manner. He said that he himself had been waiting quite a while for 
80 Van Diemen’s report, DRB June 23, 1637, 283.
81 Van Diemen’s report, DRB June 23, 1637, 284.
82 “conform toesegginge op antwoort was blijven uit te zien Van Diemen’s Report.” Van Diemen’s report, 
DRB June 23, 1637, 284.
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the Dutch to appear, and then with a laugh he declared that the blame must be 
put on a misunderstanding by his envoys.83 Van Collster was thereupon brought 
back to the ship to confirm the sultan’s readiness for the audience.
The “misunderstanding” about proper procedure was critical in the sense that if 
it had not been cleared up, it would have led to an increased lack of trust. And had 
it escalated, that lack of trust might well have led to a breakdown in negotiations 
before they even started. Van Diemen’s way of handling it was, as we have seen, to 
suggest that the sultan’s side was not upholding its agreements. Alauddin preferred 
simply to brush the affair aside while at the same time he offered an outstretched 
hand to the Dutch. Judging by his actions, Alauddin seems to have had a fairly 
accurate perception of what was at stake at the time. In any case, having thus clea-
red up the initial misunderstanding, on the morning June 24, the scene was set for 
“real negotiations,” namely an  agreement on the specific contents of the treaty.
Negotiations of substance, June 24
Caen, who had done the initial talking with the Makassarese envoys the day 
before, was appointed chief negotiator of a six-person delegation, including a 
trumpeter, all “well-dressed” for the task. Once ashore, the delegation was 
received with honour and brought to the court to meet with the Makassarese 
negotiation party: Alauddin himself, and prominent members of the elite.84 So, 
after some delay it was time to determine among members of the Makassarese 
elite themselves the terms of the treaty.
After giving another concession to protocol by passing on the governor-
general’s greetings to Alauddin, Caen repeated that the purpose of their mis-
sion was to negotiate the terms for a formal peace with the sultan.85 There 
seems to be an adjustment here compared to the day before. Caen’s proposed 
treaty of “peace and friendship” of the day before was reduced to “peace” 
and  “peace” only. This might well reflect that Van Diemen and Caen had 
 lowered their expectations in view of the complications they had already 
 experienced in securing a negotiating position.
83 “een abuijs van zijn volk.” Van Diemen’s report, DRB June 23, 1637, 284.
84 Van Diemen’s report, DRB June 23, 1637, 284.
85 “Van de condition die op het sluijten des vrede mocten voorgestelt worden.” Van Diemen’s report, DRB 
June 23, 1637, 284. One should note that neither “friendship” nor “alliance” are mentioned.
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The Company’s initial conditions for peace were also repeated, but they 
were not phrased in the same manner. On June 24, the demand for a ban on 
sailing to Malacca was openly stated as being directed against the Portuguese. 
The sultan should prohibit his subjects from sailing to Malacca and Ceram 
because the former was in the hands of Company’s declared “arch-enemies.”86 
It is not inconceivable that the implication of this demand was that if the 
Makassarese did not comply, the Dutch would consider them enemies, too. 
Also on the speculative side, it might well be that the explanation of the war 
against the Portuguese could have been taken as an invitation to Alauddin to 
take a pro-Dutch stand against the Portuguese. After all, who would want to 
side with deceivers, unless they be deceivers themselves!
Alauddin’s first response, June 24
After Alauddin had conferred with his suite, prince of Tello acted as spokes-
man. He declared once more that the sultan “highly applauded the offered 
peace”87 and that he wished “nothing more than to confirm an everlasting 
treaty.”88 This was an exaggeration, to say the least. After the initial gesture of 
general goodwill, Alauddin, still speaking through prince of Tello, went on to 
give the Makassarese position on the Dutch proposals in more detail, raising 
several objections and proposing several revisions.
As for a Dutch prohibition on Makassarese sailing to Malacca and Ceram, 
the sultan held forth that sailing to those destinations were traditional rights of 
his people and beneficial to the welfare of his realm.89 Still he accepted the 
prohibition in principle, by recognising the Company’s right to enforce the ban 
in “unfree waters,”90 and that the exercise of rights of sanction should not be 
regarded as an infringement or breach of contract from the Dutch.91 This was 
86 “openbaere erfvijanden.” Van Diemen’s report, DRB June 23, 1637, 284.
87 “den aengeboden vrede op’t hooghste behaechte.” Van Diemen’s report, DRB June 23, 1637, 284.
88 “Item niet anders verlanghden alls om deselve te conformeeren ende voor eeuwich te continueeren.” 
Van Diemen’s report, DRB June 23, 1637, 284.
89 “Tot beter welvaert van zijn landt souwde exerceeren.” Van Diemen’s report, DRB June 23, 1637, 285.
90 “Datt wij zijn onderdaenen off subjecten op gemelte onvrij vaarwaetters bejegennende als vijanden 
aenslaen mochten.” Van Diemen’s report, DRB June 23, 1637, 285.
91 The grant of the Company’s right of sanctions continued thus: “sonder dat het selve eenige verbreck-
inghe van het selve eenige verbreckinghe aen dese contract veroorsaecken soude.” Van Diemen’s 
report, DRB June 23, 1637, 285.
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also what was agreed upon in the final treaty.92 Although giving in to the Dutch 
demand, Alauddin did leave his imprint on the regulation of the sailing ban 
issue. First, he made his statement on the traditional Makassarese sailing rights 
in the “unfree waters,” and although accepting the Company’s terms, neither 
the blame for breaches nor the obligation of enforcement was laid on him. He 
must have considered it the best he could get given the situation he was in with 
a Company fleet anchored in his roadstead. Alauddin’s recognition of the “per-
suasive power” of the Company’s military strength was explicated both during 
the negotiations and in the final treaty.93
Seen in this light Alauddin seems to have been acting rationally to protect 
the secular interests of Makassar, in particular its sovereignty and livelihood. 
When he made concessions, as in the above example, his strategy seems to 
have been to give away what the Company would very likely take anyway, 
given their superior naval strength. From such considerations of the asymme-
trical balance of military strength it seems reasonable to suggest that Alauddin’s 
thinking went something like the following: If he refused to comply with the 
Dutch condition, they would act to enforce it anyway, while he himself risked 
war with the Company. Total compliance, on the other hand, would mean that 
if he failed to enforce the prohibition, which he in all likelihood would, he 
would himself be accused of a breach of contract, the likely outcome of which 
again could be open war.
If we view the Makassarese acceptance of this perspective, it might as 
likely originate from a shared reason of state rationality between the 
Makassarese and the Company’s negotiators as from a miscommunication 
between two parties who were unable to transgress their traditional mental 
framework. It is also well worth noticing that the Dutch demand for a sai-
ling ban was not phrased in legal generalities. The formulation of the regu-
lation was casuistic and concrete. This all suggests that Alauddin and Van 
Diemen not only were players in the same game, but were able to perceive 
it as such.
With the Makassarese acceptance of the Company’s conditions for peace on 
June 24, the conditions for a treaty seemed settled. Depending on Dutch 
approval of the Makassarese revisions, all that remained was the signing and 
92 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 3, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304; see section 3.
93 See below, especially section 3.
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sealing of the treaty.94 The procedure for the final signing was agreed as fol-
lows: On Caen’s return to the ship, Van Diemen was to signal as soon as he had 
accepted the sultan’s revisions and signed the treaty. The sultan was then to 
give his return salute from the fort.95 But the final deal was not closed yet. 
Before he returned to the ships Caen raised the issue of establishing a Company 
lodge in Makassar.96 This raising of an issue of substance after the negotiations 
proper had been concluded could be regarded as a breach of protocol, but on 
the other hand, in principle the request should not be regarded as controver-
sial, since the right of permanent residence had already been granted to the 
Portuguese.
But, from the Makassarese point of view, the request for a permanent Dutch 
lodge was both controversial and delicate. It put Alauddin in a dilemma, 
because to reject it outright would be offensive, while conceding to it would 
put Makassar in an awkward position. A Dutch presence in Makassar would 
increase the probability of outright violence between the Dutch and other 
Europeans in the realm itself. More important, it might expose the Makassarese 
to increased Dutch influence in all their affairs. In that sense, the request for a 
permanent lodge went to the heart of their concerns over Makassarese auto-
nomy and sovereignty. Alauddin solved the dilemma by replying that an estab-
lishment of a Dutch lodge “may well happen, but first they had to come to 
trade.”97
In the final treaty text Alauddin’s vague answer was worked into a compro-
mise: The Company was allowed to establish a lodge, but not on a permanent 
basis, the right was restricted to periods of stay for Company ships.98
Furthermore, the establishment of a Company lodge in Makassar meant 
that a whole new range of issues, particularly concerning jurisdiction in cases 
of conflict between Company servants and the sultan’s subjects or third parties 
residing in Makassar, had to be regulated. Such concerns figured either 
94 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 24, 1637, 285.
95 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 24, 1637, 285.
96 “Alls off seer gaerren eenige residenten op Macassar wilde houwen.” Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 
24, 1637, 285.
97 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 24, 1637, 285.
98 The crucial formulation was “zoo langh hier een off meer schepen ter rheede hebbebde.” 1637 treaty, 
unnumbered art. 1, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.303-304.
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implicitly or explicitly in several of the clauses of the final treaty text.99 The 
ruling on these political and juridical issues also became a major topic in the 
negotiations.
Dutch deliberations and swift response on the ship, 
June 24
After Alauddin’s response on the lodge issue, Caen returned to the ships for 
deliberations and instructions on how to respond to Alauddin’s response. Van 
Diemen was quick to accept Alauddin’s propositions, and ordered the firing of 
the salute to confirm his signing of the treaty, thirty-two shots in all. “After 
some waiting,” a “counter-salute” was fired from the Makassarese fort, from 
“three pieces.”100
Van Diemen noted both the imbalance in numbers of shots fired and 
the  interval between the Dutch and Makassarese salutes, which suggests 
he  thought the Makassarese response was asymmetrical. He still 
may have  harboured doubts about Alauddin’s real intentions and motives, 
as he  “seems  to  be totally under the spell of our enemies and feigned 
friends.”101
On the other hand, there can be no doubt that after receiving Caen’s 
report Van Diemen was convinced that only a few formalities remained 
before the Company could sign and seal the treaty with Makassar. 
Nevertheless, the   following day, when Van Diemen and Caen originally 
planned to devote to  the concluding formalities, saw another round of 
negotiations.
Alauddin’s amendments and continued negotiations, 
June 25
On sending Caen ashore with an “honourable” retinue on the morning of June 
25, the Dutch expected Alauddin to sign the treaty agreed to the previous day. 
99 1637 treaty, unnumbered arts. 2–3, 5–6, and 11–12. For the negotiations on these issues, see below. For 
the final formulation of the regulations, see section 3.
100 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 24, 1637, 285.
101 “Apparent door onse vijanden and geveijnsde vrunden d’ooren voll geblasend wesende.” Van Diemen’s 
Report, DRB June 24, 1637, 285.
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Instead, Caen was met by several amendments proposed by Alauddin. As these 
undisputedly represented Makassarese deliberations and a further response to 
the Dutch proposals of June 24, the sultan’s proposals for amendments and his 
way of putting them forward on June 25 are worth analysing in detail. In them 
we are faced with an autonomous Makassarese diplomatic response to the 
Dutch initiative “in the raw.”
Alauddin’s proposed amendments, written in Malay, were presented as 
intended “to strengthen the obligations and commitments of the contract for 
both sides.”102 Alauddin also repeated his “sincere and sole intention for a las-
ting peace,”103 and assured that his amendments were “completely in line with 
what had been agreed to the day before, translated in his presence into the 
Dutch language.”104 Alauddin requested that the June 24 document with the 
governor-general’s signature be returned, and that his own amendments be 
included in a new draft of the treaty.105
It was a clever and cunning move by Alauddin. Ironically, Caen’s request for 
a lodge after the formal ending of the meeting June 24 was met by a symmetri-
cal breach of protocol by Alauddin, because he demanded new revisions after 
the negotiations were supposed to have been concluded. Alauddin’s wish to 
amend and revise put the Dutch in a dilemma. Given his intentions of making 
the treaty more solid and binding, the Dutch could hardly object without a loss 
of face. Alauddin’s amendment raised the question of jurisdiction in criminal 
cases in Makassar when Company servants were accused of crimes. Here the 
sultan demanded that he should hold supreme and sole authority.106 
Undoubtedly the sultan’s amendment was directly connected with the Dutch 
request for a permanent lodge.
102 “omme te dienen tot bondiger onderhoudinghe ende meerder verseeckeringe van’t gecontracteerde 
aen weder sijde.” Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 24, 1637, 286.
103 “den vreede recht meenende, ende niet anders socht dan die lang te continueeren.” Van Diemen’s 
Report, DRB June 24, 1637, 286.
104 “punctuelick conform de meeninge in’t bijwesen des Coninckx getransalateert ende in Nederlandts 
overgenomen hadde.” Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 24, 1637, 286.
105 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 24, 1637, 286.
106 “d’onse wanner in sijn land coomen te vergrijpen. Off ijmant te beschadigen straffen sall.” Van Diemen’s 
Report, DRB June 26, 1637, 286.
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Deliberations and decisions on Alauddin’s 
amendments on board, June 25
On board the ship, all Alauddin’s amendments were found acceptable, except 
for the one concerning jurisdiction over the Company’s subjects when residing 
in Makassar. Although he euphemistically said that it must be “slightly 
revised,”107 Van Diemen’s position was that Alauddin’s proposal was unaccep-
table. His counterproposal— that the Company itself should correct its own 
personnel—represented a radical break with the sultan’s claim of full sove-
reignty.108 The Dutch counterproposal thus not only represented more than a 
“slight revision,” it implied an infringement on the sultan’s judicial autonomy, 
or sovereignty. As we have seen Andaya states that this was a point that any 
South Sulawesi ruler would never compromise on, as it concerned his and his 
lineage’s pride and honour,109 but as it was, Alauddin did bargain when the 
matter became an issue during the further negotiations, and the final solution 
in the treaty was a compromise between Alauddin’s proposition and Van 
Diemen’s counterproposition. The supreme sovereignty of the sultan in cases 
involving the Company and other European nationals residing in Makassar as 
well as between the Company and Makassarese subjects and others residing in 
Makassar was recognised. On the other side, the Company’s chief resident had 
the right to sit in and be heard in such cases.110
The June 26 negotiations
On Friday, June 26, Caen went ashore with an “impressive following”111 for the 
final negotiations, bringing with him two documents: the Dutch response to 
Alauddin’s revisions and amplifications from the day before, and the original 
treaty text of June 24.112 In the following exchange with the sultan, Caen first 
declared that the Company agreed to all of the sultan’s minor amendments, 
107 “Een wenig veranderen.” Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 26, 1637, 286.
108 “dat van ons eigen volck souden blijven corrigeeren.” Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 26, 1637, 286.
109 See my treatment of Andaya’s positions above.
110 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 5, in which the Sultan’s supreme authority was recognised: “alle voorval-
lende questien tusschen de Nederlandsche ende d’Engelschen, Deenen, Portuguesen, Makassaren etc. 
bij de Maijesteit affegedaen sall worden … mits dat het presente Nederlandts oppe hooffd mede in sijn 
raedt sall compareren.” Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304.
111 “aensienkijcke suijte.” Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 26, 1637, 286.
112 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 26, 1637, 286.
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and that these could well be included in the treaty.113 He then turned to the 
controversial issue of jurisdiction over Company servants. Having put forward 
the Dutch counter-proposition of a “joint” sitting and hearing in such cases, 
Caen went on to give the Dutch rationale, which tellingly did not represent an 
example of principal legal thinking “à la Europe.” Caen’s argument was that the 
Company’s autonomy in jurisdiction over its own personnel was the “standard 
practice” elsewhere in the Company’s area of operation in Asia.114
It should be noticed that Caen’s argument here is not built upon general 
principles of law, but on precedents and actual practice. If the argument here is 
used tactically to acquire rights on par with those of other nations and peoples, 
it still aligns more with the Directors’ recommendations of pragmatism than 
an appeal to European legal formulas.
In his response, Alauddin stuck to his original position of maintaining sole 
and unabridged jurisdiction. Any outsider, be they English, Danish or Portuguese, 
or any other outside people who came to trade, were under the sultan’s jurisdic-
tion.115 His position on the one hand is thus in keeping with Andaya’s proposi-
tion about the sacrosanct status of sovereignty in the South Sulawesi states-system. 
But, on the other hand, it is noteworthy that Alauddin’s legitimation of his stand 
does not refer to idioms of or arguments from this tradition. In fact, he justifies 
it in the same fashion as Caen, by pointing to already established practice. The 
sultan’s unabridged authority was “the rule and practice that was being followed 
regarding the handling of justice regarding the English, Danish and Portuguese 
and all other foreigners that had come to trade in his land.”116 So, if there were 
antagonistic positions, the arguments for them followed similar lines: custom 
and practice was the shared point of reference. A proposition about conflicts of 
interest within a shared field of competition is then just as plausible a frame of 
interpretation as one of “conflicting treaty conceptions.”
After hearing Alauddin’s position and his argument for it, Caen concluded that 
they would “come no further on this point.”117 He would have to confer with Van 
113 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 26, 1637, 286.
114 “hoe wij in meest alle quartieren van Indien daer negotieeren meesters over ons volck waerren.” Van 
Diemen’s Report, DRB June 26, 1637, 287.
115 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 26, 1637, 287.
116 (Alauddin) “bleef parsisteerren ende vaststaen also seijde … d’Engelsen, Portugeesen ende alle andere 
vremdelingen die in sijn land resideerren off coomen handellen sulcx subject sijn.” Van Diemen’s 
Report, DRB June 26, 1637, 287.
117 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 26, 1637, 287.
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Diemen before agreeing, and consequently Caen asked permission to return to the 
ship to do so.118 Back on the ship Van Diemen and Caen came up with a compro-
mise position involving a “slight change” of the text “according to the king’s wishes 
[and] which would be favourable to both sides.”119 The revision gave the Company’s 
resident the right to appear in the king’s council and have a voice in the final deci-
sion.120 If the Dutch were accorded a place in judicial matters concerning their own 
personnel, the revised proposition was better for Alauddin than the original one, 
because the Company was allowed no jurisdictional autonomy, and the sultan’s 
supreme position in judicial affairs was recognised.
The revised proposal was then included in the (new) draft treaty, which was 
signed and sealed anew by Van Diemen. What was left then should be for 
Alauddin to accept and sign. Around noon then, and for the second time Caen 
went ashore, and we must assume in the hope that the treaty would now finally 
be signed.
The second negotiations, June 26
Meeting with the sultan for the second time on June 26, Caen offered the 
 revised treaty text to Alauddin for his signature, with the appropriate 
deference,121 upon which the sultan reportedly “showed every sign of 
satisfaction.”122 That should have been it—mission accomplished. But there 
was still another hurdle to jump, and it was Alauddin who set it up. He requ-
ested the addition of a clause stating that the treaty would be binding not 
only for the present governor-general, that is Van Diemen, but for future 
governors-general as well.123 Caen had no objections to this point, and so it 
was agreed.124
118 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 26, 1637, 287.
119 “goetgevonden … tselve point een weijnich tot des koninckx begeeren tusschen beide te veranderen.” 
Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 26, 1637, 287.
120 “hij [the sultan] over d’onse wanner in hun in sijn landt comen te verlopen of te vergrijppen recht ende 
justitie recht ende justitie sall mogen administreeren mits dat her presente Nederlants opperhoofd in 
sijnnen raet compareren ende stemme hebben sall.” Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 26, 1637, 287.
121 “met de vereijste eerbiedicheijt.” Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 26, 1637, 287. 
122 “darinne seer goet contentement nam.” Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 26, 1637, 287.
123 “Doch alsoo considereerden dat de Generaells oordonnararij naer drie jaerren verandert werden…
datt dese contractie soo wel bij de naercomelingen als de presente generaell soude van weerden gekent 
ende achervolgcht warden.” Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 26, 1637, 287.
124 Van Diemen’s Report, DRB June 26, 1637, 287.
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Conclusion, Section 3
The issue of the treaty’s duration illustrates problems in Andaya’s approach on 
a number of issues. It is difficult to see what precisely Andaya would have us 
believe is the cultural specificity of Alauddin’s claim.125 The insistence on dura-
bility might as likely come from contextual considerations as from spiritual 
notions of “treaty.” In other words, Alauddin may simply have thought that he 
had gotten the best terms he could under the circumstances.
Even if Andaya’s view of the sacred nature of South Sulawesi contract logic 
is accepted, the question remains: Was it this perception that “directed” 
Alauddin’s expectations and performance during the June 1637 negotiations? 
Some facts contradict such an assumption. Alauddin was not dealing with 
another Makassarese power. He was dealing with a European outsider. Second, 
the issues involved concerned practicalities in formalising a relation with this 
outside power, not issues of relative hierarchical rank. The context implies that 
the concerns and conceptions in the South Sulawesian model of diplomacy 
were irrelevant in the negotiations with the Company from the start.
Third, Alauddin’s performance during the negotiations shows that his pre-
occupation lay with obtaining the optimal results on the practical issues raised 
by the Dutch. Concerns of prestige and hierarchy were only indirectly invol-
ved. Suppose, then, that from Alauddin’s point of view, the terms he got at the 
end of the June 26 session were the best he could get, considering the balance 
of strength between himself and the Company. Alauddin’s insistence on the 
permanence of the treaty may too just as well be explained by contextual as by 
structural reasons. The former explanation is actually supported by Alauddin’s 
remark in the treaty text itself, where he says that he would have wished it 
otherwise, but in view of the Dutch naval military strength he saw no other 
option but to accept.126 Taking such contextual considerations into account, 
Alauddin had immediate reasons for insisting on the perpetuation of the treaty. 
The claim may thus not have stemmed from particular South Sulawesian 
sacred conceptions of treaty, but more likely from contextual concerns over 
secular power politics. This proposition has more general methodological 
125 See section 1, above.
126 “Dat hem in zijn rijck geensints sullen sullen mogen beschadigen, allsoo tegen de Nederlanders 
geringh van maght zegt te wesen.” 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 2 (see also unnumbered art. 7), Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 1.304. See analysis of treaty text, below.
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issues. For in Andaya’s explanation, we are invited to explain Alauddin’s actions 
as reflexes where “tradition is speaking through him.” But the evidence of the 
negotiations suggests otherwise, namely that Alauddin was consciously acting 
out of secular reflections on the situation and context he was in.
Finally, Alauddin was acting in a mode that was understood by the Dutch. As 
for miscommunications, insistence that the treaty was binding “forever” was not a 
foreign idea never formulated in the VOC contracts127. But in all fairness, it must 
be taken into account that Andaya’s argument for misconception is that “forever” 
meant something different in the South Sulawesi context than in the Dutch, given 
the sacred or metaphysical logic in which it was conceived. But that counter- 
argument rests on the assumption that Alauddin was bringing his local conception 
of treaty to the negotiations with the outsider Dutch, that is, that he was disregar-
ding the fact that he was dealing with “outsiders.” But, if we follow Resink, the 
Makassarese had their own separate institutions reserved for dealing with outsi-
ders. The proposition is also weakened by Alauddin’s performance during the 
negotiations, which reveals a preoccupation with specific regulations.
There is hardly any correspondence between Alauddin’s actions during the 
June negotiations 1637 and what one might expect from Andaya’s conception 
of the typical South Sulawesi treaty. Contrary to Andaya’s propositions about 
the relatively peripheral position of specific regulations in the treaty, and com-
pared to the primary focus on the treaty as a “mythical” regulation of relative 
status positions of treaty, Alauddin’s preoccupation in his dealings with the 
Dutch lay in the substance of specific treaty regulations. The back and forth 
and the final agreement over the issue of jurisdiction over Company servants 
in Makassar illustrates this well. Nor does the Dutch performance fit with 
assumptions about being “hung up” by a master manual of “international law.” 
The 1637 treaty was a negotiated one, with give and take on both sides. Judging 
from their respective performances, both Van Diemen (and Caen) and 
Alauddin acted pragmatically during these negotiations, trying to get their 
best in the circumstances they were in. “Their best” meaning the best practical 
solutions to actual problems, neither conceived nor articulated in terms of 
local tradition or in terms of international law.
That Alauddin’s insistence on permanence was accepted on the spot 
 corroborates the proposition that the Dutch also felt that they had obtained 
127 chapters 7 and 8 below.
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the optimum result. In fact, for all the initial misunderstandings leading up to 
the negotiations per se, and for all the hurdles during the negotiations, the two 
parties understood each other well enough to conclude a treaty that was cha-
racterised by compromises.
Section 4: Text, meaning, and nature of the 
June 26 treaty
Section introduction
For Andaya, what caused the clash in making the Company–Makassar treaty 
was that the former stuck to European standards and methods that were 
incompatible with the South Sulawesian tradition. In the section on the nego-
tiations for the 1637 treaty, I have argued that this seems a dubious proposi-
tion. What I shall do in this section is to demonstrate that neither Andaya’s 
proposition about the typical European reference to international law, nor his 
assumption of miscommunication due to conflicting and incompatible frames 
of cultural references are convincing when we consider the text of the final 
treaty.
The typical Company treaty as opposed to the South 
Sulawesian tradition, according to Andaya
The expectation in the South Sulawesi function and meaning of “treaty” 
was that it served to reflect shifts in power relations and alliances. It was 
dynamic and flexible: the constant alignment and realignment of vassal 
states from one overlord to another was an expected phenomenon that 
resulted from an on-going process by which each state sought its proper 
level within the interstate hierarchy. Shifts in alliances that resulted from 
new agreements were not seen as breaches of contract in South Sulawesian 
logic, but as a reflection of the South Sulawesian leaders’ subtle understan-
ding of the function of both while assuring the political as well as the 
 spiritual welfare of their states.128
128 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 285–86.
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Leaving aside the unlikely implicit proposition that South Sulawesians 
 assumed that by concluding a treaty with an outsider party like the Company 
the latter was automatically included in the local hierarchy of power, Andaya’s 
point is that European standards and the Company’s practice were built on a 
totally different platform. In Andaya’s words, the Company “introduced a new 
concept of treaties and treaty-making in South Sulawesi.”129
What was then so “new” and “different” about it? The emphasis in the 
European contracts lay on specified and detailed regulations with the expecta-
tion that these be honoured as to their precise and specific wording: According 
to Western European treaty practices at the time, once a treaty text had been 
formulated, “the provisions therein were considered to be binding to all 
signatories.”130 The dynamism and flexibility that lay in the South Sulawesian 
conceptualisation of “treaty” were then consistently interpreted as lack of 
trustworthiness and breaches of contract. Whereas local South Sulawesi trea-
ties in essence represented a mechanism for the distribution of political and 
spiritual “capital,” to the Company they represented a means for acquiring pro-
fit: “The treaties between the Company and the native states were … always 
basically commercial with the foremost aim being the acquisition of trading 
advantages for the Company. But such treaties were totally alien to the concept 
of treaties in South Sulawesi.”131
So, both in meaning and intent, the treaty making between the Company 
and Makassar represented a clash between two conceptual worlds. That applied 
to the respective forms of the treaties, as well; i.e. between the South Sulawesian 
treaty whose general function lay in preserving “harmony in society,”132 and 
the typical Western treaty with “its carefully worded articles.”133
Accommodation as the exception to the rule
Andaya notes that elements from the South Sulawesian tradition could be 
incorporated into the treaty text. He also mentions that at times, the Company 
incorporated elements of the local treaty mode and form; but this was the 
129 Ibid. 286.
130 Ibid. 286.
131 Ibid. 288.
132 Ibid. 284.
133 Ibid. 286.
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exception, and limited to cases where the Company was in a weak negotia-
ting position or in dealings with insignificant native states.134 Thus, Andaya’s 
argument for explaining the exception to the rule is that the Company would 
depart from its preferred mode of imposing its own treaty tradition either 
when it felt itself bargaining from a weak position, or from a position where 
it felt no threat at all.
Andaya on antagonistic interpretative frameworks as 
the rule
One should note that although Andaya seemingly allows for the possibility of 
compromise, the idea of compatibility is still rejected. If there is compromise, 
it is really the conjoining of separate forms. Andaya’s perspective does not 
allow for compromise as mixing and blending on the same and individual 
point, because real communication is ruled out by the assumption of antago-
nistic interpretative frameworks. But, as I have tried to demonstrate in my 
discussion on the negotiations, the making of the 1637 treaty was a process 
between actors who did communicate with each other in meaningful ways. 
That is reflected in the text of the treaty, which precisely puts down the mix of 
concessions and gains on both sides arrived at during the negotiations. To 
demonstrate my point that the treaty was a result of give and take, I shall give 
a brief overview of the contents of the respective clauses, before analysing in 
more detail how the issue of sovereignty is handled.
The specific regulations of the treaty
The specific regulations in the 1637 treaty are not numbered.135 Simple 
reckoning by paragraphs starting with “that,” and splitting one of these into 
two, yields twelve specific regulations in all. I shall briefly summarise the 
contents of each separate “article,” and indicate the connection between the 
final regulations and the negotiations that led up to them. For the sake of 
clarity, I will use my own numbering of the clauses. All references are to 
Heeres’ Compilation.
134 Ibid. 287.
135 See section 1, above.
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The first clause states that the Company’s right to establish a lodge remained 
restricted to the periods when its ships were in the roadstead of Makassar.136 
The final regulation on the issue of the Company’s request for a lodge thus 
reflects a compromise between Caen’s request and Alauddin’s response on the 
first day of real negotiations, when Alauddin rather coldly had retorted to the 
Company’s request that “first they had to come to trade.”137
In the second clause, the Company’s obliges itself to guarantee the sultan’s 
sovereignty and safety,138 and in the third clause this obligation is elaborated to 
apply to all foreigners residing in Makassar.139 Not stated, but implicitly clear 
enough, the Dutch were not to start any hostilities towards other European 
nations while in the sultan’s domain.
Not introduced by a “that,” but still an issue by its own right, the ban on 
Makassarese sailing to Malacca and the coast of Ceram is included in the third 
clause.140 The reason why it is included in the paragraph banning Company vio-
lence in the sultan’s domains is easy to understand. It states an exception to the 
ruling of nonviolence by the Company because it allowed sanctions against sai-
lings in the “unfree areas.” As had been agreed during the negotiations, then, the 
responsibility of enforcement lay explicitly in the hands of the Company.
The fourth item concerns the mode of action in case of conflict between the 
Company and the sultan’s subjects. Such conflicts should not be regarded as 
breaches of the peace between the Dutch and Makassarese people, but be 
handled in “the most delicate manner.”141 The regulation thus represents the 
final agreement on the back and forth haggling on the issue during the 
negotiations.
136 “dat zoo lang hier een off meer schepen ter rheede hebbende.” 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 1, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 1.303.
137 See section 2, above.
138 “Hem in zijn rijck geensints sullen mogen beschadigen.” 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 2, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 1.304.
139 “De Nederlanders ook gedurende desen vreede niet vermogen zullen, tegen Zijne Maijt nogh nie-
mandt onder desselfs gebiet sorterende vijandtlijckheidt te betoonen.” 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 3, 
Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304.
140 “Behoudens dat desselffs subjecten in onvrij vaarwaters, te weten omtrent Malaca, op de cust van 
Ceram etc. sullen vermogen als vianden aen te tasten ende te nemen, ‘t welck aen dit tractat geen 
infractie zall veroorzaeken.” 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 3, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304
141 “Dat om particuliere questie met ijmandt van de zijne geen verbrekingh van vrede comen, maer op het 
gevoeghelikste gemodereerdt werden zal.” 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 4, Corpus Diplomaticum, 
1.304.
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The fifth ruling concerns how to handle eventual conflicts between the 
Company and the other European nations residing in Makassar. The proce-
dure agreed upon is that the sultan should have “the final say.”142 The Company’s 
senior merchant (opperhoofd) was, however, accorded the right to sit in and be 
heard at the proceedings.143 The final wording on the issue then reflected the 
last Dutch compromise proposal by the Dutch to Alauddin’s rejection of their 
original proposal during the negotiations.
The sixth ruling is partly in favour of Alauddin’s interests as it expressly for-
bid violent actions by the Company against its European enemies in Makassar’s 
roadstead.144 At the same time, the Dutch were to enjoy the same freedoms as 
the other European nations145— another negotiated compromise inscribed in 
the treaty.
The issue of intra-European fighting in the harbour at Makassar is further 
elaborated on in the following paragraph, which simply states that the sultan 
neither could nor would be held responsible for such belligerent actions.146 An 
explicit explanation is given whereby the sultan points to his impotence regar-
ding naval military strength.147 Still the Company was declared free to chase 
and fight their enemies outside the roadstead.148
The eighth unnumbered clause treats the political relations between the 
Company and Makassar more generally, defining their rights of autonomy in 
foreign policy and defining limits to their mutual commitments. Each party 
was free to attack its own enemies, but neither was obliged to assist the other 
in case of an attack by a third party.149 In short, the Company and Makassar 
were not allies.
142 “Bij de Maijt. affgedaen zall worden.” 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 5, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304.
143 “Mits dat het presente Nederlandts opperhoofd mede in zijn raedt sall compareren.” 1637 treaty, 
unnumbered art. 5, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304.
144 “zijn rheede ongevioleerdt zullen laten.” 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 6, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304.
145 “De Nederlanders ende ook gelijcke vrijheidt (as the other Europeans in Makassar) genieten.” 1637 
treaty, unnumbered art. 6, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304.
146 “hem (the Sultan) allsdan de schullt niet sullen geven.” 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 6, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 1.304.
147 “allsoo sulx ter zee niet beletten kan.” 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 6, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304.
148 “Mits dat de Nederlanders op gelijcke maniere bij gelegenheidt hare revenge sullen mogen nemen.” 
1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 7, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304.
149 “Dat ijder met zijn vijanden zal aenspringen, sonder gehouden te wesen den andren te adsisteeren.” 
1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 8, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304.
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The ninth article represents a qualification of the preceding one. The non-
alliance status was modified by a reciprocal vow not to enter secret negotia-
tions with third parties, which might jeopardise the peace.150 So, there were 
some restrictions on autonomy after all.
The tenth unnumbered article is the only one concerning trade directly, 
 specifying export tolls,151 whereas the final two clauses concerned actions to be 
taken in cases of runaways and converts. They included the reciprocal obliga-
tion of returning runaways152 and a reciprocal abstention from acts of conver-
sion.153 The treaty concludes with the amendment, presented by Alauddin on 
the final day of negotiations that the treaty should be binding on future 
governors- general.
Comments: The nature and form of the treaty
The 1637 treaty presents regulations for practical issues concerning political 
relations between Makassar and the Company. Of the twelve clauses, only one 
concerned regulations on commercial interactions. The regulations for politi-
cal interaction, regarding both relations with third parties and bilateral rela-
tions between Makassar and the Company, predominantly represented issues 
that had been brought up during the negotiations, or were derived from them. 
None of them were formulated in European legal terms, nor made with refe-
rence to international law. All of them were casuistic, and formulated with due 
regards to specifics. As such, none left much room or need for “cultural 
interpretation.”
Had Alauddin applied a local South Sulawesi treaty conception along the 
lines of Andaya’s model, he would have been blinkered. But his performance 
during the negotiations proves that he was not. The imprint of the negotiated 
compromises in the final treaty gives the same impression. I shall elaborate the 
proposition of Alauddin’s accommodated” concept of “sovereignty” in further 
detail.
150 “Dat van beijde zijde geen vreemde praetjens ofte uijtstroijselen die den gamaeckt vreede eenighsints 
hinderlijck moghten wesen, lightelijck sullen aennemen.” 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 9, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 1.304.
151 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 10, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304.
152 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 11, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.305.
153 1637 treaty, unnumbered art. 11, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.305.
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The issue of “sovereignty”
Andaya’s proposition is that “sovereignty” in the South Sulawesian sense was a 
sacred concept infused with emotions of pride and prestige,154 and thus consti-
tuted the core of South Sulawesian thinking on self-esteem and rank.155 It was 
an issue for which any South Sulawesian ruler would sooner give his life than 
compromise on.156 But, Alauddin all the same did compromise with the 
Company in 1637, and consciously so, most likely to protect his realm.
In the preamble of the Contact between Makassar and the Company of 
June 26, 1637, the type of treaty is given as “agreed conditions for peace.”157 
Alauddin’s status as contractor was given as “king of Makassar” and he was 
titled “His Majesty.” Van Diemen acted as contractor on behalf of the 
Company in the position as governor- general of “The Dutch state in 
Asia.”158 The preamble then clearly deviates from the typical South Sulawesi 
diplomatic idiom, as no specific type of relationship or implicit distribu-
tion of reciprocal rights between the contractors was included. Still, rather 
than looking at this as an intrusion of Company standards, this might be 
explained by the fact that neither party saw the inclusion of the Company 
into the local South Sulawesi states system as relevant. After all, Alauddin 
did not even accept a permanent Company lodge in Makassar. The South 
Sulawesian model of preamble might simply have been regarded as both 
irrelevant and undesirable to him.
The same goes for labelling the agreement as a treaty of peace rather than as 
an alliance. Van Diemen probably hoped for the latter, but the request was 
quickly put aside. Alauddin, on his side, must have preferred a treaty of peace 
and peace only rather than an alliance, as his performance during the negotia-
tions indicates that he was trying to avoid any tighter bonds than the ones he 
could not refuse without risking war with the Company.
The preamble is furthermore clearly “European” in the sense that it is pre-
sented as a symmetrical state-to-state treaty. Such symmetry does admittedly 
mark a break with the South Sulawesi traditional preoccupation with 
154 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 284.
155 Ibid. 285.
156 Ibid. 284.
157 “Conditien … op het treffen van de vrede.” 1637 treaty, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.303.
158 “den Nederlandtschen stant in Orienten.” 1637 treaty, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.303
198
chap ter 4
hierarchy.159 But did that mean it was incomprehensible to Alauddin and that 
consequently he could not act rationally within such a framework? The coun-
ter-propositions and amendments that Alauddin came up with during the 
negotiations and the compromises laid down in final text give little merit to 
such a proposition. Both point more in the direction of a ruler trying to pre-
serve his symmetrical position in relation to the Company while keeping the 
Dutch at arm’s length. In other words, the South Sulawesian thinking about 
hierarchical systems did not apply in Alauddin’s strategy towards the Company. 
The issue was “sovereignty” and autonomy, but these concepts may not have 
been conceived in the South Sulawesian framework in dealings with the 
Company. More likely, they functioned as defensive tools for holding a threate-
ning outsider at bay.
Explications and implications of secular, defensive 
“sovereignty”
Eight of the articles in the 1637 treaty concern the demarcation between the 
Company’s rights and the sultan’s sovereignty, either in his domestic realm or 
his and the Company’s relations with third parties. Not discounting that pre-
stige and pride were parts of Alauddin’s package of concerns, and for the sake 
of argument, even accepting that metaphysical concerns held priority on the 
local scene, a concern for secular power compatible with the Dutch conception 
underlay the compromises reached during the negotiations and was inscribed 
in the final treaty.
Consider, for instance, the second clause concerning the keeping of 
peaceful relations. Alauddin demands a binding oath regarding the 
Company’s peaceful intentions “that [the Company] should never do him 
any harm.”160 Alauddin himself gives a secular reason for the compromise 
on his authority on this issue, namely his underdog position compared to 
the Company as far as military power was concerned.161 Concerns about 
secular power seem more likely as a motive than prestige and pride in the 
spiritual sense here.
159 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 285.
160 “dat hem in zijn rijck geensints sullen mogen beschadigen.” Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304.
161 “also tegen de Nederlanders Gering van maght zeght te wesen.” Corpus Diplomaticum, 1. 304, also 
quoted above.
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The fourth ruling, which stated that conflicts between Company servants 
and the sultan’s subjects should not be regarded as a breach of the peace and 
that such problems should be solved by delicate mediation, represented 
another negotiated compromise. But, if Alauddin ultimately felt that the final 
ruling meant an undermining of his sovereignty, the negotiated solution was 
still better than the initial Company proposition. Considering that a uncom-
promising stand on the issue might well have led to open war, which is the 
implication of Alauddin’s lament about his relative inferiority in strength, 
the final compromise on the issue of jurisdiction might well have represented 
considerations of a secular and contextual nature. The point is that primary 
concerns of prestige and pride and metaphysical considerations do not invite 
compromise to the same degree. The same goes for all the compromises in 
the treaty: in the procedure for handling conflicts between the Dutch and 
other Europeans in Makassar, as well as between the Dutch and the sultan’s 
subjects, treated in the fifth clause, and the threat to his sovereignty by the 
imminent danger of the Company bringing its wars with European rivals to 
Makassarese waters, the topic of the sixth and seventh articles. One can 
almost hear a sigh of resignation in Alauddin’s recognition of the Company’s 
right to pursue its enemies. It is followed up by Alauddin’s admission of his 
own impotence as far as naval warfare was concerned: “At sea, there was not-
hing he could do about it.”162
In Alauddin’s admission above, we are confronted with a kind of conceptuali-
sation of sovereignty and power that is neither abstract nor “mystic” but secular 
and contextual. The same goes for the regulations on prohibited and permissible 
alliances in the two succeeding articles, which obviously represented an infrin-
gement on Alauddin’s autonomy. But what Alauddin achieved was better than an 
enforced alliance. And it is clear that what the Dutch obtained was less than what 
they wanted, too, namely a treaty of “peace and friendship.163 The final treaty 
specifies terms for a bilateral peace, but with no strings from a bilateral alliance 
attached. Somewhere along the line, Van Diemen and Caen must have opted 
merely for “peace,” considering it to be the best they could get, and the peace 
they got was the maximum Alauddin was willing to offer.
162 “hem (the Sultan), also sulx ter zee niet beletten en kan,” unnumbered art. 7, Corpus Diplomaticum, 
1.304.
163 See below, and: “section 1.”
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That the Company–Makassar relationship was an evolving one, and thus 
both fragile and fluid, can also be seen in the curious ending of the eighth 
clause. Having stated beyond any reasonable doubt that the Company and 
Makassar were not allies, there comes a passage that presents a lamentation on 
the absence of positive obligations to assist each other: “even if inclined to do 
so,”164 which suggests that the Company intended to secure a positive alliance 
from the outset. The Dutch “sigh” was probably what was left of Van Diemen’s 
initial hope for a treaty of alliance.
The hoped-for positive alliance becomes clear from the following paragraph, 
which is formulated like an advertisement for an alliance partnership with the 
Company. Compassion and loyalty were the typical traits of the Company’s 
treatment of its alliance partners: “The Dutch always felt an obligation to pro-
tect their allies against unreasonable harassment.”165
The meaning of these formulations, which by the way clearly must be ascri-
bed to the Dutch, can be interpreted in a different way, however. In addition to 
being seen as an implicit invitation for Alauddin to enter into an alliance with 
the Company, it could also be read as an implicit warning about the Company’s 
intention to interfere on behalf of its allies in Makassarese waters, if Makassar 
decided to go against them. Maybe for that reason it was a “protection” that 
Alauddin never asked for.
As for implicit subtleties, the above example is as close as we get in the treaty 
text. Furthermore, none of the articles are formulated with reference to or in 
terms of international law. The general characteristic of the treaty is that the 
regulations represented concise formulations on the compromises that had 
been reached during the negotiations. What we see in the final treaty is not at 
all the product of “cultural collision.” Neither is it a dual product with discon-
nected components of the South Sulawesian and Western treaty traditions. It 
represents the endresult of the give and take process that started with the nego-
tiations of June 24–26.
164 “off te ware sulx uijt lieffde deden,” unnumbered art. 8, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304.
165 “behoudens dat de Nederlanders t’allen tijde haere gealieerde tegens onbehoorlijcke overlast moeten 
protegeren,” unnumbered art. 8., Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.304.
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Chapter conclusion: Treaty compromise by context 
and meaningful communication, not cultural collision 
and miscommunication
Rumours about Van Diemen’s mercilessness in defending the Company’s 
monopoly in the Moluccas166 must have reached and made an impact on 
Alauddin before the 1637 negotiations. It is reasonable to see his recurrent 
lamenting about his relatively weak naval strength in the light of his fears of 
Company war actions. Alauddin’s handling of the Company’s claim to the right 
to pursue their Spanish and Portuguese enemies in Makassarese waters points 
in the same direction. The final agreement thus represented a pragmatic solu-
tion reached by rational calculation, in which Alauddin’s considerations on 
asymmetrical capacity for maritime warfare must have played a role. Similarly, 
his decision to allow the Company to sit in on the cases involving Company 
personnel represented a pragmatic solution. Although both these issues had 
clear implications regarding sovereignty, they were treated as practical pro-
blems, and solved pragmatically. No principles of international law, no referen-
ces to South Sulawesian concepts of “sovereignty” were involved, either during 
the negotiations or in final treaty.
The 1637 treaty was not the outcome of representatives of two parties speak-
ing mutually unintelligible languages. It came about as a result of mutual nego-
tiations over secular interests in a context in which both parties considered 
reaching a negotiated solution better than the alternative. The two parties 
understood each other well enough to make meaningful communication pos-
sible. Their initial modes or models of diplomacy and treaty making may have 
been different; but they were not so incompatible as to make meaningful com-
munication impossible.
166 Witteveen, Antonie van Diemen, 217 ff. Witteveen also underlines that Van Diemen, apart from using 
his “iron fist,” could also use a “velvet glove” (218), as was the case with Makassar in June 1637.
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Policy Discussions and 
the 1655 Treaty with 
Makassar—A Matter of 
Trust and Belief
Section 1: Chapter introduction
The topic of this chapter is the deliberations that occurred within the High 
Government of Batavia concerning Makassar in 1655, and the treaty, which 
was made on basis of the decisions on policy that were reached.1
The 1655 context
On October 23, 1655, the High Government decided to find out if the 
Makassarese were inclined towards peace and sent members of the Council of 
the Indies, the governor of Ambon, Willem van der Beeck,2 and the Armenian 
trader Chodia Soliman to determine if this was the case.3
When the High Government took the initiative for peace negotiations in 
October 1655, it was for several reasons, chief among them the Directors’ 
 worries about the high costs of the war and its detrimental effects on trade.4 
But seen in a broader perspective, and of more relevance in explaining 
Governor-General Maetsuyker’s willingness to accept the treaty terms of the 
1655 treaty, is probably the Company’s pressed situation at the time.
1 For the period from the conclusion of the 1637 Treaty to the outbreak of the war I refer to the chrono-
logy of Company-Makassar relations p 10-11. above.
2 Van der Beeck was until 1654 Governor of Ambon, Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 53, n. 4.
3 Ibid. 53.
4 Ibid. 53.
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After the end of the truce with the Portuguese in 1651, the High Government 
received orders from the Directors to continue the struggle against the 
Portuguese east of the Cape.5 The Company was thus engaged in war with the 
Portuguese in Ceylon until 1656.6 Relations with Banten also caused concern, 
particularly following the installation of Ageng as sultan in 1651.7 Added to 
this, the relations with Palembang and Aceh were troubled.8 Finally, the 
Company’s position in Taiwan was worrisome, affected as it was by the chaos 
resulting from the civil war between the Manchus and Ming loyalists in the 
south, among them Coxinga, who was no friend of the Company.9 Given these 
concerns, and with troops tied up in the Moluccas and Ceylon,10 one must 
conclude that there were also external pressures for making Maetsuyker accept 
the terms of the treaty of December 28, 1655. As for the reasons for declaring 
war in the first place, the conflict over destitution claims regarding the São João 
Baptista and Nazareé ships, which involved both Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo 
and the Sultan, must be added.11
Chapter sections and propositions
I shall begin by giving a brief chronology of the diplomatic interaction bet-
ween 1650 and 1655 to clarify my subject and my propositions. The analysis 
proper consists of three sections. The first concerns the Directors’ advice on 
Makassar in the 1650 General Instructions; I intend to identify the general 
scope of manoeuvre and approach that the Directors’ gave the High 
Government. I propose that the tenor of the advice on Makassar conforms 
with the generally pragmatic approach to overseas diplomacy in the 1650 
Instructions. In the following section, I undertake a textual analysis of the con-
flicting views over policy between Governor-General Maetsuyker and the 
Governor of Ambon, De Vlaming van Oudshoorn, at the close of hostilities in 
1655. The latter saw total victory over Makassar as a necessary precondition 
5 Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië, 311.
6 Ibid. 312–13.
7 Ibid. 350.
8 Ibid. 355 ff.
9 Ibid. 366.
10 Ibid. 350.
11 “One of the principle causes of the renewal of the war in 1653”, Boxer calls it: Boxer, Francisco Vieira 
de Figueiredo – A Portuguese Merchant-adventurer in South Est Asia, 1624–1667, Verhandelingen, 
KITLV, 52, 1967, 11. For the details of the incidents, see Boxer 109–11.
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for the establishment of a lasting peace and the protection of the Company’s 
interests in the Spice Islands, whereas the former argued that the conclusion of 
a satisfactory treaty by fall 1655 was not dependent on a total military victory.
I propose that although the two parties held contrary views, their respective 
arguments sprang from the same raisons d’état. The difference between the two 
lay in their perceptions of Makassarese intentions: Maetsuyker’s arguments 
were built on trust in the Makassarese, De Vlaming’s on distrust.
When Maetsuyker won the day, the form of the proposed peace treaty of 
1655 was based on the assumptions that the Makassarese were sincere in their 
wish for peace and their vow not to interfere with the Company’s trade mono-
poly in the Spice Islands. In the third section, I analyse the regulations and 
formulations in the 1655 treaty from this perspective.
In summary, my aim is to demonstrate that the advice of the Heeren XVII 
on Makassar, the discussions between De Vlaming and Maetsuyker, and the 
regulations and formulations in the December 28 treaty all sprang from consi-
derations of local context. The Company’s policy towards Makassar between 
1651 and 1655, the 1655 discussions on how to deal with Makassar in the 
future, and the final arrangements in the 1655 treaty all serve as examples of 
pragmatic overseas diplomacy.
Sources
The following chronological overview is mainly based on Stapel’s Het Bongaais 
Verdrag,12 which in its turn to a large extent is built on Valentijn.13 In the first 
section of textual analysis, I rely mostly on the advice regarding Makassar in 
the 1650 General Instructions.14 The policy advice and instructions in indivi-
dual letters from the Directors during the main period are not analysed, but 
only referred to because of their influence on policy decisions in Batavia. The 
1650 Instructions offers the framework within which the High Government 
was supposed to work.
As for the discussion between Maetsuyker and De Vlaming, I rely on 
Maetsuyker’s general letter of December 24, 1655,15 which refers to De Vlaming’s 
12 Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag (PhD diss., Leiden University, 1922).
13 François Valentijn, Beschryvinge van Oost Indiën, vol. 1 (Dordrecht: 1724), Molukse Zaaken, 1.286–
323, and Ambonse Zaaken, 2.166–203.
14 All from Mijer, Verzameling van instructiën.
15 December 24, 1655, GM 3.4–8.
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arguments. Maetsuyker’s advocacy of the negotiation options to the Directors 
and his implicit refutation of De Vlaming’s plan offer a coherent and consistent 
deliberation on policy options from which it is possible to reconstruct a “diplo-
matic worldview.” Still, some comment on the use of the Generale Missiven as a 
source for understanding diplomatic culture and outlook is needed.
A comment on the Generale Missiven as a source for 
understanding “overseas diplomatic culture”
The High Government’s reports on its dealings with and decisions on policy to 
the Directors could well be said to represent justifications of how the Company 
rights and interests had been protected and defended. According to W. Ph. 
Coolhaas, Maetsuyker particularly underlined this. If the Generale Missiven 
were aimed at pleasing the Directors, they are all the more relevant as a key to 
understanding the shared diplomatic culture of the High Government and the 
Directors at the time. The same goes for De Vlaming’s argument for a military 
solution. The factual contents are not the issue here in either case, but I shall 
focus on the mode of arguing as indicators of perceptions and attitudes. In this 
capacity, the discussion over policy towards Makassar in Maetsuyker’s general 
letter and De Vlaming’s letter to the Directors show equally well what the two 
men thought might please and convince the Heeren XVII.
Section 2: Conflicting assumtions of diplomatic 
performace 1650-1655
A brief chronology of diplomatic interaction, 1650–55
The Makassarese stand on allowing permanent residency for the English and 
Portuguese but not for the Company was a thorn in Batavia’s side.16 On 
February 28, 1650, Evert Janssen Buys was sent to Makassar with instructions 
to enhance the Company’s prestige and discredit the Company’s European 
rivals there.17 Sultan Maliki Said was given an extract of the 1648 Hispano-
Dutch Treaty of Münster that emphasised the considerable concessions that 
had been made by the Spanish.18 The story of the beheading of Charles I in 
16 Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 45.
17 Ibid. 45.
18 Ibid. 45.
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1649 was used to discredit the English.19 Although partly a matter of prestige, 
the wish to establish permanent residence in Makassar had to do with the need 
to acquire a steady flow of information on what was going on there.
The conflict between the Company and Makassar stemmed from the fact 
that smuggling from Ambon undermined the Company’s monopoly regime in 
the Moluccas. When rebellion in Ambon broke out again in 1648,20 the 
Company suspected and later verified Makassarese support for it.21 War with 
Makassar as a result became the only option. A decision for war was made by 
the High Government on October 23, 1653, and on November 8, Admiral De 
Vlaming van Oudshoorn set out as superintendent of the eastern quarters, and 
commander of the land and seas forces.22
It is important to note that the final decision to go to war on Makassar did 
not come until the fall of 1653 after a series of failed missions to seek a peaceful 
solution. These negotiations were respectively Jacob Hustard’s mission, which 
left Batavia January 16,23 and that of Evert Buys, whom De Vlaming sent from 
Buton on June 18.24 De Vlaming took his own initiative for negotiations on 
September 22 of the same year.25 On the news of the Sultan Maliki Said’s death 
and the instalment of his son Hasanuddin as sultan, the decision was taken on 
December 10 to send Buys to Makassar to see if the mood had changed for the 
better.26 When he confirmed that this was not the case, the war was escalated. 
The initiatives to see if a negotiated solution could be reached were important 
in two respects. They underscored the fact that negotiations were the preferred 
means for solving the conflict with Makassar. The decision to start negotia-
tions again upon the accession of a new sultan, hints that the evaluation of the 
Makassarese plans and prospects determined the choice between the conti-
nuation of war or the start of negotiations for peace. In 1655, the central issue 
for the High Government became when and how to conclude the war. It was 
on this issue that De Vlaming and Maetsuyker laid out their differing assump-
tions about the intentions of the Makassarese.
19 Ibid. 45.
20 For the various rebellions in Ambon, see Blussé and de Moor, Nederlanders Overzee, 138–41.
21 Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 46–47.
22 Ibid. 49.
23 Ibid. 46.
24 Ibid. 47.
25 Ibid. 49.
26 Ibid. 50.
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The decision to seek peace with Makassar by negotiations to be carried out 
by the Council of the Indies on October 2327 was partly motivated by pressure 
from the Directors, who felt that the war was costly in terms of both military 
expenditures and loss of trade.28 As we shall see, Maetsuyker adopted this line 
of argumentation.
As it was, Van der Beeck and Soliman, arrived in Makassar December 28, 
and were successful in their dealings. A treaty between Van der Beeck on 
behalf of the Company, and Sultan Hasanuddin of Makassar was signed 
December 28 and countersigned in Batavia February 2, 1656.
Makassar as a category 3 territory in the 1650 General 
Instructions
At the outset, Makassar belonged to the polities that fell under category 3 of 
the 1650 tripartite classification. As such it was a place of trade where the 
Company could neither dictate nor decide the terms of interaction, but should 
accommodate itself to the local ruler.29 As we have seen, the advice on mode of 
operation in places falling under category 3 was that the Company must trade 
“without causing any offence to anybody.”30 The importance of information 
gathering was also stressed.31 Finally, the High Government was instructed to 
take particular care not to cause conflict with the local princes and rulers of 
those places32 because that would prove “most harmful for the Company’s 
well-being.”33 This general advice also applied to Makassar.
Yet, Makassar was an extraordinary case. Thanks to its proximity to and 
entanglement in affairs of the Eastern Archipelago, it was a place of primary 
importance to the Directors, as its actions had direct implications for the 
Company’s possessions and position in the region.
That Makassar was intrinsically intertwined with the Company’s vested 
interests in the Moluccas modified the recommended restraint and 
27 Ibid. 53.
28 Ibid. 53.
29 1650 Instructions, art. 71. See chapter 3.
30 “in vrienschap en vrede, zonder eenige de minste offensie te geven.” 1650 Instructions, art. 116. See 
chapter 3.
31 See chapter 3
32 “zonder te denken, om in eenige verwijderingen met de koningen en prinsen … te geraken.” See chapter 3.
33 “als ten hoogste nadeelig voor her welvaren van de Generaele Compagnie wezende.” See chapter 3.
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accommodation, and amplified the Company’s need to obtain information on 
Makassarese plans. This was, however, hampered by the absence of a perma-
nent Company residency. In the 1650 Instructions, information gathering was 
stressed by the Directors as being vital to improving the Company’s relative 
position compared to the English and the Portuguese.
Two articles in the General Instructions of 1650 are devoted to Makassar, 
namely articles 44 and 45. In the former it is emphasised that the profits that 
could accrue from trade on Makassar should not be the High Government’s 
primary concern. Taking the magnitude of trade and therefore also the great 
numbers of people frequenting Makassar into consideration, the Company 
should trade there with the aim of obtaining information, particularly on the 
doings of other European traders.”34 The Company must further out seek 
information with a particular eye to whether in due time a situation might 
arise whereby the Company could get ahead of its European rivals.35 In other 
words, the Directors encouraged information gathering from a political and 
commercial point of view.
Profit-making motives were however entangled with political ones. The 
smuggling and trade of cloves from Ambon via Makassar was the subject of 
the article 45. The cloves brought by Makassarese sailing to Ambon and sold to 
the English and Portuguese residing there was causing “considerable damage”36 
to the Company. Although this smuggling seemed to be subsiding, the High 
Government was reminded that one could never know whether there would 
be an upsurge in the future. It was therefore “all the more important for the 
Company’s servants to stay in contact with the king and Court of Makassar to 
keep their ears and eyes open to what was really taking place there, and what 
might serve the Company.”37
Article 45 merely repeated the substance of the preceding one. The only dif-
ference between the two paragraphs was their perspective. Article 44 concerns 
34 “om nevens de kleine negotie van de Compagnie aldaer te hooren en te zien wat er passeert en zonder-
ling ten regarde van de europeische negotianten.” 1650 Instructions, art. 44, Verzameling van 
instructiën, 81.
35 “op welcke action (de europeische negotianten) naauw gelet moet worden, om dezelve in tijd en wijle 
naar gelegenheid van zaken te mogen preveniëren.” 1650 Instructions, art. 44, Verzameling van 
instructiën, 82
36 “merkelijcke schade.” 1650 Instructions, art. 45, Verzameling van instructiën, 82.
37 “de presentie van de ministers van de Compagnie omtrent het hof en den koning van Makassar te meer 
nodig is, om te hooren en te zien, wat aldaar passeert, en de Compagnie te mogen dienen.” 1650 
Instructions, art. 45, Verzameling van instructiën, 82.
210
chap ter 5
the relative standing of the Company as compared to its European rivals in 
Makassar, while the second deals with the issue of smuggling directly. The sha-
red message was that the High Government must acquire the most accurate 
information possible about plans in Makassar to serve the Company’s inter-
ests. No further instructions were given as to how exactly the High Government 
should go about improving the Company’s position in Makassar. The apprecia-
tion of the situation, as well as the specific mode of action was left to the discre-
tion of the High Government. All this aligns well with the tenor of the General 
Instructions, namely that the High Government was expected to perform wit-
hin the general framework laid down there and supplemented and elaborated 
in particular letters by the Directors.
As for choice of action and implementation of policy, the High Government was 
expected to adjust its approach to the context in situ. The Directors could only 
provide the general framework in the 1650 Instructions, and give some general 
advice. Still, the costs of war—both direct military expenditures and the loss of 
trade—were a worry that made the Directors press for a conclusion of peace.38
Implications in the Directors’ advice on Makassar, 1650
The Directors’ advice on Makassar in the 1650 Instructions did not explicitly 
say much more than this: get your share of information and political influence 
at the expense of the Portuguese and the English. But, in this advice there were 
two important implications for Batavia’s diplomacy towards Makassar. 
Reducing the influence of other Europeans in Makassar implied undermining 
their influence at the Makassarese court, and enhancing that of the Company. 
This could only be achieved by a diplomatic approach that was at least superfi-
cially accommodating. An alternative would be to engage the Company’s 
European rivals at sea, but then this would mean the risk of falling out with the 
Makassarese at the political-diplomatic level. A third option was of course to 
engage the Makassarese directly in a costly campaign both at sea and on land. 
The 1650 Instructions remain silent on these options, but the High 
Government’s reflections in the period 1653–55 oscillated among them. The 
reason lay in the problem of deciding how Makassar’s role in the Ambonese 
rebellion against the Company’s monopoly regime should be tackled.
38 Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 53.
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Section 3: The De Vlaming–Maetsuyker 
Controversy Concerning When to End the War: 
the shared pragmatic mode of thinking about 
overseas diplomacy, and the assumptions in 
Maetsuyker’s “soft approach”
Section topic and problem
A disagreement rose between Governor-General Maetsuyker and De Vlaming 
concerning how and when to end the war with Makassar. De Vlaming’s posi-
tion was that any treaty with Makassar should be based on a military victory. 
Against this position of “treaty by total victory only” Maetsuyker argued for 
negotiations as soon as the Makassarese were “ripe for it.” This discussion may 
have started already in fall 1654, when De Vlaming was in Batavia November 
1–24, to confer with the High Government, and when he presented a letter to 
the Directors in which he proposed a strategy for a final victory over Makassar 
in order to settle the Company’s problems with it once and for all.
In this section, I focus on the respective arguments as presented by Maetsuyker 
in the missive of December 24, 1655.39 My aim is twofold: to reconstruct the shared 
implications of the pro and con arguments for war, and second, to establish the 
particular characteristics of Maetsuyker’s argument in favour of negotiations.
Presentation of the two contestants
Maetsuyker: Career and historiographic evaluation
Maetsuyker was legally trained and had practised at the provincial court of Holland. 
He had been “headhunted” by the Directors as part of a campaign to straighten up 
corruption and irregularities in the judicial system in Batavia. He left for Batavia in 
1636, and was the author of the Bataviasche Statuten. He gained diplomatic expe-
rience as envoy to the Portuguese, viceroy in Goa, served as governor of Ceylon, 
and was appointed director-general before his election and official appointment as 
governor-general in 1653.40 Stapel praises him for his “great capability” and “excep-
tional political talents,” particularly in dealing with local rulers.41
39 In 3.4–8. I have not been able to find De Vlaming’s original letter to the Directors.
40 All from Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië, 310–11.
41 Ibid. 310.
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De Vlaming van Oudshoorn
Arnold De Vlaming van Oudshoorn was appointed governor of Ambon in 
1647. In the view of Stapel and others, he was a man of energy, but little 
empathy42—a man with an “iron fist,”43 or an ijzervreter (swashbuckler) as 
Blussé calls him. Tellingly, De Vlaming’s performance in Ambon drew criti-
cism from Governor-General Van der Lijn who held that he was imposing 
too much hardship on the local population.44 Nonetheless, De Vlaming was 
the one who was put in charge of suppressing the rebellion in Ambon. In 
short, he had earned his position and prestige for reasons quite different 
from Maetsuyker. When De Vlaming openly opposed Maetsuyker’s policy, 
he could do so because of the strong position he had already earned in the 
service of the Company.
Propositions
The contrast in Maetsuyker’s and De Vlaming’s approaches to Makassar 
may be explained partly by differences in character: Maetsuyker was pru-
dent and calculating, De Vlaming devious and energetic. Such armchair 
psychological judgement should not overshadow another important factor 
that reveals itself from a close reading of Maetsuyker’s counter-argument 
to De Vlaming’s offensive tactics. It becomes clear that their disagreement 
was embedded in diverging views on what to expect from the Makassarese, 
or, more specifically, Hasanuddin’s intentions and motives. Maetsuyker 
believed that Hasanuddin would honour a treaty in which Makassarese 
non-intervention in the Spice Islands was stated. De Vlaming believed that 
no matter what the treaty said on this point, the Makassarese would conti-
nue to interfere. Diverging appreciation of context conditioned the diver-
ging views on tactics. This is supported by the shift in policy after 1655, 
when an appreciation of the sultan’s motives and real intentions were rein-
terpreted in line with De Vlaming’s positions, and in 1660, when direct 
military intervention in combination with opposition from within 
Makassar itself became promising.45
42 Ibid. 294.
43 Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 46.
44 Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië, 294.
45 See chapter 6, below.
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Although Maetsuyker and De Vlaming started from distinct assumptions 
and arrived at different conclusions in 1655, both conformed to the pragmatic 
mode of thinking about overseas diplomacy. No appeal to international law 
was included in the respective arguments. Both applied a mode of argument 
that would now be termed a “cost-benefit analysis,” as seen from the Company’s 
perspective. Thus, even when Company opinion overseas was split on tactics, 
it is still possible to reconstruct a shared framework of thought about overseas 
diplomacy for the two divergent arguments.
Textual analysis, Maetsuyker’s advocacy for the 
negotiation option in the missive of December 24, 1655
The section on Makassar in the December 24 missive starts by giving some 
general reasons for the decision to start negotiations. The illicit export of 
cloves from Makassar had caused the High Government “serious worries.”46 
The High Government did not concur with De Vlaming’s proposal “to 
avoid participation by others… and that the foreigners should be deterred.”47 
Such a policy would only provoke increased cultivation of cloves in places 
unheard of before,48 and thus lead to a volume of smuggling that the 
Company could not possibly contain.49 The result would be a heavy draw 
on the Company’s resources from which only the Company’s rivals stood to 
profit.50
It was understood that the third parties reaping the fruits of the imperfect 
control were the other Europeans, particularly the Portuguese, residing in 
Makassar. The above argument sums up Maetsuyker’s general opposition to De 
Vlaming’s militant approach, which he considered counterproductive in terms 
of cultivating local goodwill, too costly to be effective, and therefore damaging 
to the Company’s interests.
46 “ons in groote becommeringen hout.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.5.
47 “Dat om het minste dat iemant anders daarin willen participiren … de vremdelingen te detereren.” 
December 24, 1655, GM 3.5.
48 “Maer dat deselve door ons groot woelen eer sullen worden waecker gemaeckt om haer totte cultur 
ende aenplantinge van nagelen te begeven, daer se anders noyt en souden hebben om gedacht.” 
49 “Te meer om dat ons hetselfde (the smuggling) overal te beletten t’eenemael onmogelijck is.” December 
24, 1655, GM 3.5.
50 “In welcken gevalle de Compagnie onder de sware lasten sal moeten beswijcken ende andere mette 
vruchten van deselve doorgaen.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.5. 
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On De Vlaming’s excessive use of force as 
counterproductive in particular
The suggestion that De Vlaming’s hard method was alienating the locals and 
creating opposition instead of goodwill was further elaborated by Maetsuyker 
in a separate section. Maetsuyker criticised De Vlaming’s excessive use of 
force, which, according to him, alienated the locals and thus created opposi-
tion. He ventured more general considerations on the counter-productivity of 
using violence in the Moluccas to obtain good relations with Makassar. 
Maetsuyker then referred to De Vlaming’s conduct of operations against Buton 
and Makassar during the war. The High Government “had wished that his 
Excellency had not shown up there and had abstained from hostile actions 
against the city.”51 This specific reproach was then expanded into a more gene-
ral deliberation over whether resorting to violence actually was conducive to 
improving relations with Makassar. Maetsuyker’s again argued that it was not; 
quite the contrary: “Such bravado just caused bitterness and contempt and 
thus jeopardized the state of peace that was so vital to the Company.”52 By 
implication, only tactful negotiations could secure a much-needed peace; pro-
vocative actions only worked against it.
The basic assumptions in De Vlaming’s argument for 
prolonged war until total victory
As we have seen, Maetsuyker presents in essence a cost-benefit analysis, in 
which the argument against De Vlaming’s plan is that the costs of sanctions 
would exceed the returns. De Vlaming used the same type of reasoning for his 
pro-war stand, but argued that long-term gains would surpass short-term los-
ses. According to De Vlaming, the Makassarese were not really inclined 
towards peace.53 From this it followed that the Company had “nothing to gain 
from negotiating a treaty under the present circumstances,”54 that is before a 
51 “Wij wenschten wel, dat sijne E. daer op die wijse niet en ware verschenen of tenminste op de stadt 
uytter zee geen hostiliteyt hadde geplecht.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.6. 
52 “Also diergelijcke bravaden niet dan meerder verbitteringe en connen verwerken, tot verachteringe 
streckende van de vrede, die de Compagnie soo noodich is.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.6.
53 “Geen groote genegenheyt tot vrede en accommodatie van sacken te hebben.” December 24, 1655, GM 
3.6.
54 “daer geen voordeel voor de Comp.e uyt gesien te connen worden.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.6.
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total military defeat had been forced upon them. Although the sultan and 
court proclaimed themselves inclined towards peace, they harboured consis-
tent expansionist ambitions in the Eastern Archipelago. The Company there-
fore had to be on constant alert for Makassarese aggression in the Spice 
Islands.55
For De Vlaming then, war, whether openly declared or not, was structurally 
built into the Makassarese–Company rivalry over the Spice Islands. No matter 
what came out of the negotiations, or whatever the terms of their agreement, 
the Makassarese would always pose a threat to Banda and Ambon. Therefore, 
the Company would be obliged to direct resources to defending its interests in 
the Spice Islands. De Vlaming underscored his position with the cost-benefit 
argument that future commercial gains would outweigh the cost of war. The 
big volume of trade passing through Makassar was detrimental to the 
Company’s commercial interests. A military defeat of Makassar would put an 
end to that.56
De Vlaming’s cost-benefit argument
The cost-benefit argument in De Vlaming’s argument for a military solution 
was also illustrative of the long-term expansionist thinking in which today’s 
spending yields tomorrow’s profits. In any case, both aspects of the argument 
are indicative of the primary concern of the Company’s commercial balance 
sheet both in the republic and overseas.
Maetsuyker on De Vlaming’s cost-benefit argument 
for war
Maetsuyker’s counter-argument to war as a means of securing future gains tur-
ned De Vlaming’s cost-benefit assumptions upside down. War would fall hea-
vier on the Company than on Makassar, which could wage war with fewer 
costs, claimed Maetsuyker,57 supporting his assertion by reference to past 
55 “Omdat sij doch echter altijt sowel bij vreede als oorlog hare Oosterse conquesten tegen derselver 
attentaten sal moeten versekert houden.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.6.
56 “Sijnde besijden dien de vreede met Macassar de negotie tot Batavia schadelijck om de groote vaart, die 
sij hebben, dewelcke haer moste worden belet.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.6. 
57 “die hare oorlogen met seer cleyne costen connen voeren.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.6.
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experiences. The Company had paid dearly for its past conflicts with Makassar.58 
Prolonged war was not a means to increased profit. Instead of spending money 
on war, Maetsuyker continued, the Company’s resources would be more profi-
tably deployed in other projects.59
So, sharing the same general pursuit, and within the same framework of 
reasoning, Maetsuyker flipped De Vlaming’s conclusion on its head by a dif-
ferent reckoning of the prospected gains and costs. This difference over 
approach was not embedded in legal considerations; it was based on diverging 
assumptions as to what to expect from the Makassarese.
De Vlaming and Maetsuyker on whether to trust the 
Makassarese
De Vlaming mentioned unreliability and opportunism as inherent character 
traits of the Makassarese. They had well proven to be “people that would never 
wink at breaking their word if it served their own interests.”60 The Company’s 
prior experience went to prove that: “Each time the Company lowered its 
guard, the Makassarese seized the opportunity to infringe on Company 
possessions.”61 Considering the Company’s experience with Makassarese 
deceit in the past, there were no reasons for trust now.
The divergence in opinion between De Vlaming and Maetsuyker rested on 
a fundamental difference in belief about Sultan Hasanuddin’s trustworthiness. 
With the conclusion of the 1655 war, a golden opportunity presented itself in 
which the Company’s aims could be achieved by negotiations alone.62 This 
opportunity should not be spoiled by “adventurous war-making.”63
58 “Daer deselve daerentegen de Comp.e soo lastich vallen, gelijck dese jaren genoechsam gebleken sijn.” 
December 24, 1655, GM 3.6.
59 “Behalven dat ondertusschen andere exploiten, daer haer meer voordeel uyt soude connen toevloyen.” 
December 24, 1655, GM 3.6.
60 “Als lieden sijnde, die van het verbreecken van haer wort gants geen werck en sijn maekend, als se daer 
maer voordeel met connen doen.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.6.
61 “Gelijck se t’allen tijde connen, soo haest wij naelaten tegen haer op hoede te sijn ende onse plaetsen 
met genoeghsame macht beset te houden.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.6
62 December 24, 1655, GM 3.7.
63 “Maer wij oordelen, dat de Comp.e nu haere saecken, God sij lof op soo gewensten voet gebracht sijn 
ende dat men hoope heeft tot een equitabile vrede te sullen konnen geraken, niet van node en heeft 
soodanigen hachelijken cans te wagen.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.7.
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Maetsuyker’s counter-arguments to De Vlaming’s 
“grand strategy”
Maetsuyker declared that ending the war and concluding a peace not only consti-
tuted the better option, but were also of vital importance to the Company’s interest 
in the long run.64 Continuation of the war would only lead to fanatical, anti-Com-
pany sentiment in Makassar; it had to end to “preclude the further spread of ill-
feeling against the Company.”65 The argument that prolonged war would entrench 
a hostile attitude towards the Company was further underlined by the characterisa-
tion of the Makassarese as “stubborn and uncompromising.”66 One must therefore 
be careful not to provoke them. The plausible negative consequences of continued 
war necessitated a different approach than De Vlaming’s provocative use of force.
Neither De Vlaming nor Maetsuyker appealed to legal arguments. Both of 
them appealed to cultural factors, understood as specific traits of the national 
character of the Makassarese. De Vlaming argued his position from an assump-
tion of Makassarese ingrained deceit, Maetsuyker from a belief in their sensi-
tivity and pride.
De Vlaming’s grand strategy for Makassar rejected—a 
matter of differing expectations
The next step in De Vlaming’s line of argument was to show how total victory 
could be obtained. A vital element in his grand strategy was that the Company 
must encourage local dissent and join forces with local insurgents rising in 
rebellion against Makassar. He deemed the prospect of finding a local ally who 
could be used in the interest of the Company good.67
Maetsuyker rejected the idea of sowing discontent and division among the 
Makassarese and so intervening on the side of the rebels on the grounds that it 
was unrealistic and, moreover, counterproductive in that it would only sow 
hatred against the Company and foment anti- Company feelings.68
64 “dat de vrede de Comp.e niet alleen dienstich, maer ten hoognodich is.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.6.
65 “Om voor te komen, dat sij haer heyllose concepten niet meerder ernst en comen te vernemen.” 
December 24, 1655, GM 3.6.
66 “gelijck het een obstinate, hertneckige natie is.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.6.
67 “dat men bequamelijck twedracht onder de landtsaten soude connen veroorsaecken ende daermet ons 
voordeel doen.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.6–7. 
68 “dat eenige gemisconteerende landtsaten dan terstont souden gereet staen met ons te spannen ende 
tegen de Maccasarse croone op te staen, dat soude t’eenemael op het onseecker gebout sijn. Sijnde eer 
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Rejecting De Vlaming’s war plan as costly, reckless 
and likely counterproductive—advocating soft 
diplomacy as an alternative
De Vlaming’s war-plan was simple and bold, namely to attack the southern-
most Makassarese forts with 1,200 troops, 600 from Batavia and the rest from 
Ambon and Banda. All were to land “with a clear dedication to either conqu-
ering or perishing.”69 Maetsuyker, however, found De Vlaming’s war plan not 
only costly and reckless, but also counterproductive. Typically, Maetsuyker’s 
counter-argument started with a tactical consideration on the lack of realism 
in De Vlaming’s plan. Prospects of success were deemed bleak because sowing 
discontent and tying up with local allies would be difficult as long as the 
Company did not have “a firm foot on land.”70
Opposing De Vlaming’s grand strategy for its lack of 
long-term realism
Added to the conviction that the present situation greatly favoured a settle-
ment by negotiation was Maetsuyker’s opinion that De Vlaming grossly under-
estimated the risks involved in settling the issues with Makassar by continuing 
the war. First, the transfer of troops from Banda and Ambon would jeopardise 
the security of these “valuable possessions” so that the “enemy would meet an 
open door to go about as he liked.”71 Second, even if the war was successful and 
the Makassarese forts fell into the Company’s possession, the Company’s limi-
ted resources would prevent it from holding them for long. The sheer number 
of the Makassarese fighting men, their fighting spirit, and their swiftness of 
mobilisation spoke overwhelmingly against it.72 Lack of military realism and 
te gelooven dat sij, haer van een uytheemse ende Christenen vijandt op haere eygen bodem besprongen 
siende, sich te vaster met den ander souden verbinden om denselven met gemene macht van het landt 
te drijven, gelijk men dat veeltijds soo heeft sien geschieden.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.7
69 “met resolutie te overwinnen of daer alle te sterven.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.7. 
70 “hetselve beswaerlick sal wesen in ’t werk te stellen, tensij alvooren voet op het landt hebben.” December 
24, 1655, GM 3.7.
71 “ende de viandt bij verlies van soodanigen getal crijghsvolck een deur geopent om in deselve te gaan 
grasseren na sijn geliefte.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.7. 
72 “Ende genomen, den aenslach quam al te gelucken ende wij wierden van hetselve casteel meester, wat 
hoope om hetselve in te houden tegen de macht van soo menighte duysenden seer moedige menschen 
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long-term strategic thinking were thus Maetsuyker’s main arguments against 
De Vlaming’s grand strategy.
Arguing the lack of realism in the belief in obtaining 
local allies
Maetsuyker logically discredited De Vlaming’s belief in obtaining local 
allies within Makassar itself. In fact, De Vlaming’s assumptions were rever-
sed. First, Maetsuyker and the High Government repeated their view that 
finding allies among local rebels was highly uncertain.73 Then they drew up 
a contrary scenario as the more likely outcome of involvement by the 
Company, namely that the people of South Celebes would join ranks and 
be even more united in an attack by a Christian nation.74 They concluded 
their argument by pointing out that this had been the prior experience 
with Makassarese internal mobilisation in the face of external 
aggression.75
Far from doctrinal legal arguments, the criticism of De Vlaming’s policy and 
defence of the negotiation option were formulated on basis of the nature of the 
Makassarese, their traits, and empirical, historical experience. The argument 
represented a form of realist tactical thinking; in a word, it was pragmatic. 
Having pointed that out, one should note the respective assumptions about the 
Makassarese.
Maetsuyker and the Council implicitly characterised De Vlaming’s approach 
as “military adventurism.” But, significantly neither party clearly labelled their 
own or their opponent’s position. Rather, they both assessed the situation in 
Makassar and weighed the options for Company action from a practical point 
of view. Maetsuyker’s and De Vlaming’s disagreement was one over means, 
als den Macassar in minder dan een uyr tijts tegen ons soude connen op de been brengen.” December 
24, 1655, GM 3.7.
73 “dat eenige gemisconteerde landsaten dan terstont souden gereet staen met ons aen te spannen ende 
tegen de Macassarese croone op te staen, dat sou ‘teenemael op het onseecker gebout sijn.” December 
24, 1655, GM 3.7.
74 “Sijnde eer te geloven, dat sij, haer van een uytheemsen ende Christen vijandt op haren eygen boden 
besprongen siende, sich te vaster met den ander souden verbinden om denselven met gemene macht 
van het landt te verdrijven.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.7.
75 “gelijck men dat veeltijds soo heeft sien geschieden.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.7.
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and rested on diametrically opposing convictions about whether Hasanuddin 
could be trusted or not.
Arguing permanent residency and information 
gathering by way of treaty as opposed to war
Maetsuyker’s diplomatic approach aimed for a negotiated peace that would 
provide the Company permanent residency and thus better access to informa-
tion about goings-on in Makassar. The reasoning went like this: By obtaining a 
peace treaty without provoking the Makassarese into defiance, the Company 
would be granted a permanent establishment in Makassar and better access to 
information about Makassarese politics in the Eastern Archipelago. The need 
for keeping an enlarged garrison in the eastern quarters would be eliminated 
by the permanent residency of Company servants in Makassar itself, because 
based on the information by the Company’s resident, resources and men could 
be transferred to Banda and Ambon when needed.76
Probably as a pre-emptive move against De Vlaming’s argument that the 
Makassarese could not be trusted regardless of what they might agree on in 
writing, Maetsuyker went on to say that reliable information could be obtai-
ned, even if the rulers of Makassar must be deemed “the most civil and discreet 
of all Moorish princes in these quarters.”77 In brief, the argument against De 
Vlaming’s proposal for strengthening the Company’s military resources in 
Banda and Ambon on a permanent basis was that permanent residency in 
Makassar would “do the trick,” and at a lower cost. Once again, this was a sha-
red goal through different means, and put forward in practical, not ideological, 
terms.
The concluding appeal to the Directors
The Council’s point-by-point refutation of De Vlaming’s arguments for war 
ended with an appeal to the Heeren XVII that it shared a clear and unqualified 
76 “Ende waneer wij weder een residentie in Macassar nemen, gelijck, soo de vrede getroffen wort, sal 
dienen te geschieden, soo sullen wij door middel van deselve altijt een oogh in ‘t seyl connen houden 
ende van haer doen en ondernenen tijdich advijs hebben om ons van te dienen ende in ‘t versorgen van 
deselve provintiën na te reguleren.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.6.
77 “Behalven dat die van Macassar altijt gehouden sijn geworden wel de civielste ende discreetste te sijn 
van alle de Moorse vorsten, hier omtrent gelegen.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.6. 
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conviction that negotiation would best serve the Company’s interests under 
the current circumstances. The credibility of the negotiation option rested on 
the premise that after years of warfare, in the fall of 1655 there was a sincere 
Makassarese wish for an enduring peace. This basic assumption was argued in 
contextual terms, namely that “Given the Makassarese lack of success over the 
last years, it is to be hoped that they had learnt the lesson not to once again 
‘stick their noses’ into matters that were none of their business. Their interfe-
rence so far had gained them nothing but had cost them a lot.”78
The message to the Directors was clear: Now was the time for negotiations, 
not provocations. It was, in fact, an opportunity that the High Government 
already had seized by approaching Hasanuddin for a treaty.79 The argument for 
the negotiation option had come full circle. The centre of that circle was a con-
ditional trust in Hasanuddin.
The High Government believed an acceptable, negotiated solution to be 
imminently at hand.80 As the final decision on whether to employ De Vlaming’s 
hard-line or the diplomatic approach lay with the Directors, Maetsuyker 
underlined, he awaited and would follow the Directors’ further instructions.81 
Still there could be no doubt about the governor-general’s preference: He had 
already sent Van der Beeck for negotiations to Hasanuddin’s court.
Considerations of context primary to considerations 
of law
Judged by the standards of international law in Europe at the time, De Vlaming’s 
grand strategy represented a clear breach of the rules since his plan involved 
outside interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. If Andaya’s pro-
position about the doctrinaire legalistic obsession of VOC diplomacy were 
correct, one would expect some comments on the legal dimension on this 
78 “Sijnde te verhopen, dat den Macassar door de quade successen, die hij in dese laeste jaren heeft beha-
elt, de lust oock sal sijn vergaen om voorerst hem weder te steecken in saecken, hem geensints rae-
kende ende die hem tot noch toe geen voordeel, maer wel groote schade hebben toegebracht.” 
December 24, 1655, GM 3.7.
79 December 24, 1655, GM 3.8.
80 “Invoegen dat wij van geloven blijven dat de Compagniee in alle maniere de vrede, soo daer onder 
goede conditiën toe comen can, behoort te amplecteren om eens een een eynde van dien lastigen oor-
logh te maecken.” December 24, 1655, GM 3.7.
81 “ondertusschen daerop afwachten de ordre die U Ed. Ons dienangaende sullen gelieven te geven.” 
December 24, 1655, GM 3.5.
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point. But legal considerations were not mentioned in Maetsuyker’s counter-
argument to De Vlaming’s original proposition. Practical considerations as to 
chances of success were what mattered. Both men argued within a shared 
pragmatic framework; their difference lay in the prospects of success for their 
respective proposals.
The significance of dismantled trust after 1655 and its 
significance in interpreting the 1655 context
In De Vlaming’s version of “divide and rule” as applied to Makassar, we might see 
embryonic features of a “greater scheme” for restructuring the political geo-
graphy of South Sulawesi. As we know, this was what did take place after the joint 
Bugis–Company victory in the 1667 war. De Vlaming’s grand strategy came to 
mature in the five years after 1655, to reach a full explication in the missive of 
December 1660, when it was at last presented as a viable option. In fact, the 
Makassarese’s continued infringement in the Spice Islands and fluctuations of 
opportunity for the Company’s direct intervention in Makassar came to dictate 
a continued discussion and drove opinion in Batavia towards a military approach.
But in 1655, Maetsuyker still favoured negotiations based on his trust in 
Hasanuddin’s sincere intention for a lasting peace, and a commitment to non-
interference in the eastern quarters.
Opposing standpoints within a shared conceptual 
framework—the source of differences in policy 
preferences
As we have seen, none of the policy preferences were argued with reference to 
law. Both sides considered the problem with an eye to costs and benefits. Both 
sides considered their choice of tactics in terms of the overall context and 
pragmatism, not on basis of legal principals. The question remains, however, as 
to how much the above-sketched divergence in opinion could be explained by 
differences in personality.
There is a recurring trait in the historiography to ascribe differences in 
the formulation and execution of policy to differences in personality. 
Maetsuyker’s approach is thus explained by his being a “cautious person,” 
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while De Vlaming is judged a “man of action.”82 This might reflect a diffe-
rence in temperament, yet the evidence of their arguments suggests that 
what really divided them were their different assumptions about possible 
outcomes. The difference between Maetsuyker’s and De Vlaming’s posi-
tions was marked more by diverging perceptions of the situation at hand 
than in psychologically fixed policy preferences. I stress this point because 
when we come to the period after 1655, Maetsuyker gradually came to 
express points of view and arguments that were closer to De Vlaming’s in 
1655. It would be irrational to assume that Maetsuyker changed persona-
lity after 1655. His appreciation of Hasanuddin as a trustworthy treaty 
partner did change, and, consequently, so did his view about what consti-
tuted an appropriate policy. Too much emphasis on personality in the ana-
lysis of diplomatic behaviour may lead us to underappreciate historical 
context and the role of learning by experience.
The lesson of the disagreement between De Vlaming and Maetsuyker in 
1655 and the later shift in policy demonstrates on the one hand that deli-
berations on policy in Batavia were remarkably vivid, and that policy-
making was dynamic. Both features deny fixity to legal principles or 
fixed  personality traits as prime determining factors in policy delibera-
tions and decisions. Both features were illustrative of a pragmatic approach. 
The determining factor was an appreciation of the situation on the ground. 
In 1655, Maetsuyker still deemed that the sultan’s behaviour warranted a 
soft approach. That was also the  defining trait of the December 28, 1655, 
treaty.
Section 4: Analysis of the 1655 treaty as a typical 
product of “soft diplomacy”
Historiographic positions
Arguing from his “non-Eurocentric” point of view, Andaya holds that the 1655 
treaty “clearly demonstrates the influence of treaty making” and that its 
 contents “read like a typical South Sulawesian treaty.”83 Then again, taking 
82 Maetsuyker would not use the sword as long as there was another way out, while De Vaming’s fury was 
“repudiated”; Stapel, Geschiedenis van Indië, 338 and 306.
83 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 287.
224
chap ter 5
the  whole treaty body into account, this was an exception.84 Seen from 
theCompany’s perspective, the 1655 treaty came to be judged in rather harsh 
terms, both by contemporaries, and by later Dutch historians, particularly on 
the grounds of the concessions made to Hasanuddin.85 But it remains a fact 
that the treaty to which Van der Beeck agreed in Makassar on December 28 
was countersigned in Batavia on February 2, 1656.86
Propositions, analysis of the 1655 treaty
I present a somewhat different view of the 1655 treaty. As for Andaya’s 
proposition of its “typical” South Sulawesian nature, a good argument can 
be made to the contrary, namely that the Company’s concessions to 
Makassar can be read as specific regulations protecting Makassarese inter-
ests, in other words that they were conceived in a framework of secular 
power politics. Seen from the Company’s side, although the treaty was 
made as result of pressure for peace from the Netherlands, it can just as 
well be considered an exemplary product of the “soft diplomacy” advoca-
ted by Maetsuyker. That is my proposition. Hence, I aim to demonstrate 
that the wording and regulations in the 1655 treaty were wholly consistent 
with the basic policy assumption held by Maetsuyker at the time, namely 
that Hasanuddin would indeed ban Makassarese sailings to the Spice 
Islands. Thus, the governor-general and Council’s later criticism of both 
the treaty’s terms and Van der Beeck’s performance in Makassar should be 
seen in the light of a shift in thinking a year later,87 when these optimistic 
assumptions turned out to be wrong.88 The concessions made by the 
Company in the 1655 treaty made perfect sense considering that the 
Company obtained acknowledgement by Hasanuddin that Makassarese 
should stay out of the Spice Islands, and that the Company was free to 
handle third parties who broke the sailing ban at its own discretion.89
84 Ibid. 287–88.
85 See for instance Valentijn, Beschryvinge van Oost Indiën, 1.322 and Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 54 
referring also to Speelman’s negative evaluation of it.
86 Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 53.
87 See below.
88 See chapter 6 for elaboration.
89 See analysis below.
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Textual analysis
One of the most telling parts of the 1655 treaty90 is the preamble in which 
Sultan Hasanuddin presents the background and general conditions for the 
agreement. After having stated who the treaty parties are,91 he places the initia-
tive for peace with the Company. The treaty has been concluded “because the 
governor-general is inclined towards peace.”92 His own reasons for an agree-
ment with the Company Hasanuddin depicts as a necessity due to the imba-
lance in strength between him and the Company.93 He has agreed to the peace 
because “the governor-general is a strong and powerful man”94 while he him-
self, “is so much inferior in strength and power.”95 The message is clear: it is the 
Company who has approached Hasanuddin with an offer for peace, and the 
sultan, considering his relative weakness, has no other option than to accept. 
But at the end of the preamble, he states he has managed to secure a treaty that 
does no harm by rhetorically asking “should I not agree to a peace that clearly 
implies no harm to my people and subjects.”96
Comments, Preamble
The inclusion of Hasanuddin’s wish for the Company to stand out as the party 
asking for peace might have been perceived as a face-saving device addressed 
to the sultan’s home audience with no serious consequence for the Company. 
The transaction of prestige involved here represented a concession that the 
Company could afford. Given the High Government’s willingness to please 
Hasanuddin on this point, it seems reasonable to believe that the sultan’s ambi-
guous remarks on the peace as being forced on him because of his relative 
weakness, was accepted for the same reason. The transaction was however 
counterbalanced by Hasanuddin’s positive depiction of the peace at the end of 
the preamble. He had agreed to a treaty that was not harmful to his people. My 
90 I follow the text as reproduced in the Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.82–84.
91 The ruler of Goa and Lord of Tello and Ambassador Van Der Beeck on behalf of the Company, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.82.
92 “Om dat den Gouverneuir Generael will vrede maken.” Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.82.
93 As was done by Alauddin in 1637, see chapter 3.
94 “en een groodt man is ende sterck.” Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.82.
95 “ende ik, die zoo veell cleiner ben en onmaghtigh.” Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.82.
96 “Zoude ick geen vreede maeken wanneer geen quadt aen onse onderdanen doet.” Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.82.
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point is That, with the possible exception of his remark about his relative infe-
rior strength, Hasanuddin’s presentation of the treaty has as much to do with 
concerns of secular power as with traditional South Sulawesian concepts of 
symbolic power.
Seen from the Company’s side, both the transfer of prestige to Hasanuddin 
and the expressed ambiguity about the peace itself were tactical concessions that 
the High Government could accept as long as it obtained a formal declaration of 
commitment to stay out of the Moluccas from the Makassarese. Hasanuddin’s 
trustworthiness on this point was, as we have seen, what Maetsuyker had consis-
tently argued for in his rejection of De Vlaming’s hard-line approach in 1655.
Concessions
If Dutch concessions could be made on presumably insubstantial issues such as 
Hasanuddin’s prestige in Makassar, making them on regulations that could well be 
interpreted as creating loopholes in the Company’s privileges in the Spice Islands 
was another matter. Yet the 1655 treaty was full of such. The first clause, for 
instance, confirmed that the sultan’s subjects still residing in Ambon should be 
allowed to return to Makassar.97 Most of these were people who had taken part in 
the rebellion against the Company in Ambon.98 Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5, all offered 
loopholes in the ban on Makassarese sailings to the Spice Islands on religious 
grounds. The Makassarese appeal to religion was probably why the High 
Government accepted them, thinking them insubstantial. But for the Makassarese, 
this appeal may well have been interwoven with, and thus have served, political 
purposes. I shall analyse these articles in detail to highlight the function as well as 
the probable thinking behind the Company’s acceptance of them.
Article 2, 1655 treaty
The second article in the treaty allowed Muslims residing in Ambon to sail to 
Makassar: “all Muslims wishing to go to Makassar should be allowed to do 
so.”99 The explicit rationale for the concession, clearly coming from Hasanuddin, 
97 1655 treaty, art. 1, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.82.
98 Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.82, n5.
99 “Dat alle Mooren, die met haren vrije will near Maccassar willen, hem zullen toegestaen werden.” 1655 
treaty, art. 2, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.83.
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was presented in terms of religion in the following manner: “According to the 
Makassarese Religion it would be a grave sin to leave them [i.e., the Muslims in 
Ambon] in Christian custody.”100
Heeres regards the Company’s agreement to open up for traffic of Muslims 
from Ambon to Makassar as a “dangerous concession,” since some the 
Ternatese and Ambonese would qualify as “Muslim.”101 The concession would 
only appear to be dangerous assuming that Hasanuddin harboured expansio-
nist or aggressive plans. The prevailing thinking in Batavia at the time was that 
he did not.102 It is more likely that the High Government interpreted 
Hasanuddin’s request for the exception regarding the free trafficking of fellow 
Muslims as another quest for prestige, this time with a religious twist. If so, the 
High Government was acting on assumptions that fall within Andaya’s percep-
tion of the symbolic or metaphysical nature of South Sulawesian diplomacy. 
Contrary to Andaya’s assumptions about Company diplomacy then, it was not 
acting on principles of international law, but, rightly or wrongly, on percep-
tions of local context and culture.
Goals and means in Makassarese and Batavian policy may not have been 
identical, but their power politics overlapped. As long as both parties laid 
claims to influence and sovereignty in the same territory, in the end the agre-
ement had to fail. But if in 1655 the High Government assumed that prestige 
recognition for internal use was Hasanuddin’s primary motive, this could well 
be traded against guaranties for the Company’s monopoly rights. I think such 
assumptions go a long way to explain all the concessions made in the 1655 
treaty.
Articles 3 and 4
Another concession that was also based on Makassar’s role as a protector of its 
co-religionists was made in article 3, which simply states that none of the 
Muslims in Ambon would be punished.103 In effect, the article offers a de facto 
general amnesty to the rebels. Once again, this was a Makassarese claim that 
100 “om dat het voor haer weens hare religie een groodte gesonde i, die onder de Christenen te laten.” 
Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.83.
101 Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.83, n2.
102 See the foregoing discussion of Maetsuyker’s advocasy for the soft diplomacy approach.
103 “Dat alle de Moren, die in Ambon zijn, niet sullen gestraft zijn.” 1655 treaty, art. 3, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.83.
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could be explained by motives of prestige, and in that light the concession 
made perfect sense given the belief that Makassar would from now on not 
interfere in matters relating to Ambon. Continued contact between Makassar 
and Ambon was also implied in the following article, which concerned the 
sultan’s right to collect his debts in Ambon.104 As in the above, the concession 
must be explained as part of a “good faith” attitude on behalf of the Company.
Article 5
In article 5, which concerned the exchange of prisoners, Hasanuddin achieved 
another advantage with an agreement for the exchange of prisoners: all priso-
ners being held in Batavia should be returned to Hasanuddin, as likewise all 
Company prisoners held by Hasanuddin should be returned by him, except 
those who had converted while in Hasanuddin’s custody.105 This was still 
another concession to Hasanuddin made for religious reasons. Again, there is 
every reason to believe that the High Government primarily regarded this as a 
pure prestige transaction, and thus of secondary significance.
A brief speculation on Hasanuddin’s use of the 
religious argument in articles 2–5
If Hasanuddin was appealing to his role as defender of the faith for secular 
reasons and simply to buy time, as there is reason to believe judging by his later 
actions, there is every reason to admire his manoeuvring in 1655. The sultan 
succeeded in creating loopholes in the treaty to protect his own power position 
in the Eastern Archipelago by “playing the religious card.”
This interpretation, however, implies that Hasanuddin’s tactics were not 
based on the South Sulawesi treaty tradition à la Andaya, but that he exploited 
the Dutch assumptions that he was in pursuit of religious prestige. A feeling of 
having been outsmarted in 1655 may help explain Batavia’s uncompromising 
tone in its later hard-line approach.106
104 “Dat den Coningh zijn schulden, die in Ambon heft uijtstaende, zall mogen doen inmanen.” 1655 
treaty, art. 4, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.93.
105 “Excepto die Moorse gewerden zijn.” 1655 treaty, art. 5, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.83.
106 See chapter 6.
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Prestige and religion as motives in Company 
diplomacy
In maritime Southeast Asia, the Company obviously was a Christian intruder in 
an environment in which Islam was dominant. This meant that local powers 
could always appeal to religion as a mobilising force against the Company. One 
should not, however, underestimate the psychological role of religion as an iden-
tity-marker for the Company. But it may have taken the form of the merger bet-
ween Company honour and divine providence, as I have found in the General 
Instructions.107 Makassar and Batavia differed not in whether, but in the degree 
to which they used religion to mobilise their supporters. In any case, in the 
August 1660 treaty, which was negotiated from a different balance of power, the 
1655 ruling on converts was reversed, although with qualifications.108 A parallel 
instance on reversal with respect to the issue of converts is also found in the 
negotiations and contracts with Banten in 1659 and 1684. In 1659, Maetsuyker 
conceded that two converted former Company servants could stay in Banten.109 
In 1684, in a situation where the tables had turned completely, the ruling was 
reversed.110 Viewed in this light, it seems reasonable to assume that the conces-
sion made with Makassar in 1655 on the issue of converts was not made with a 
light hand, but made from the conviction that the issue was secondary and must 
be subsumed to the strategic goal of getting a viable treaty at last.
Articles 6 and 7: Regulating relations with the 
Portuguese and other third parties
Article 5 represented the final modification of the Company’s monopoly and 
sovereignty in the Spice Islands. The Company’s privileged position in the 
Spice Islands itself was confirmed in the final article of the treaty, article 8. The 
two articles in between concerned how Makassar and the Company should act 
in relation to the Portuguese and other third parties in general. It is important 
to note that as we turn from bilateral to multilateral relations from article 5 
onwards, the terms in the treaty increasingly favour the Company.
107 See chapter 3.
108 See chapter 6.
109 See treaty with Banten, art. 1, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.156.
110 See treaty with Banten, art. 6, Corpus Diplomaticum, 3.340.
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Regarding the issue of the Portuguese, the regulation was closer to a draw 
than a win for either party. Article 6 simply stated that “The Company’s ene-
mies should not be regarded as the king’s enemies.”111 For one thing, this 
meant that the Company’s aspirations to oust and replace the Portuguese in 
Makassar were blocked. On the other hand, although only by implication, 
the Company was still free to fight the Portuguese anywhere else. Still, the 
reality was that the continued Portuguese presence in Makassar implied con-
tinued smuggling with the Spice Islands. In article 7, the recognition of 
Makassar’s autonomy in its policy towards the Portuguese was extended to 
apply to a general autonomy in its relations with all third-party actors “below 
the winds.”112
Comments on the regulation of the Makassar–
Company positions in the multilateral interaction 
regime set down in articles 6 and 7
It may seem puzzling that the Company, having gained the upper hand in war, 
not only made serious concessions regarding continued contact between 
Makassar and Ambon but also agreed to terms that guaranteed full autonomy 
for Makassar’s foreign policy. One factor was the pressure for peace from the 
Netherlands. Nor can the blame be put on Van der Beeck’s poor negotiating 
performance, because the treaty was, after all, countersigned in Batavia. A bet-
ter explanation is to regard this puzzle as one that primarily arises in a realist 
and hard-line frame of thought.
Viewed in the idealistic, soft diplomacy approach of 1655, the concessions 
made to Makassar all made perfect sense. Makassar got no more than the stan-
dard rights prescribed by category 3 of the General Instructions of 1650. The 
concessions made were the price to be paid for what the Company got in the 
final article of the treaty, namely Makassarese recognition of the Company’s 
monopoly and sovereignty in the Spice Islands.
111 “Dat de vijanden van d’E. Compagnie des Conings vijanden niet sullen wesen.” 1655 treaty, art. 6, 
Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.83.
112 “Dat zoo den Coningh met dese off gene natien benedenwints in questie (is), dat d’E. Compagnie haer 
daermede niet sall mogen bemoeijen.” 1655 treaty, art. 7, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.83.
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Securing the Company’s monopoly and Sovereignty by 
treaty: Article 8
The first part of the eighth and concluding article of the 1655 treaty reads “The 
Honourable Willhelm van der Beeck requests of the king that no Makassarese, 
nor subjects of the king, be allowed to sail to Ambon, Banda or Ternate.”113
This was what the Company’s envoys had come for in the first place, the 
issue on which the Company would not concede. Still it was phrased as a 
“request.” The phrasing clearly entailed yet another prestige transaction and 
once again in favour of Hasanuddin. But that was in line with the general tenor 
of the treaty as such.
Still more was working in Hasanuddin’s favour in the content and wording of 
Article 8. The “request” was also modified by the qualification that the sultan 
could be held responsible for his own subjects,114 but that he could not ban the 
sailing of the many foreign subjects residing in his country.115 Even so, the 
Company was recognised as free to deal with such third parties as it might please. 
This was put in the voice of the Company: “But if we [the Company] should 
catch them [the non-Makassarese intruders, we] are free to detain and handle 
them at our own discretion”116 The Company’s liberty in this matter was further 
emphasised by a confirmation that such sanctions would “neither be considered 
a breach of the peace, nor would the sultan look upon them in anger.”117 In other 
words, the Company’s exercise of sanctions against third-party infringement of 
its rights in the Moluccas was not to be regarded as a cause for war.
The conclusion of the 1655 treaty
From the Company’s viewpoint, article 8 was the crux of the 1655 treaty. It 
fulfilled the High Government’s primary aim at the time, as it guaranteed 
Makassarese recognition of the Company’s commercial and political rights in 
113 “D’H Willhelm van der Beeck versoekt op den Coningh datter geen Maccassaresen offte andere natien, 
onderdanen van de Coningh, near Amboijna, Banda offte Ternaten sullen mogen varen.” 1655 treaty, 
art. 8, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.83.
114 “dat hij zijn volk can inhouden.” 1655 treaty, art. 8, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.83.
115 “maer dat hij veell vremdelingen en coopluyden in sijn landt hadt, die hij t varen niet can verbieden.” 
1655 treaty, art. 8, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.83–84.
116 “maer zoo wij desellve connen crijgen, mogen vrijelijck nemen ende daermede handelen, sulx als wij 
cunnen.” 1655 treaty, art. 8, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.84.
117 “soo en sall ‘t noghtans dese vrede niet verbreeken ende sall den Coningh daerom niet quat wesen.” 
1655 treaty, art. 8, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.84.
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the Moluccas, obligated the Makassarese not to interfere, and guaranteed the 
Company’s right to prevent third parties from doing so. These were Batavia’s 
primary aims in 1655, and securing these goals was what made the treaty 
acceptable. Maetsuyker’s stand on this must have rested on his belief that 
Hasanuddin would honour the rulings of article 8, and not misuse the conces-
sions he gained in articles 1 through 5. None of this came true, but it was the 
basic assumption upon which the 1655 treaty rested. Given this background, it 
seems fair to say that later historians have either misunderstood or too harshly 
judged the 1655 treaty. At the least it deserves to be considered in terms of the 
assumptions from which it sprang.
Chapter conclusion
The 1655 treaty and regulations make perfect sense within the framework of a 
soft diplomacy approach in which the defence and protection of the Company’s 
possession of the Spice Islands was the primary goal. It sprang from a convic-
tion that the context and the Company’s position were such that more ambiti-
ous plans were unrealistic, too costly, and otherwise counter to the Company’s 
interests. Considering that Hasanuddin would no longer interfere with the 
Company’s interests in the Spice Islands, a negotiated peace was the better 
option. Maetsuyker’s positions and policies in 1655 were part and parcel of a 
pragmatic diplomatic approach, built on trust and good faith.
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The Pragmatic Dynamics 
of the Batavian Diplomatic 
Mode—Shifts and 
Fluctuations in the High 
Government’s Approach 
towards Makassar as 
Presented in the Generale 
Missiven, 1656–61
Section 1: Introduction to the chapter topic
The difference in opinion between Maetsuyker and De Vlaming in 1655 origi-
nated, as we have seen, from diverging appreciations of Sultan Hasanuddin’s 
intentions. In the period after the conclusion of the 1655 treaty up to the war 
in 1660 however, there was a shift towards De Vlaming’s position that 
Hasanuddin was inherently untrustworthy. The actual choice of policy was 
predominantly determined by the logic of the situation. This chapter analyses 
the shift in policy assumptions from 1656 and the reasons behind the fluctua-
tions in policy decisions as they can be read from the High Government’s pre-
sentation of them in the Generale Missiven in the period after 1656 until 1661.
Although policy recommendations between 1656 and 1660 fluctuated 
between accommodation and intervention, the basic underlying assumption for 
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both positions marked a break in that there was now little left of the trust in 
Hasanuddin that had been the basis of the 1655 treaty. This meant that negotia-
tions were increasingly regarded in purely tactical terms. The restructuring of 
the political order in South Sulawesi by military intervention increasingly came 
to be viewed as the optimal solution to the Company’s problems with Makassar. 
In 1659, a situation arose in which the prospects of setting forth De Vlaming’s 
grand strategy of 1655 looked promising. As this situation subsided, the argu-
ments against military intervention in conjunction with an internal rebellion 
were not precisely the same as in 1655. Instead of claiming the absolute imprac-
ticality of implementation, the counter-argument implicitly added “for the time 
being,” that is postponing it until favourable conditions would again arise.
The High Government asserted that this shift of thinking was forced on the 
Company by Hasanuddin’s devious manoeuvres and continued aggressive 
schemes for the Spice Islands. There was clearly an element of “selling” the 
argument to the Directors, who always regarded war as a last resort. But, there 
can be no doubt that Hasanuddin’s claims to his rights to sail to the Spice 
Islands, and his exercise of that right after the conclusion of the 1655 treaty, 
formed the basis for a break with the 1655 assumptions as well as the revitalisa-
tion of the grand strategy for Makassar.
Contextual considerations and factors
Besides the internal unrest caused by the Bugis rebellion, attention also had to 
be paid to affairs outside Sulawesi and the Moluccas. In the period 1659–60, 
one of the most pressing issues for the High Government was Ceylon. At the 
end of June 1658, the Portuguese gave up their last fort in Ceylon1 and the 
Company had seemingly broken Portuguese power on the island for good. But 
the Company soon faced war with their former ally, Raja Singha.2
In 1658, the Company had also ousted the Portuguese both in Coromandel 
and Malabar,3 but with the outbreak of war between the Company and Raja 
Singha, the Portuguese were quick to use the opportunity for their benefit, 
launching an offensive against the Company in Malabar with success.4 
The  peace with Makassar in August 1660, however, freed troops for 
1 Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië, 318.
2 Ibid. 321.
3 Ibid. 319.
4 Ibid. 321.
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engagements both in Ceylon and against the Portuguese.5 One must infer that 
the Company’s challenges in both Ceylon and Malabar in 1659–60 made con-
cluding a peace with Makassar a more tempting alternative to prolonging the 
war.
But there were also other factors that may have both distracted the High 
Government’s attention from Makassar, or made peace seem an alluring alter-
native. Aceh was one such factor. The period between a peace treaty agreed in 
December 1655 and one concluded in June 16596 saw both Company block-
ades of the Aceh roadstead and a military expedition against the sultanate.7
Probably more alarming were developments in China and their implications 
for the Company’s position in Taiwan. As in 1655, the concern was about the war 
between the advancing Manchu forces and Ming loyalists in Southern China. 
The leader of the resisting warlords of the southern provinces was the famous 
Coxinga. In a letter to the High Government in early 1660, the Dutch governor 
of Taiwan, Frederick Coyet, reported on rumours that Coxinga harboured plans 
to evacuate to Taiwan because he could no longer withstand the Manchus, and 
that a number of Chinese on the island were already in his service and supplying 
him with information.8 This cannot but have increased the tension in Batavia and 
increased its wish for a conclusion of the war against Makassar.
So, all in all, if circumstances in South Sulawesi at one point seemed to offer 
the Company a complete solution to its problems with Makassar, there were 
clearly circumstances outside the Moluccas that weighed against it.
Propositions
My main propositions are that as trust in Hasanuddin decreased the attraction of 
De Vlaming’s original “grand strategy” increased. Shifts in attitude towards 
Hasanuddin meant that “negotiations” and negotiated revisions to the treaty on 
symmetrical terms came to be looked on in Batavia as secondary to waiting for 
an opportunity to force a “final showdown.” The political reordering of South 
Sulawesi by military intervention came to be viewed as the instrument by which 
a viable solution of the Makassarese problem could be finally achieved. Whereas 
the missive of December 24, 1655 had advocated negotiation with no goal beyond 
5 Ibid. 322.
6 Ibid. 356 and 358, respectively.
7 Ibid. 357–58.
8 Ibid. 366.
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getting an optimal treaty that of December 16, 1660 advocated transforming the 
political geography of South Sulawesi as the one and only means that could 
establish a lasting solution to the problems with Makassar.
In this process, the meanings of “negotiations,” “treaty,” and “war” were 
readjusted. Negotiations were grounded in the lack of opportunity and a means 
to implement the grand strategy—that is in the absence of a powerful local ally. 
Whenever there were prospects of such an alliance appeared, so did advocacy 
for the grand strategy. This all goes to corroborate my general proposition that 
the High Government’s diplomatic thinking was pragmatic through and 
through, and not driven by European preconceptions of international law. The 
aim of this chapter is to show that the pragmatism was dynamic and grounded 
in considerations of local context and situation.
Focus and plan of exposition
The High Government’s presentation of policy deliberations and decisions con-
cerning Makassar in the Generale missiven between 1656 and 1660 forms the topic 
of the present chapter and I discuss these presentations in chronological order. The 
analysis is focused on the way policy options and decisions were argued to expli-
cate both the mode of thinking as well as the emotions involved. At the beginning 
of the analysis of each respective missive I review events that are relevant to under-
standing the context for the issues raised and the approach argued. This introduc-
tory section is followed by a close reading of the text itself. At the end of my analysis 
of each missiven, I comment on the relationship between the text and historical 
context. Many of the events treated here will be analysed in a broader context and 
greater detail in chapters 6 and 7. However, those chapters analyse Batavia’s diplo-
matic posture towards Makassar. In the present chapter, I deal with the dynamics 
of Batavia’s perception of diplomacy towards Makassar between 1655 and 1660 as 
presented by the High Government to the Directors in the Netherlands.
Comments on the sources
As the primary sources here are letters from the Generale Missiven, the same 
general source critical warnings given in chapter 4 apply: they should be read 
with an eye to how Batavia sought to please the Directors. Between 1655 and 
1661, Maetsuyker signed reports in which the assumptions and positions 
regarding Makassar ran contrary to his earlier views of 1655. That and the fact 
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that Batavia after 1655 came to endorse an offensive policy, which in general 
was not to the Directors’ liking, goes a long way to explain why the arguments 
and their respective assumptions are so thoroughly worked out. In that quality, 
they make excellent material for the study of the language of legitimating a 
form of overseas diplomacy. As for the general chronology of events, I rely 
mainly on Stapel’s 1922 thesis, Het Bongaais Verdrag (The Bongaya treaty).
Section 2: The missive of December 4,  
1656—blaming Van der Beeck
The 1656 context—the reversal of positive 
expectations of Hasanuddin
The missive of February 1, 1656, contained nothing on policy deliberations 
Makassar. Nor do the two brief letters to the Directors dated 18 and 31 July, 
respectively.9 It may then seem reasonable to assume that up to late summer 
1656 the feeling in Batavia was that the Company’s relations with Makassar were 
well taken care of by the 1655 treaty. Still, Stapel points to the fact that friction 
and “lack of trust” in the Makassarese was beginning to show,10 and by the 
autumn of 1656, there was open discord. The point of contention was that 
Makassarese sailings to Ambon had resumed and Hasanuddin claimed he was 
entitled to continue the sailings under the terms of the 1655 treaty.11 It seems 
reasonable to date the break with the 1655 model of trust and soft diplomatic 
approach towards Makassar with these events. The section on Makassar in the 
letter of December 4, 1656 is symptomatically dedicated to the deliberations on 
what steps needed to be taken regarding aggressive plans by Makassar.
Textual an alysis, Makassar in the missive of 
December 4, 1656
The focus on Makassar in the missive of December 1656 was on new problems 
with the sultanate, and how they could be blamed on Van der Beeck’s poor 
9 Symptomatically none of these are found worth mentioning in the relevant section in Stapel, Het 
Bongaais Verdrag, 52–55.
10 Ibid. 54 “weinig vertrouwen”
11 Ibid. 54–55.
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performance during the negotiations in December of the previous year. In short, 
the current problems were not the fault of the 1655 decision to negotiate as such, 
but were blamed on Van der Beeck’s poor negotiating performance. He had 
accepted a treaty that “could give very little contentment” to the Company.12 The 
fault for the substandard treaty terms was given exclusively to Van der Beeck, who 
seemed to have understood “the High Government’s instructions and intentions 
poorly.”13 In fact, by acting in “direct contradiction to the High Government’s 
intentions,”14 Van der Beeck had concluded a treaty that was “totally adverse” to the 
Company’s interests.15 Due sanctions had been taken, however: Van der Beeck was 
now excluded from the Council and had no prospects for promotion.16
Comments
Although ostracised because of his poor performance in 1655, Van der Beeck 
was still made commander of the return fleet in 1656.17 At an earlier time, he 
and his co-envoy Soliman had also been praised and rewarded for their “good 
services during the negotiations.”18 After all, the 1655 treaty was no more than 
the logical result of Maetsuyker’s trust in Hasanuddin. It therefore seems fair 
to propose that what had changed by December 1656 was not a loss of faith in 
Van der Beeck’s ability as a negotiator but the belief in accommodation as 
means to solve the problems with Makassar. The merciless denunciation of 
Van der Beeck in the 1656 missive thus signalled that the High Government 
had made a decisive shift in expectations towards Makassar. What was the 
approach argued by the High Government, when confronted with new 
Makassarese intrusions in the Eastern Archipelago? In view of the challenging 
situation, a campaign against Makassar was out of the question: Batavia was 
quarrelling with Banten, it was at war with Aceh, Mataram kept its ports shut 
to the Company, and the kingdom of Johore and its allies were threatening 
Malacca.19 Appeasement to buy time was the selected option. At the end of 
12 “Gans weynich contentement connen scheppen.” December 4, 1656, GM 3.88. 
13 “schijnende onse ordre ende mijninge daerinne qualijck te hebben begrepen.” December 4, 1656, 
GM 3.88.
14 “directelijk met onse intentie strijdigh.” December 4, 1656, GM 3.88.
15 “Geheel ‘t onsen nadeele.” December 4, 1656, GM 3.88.
16 December 4, 1656, GM 3.88.
17 DRB 1656, November 14, 10.
18 “De goede officien … aen d’Ed. Comp.” DRB 1656, Novermber 10, 8.
19 “doch uyt veele opsichten het contrarie seer soude mogen vresen.” December 4, 1656, GM 3.88.
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1656, the approach was thus to “keep up the appearance of peace towards the 
sultan but at the same time watch out for an attack.”20 The tactics towards 
Makassar must be to offer the sultan every outward sign of peace, including 
engaging in negotiations that could possibly be drawn out for one to three 
years.21 That was a choice for “mock negotiations,” negotiations that primarily 
served to bar the Makassarese from declaring war on the Company.
Summing up positions and their implications in the 
missive of December 4, 1656
A definite shift in Maetsuyker’s assumptions and recommended policy towards 
Makassar is obvious in a comparison of the missive of December 1655 and that 
of one a year later. Although much of blame was given to Van der Beeck, the 
message of December 1656 was that the 1655 approach and treaty had proven 
totally unproductive. By implication, war was understood as the force that 
could bring about a viable interaction regime and treaty with Makassar. 
Because the present conditions ruled out that option, the tactics for the time 
being were to negotiate and to avoid war by buying time. Maetsuyker’s posi-
tions on and understanding of “treaty” and “negotiations” in 1656 thus seem to 
have turned 180 degrees from the positions he had taken the previous year. 
That turn would find its full articulation in the missive of December 17, 1657.
Section 3: The missive of December 17, 1657—full 
explication of an offensive policy towards Makassar
Context
By December 1657, the Company’s relations with Banten and Mataram had 
changed for the better compared to the previous year. Although the Bantenese 
had been provocatively aggressive in 1656, the mood turned during 1657, culmi-
nating with a Bantenese initiative for negotiations for peace in December.22 The 
tension regarding Mataram, too, had lessened somewhat, as the ports of 
20 “Dien voorst (the Sultan of Makasar) vooreerst al wat te simuleren ende in te sien, maer sullen daero-
nder echter niet naerlaten naer vermogen op hoeden te sijn.” December 4, 1656, GM 3.89.
21 “Soo den Maccassaeren haer maer voor een jaar á drie aen haere onderhandelinge trouwelijck houden 
gebonden.” December 4, 1656, GM 3.88.
22 Somers, Nederlandsch-Indië, 69.
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northern Java were reopened. As a feared pan- Islamist alliance against the 
Company did not materialise, the prospect of war with Banten, Mataram, and 
Makassar, which characterised the previous year, also subsided.23 The Company 
was on the offensive in Aceh and entered negotiations in the summer of 1657,24 
but peace was not concluded until June 1659. In short, developments in 1657 
presented a context that opened a wider range of options and a more offensive 
policy towards Makassar than the in previous year was possible.
Makassar in the missive of December 17, 1657
The policy advocated for Makassar in the missive of December 17, 1657, 
 represents an explicit, final break with the approach of 1655. Now the premise 
was that Hasanuddin would always look for an opportunity to increase his influ-
ence in the Spice Islands, no matter what he might promise to the contrary.
In December 1657, the High Government wrote that only a successful mili-
tary campaign, devastating Makassarese power once and for all, could in the 
end secure a viable and lasting interaction regime with the sultanate. This in 
fact represented an endorsement of De Vlaming’s long-held assumption that 
Hasanuddin and the Makassarese were by nature deceitful and could not be 
trusted in diplomatic dealings. With this newly adopted framework of princi-
pled distrust “negotiations” and “treaty making” came to be understood pri-
marily in tactical terms.
Textual analysis, missive of December 17, 1657: 
Validating Hasanuddin’s hostile intentions and 
deceitfulness
The High Government harboured no doubt that Hasanuddin was pressing his 
right to sail to Ambon in order to inspire a new rebellion there among the 
VOC’s subjects.25 After the 1655 treaty had been signed, Hasanuddin had a 
copy of the contract taken to Ambon where it was shown to the pardoned reb-
els as a trophy. As the High Government saw it, Hasanuddin was posing as a 
23 De Graaf, 1977, 106-107.
24 Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië, 358.
25 “buyten twijfel niet anders voor hebbende gehadt dan maer occasie te houden om U.Ed. onderdanen 
tegen U.Ed. daer weder op te ruyen.” December 17, 1657, GM 3.147. 
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champion of the rebel’s cause by perverting an act of mercy granted by the 
Company’s generosity.26
Hasanuddin’s spite in turning the Company’s virtue into a vice and trans-
forming his own vice into a virtue was but one incident where the High 
Government perceived a generally defiant arrogance and ill will towards the 
Company building up in Makassar. The Company’s commissioners and resi-
dents were shown very little respect in public, and a demonstrative haughti-
ness by certain Makassarese nobles clearly indicated that Makassar was not 
inclined towards peaceful coexistence with the Company.27
Comment: The emotional aspect of the turn from trust 
to distrust
The High Government’s main point in the drawing attention to the above inci-
dents was clearly aimed at underlining the probability of plans for war in 
Makassar. The Company was facing a challenge of power politics. Still one 
should not underestimate the impact of Makassarese provocations to the 
Company’s prestige. The issue of prestige had important implications for the 
Company’s diplomacy, viewed both instrumentally in power politics, as well as 
taken as an insult to the Company by its own right. From a power politics per-
spective, not answering Makassarese provocations meant potentially under-
mining the Company’s diplomatic capital in the archipelago at large as well as 
among potential allies in Sulawesi.
But there are strong indications that the High Government’s grievances 
about the lack of respect may well have had purely emotional motives too. 
When Maetsuyker’s and other advocates of accommodation held forth in 
1657 that the sultan was acting with defiant arrogance against the Company, 
they must have done so with some feelings of having been deceived. After all, 
the Hasanuddin whom they in 1655 had presented as having learnt not to 
stick his nose into affairs that were none of his business was in 1657 pre-
sented as thumbing his nose at the Company. This may well help explain the 
26 “Om daeruyt d’inwonders te doen blijcken van de liefde ende genegenheit, die sij (quasi) in het besluy-
ten van hetselve met haerl. pardon van ons t’ obtineren tot haerl. hebben bethoont om haer met hets-
elve op haer sijde te trekken.” December 17, 1657, GM 3.148.
27 “is onsen commisaris ende residenten daer doorgaens seer cleen respect aengedaen, sulx sijl. Uyt ver-
scheyde hoofden wel claerlijck doen blijcken haer aen U Ed. Vrundtschap gantsch niet en laten sijn 
gelegen.” December 17, 1657, GM 3.153.
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peculiarly “heated” tone in the deliberations on Makassar in the December 
17 missive.
Explaining the probability of Makassarese plans for 
war and conspiracy against the Company
If not explaining the emotional aspect of its turnaround regarding what to 
expect from Makassar, the High Government did emphasise that Hasanuddin’s 
provocations and the demonstrations of anti-Company sentiment in Makassar 
could only mean that the sultan and his nobles were once again planning for 
war.28 Furthermore, there was alarming evidence of the sultan and his court’s 
encouraging the Portuguese to challenge the Company’s military presence in 
Asia wherever possible.29 In other words, the prospects of war were not only 
considered very likely, they were considered very grave taking the Makassarese– 
Portuguese conspiracy and alliance into account.
The commercial conspiracy, already at work
If the political-military conspiracy had not appeared in the open yet, at the 
commercial level a joint Makassarese-Portuguese conspiracy was already at 
work. By sailing under the Makassarese flag, Portuguese in Makassar were free 
to trade wherever they pleased30 and thus undermine the Company’s monop-
oly rights in the Spice Islands. Judging from this practice and other 
“absurdities,”31 there can be no doubt that the Makassarese were determined to 
continue sailing to the Spice Islands notwithstanding the terms of the 1655 
treaty.32
28 “Soowel de Coningh en de grooten aengaet, alsoo lief met U Ed. weder tot oorloge traden, als in vrede 
bleven.” December 17, 1657, GM 3.153.
29 “Daertoe haer buyten twijfel de Portguesen seer animeren om daerdoor alle uwe wapenen op de custe 
van Indïen ende elders, waer se haer drucken, van hare halsen te crijgen.” December 17, 1657, GM 
3.153.
30 “Trachtende haren handeel herwaerts ende derwaerts onder de naeme der Maccassaren ende haerl. 
ontsagh onbecommert uyt die platse te drijven.” December 17, 1657, GM 3.153.
31 In this context to be read as “decoy-arrangments” i.e. on par with the Makassarese sailing flagging 
themselves as Portuguese.
32 “Al hetwelcke en meer en andere absurditeiten, de Comp.e bij dat hof aengedaen werdende, van ons 
sijnde ingesien ende dat sijl. onaengesien de vrede, die met haer gemaekt hebben, al echter niet sullen 
naerlaeten d’oosterse quartieren te bevaeren.” December 17, 1657, GM 3.153.
243
t he pr agm atic  dyna mic s  of  the batavian d iplom at ic  mode
The explanation of the post-1655 strategy
It was time for the High Government to explain its new strategy. The shift in 
assumptions and the break with the 1655 line on accommodation began in a 
“soft voice,” but soon rose in volume. The High Government had “seriously 
begun to have grave doubts about whether staying on friendly terms under 
the present conditions would serve the Company’s interests and whether it 
would not be better served by once again going to war.”33 The question must 
be read as a rhetorical one. The implicit request is illustrative of the post-
1655 conceptualisation of the position of war in the “war–negotiations–
treaty triangle.” As it stands in the missive of December 17, 1657, war was 
presented as the sole guarantor for a reasonable treaty with the Makassarese. 
In this regard, the High Government now assumed the same position De 
Vlaming had advocated in 1655. This begs the question: Why advocate for 
war in 1657 and not in 1656? The answer is simple: the context had changed. 
In 1657, Makassarese provocations had devolved from bad to worse and, just 
as important, the Company had gained control of the situation with Aceh 
and the danger of having to fight both Banten and Mataram had 
diminished.
Arguing the case for war by referring to the deceitful 
nature of Hasanuddin and the Makassarese
The High Government’s argument for negotiations in 1655 had rested on the 
assumption that Hasanuddin could be trusted. The call for war in 1657 rested 
on the contrary assumption. Still, in the missive of December 17, 1657, there 
is a discrepancy between the uncompromising depiction of Hasanuddin’ 
aggressive intentions, and the relatively “soft wording” of the proposition for 
militant actions.34 This may be explained by the fact that the Directors had 
been so eager for an end to the war in 1655.35 On the one hand, there can be 
little doubt about the High Government’s real intentions. It was no longer 
deliberating whether war would be the best way to secure a viable interaction 
regime with Makassar; that had already been decided. What the Councillors 
33 “Soo beginnen wij grootelijckx te twijffelen of deselve vrede op dien voet de Comp.e al voordeelijck sal 
wesen, en of niet goet en sal sijn weder met haer in oorlogh te comen.” December 17, 1657, GM 3.153.
34 “One had begun to wonder if war was the preferable option.” See above.
35 See chapter 5.
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more likely wondered was the best way to sell this proposition to the 
Directors. It is against this background that we must read the remaining part 
of the letter, which contains a return to the “all reasons not to trust 
Hasanuddin” argument, and turns upside-down the cost-benefit arguments 
used to counter the pro-war argument in 1655. In this section, the tone heats 
up again.
The presentation of Hasanuddin as an unreliable 
partner in treaty making
It is reasonable to think that, for the High Government, the Directors’ 
acceptance of the war option rested on their conviction of the irredeemably 
deceitful nature of the Makassarese. The High Government worked hard to 
convince the Directors. Its first argument was that Hasanuddin’s motives in 
signing the 1655 treaty had been purely tactical, and his agreement to a 
peace had only come about because at the time he was unable able to wage 
war effectively.36 But beneath a mask of friendliness, Hasanuddin still har-
boured plans to attack the Dutch. Given the consistently devious nature 
and aggressive plans of the Makassarese, an accommodating mode was 
thus not only futile but counterproductive: “Because the more we appease 
and accommodate them [the Makassarese], the more they claim [from us] 
and the more impertinent they become in their claims.”37 The real message 
read loud and clear: Hasanuddin must under no circumstance be regarded 
any longer as a reliable treaty-partner. Doing so would harm the Company’s 
interests.
Assurance of the commitment to fend off a 
Makassarese attack on Ambon and Banda
On top of the harassment of continued Makassarese sailings to the Spice 
Islands, the High Government pointed to a range of incidents that clearly 
36 “Niet anders namentlijck also deselve (tegen haer Haer Ed. Comp.e) met publicque oorloge niet heb-
ben subsisteren.” December 17, 1657, GM 3.148.
37 “hoe wij haerl. meer inwillingen ende caresseren, sij noch al meer ende van ons begeeren ende te 
stouter warden.” December 17, 1657, GM 3.148.
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indicated that Hasanuddin and his supporters were escalating their activities 
in the Eastern Archipelago. The Directors were however assured that measures 
had been taken to defend the Company’s “precious” (costelijcke) possession of 
Banda and Ambon. Orders had been given that the defences on Ambon and 
Banda, belonging to the Company by right of conquest, be duly strengthened 
to ward off any intrusion by the Makassarese or anyone else.38
The reference to the Company’s legitimate claims to defend its position in 
Ambon and on Banda “by right of conquest” is the only reference to international 
law in the deliberations on Makassar in the December 17 missive. The legality of a 
pre-emptive war on the other hand, were not considered. The option of war was, as 
in 1655, discussed in terms of pragmatic cost-benefit considerations. If the mode 
of thinking in this regard was the same as in 1655, in 1657 both assumptions and 
conclusions of the war option had been turned upside down.
A return to, and turnaround of, the 1655 cost-benefit 
arguments about war
An important argument in the High Government’s promotion of the war 
option in December 1657 was that the relatively low costs of war outweighed 
the gross long-term benefits to be gained from it. In essence, this was an 
endorsement of De Vlaming’s position in 1655. Disregarding its argument of 
the lack of realism in the war plan in 1655, and countering the 1655 argument 
that war would mean a lessening of trade, and thus a loss of profit for the 
Company, in 1657 the High Government pointed out that war would disturb 
Makassar’s trade.39 No mention was made of the Company’s losses.
Comment
The arguments presented for war in 1657 illustrate not only the break with the 
positions of 1655, but point to a break in the High Government’s general mode of 
thinking about the VOC’s relations with Makassar. In 1655, Maetsuyker’s 
38 “Soo hebben wij nu ordre gegeven, als voors. Plaetsen Comp.s eigen landen metten den swaarde 
gewonnen sijnde de voorsz. Vestinge daer hetsij met ofte tegen haerl. gemoede geweldelijck te doen 
leggen, ende de Maccasaren ende alle andere vremdelingen van daer en omtrent te houden.” December 
17, 1657, GM 3.148.
39 “Als wanneer wij haer in retorsie tenminsten oock haeren handel seer souden becommeren.” December 
17, 1657, GM 3.153.
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assumption about Makassarese intentions in seeking peace rested on potential 
losses of trade due to war. The mode of argumentation in 1655 thus built on an 
assumption of shared concerns over trade losses as a motivation for peace in both 
Makassar and Batavia. In 1657, war and the impending losses in trade were the 
means to force Makassar to a lasting peace. By implication, the terms of the treaty 
to follow that war would be of a quite different nature than the treaty of 1655.
The argument concerning the excessive costs of war 
countered
The High Government’s positions in 1657 regarding the costs of war equalled De 
Vlaming’s positions of 1655. The High Government now argued that the military 
expense of a campaign might well be kept within reasonable limits. A campaign 
would not imply much of an increase compared to what the Company was already 
spending on its defence of Ambon and Banda. In 1657 alone, the High Government 
had had to deploy 573 soldiers to discourage and prevent Makassarese intrusion.40 
That was approximately the same number that would be required for a campaign. 
War would thus mean minimal or no additional expense.41
Reassuring that the security of Ambon and Banda is not 
jeopardised and arguing the soundness of the war plan
The 1655 counter-argument to war had been that the transfer of troops from 
Ambon and Banda would jeopardise the defence there. This argument was 
rejected in 1657. Now the argument ran that the transfer of troops from 
Ambon and Banda was not only a necessary prerequisite for the success of the 
campaign, it should also be regarded as a tactically sound adjustment since the 
troops were already there, ready, and packed.42 Deploying them in Makassar 
was sensible and the High Government assured the Heeren XVII it would 
never do so in a way to cause peril.43 Timing was the decisive factor in the High 
40 “Want wij desen jaere al echter om op haer ende haerl. bedrijf toe te sien een nombre van 573 soldaten 
sijn genootsaeckt geweest uyt te setten.” December 17, 1657, GM 3.153.
41 “Dat al omtrent sooveel is wij by tijde van oorloge te doen plachten, ende dan weynich of gene oncos-
ten mede gepraevenieert warden.” December 17, 1657, GM 3.153.
42 “Indien wij deselve chrijghsmacht van daer over becomen.” December 17, 1657, GM 3.153.
43 “gelijck vreesen, dat niet sullen doen mogen, soo wij geen pericul willen loopen.” December 17, 1657, 
GM 3.153.
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Government’s argument here. If undertaking the campaign during the eastern 
monsoon,44 one need not worry about attacks on Ambon and Banda.45 All in 
all, considering the serious challenge that Makassar posed for the Company, 
and the good prospects of a successful campaign undertaken at low cost and 
risk, it was the time to act. If no military actions were taken, the Company 
stood the danger of facing irreparable damage.46
Inscribing Makassarese deceit towards the Company 
as structurally embedded
Having advocated the arguments for going to war and the good prospects for 
success, the appeal to the Directors to endorse the plan returned to the basic 
premise, that the Makassarese could never be trusted. In its 1657 version, this 
view is given an additional twist. Deceit by the Makassarese towards the 
Company was described as a structurally inherent trait in Makassarese charac-
ter and society. When the Makassarese had proven to be untrustworthy, it was 
because they were by nature opportunistic and would break contractual obli-
gations at any time to serve their own best interests.47 Maetsuyker’s volte-face 
could hardly be more striking. He now assumed that by their very nature they 
neither could, nor would, be trusted either at present or in the future.
The cultural-religious argument
The psychological argument for inherent Makassarese deviousness was supple-
mented by a cultural-religious argument. When the Makassarese by their nature 
would gladly break any promise with any party, the case for the Company was 
even worse, representing as it was a Christian party.48 The religious code in Islam 
read that it was no sin for a Muslim to dishonour a treaty with Christians, the 
latter being considered unbelievers.49 In short, regarding promises made to the 
44 Meaning the period October–February.
45 December 17, 1657, GM 3.153.
46 “een onversettelijcke schade aengedaen te werden.” December 17, 1657, GM 3.153.
47 “wie haer aen eeden trouwe ofte beloften niet houden gebonden, als sij met dezelve te breecken maer 
voordeelen te behaalen weten.” December 17, 1657, GM 3.153.
48 “Doch vornaementlijck tegen ons Christenen te doen hebbende.” December 17, 1657, GM 3.153.
49 “Die sij voor ongelovige houden en geen sonde van en maecken of sij bedriegen ende te cort doen ofte 
niet.” December 17, 1657, GM 3.153.
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Company by the Makassarese, the latter could cheat and lie as much as they liked 
without breaking their own religious code. Makassarese fraud and deceit towards 
the Company were thus presented as structurally embedded, by both cultural 
predisposition and religious sanction. Any hope for change was naïve and futile.
Comments
Propositions that this negative portrayal of the Makassarese represents a typical 
Eurocentric perception would do well to consider the timing and context of these 
remarks. Rather than interpreting this characterisation as “orientalist,” it would 
seem more to the point to regard it as ex post facto rationalisations of what was 
considered in Batavia as consistent Makassarese breaches of contract. One would 
also do well to view the proposition about inherent deceit in the light of the need 
to “sell” the war option to the Directors. After all, the High Government’s advocacy 
for war basically rested on the proposition that words alone would never suffice 
and that a solid, durable treaty with Makassar had to be enforced by the sword.
In no way can the above remarks be regarded as originating from fixed Eurocentric 
preconceptions. The contrast between the declared optimism and trust that pro-
vided the arguments for the initiative for peace and the negotiations in 1655 and the 
realism that characterises the thinking in 1657 goes to disprove that. The thinking 
about the role of religion and the appeal to religious concerns may be said to have 
beencompletely reversed. The concessions made on religious grounds in the 1655 
treaty sprang from an assumption of a separation between the religious and political 
spheres in Makassar. In 1657 the political implications constituted the primary focus. 
Learning from experience must explain this change of position from 1655 to 1657.
Summing up the break with the 1655 assumptions and 
positions in the Generale Missiven of December 1656 
and 1657
The 1656 letter marks a general break with the optimism of 1655 and the belief 
that the differences with Makassar had been sorted out by the treaty that year. 
The 1657 missive to the Directors argued for a new direction. This shift must be 
explained by Hasanuddin’s resumption of his activities in the Spice Islands, 
which was regarded as a clear breach of treaty in Batavia. But there was more 
to it than the terms of the treaty. The uncompromising pro-war stand, the 
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language used, and the essentialist characterisations of Hasanuddin and the 
Makassarese in the 1657 missive betray the fact that the High Government felt 
fooled by Hasanuddin. It was a matter of restoring prestige and face.
In the deliberations over Makassar presented to the Directors after 1657, the 
issue was not whether to war, but whether the moment was ripe or not, or 
whether the desired result could be achieved in some other way. The missiven 
after 1657 and up to the war in 1660 reveal a fluctuation of recommendations 
for war and tactical considerations.
Section 4: The missive of December 14, 1658
Context and focus
The background for the approach to Makassar in the missive dated December 
14, 1658, was that the Company was still formally in a state of war with Banten, 
but relations with Mataram had eased since the susuhunan (king) had reopened 
the northern harbours in the spring.50 Still the fear of an anti-Company alli-
ance between Mataram and Makassar lingered.51 Letters and reports from 
Makassar and increased Makassarese activity in the eastern provinces con-
firmed and strengthened the Council’s fears of Makassarese plans for war.52
The High Government’s outward response to the Makassarese challenges of 
1658 was accommodation, but it kept a sharp eye on the possibility of war. On 
August 20, merchants Joan Barra and Pieter Schuyftang were sent to Makassar 
to ease tension and keep relations as normal as possible.53 This was clearly a 
defensive move dictated by Batavia’s ambivalent situation at the time. The mis-
sive of December 1658throws light on how Batavia viewed regional politics in 
the archipelago in an unclear situation, and how the High Government’s pre-
sented its response to the Directors. Of special interest is that the prospect of 
being confronted by a coalition of Muslim states led to elaborate deliberations 
on the role of religion in overseas diplomacy, or more specifically, on how to 
tackle the religious divide between the Company and its Muslim friends and 
foes.
50 H.J. De Graaf, De Regering van Sunan Mangku-Rat I Tegal-Wangi, vorst van Mataram, 1646-1677, 
Verhandelingen KITLV, 33, S’-Gravenhage – Martinus Nijhoff, 1961, 107.
51 Ibid. 105.
52 Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 58.
53 Ibid. 58–59.
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The fear of a Makassar–Mataram alliance, and the 
implications for the Spice Islands
The section on relations with Makassar in the December 1658 letter started 
with a repetition of the 1657 position that the Company should not trust 
the Makassarese, but be on the alert.54 The High Government then turned 
to the the 1658 situation, namely that Makassar was trying to mobilise 
other powers in the archipelago as allies in its struggle against the Company. 
Information had been acquired that Makassar had sent envoys to Mataram 
asking the susuhunan to close the northern ports (of Java) to the Company. 
This initiative aroused anxiety that Mataram could be talked into trying to 
starve Batavia.55 The High Government believed that Hasanuddin pre-
sumed that a blockade of the northern harbours would lead to unrest in the 
Company’s possessions in the eastern quarters.56 The contact between 
Makassar and Mataram thus confirmed and actualised the High 
Government’s fear of aggressive Makassarese plans for the Spice Islands, 
“from which one most certainly should presume that the Makassarese had 
no friendly intentions towards the Company.”57 That was a euphemism. 
The real message to the Directors read that in view of a possible Makassar–
Mataram alliance, the Makassarese threat to the Company had acquired a 
new, more serious dimension, namely a threat to the Company’s posses-
sions in the Spice Islands.
Deliberating on the nature of religion in Makassar’s 
expansion efforts
The mobilisation appeal behind the anti-Company alliance was taken to lie in 
the religious division between the Company and its Muslim antagonists. 
Makassar’s religious prestige made possible a rallying of its co-religionists in 
54 “Invogen wij voor dat rijcke altos wel verdacht ende op hoede sullen dien te sijn.” December 14, 1658, 
GM 3.216.
55 “Havens voor ons weder soude sluyten om ons daermede tot necessiteyt ende hongersnoot te brengen.” 
December 14, 1658, GM 3.216.
56 “Dat sij wel weten, dat in de oosterse quartiren strackx mede ongelegentheden verorsaeckt.” December 
14, 1658, GM 3.216.
57 “waeruyt men met recht wel soude presumeren, de voors. Maccassaren van geen goet voornemen 
tegen de Compagnie.” December 14, 1658, GM 3.216.
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the archipelago against the Company. The fact that a significant Makassarese 
fleet had been sent to Mena on northern Timor to offer “protection” was but 
one example of how the political and religious dimensions were intertwined in 
Makassar’s expansionism. The population on Mena was still heathen, but the 
Makassarese initiative could be regarded as part of a more encompassing plan 
by which the Makassarese sought to secure dominance over Mena by convert-
ing the population to Islam.58
Comment
The worries over the Makassarese approach towards Mena serve well as a 
springboard to offer some comments on the High Government’s thoughts on 
the role of religion and religious prestige in Makassar’s expansion effort after 
1655. As we saw in chapter 4, the concessions made in the 1655 treaty were 
made in large part in response to Hasanuddin’s appeal to his concern for his 
co-religionists. Andaya takes this at face value, as an example of two contradic-
tory means and ends constellations: Makassar was pursuing religious and 
political prestige by, among other things, economic means, while the Company 
sought power and prestige as means to increase its profit.59
My proposition regarding the Company’s concessions is that these were 
given with the implicit understanding that Hasanuddin’s motives had to do 
with religion and prestige only. Seen from the viewpoint of power politics, 
they were insubstantial. The Company’s understanding at the time was con-
gruent with Andaya’s propositions. But in 1658, the explicit understanding 
was that the appeal to religion went hand in hand with, or was even deliber-
ately used for, political purposes. When the High Government that year 
pointed out that the Makassarese court was well known for its religious 
zeal,60 the issue of concern was clearly the ability to mobilise political and 
-military support that Makassar possessed by means of its religious prestige. 
The scenario depicted in 1658 was that the Company faced the prospect of 
war with the three largest Muslim powers in the archipelago, Mataram, 
58 “Sij haere dominie over die eylanden noch mede sullen soecken te verbreyden ende desselve, noch 
heydenen sijnde, tot de Mahumetise religie te brengen.” December 14, 1658, GM 3.216.
59 Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, 46.
60 “In hetwelck het Maccassars hoff op haere wijse vrij devoot schijnt te sijn.” December 14, 1658, GM 
3.216.
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Banten, and Makassar. Joined together in faith and purpose, these would 
represent a formidable power, both ideologically and militarily. However, in 
the 1658 text, the magnitude of the challenge of the combined forces united 
by faith is not further elaborated. This could be explained by the fact that the 
implication was more than clear enough at the outset. For my purposes, the 
relevant point is that the High Government was aware of both the twin reli-
gious and political nature of Makassarese expansion and the potential of 
using religion as a tool for political mobilisation in the archipelago, and that 
this represented a shift compared to the thinking in 1655.
The High Government’s change of view on the mix 
and hierarchy among the pursuits of power, prestige, 
and profit
Andaya’s cultural-divergence model shows an absolute dichotomy between the 
Company’s quest for influence in the Eastern Archipelago and that of the 
Makassarese: Makassar sought pride and prestige, the Company optimal trad-
ing opportunities. As I have pointed out in the analysis of the 1657 missive 
above, as well as in my analysis of the instructions from the Netherlands, there 
are reasons to believe that the preservation or restoration of prestige, both at 
the individual, personal level and for the Company as a corporate unit a role in 
political considerations both at home and in Batavia. The frequent display of 
corporate pride in rituals and ceremonies when celebrating Company suc-
cesses at Batavia is a phenomenon that comes to mind.61
A comparable, if not necessarily identical sense of “prestige” and “pride,” 
whatever its cultural particularities, likely played a part in both Batavian and 
Makassarese politics. If the Company’s politics were not free from “contamina-
tion” by non-commercial concerns, it seems unlikely that Hasanuddin’s poli-
tics were absolutely “uncontaminated” by secular concerns of profit and power. 
Such differences as there were between the Company and Makassar seem more 
appropriately explained as a divergence in “mix” and balances than by absolute 
dichotomies.
The proposition of the December 1658 missive is that Hasanuddin played 
his religious-prestige card in a game he also conceived of in terms of power 
61 See F. De Haan, Oud Batavia, 2nd ed. (Bandoeng: A.C. Nix, 1935), 135 ff.
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politics. The High Government no longer viewed the assumptions about reli-
gious concerns as purely symbolic. In 1658, Batavia acknowledged the sub-
stantive role of religion in the power politics of the Indonesian archipelago.
Concluding the analysis of the December 14, 1658 
letter: The difference of tone in the 1657 and 1658 
letters
A striking feature of the 1658 missive is that it is calm and “matter of fact” in 
tone compared to the one of December 1657. My suggestion is that the “heated” 
tone of the earlier letter reflected the then still-fresh feeling of having been 
cheated by Hasanuddin. By 1658, the assumption of Hasanuddin as a fraudu-
lent partner in diplomacy had become a premise in the High Government’s 
thinking about Makassar. After the initial “emotional blow-out” in 1657, the 
High Government went back to a cooler presentation on how to handle 
Makassar based on their new set of assumptions.
Shared characteristics of the 1656, 1657, and 1658 
missiven in contrast to that of 1655
What distinguishes the approach to Makassar in the three missiven of 1656, 
1657, and 1658 is that they originate from a perceptual framework markedly 
different from the one of 1655. Those of 1656 and 1657 made clear that the 
High Government’s preferred solution to the problems with Makassar was a 
military campaign. In the 1658, that station was already passed. Starting a war 
on Makassar was out of the question because it might help trigger a war with a 
broader anti-Company alliance. The Company reverted to a time out for tacti-
cal reasons. When in August 1658 Barra and Schuyftang were sent to obtain 
the sultan’s permission to reopen the Company’s trade in Makassar, their 
instructions were to concede to all Makassarese claims “as much as the 
Company’s prestige could suffer.”62 This does not mean that the idea of going to 
war against Makassar had been abandoned. In the 1658 setting, negotiations 
and accommodation were forced by the logic of the political situation at large. 
62 “als behoudens Compagnies reputatie eenigzins mogelijk was.” Instructions to Barra, August 20, 1657, 
in Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 58n5, taken from Van Dijk, “Borneo.”
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The purpose of Barra’s and Schuyftang’s mission was to temporarily cool down 
the situation.
Section 5: The December 16, 1659 missive: 
Reporting on Negotiations with Low Expectations
The primacy of contextual considerations
Three events mark the period January–December 1659: the sending of another 
embassy to Makassar, headed by Willem Basting, who left Batavia on February 
25; the outbreak of rebellions against Makassar by Mandars and Bugis;63 and 
the long-delayed decision to wage war on Makassar in the coming November.64 
Of these events, only the Basting mission is elaborated on in the December 16, 
1659 missive. The decision for war was not included, but the Mandar and Bugis 
rebellion was mentioned as a factor that was diverting the energy of Makassar 
court away from the Spice Islands.
The High Government did not refer to the possibility of creating an alliance 
with the Mandars and Bugis however. (Those issues would receive full atten-
tion and elaboration in the missive of December 16, 1660.) But, the section on 
Makassar in the December 1659 letter was dedicated to the Basting mission. 
This is surprising, considering that the 1659context presented a scenario in 
which the option of putting De Vlaming’s original plan of intervention was 
much more relevant than in 1658. Contributing to this was that peace had 
been concluded with Banten in July 1659.65 My proposition is that this new 
situation made the High Government ambivalent about the Basting negotia-
tions. In my analysis of the missive of December 16, 1659, I shall focus on how 
this ambivalence towards negotiations colours the High Government’s presen-
tation of it to the Directors.
The chronology of the Basting mission
On January 10, the High Government sent lengthy instructions to Barra and 
Schuyftang in Makassar, informing them of its plans to send out a negotiation 
63 Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, 48.
64 Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 62.
65 See Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.155–61.
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mission to “seek out” the possibilities for an agreement with Makassar, even 
though there was little hope of success. On February 10, the Council decided 
to send Willem Basting on this mission. He was instructed to be accommodat-
ing with respect to Makassarese damage claims, but he was to stay firm on the 
demand that the Makassarese must keep out of the Spice Islands.66 Inconclusive 
negotiation between Basting and Hasanuddin took place in Makassar on April 
1, 7, and 27.67
The chronology of the negotiations suggests that the main purpose of this 
embassy might well have been to buy time. In response to Hasanuddin’s claims 
of his contractual right to sail to the Spice Islands, Basting insisted that he had 
to confer with his superiors in Ambon before taking a decision. For his part, 
the governor of Ambon, Jacob Hustard, declared himself unauthorised to take 
a decision on the matter. Basting’s mission in Makassar ended inconclusively 
when he asked the sultan for permission to return to Batavia to discuss the 
matter and get a decision from the highest authority directly. On his return to 
Batavia on September 16, Basting gave his oral report. The crux of the problem 
remained the sultan’s insistence on his lawful right to sail to and from the east-
ern quarters.
Textual analysis
The essence of the High Government’s presentation of the 1659 negotia-
tions to the Directors was that it had stuck to an outwardly accommodating 
approach. During the negotiations, it had, for instance, let go of its initial 
claim that Hasanuddin swear by oath that once his damage claims had been 
met, he would have no further claims on the Company.68 In the fall of 1659, 
the contextual counter-arguments against war in 1658 had changed. A 
treaty of peace and friendship had been concluded with Banten on July 10, 
1659.69 Moreover, the Mataram–Makassar alliance had failed to materialise 
and relations between the two were cool until November the same year.70 
As the High Government saw it, the probability of Hasanuddin going to 
66 Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 59.
67 For this and the below on Basting’as mission, see ibid. 60–62.
68 December 16, 1659, GM 3.253.
69 Corpus diplomaticum, 2. 155-160.
70 De Graaf, 1961, 49-50.
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war alone was low. On his own, without foreign help, he was no match for 
the Company.71
The decision for new negotiations in the beginning of 1659 must be seen 
against the background of general pressure from home to avoid war, and 
because the peace with Banten had not yet been concluded.
Considering the change of context in the autumn of 1659, it is a puzzle that a 
more offensive approach was not considered. The High Government’s presenta-
tion of Basting’s report quickly kills any propositions about a possible return to 
the accommodation model. The High Government felt provoked by what it 
deemed as Hasanuddin’s contemptuous treatment of Basting. However much 
the High Government regarded its own proposals and claims to be “totally fair 
and reasonable,”72 Hasanuddin had been presenting his own desire in a “most 
disrespectful manner.”73 This, the High Government held, must lead to the con-
clusion that Hasanuddin was only looking for a pretext to declare war to have his 
way with the Company completely on his own terms, rather than seeking a 
peaceful agreement in earnest.74 The Makassarese performance had only con-
firmed the High Government’s pessimistic assumptions about Hasanuddin.
The report to the Directors on the negotiations in the December 1659 mis-
sive suggests that war as the ultimate means to finally resolve all the problems 
with Makassar was still in Batavia’s mind. If negotiations and compromise 
were forced upon the Company from an excess of caution and the still unclear 
situation in 1659, the conditions were drastically changed in the following 
year. The December 1660 missive portrays expectations of military interven-
tion as the ultimate problem-solver.
Section 6: The December 16, 1660 missive
The missive of December 16, 1660 encapsulated the period in which a new war 
with Makassar was launched and a new treaty was agreed on. It also covered a 
71 “sij allenigh sonder uytenlandts behulp tegen de Comp.e niet substisteren connen.” December 16, 
1659, GM 3.252.
72 “niet dan volcomen redelijk ende billicke sijn.” December 16, 1659, GM 3.252. 
73 “Hebbende haer begeeren oock op een seer laetdunckende wijse den commisaris bekentgemaeckt.” 
December 16, 1659, GM 3.253.
74 “Waeruyt men eerder soude mogen geloven, sij maer redenen soecken om met ons weder tot oorlogh 
te comen ofte ons t’eenmemael naer haere pijpen dansen, dan dat se van ons trachten voldaan te 
wesen.” December 16, 1659, GM 3.253.
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dramatic shift in context as a new Bugis rebellion against Makassar broke out 
in spring 1660.75 This took place after an armistice had been signed between 
the Company and Makassar, but before the final treaty had been counter-
signed. The High Government’s presentation of relations with Makassar 
reflects this shift in opportunity. Now the grand strategy was conceived of as 
the only means that could establish a lasting solution to the problems with 
Makassar. But, when this option fell with the suppression of the Bugis rebel-
lion, the High Government fell back on a return to the negotiated treaty. I shall 
analyse these shifts, and will be arguing that Batavia reverted to the latter 
option out of necessity. The lure of the ultimate solution promised by the grand 
strategy was still there.
Brief diplomatic chronology, January–December 
166076
In January and February 1660, a war fleet under the command of Major Johan 
van Dam and chief merchant Johan Truytman sailed for Makassar via Ambon. 
On June 7, they arrived at the Makassar roadstead where they engaged in a sea 
fight with the Portuguese. The Makassarese responded by hoisting the war flag. 
On June 12, Company forces succeeded in taking the strategically important 
Fort Panakkukang, south of Makassar city. With the fall of the fort, the 
Makassarese asked for an armistice, which was agreed to the next day. Two 
important conditions were set for an armistice, namely that the Makassarese 
send envoys to Batavia to sign a new treaty, and that the Company evacuate the 
fort until a final peace had been signed.
Van Dam returned in Batavia on July 17 with the Makassarese envoys, and 
negotiations started in Batavia on July 29. On August 19, a new treaty between the 
Company and Makassar was signed in Batavia. ZachariasWagenaar and Jacob Cau 
were assigned to bring the Makassarese envoys home and obtain the sultan’s coun-
tersignature. They arrived in Makassar October 13, but were not given access to 
Hasanuddin until November, when they found themselves in a different kind of 
negotiation situation than they had expected. Hasanuddin proposed radical 
75 Basset 1958, 31. 
76 The below based on Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 61–68, who in his turn draws heavily on Van Dam 
Van Ijselt, Mr. Johan van Dam en sijne tuchting van Makassar in 1660, Bijdragen, KITLV, series 7, part 
6 (1908): 16 ff.
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revisions of the Batavia text and raised new claims. Nonetheless, on December 3, 
Hasanuddin countersigned a revised version of the August 19 treaty in Makassar.
The Bugis rebellion, 1660
Hasanuddin was aware of the possibility that the Company might seek an alli-
ance with rebellious Bugis.77 Already in February, he had started consolidating 
Bugis commitment to the defence of the realm, calling in troops from his vassal 
states as well. In June 1660, he called in manpower to build fortifications for the 
defence of the capital.78 The beginning of the Bugis rebellion can be dated to 
August 7, when the Bugis in Makassar, some ten thousand of them, decided to 
return to their homeland because of excessive burdens laid on them in conjunc-
tion with the war.79 Once returned, they reorganised themselves to rebel against 
Makassarese overlordship. Hasanuddin on his side raised forces to bring them 
back into the fold, but it was not until the beginning of October that the rebellion 
was quelled.80 It is worth noting that the Makassarese envoys to Batavia sailed at 
the beginning of the Bugis rebellion and before serious fighting had broken out. 
The beginning of the negotiations for the Countersignature in Makassar started 
before the outcome of the rebellion was clear, whereas the actual countersigna-
ture of the treaty took place when the rebellion had been quelled.
Topics and issues in the missive December 16, 1660
Stapel comments on a divergence in the historiography regarding the High 
Government’s instructions to Van Dam.81 Valentijn has it that Van Dam was 
instructed to negotiate before engaging in actions of war. Stapel however, sub-
scribes to Van Ijselt’s version,82 which holds that Van Dam was instructed to 
immediately open attack after having rescued the three remaining Company 
servants still residing in Makassar.83 There is all the reason to support the lat-
ter’s view. Searching for the possibility of a negotiated solution before acting 
77 Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, 48.
78 Ibid. 48, referring to Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 65–66.
79 Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, 49.
80 Ibid. 50.
81 Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 63-64.
82 Ibid. 64, referring to Van Dam van Ijselt.
83 Ibid. 64.
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was what one would have expected according to standard procedure.84 But 
because Hasanuddin still stood by his claims in the Eastern Archipelago, the 
standard procedure no longer applied. The General letter of December 16, 
1660, bears witness to that. The High Government’s basic preoccupation now 
was how to cripple Makassar both politically and militarily so that it would no 
longer pose a threat to the Company. In the period between the sending off of 
the Makassarese for the signature of a treaty in Batavia and their return for 
countersignature in Makassar, the Bugis rebellion had made it seem that De 
Vlaming’s plan could be executed, but after the defeat of the Bugis, conditions 
returned to “normal.”
The contextual imprint in the December 16, 1660 
missive on Makassar—and the slide from realism 
towards cynicism
If the tactical options of the Bugis and Mandar rebellion in 1659 were not yet 
commented upon in the missive of December that year, in the following year 
they were dealt with in full. The topic in this section is how the High 
Government presented this situation in the Missive of December 1660.
With the Bugis uprising in August 1660 and its final repression by the 
Makassarese in early October, the missive of December 1660 covered a period 
of two diametrically opposite contexts as far as Batavia’s strategic options 
towards Makassar were concerned. The Bugis-rebellion revived plans for ally-
ing with the rebels to solve the problem of Makassar by intervening militarily 
on the side of the Bugis. The “grand strategy” fiercely rejected by Maetsuyker 
and the Council in 1655 now popped up again, expanded to involve a total 
restructuring of the political landscape of South Sulawesi. But in October, 
when it was clear that the Bugis stood to lose, there was a reversion back to the 
negotiation approach. This was a totally pragmatic shift. The advocacy for 
negotiation was mixed with speculation about the inevitability of a new war in 
which the opportunity to implement the grand strategy might well present 
itself again. The change in meaning of “negotiations” in the 1660 policy recom-
mendations may be characterised as an explication of a glide from a realistic to 
an outright cynical understanding of it.
84 Compare for instance the procedure in 1654, See chapter 5.
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Textual analyses, the December 16, 1660 missive on 
Makassar: Defending the decision to go to war
The section on Makassar in the December 16, 1660 missive starts, not unex-
pectedly, with a ritual assurance that the Company’s possessions in Ambon 
and Banda were now both duly protected and secured against Makassarese 
intrusion.85 The High Government immediately went on to defend its decision 
to go to war against Makassar. This should have given ample opportunity to 
legitimate it in terms of international law.
It was an opportunity neglected. The defence of the decision for war was 
accorded one paragraph only, and the argument for it was exclusively contex-
tual: At the time of the decision it was considered that either Batavia or 
Makassar would start a war; and it was deemed that it had better be the 
Company as “the time seemed right.86 The “right time” in this context is best 
translated as “availing oneself of the window of opportunity.” The viability of 
the option was judged by opportunity, not by law. In other words, the High 
Government’s rationale for going to war reflected nothing more than raison 
d’état thinking brought overseas, pure and simple. That this was the dominant 
mode of thinking is further illustrated by the High Government’s explanation 
of favourable conditions for successful intervention.
Advocating the grand strategy
With the outbreak of the Bugis rebellion in August, a Company alliance 
with them and others chafing under Makassarese authority, of which there 
were plenty, to overthrow the present regime was presented as highly real-
istic.87 The prospect of toppling Hasanuddin’s regime by joining forces with 
local rebels was even more alluring because it opened a window of oppor-
tunity for dealing a crippling blow to Makassar’s politico-military power. It 
would reorganise the political structure of South Sulawesi in such a way as 
85 “De waardevolle provincie Amboina is royaal van alles voorzien, zo van 700 soldaten w.o. voor Banda, 
en dat wegens Makassar, waartegens overal dient gewaakt.” Dececember 16, 1660, GM 3.314.
86 “hebben dan geraden geacht beeter te sijn, wij selfst eerst op waren ende trachten…Indien het de tijt 
noch veelen conde, haer in haer eygen landtbodem te vallen.” December 16, 1660, GM 3.318.
87 “Op hoope soodanig dese ende gene gemisconteerden (wie daer veele sijn) mochten gaende werden 
om de wapenen beneffens ons tegen de presente monerchale regeringe mede op te nemen.” December 
16, 1660, GM 3.318.
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to dethrone Makassar as a hegemon and reduce it to only one among many 
powers on the island: “Makassar’s might and power could be broken or 
kept in check for the foreseeable future by dividing the realm into smaller 
entities, such as had been the case before the Makassarese expansion88. 
This was how the Company’s “promised land” of political order in South 
Sulawesi was envisioned: divide et impera. It was also an unofficial endorse-
ment of De Vlaming’s plan of 1655.
Comment
Despite its hardly concealed optimism for a final resolution of the “Makassar 
problem,” the call for implementing the “grand strategy” was remarkably calm 
considering the dramatic measures it proposed. Not only a direct military 
intervention, but a role for the Company in the construction of a new political 
order was implied. But with the Makassarese defeat of the Bugis in October, 
the scheme was put aside for the time being.
Policy preferences fluctuating as to information about 
context
Van Dam returned to Batavia with the Makassarese negotiators on July 17,89 
and the Bugis rebellion did not break out until August, so at the time of con-
cluding the negotiations in Batavia, the High Government either did not know 
of it, or, if it did, felt bound to go through with the process of negotiations now 
that they had started. Reflections on the option of implementing the more 
tempting grand strategy must have taken place sometime between the conclu-
sion of the treaty in Batavia on August 19 and the sending of the Wagenaar-
Cau mission for countersignature in Makassar on October 13. On the other 
hand, there is evidence that Cau contacted the Bugis to seek out the possibility 
of an alliance as late as in November.90 It is improbable that Cau would have 
undertaken this without prior consent or instructions from the High 
88 “Mitsgaders deselve trachten te destrueren ende het gemelte rijck weder onder verscheyde cleyne sou-
vereyne Coningjens verdelt te helpen Sooals hetselve voor desen geweest is. December 16, 1660, GM 
3.318.
89 Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 66.
90 Ibid. 67.
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Government. When the Bugis were finally defeated, however, the only realistic 
option left was to go through with the treaty agreed upon with Hasanuddin.
Comment
What is striking about the 1660 negotiations for counter-signature of the treaty 
signed in Batavia on August 19 is that it represented a “double play” in the sense 
that Batavia was negotiating for a treaty while at the same time searching for pos-
sibilities to overthrow its treaty partner. This might be indicative of the fact that 
negotiations had been “devaluated” to purely tactical devices to be reverted to as 
long as the grand strategy could not be carried out. Moreover, the Company in 
the first place had signed a treaty, which meant it had to be honoured. Then 
again, that was as far as the legal considerations went. More important is that if 
the High Government seems to have been ambivalent about whether to proceed 
with the treaty or search for opportunities for an alliance with the Bugis rebels in 
the late autumn, this should be regarded as a turn towards a cynical interpreta-
tion of the diplomatic interaction with Makassar. That turn was not at all legally 
dogmatic, simply contextually pragmatic.
In the final paragraph of the section on Makassar in the December 1660 mis-
sive, the subtext clearly reveals that the High Government at the end of the day 
placed its bet on another war with Makassar. The section ends by stating that the 
Makassarese had regained their spirit and started to rebuild their military 
strength,91 but that under the circumstances, there was not much the High 
Government could do about it.”92 This reads like regret for a lost opportunity, but 
it also reads as an implicit hope that such an opportunity would present itself 
again soon, even if that meant bending the terms of the newly signed treaty.
Bending treaty agreements on Fort Panakkukang in 
the hope of implementing the grand strategy
One of the terms of the August 19 treaty in Batavia was that the Company could 
hold on to Fort Panakkukang until the treaty had been countersigned in 
91 December 16, 1660, GM 3.318.
92 “Sulcx het schijnt, offer bij dusdanige gelegenheyt door ons niet veel op te doen soude sijn.” December 
16, 1660, GM 3.319.
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Makassar.93 With a view to the prospect of another local uprising against 
Makassar, this ruling was bent to give room for a devious plan. By holding on to 
the fort the longest possible, the High Government reasoned that the Company 
might well be able to inspire a new rebellion. Holding on to the fort was thus of 
strategic importance if an opportunity for intervention in an internal conflict 
should arise in future. Also, the longer the Dutch held the fort, the more Makassar 
would lose respect, already on the wane, from its subject people.94 The implica-
tion was clear enough: loss of respect meant a higher  probability for another 
revolt. It was explained in the following manner: no one could know what the 
“hot-headed” Bugis would do if the Makassarese tried to regain the fort and were 
unsuccessful.95 In short, what the High Government proposed was to bend the 
terms of the treaty to recreate favourable conditions for the implementation of 
the grand strategy. However much it may have paid heed to international law, 
whatever the Company’s insistence on pacta sunt servanda, the High 
Government’s perception of treaty making with Makassar in 1660 must be char-
acterised as cynical power politics applied to local, overseas conditions, rather 
than an uncritical import of European legal formalism.
Comments
In my view, the position of the High Government towards Makassar as pre-
sented to the Directors in the missive of December 16, 1660, represents what 
can be regarded as the culmination of a downward spiral into cynicism after 
the breakdown of the order created by the 1655 treaty. Military victory increas-
ingly came to be regarded a far more attractive means of solving the Company’s 
otherwise intractable problems with Makassar, and it was only the lack of 
favourable local conditions that spoke against it. Such conditions arose briefly 
in 1660, but entanglements barred Batavia from taking full advantage of the 
resulting opportunity.
The temptation to make use of the Bugis rebellion as the springboard for 
launching the grand strategy in 1660 must understood as preconditioned in a 
93 August 19, 1660, treaty, art. 25, Corpus Diplomaticum 2.176.
94 “Conde het wel sijn, wij reputatieushalve de voorsz. Vestinge noch voor een wijle tijt bleven in behou-
den … De vrees van de omliggende volken voor dat rijck (Makassar) is gedaald.” December 16, 1660, 
GM 3.319.
95 “Wat veranderingh hetselve in de keeteloorige Boegesen soude veroorsacken mogen.” December 16, 
1660, GM 3.319.
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decreasing trust in Hasanuddin as a reliable partner after 1655. The loss of 
trust hardened the belief in the war option as the favoured means of bringing 
him to heel. With that came a more cynical view of “negotiations” and “con-
tracts” as second-best options.
Section 7: The Missiven of January 26 and 
December 22, 1661: The grand strategy in a novel 
design
One of the clauses of the 1660 treaty stated that the Portuguese had to leave 
Makassar within a year.96 The English stayed put, however, and filled much the 
same function that the Portuguese had done. How to solve this problem? “We 
lean towards the opinion,” stated the High Government to the Directors in the 
missive of January 26, 1661, that “as long as we can’t keep the English from sailing 
to enemy places, we will be better off continuing the war with Makassar than 
making peace.”97 Following the conclusion of the 1660 treaty, the High 
Government came to take an ambiguous attitude towards the grand strategy as 
the ultimate solution to the conflict with Makassar, based on pragmatic consid-
erations. On the one hand the Company’s strengthened commercial position, 
and especially the expulsion of the Portuguese, gave way to a kind of thinking 
that the expulsion clause would suffice as the basis for entrenching the Company’s 
power and influence in Makassar. At the same time, remnants of the original 
grand strategy survived in the form whereby the Company’s new commercial 
position could serve as a basis for Company dominance over Makassar. This 
ambiguity is demonstrated in the missive of December 22, 1661.
The plans for the post-1660 commercial regime and 
its political implications
The missive of December 22, 1661 may be read as a temporary return to the 
accommodationist line. It stated that the High Government would “as far as 
96 December 2, 1660, treaty, unnumbered clause 7, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.178.
97 “van gevoelen sijn dat als ‘t niet en ware om de Engelsen, en dat wij deselve niet mogen verhinderen op 
vijantlijcke plaetsen te varen, het voor de Comp.e al soo dienstich soude wesen met Mqacassar in oor-
logh te continueren dan vrede te maecken.” January 26, 1661, GM 3.367.
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possible take care not to provoke, but rather please the sultan.”98 In particular, 
one had to relieve him of any notion that the expulsion of the Portuguese 
would lead to commercial strangulation of Makassar.99 The latter point 
explained the choice of accommodation. It must be seen as a tactical device to 
make Hasanuddin comply with the expulsion clause of the 1660 treaty.
But the High Government also presented the exclusion of the Portuguese as 
the first step of a broader plan to gain a commercial monopoly in Makassar. 
The catch was that to succeed the High Government had to play its cards 
shrewdly. To make commercial dependence on the Company more palatable, 
assurances had to be made to the sultan that the Company would provide even 
more cloth and other items than had hitherto been brought to Makassar by the 
Portuguese.100 The High Government also had to guarantee that there would 
still be room for local Makassarese commercial interests.101
Comments
These concessions were made so as not to suffocate the local economy of 
Makassar and were directly linked to the plan of replacing the Portuguese 
in foreign trade by the Company. The plans for the Company’s enhanced 
commercial position in Makassar can thus be seen as a part of the grand 
strategy of political domination by economic means. The High Government 
only implicitly revealed the political aspect of its commercial grand strat-
egy. But when it stated that by occupying the role of chief provider of 
Makassar’s imports, it was clear that the Company would in due course 
drive out both the English and the local Moorish traders.102 By depriving 
Makassar of commercial partners and tying the sultanate commercially to 
the Company, the Company was also isolating Makassar from potential 
allies against the Company.
98 “Maer om sijn gem. Hooghheyt sooveel doenel. tegenmoet te comen.” December 22, 1661, GM 3.376.
99 “De apprehensie, die hij van Macassars ondergangck sij hebbende te doen verdwijnen.” December 22, 
1661, GM 3.376.
100 “Het lant van Macassar nu wat meerder van alle hande lijwaten ende andere getrockene waren te voor-
sien als voor desen.” December 22, 1661, GM 3.376.
101 “ende daermede wat neering in de stadt te maken.” December 22, 1661, GM 3.376.
102 “ende sal hetselve meteene dienen om de Engelsen en de Mooren mettertijt mede te doen verhuysen.” 
December 22, 1661, GM 3.376.
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The accommodation advocated was no more than a tactical device to 
make the plan work. It simply required some co-operation from the sultan, 
and his co-operation in its turn required obtaining his goodwill. One of the 
proposed means of easing his worries was, as we saw above, to convince 
him of the advantages of co-operating commercially with the Company. 
Another was to obtain his goodwill by buying him off. To give a better 
“grip” on the Company’s takeover of Makassar’s foreign trade the High 
Government thus decided to give the sultan a substantial gift, to the value 
of around 20000 guilders, in order to “soothe his losses” and “ease his 
bitterness.”103
Summing up
The December 1661 tactics towards Makassar reflected adaptations to the 
 context after the Bugis rebellion had been quelled. Prospects for a war in com-
bination with an internal uprising had waned, and the High Government had 
to work with what they had obtained in the 1660 treaty. Of primary impor-
tance in the treaty was that it guaranteed—in writing, anyway—that the 
Portuguese would leave Makassar. That opened the opportunity for the 
Company to drive all unwanted third parties out. To make that happen, the 
Company had to act with courtesy and accommodation towards the sultan.
In essence the High Government’s strategy as spelled out in the missive of 
December 22, 1661 was that a commercial monopoly would do double duty by 
securing both the Company’s commercial and its political position in Makassar. 
In that strategy, war was redundant. A dominant position for the Company 
over Makassar would be secured by the sultanate’s commercial dependence on 
the Company. In this sense, the 1661 plan represented an alternative to the 
grand strategy based on military intervention. At the same time, it implicitly 
represented a plan that would place Makassar in category 2 of the 1650 instruc-
tion, if the other European nations were expelled too. In this latter aspect, the 
commercial takeover plan was but a variant of the original grand strategy by 
contractual commercial means.
103 “ende om hetselve noch wat meer klem te geven soo is oock verstaen Sijn gem. Hoockheyt dit eerste 
iaer tot versoetinge van sijn schade ende om het ongenoegen weg te nemen, toe te senden een aensi-
enel. Schekagie, begroot 20000 gl. of daeromtrent.” December 22, 1661, GM 3.376.
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Chapter Conclusion
I have included the High Government’s plan of 1661 of establishing a viable 
interaction regime by commercial dependence because it succinctly illustrates 
the range of tactical options deliberated and advocated by the High Government 
in the period after the signing of the 1655 treaty and in the immediate after-
math of the signing of the 1660 treaty. When there were fluctuations in per-
spectives on particular points of policy, these can generally be accounted for by 
changes in appreciation of the contextual constrictions and opportunities 
encompassing the wider world of insular Southeast Asia. Flexibility by consid-
erations of context, in other words, was the basic principle in the High 
Government’s policy planning. Principles of law mattered less, if at all. The 
former went with a pragmatic approach, the latter with a dogmatic one. In 
general, pragmatism reigned supreme.
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Learning to contract, 1: 
From contractual regulations 
of interaction towards 
construction of a relational 
regime 1637–1660
Section 1: Chapter introduction
Topic
The topic of this chapter is the nature and dynamics of the High Government’s 
treaty making with Makassar between 1637 and 1660. The relevant contracts 
include in addition to those of 1637 and 1655, already analysed, also the one 
agreed on in Batavia August 1660. The ones concluded in Makassar in 
November 1667 and the March 1668 treaty with Tello will be treated in the 
subsequent chapter. Of the three treaties treated in this chapter, the one of 
August 1660 will be given priority. The 1637 and 1655 contracts will primarily 
be referred to for comparative purposes.
Propositions
According to Andaya, the 1655 treaty marks a deviation from the norm of 
Eurocentrism in the Company’s treaty making with Makassar.1 The other 
contracts, and especially that of November 1667, except for certain 
1 Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions,” 287.
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superficial local imprints, still conform to a Eurocentric norm that was 
incomprehensible to the locals.2 I have already discussed and rejected 
Andaya’s proposition about absolute incomprehension. In this and the fol-
lowing chapter, I shall reject Andaya’s proposition about the Eurocentric 
nature of the Company’s contractual record with Makassar. I shall instead 
argue that, in both form and content, the contracts from 1637 to 1668 were 
primarily marked by assumptions and considerations about local conditions. 
All these contracts were designed to meet the Company’s needs as local con-
ditions and the situation regarding relations with Makassar were perceived at 
the time. That is my general proposition about the overseas nature of these 
contracts. Second, I shall also be arguing that Andaya’s notion of the inertia 
of the Company’s approach towards treaty making, or to be more precise, its 
fixity to the European model of treaty is simply misleading. There was a 
dynamic, and the direction of that dynamic was towards increasing adapta-
tion of the treaty to the local context and situation. This was not an even 
process however.
Continuities and breaks in the dynamics of treaty 
making
If we seek to establish phases in the Company’s needs and perceptions, the 
period following the 1655 treaty could regarded as marking a break between 
two distinct phases. Up to and including the 1655 treaty, the dominant view in 
Batavia was that forcing the Company into a privileged position in Makassar 
was unrealistic. After the 1655 treaty had proved unproductive, the option of 
forcing or luring Makassar into a dependent position became, as we saw in 
chapter 5, more and more attractive to the High Government. Although the 
four contracts of 1637, 1655, 1660, and 1667 can in one sense be regarded as a 
relay-race of contracts written from diverging perceptions of the situation on 
the ground, and with diverging political ambitions for the contracts, there is 
also good reason to point to the August 1660 treaty as a break in this 
chronology.
I argue below that the notion and meaning of “treaty” underwent a change 
after 1655. The meaning of “treaty” in 1637 and 1655 carried far more passive 
2 Ibid. 289.
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connotations than the one of 1660. The two former contracts carried a concep-
tualisation of “treaty” as “agreed rules of the game to be adhered to”—whereas 
the latter ones held far more active connotations, namely “treaty” understood 
as something to be “worked with to construct an optimal interaction order.” 
The change signalled a move towards a constructivist view of a treaty as a poli-
tical instrument. It goes without saying that if the contracts were made with an 
eye to the local situation, the turn towards a more political, constructivist view 
of treaty meant a sharpening of this focus.
Plan of exposition
My emphasis in this chapter is on the August 1660 treaty, but I start the discus-
sion with a comparison of the 1637 and 1655 contracts to corroborate my 
point that they can both be seen as contracts aimed at regulating by rules. I 
then turn to an analysis of the political constructivist contract of 1660. All the 
analyses are based on the texts in Heeres’ Corpus Diplomaticum.
Section 2: A recapitulation of the 1637 and 1655 
treaties as “soft” treaties
The context for the treaty making in 1637 and 1655 was different, but not 
 fundamentally so. In 1637, the Company had come to Makassar to open 
 relations with a strategic view to ending smuggling and protecting its posses-
sions in the Spice Islands.3 The 1655 treaty was concluded in the aftermath of 
a war that had been fought for the same reasons.
As for the contents of the two contracts, the major difference lay in the dif-
ferent role that religion was accorded in the later treaty, and the concessions 
that allowed for continued contact between Makassar and the Spice Islands.
The appeal to religion in the 1655 treaty was made because of the sultan’s 
self-professed commitment to his co-religionists outside Makassar, whereas in 
1637 the issue of runaways and converts were treated as issues of bilateral inte-
raction and accordingly formulated in terms of symmetrical, reciprocal 
 obligations.4 The 1637 treaty simply stated that the sultan obliged himself to 
3 See chapter 4.
4 See chapter 4.
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return Company runaways while the Company committed itself to do the 
same with Makassarese runaways.5 The issue of religious worship was stated as 
a general agreement on the free right to worship according to one’s own tradi-
tion. Both the Company and Makassar were “allowed to practise their respec-
tive religion without any constrictions on either side.”6 I have argued above 
that the acceptance of the concessions in the 1655 treaty might well have had 
to do with the pressure from the Directors for peace, but that it might also 
reflect the belief that the Makassarese after defeat in the war would now honour 
their treaty obligations. I have also argued that the willingness to accept the 
concessions at the time might have had to do with a cultural assumption that 
Sultan Hasanuddin was preoccupied with prestige and symbolic aspects of 
religion, and that the concessions on religion were inconsequential to the issue 
of political interference.
The 1637 and 1655 treaties: Different, but still two 
of a kind
Admittedly, the Company may have achieved more in the treaty of 1637 than 
in 1655, but regarding the 1655 treaty as a sell-out seems unwarranted. 
Although it contained concessions that later proved to be loopholes, by arti-
cle 8, confirming the Company’s monopoly rights, the High Government 
obtained what it must have considered its primary diplomatic target at the 
time. For after all, the treaty contained Makassarese recognition and a com-
mitment to respect the Company’s privileged position in the Spice Islands. 
Other concessions were insignificant compared to this vital issue. It thus 
seems proper to regard the 1655 treaty as a special, but still typical product 
of the dominating frame of diplomatic thinking in Batavia at the time. Based 
as this approach was on confidence in Hasanuddin’s intentions to stick to his 
obligations, concessions could be conceded. As I have pointed out in chapter 
5, this assumption of trust radically disappeared in the first years after the 
signing of the 1655 treaty.
5 “dat bij aldien eenige Nederlanders op Maccassar quamen wegh te loopen, desselve aen haer meesters 
weder ter handt stellen sullen, gelijck ook eenige Maccassaren bij de Nederlanders also overcomende, 
aen Zijne Maij.t restitueeren moeten.” 1637 treaty, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.305.
6 “dat ijder zijn geloff zall vrij hebben, sonder daer in eenighsints gecontringeerdt te warden.” 1637 
treaty, Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.305.
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I find there to be a distinctive difference between the contracts signed before 
and after 1655. In the 1637 and 1655 contracts, the voices and viewpoints of 
Sultan Alauddin and Sultan Hasanuddin, respectively, are quite distinct. Many 
of the rulings are phrased as regulations of what the Company was allowed. In 
this sense, the 1637 and 1655 contracts are distinguished as agreements by 
which the Company partly had to take what it had been forced to accept in 
negotiations. In 1637, this happened by rephrasing through negotiations. In 
1655, the concessions were thought compensated by a single article protecting 
the Company’s basic interests. The texts of the August 1660 and November 
1667 contracts, on the other hand, bear a quite different stamp, because they 
present detailed prescriptions for an interaction regime that was meant to 
serve and protect the Company’s interests. This signals that in the post-1655 
framework, the “treaty” was turned into something of a constructivist, politi-
cal instrument. This change did not represent a return to a Eurocentric model 
of treaty making. It represented an intensification of the overseas contextual 
approach.
Section 3: The switch to contractual 
constructivism: The dual nature of the 1660 
Treaty
Section introduction: Topic and propositions
The August 1660 treaty comprised twenty-seven articles covering all subjects 
from the status and position of Ambon and Banda, the role of Makassar and 
the Company in the regional interaction order, to the expulsion of the 
Portuguese and the mode of enforcing this, the handling of miscellaneous 
damage claims, and decisions on tariffs. It was thus a far more encompassing 
treaty both in size and scope than the earlier ones.
Treaty making as political construction would come to full maturity only in 
the treaty of November 18, 1667; but the treaty of August 1660 represented a 
turn in this direction. It also demonstrated an increased drive towards formu-
lating the treaty clauses more specifically and concretely.
These turns in the August 1660 treaty were not a shift to a European stan-
dard brought overseas. The change in treaty making had to do with the shift in 
expectations towards Makassar as a trustworthy signatory. The aim of this 
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chapter is to demonstrate how this shift towards contractual constructivism 
was reflected in the contents and formulations of the post 1655 treaties, star-
ting with the break represented by the August 1660 treaty, and ending with the 
treaties establishing Company hegemony in 1667 and 1668.
Plan of exposition
In demonstrating the contextual imprint in the form and nature of the August 
1660 treaty, I shall be concentrating on the Makassarese traffic to the Moluccas, 
and the issue of the expulsion of the Portuguese. In conjunction with the latter 
issue, I shall analyse the implicit Company invitation to the Makassarese to ally 
against the Portuguese, which I take to be typical of the political construction 
aspect of treaty making. At the end of the chapter, I shall briefly point to the 
changes that were made during the countersigning of the August 1660 treaty 
in Makassar in December.
Section 4: Textual analysis of the 
August 1660 treaty
A treaty to be honoured, make no mistake about it
The concluding paragraph of the August 1660 treaty notes that this is a treaty 
of sincere “peace and friendship” that should be “observed and honoured.”7 
The point on treaty observation was further amplified in the section on the 
ratification procedure. The treaty was first to be signed by the governor-gene-
ral and Council and the Makassarese envoys in Batavia, and then by envoys 
from the High Government and the sultan in Makassar “to secure that all the 
points be strictly honoured.”8 In the concluding oath swearing, the “one and 
only almighty and righteous God” was called upon as the final witness9 that the 
treaty was “agreed and confirmed.”10 Compared to the 1637 and 1655 treaties, 
the general binding nature of the treaty was thus particularly explicated in the 
7 “gehouden en geobserveerdt worden.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 27, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.176.
8 “In alle bovenstaende poincten des te religieuser magh onderhouden worden.” August 19, 1660 treaty, 
art. 27, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.176.
9 “met aenroepinghe van de allderheijlighste name van den eenigen allmaghtigen ende reghtveerdigen 
Godt.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 27, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.176.
10 “bevesstight en geconfirmeerdt.” August 19, 1660, treaty, art. 27, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.176.
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August 1660 treaty.11 This was a constituent factor in the formulations of the 
individual articles, too.
Reconstructing the political regime: 1—Limiting 
Makassarese claims of sovereignty outside Makassar 
to secure the Company’s interests in the Moluccas 
(articles 1, 2, and 3)
The three first paragraphs of the August 1660 treaty were all concerned with 
delimiting Makassar’s influence and rejecting its claims of sovereignty outside 
South Sulawesi. First, the king of Makassar was not to interfere with Buton or 
territories belonging to it.12 The reason given was that these territories were 
“lands belonging to the king of Ternate.”13 The same went for Menado: The 
sultan was obliged to withdraw all claims of sovereignty as these areas “from 
old belonged” to the king of Ternate.14 The sultan also had to set aside all claims 
to and stop all interference with Tidore and Batjan,15 and recognise “their lands 
and people to be included in the treaty.”16 The latter meant recognition of their 
autonomy as guaranteed by the Company.
Comment: Idioms of “sovereignty” in articles 1, 2, 
and 3 and diplomatic mode
The political arrangement in the three first articles was aimed at cutting bonds 
between Makassar and former allies and converting the latter into a “security” 
ring of independent Company-friendly states around Makassar itself.17 The 
diplomatic means to achieve this was to have Makassar recognise the 
11 The July 26, 1637 treaty placed no emphasis on its binding nature; see Corpus Diplomaticum, 1.303 ff. 
Only the December 28, 1655 treaty was wederzijts onverbreeckelijck; Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.84.
12 “dat de Coninck van Maccassar moghte szijn volck haer voortaen niet en sullen bemoeijen met 
Butonoffte landen ende plaetsen daeronder behorende.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 1.1, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.171.
13 “als zijnde de eijgen landen van de Coninck Mandarhahha van Ternaten.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 1, 
Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.171.
14 “ook van outs hefft toegekomen.” August 19, 1660 Treaty, art. 2, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.171
15 August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 2, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.171.
16 “Tijdor ende Bachan met hare landen ende onderdaenen des begeerende mede in dese vrede begrepen 
zullen zijn.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 3, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.171.
17 This was what was finally formalised in the 1667 treaty, see below.
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“autonomy” of these states and the “sovereignty” of their rulers. As for how they 
incorporated it in the treaty, neither the legal technical terms “sovereignty” nor 
“autonomy” were used. The terms were the more general “belonging to” or “lands 
of,” and the mode of legitimation was by reference to historical tradition, “from 
old”. rather than law. In neither of these cases should we propose that the 
Company’s treaty idioms were drawn from a specifically or even typical European 
tradition of international law. Appeal to local diplomatic tradition is a more apt 
description in so far as it was the local historical tradition and power relations 
that the Company referred to in legitimising the new political order. Both means 
and modes were adopted in the November 18, 1667 treaty.
Issue: Ambon, the Spice Islands—banning 
interference and restricting sailing rights 
(articles 4 and 5)
The ban on Makassarese sailings to Ambon, made in article 4, was put in abso-
lute terms, and made without any qualification. In contrast to what had been 
the case in 1655, in 1660 there were to be no exceptions whatsoever. The article 
stated that “those representing the government of Makassar from now on and 
in the future, should not interfere in the affairs of Ambon, nor bother themsel-
ves with complaints coming from the Ambonese, under whatever pretext it 
might be whatsoever.”18 The latter formulation of “pretext” held an implicit, but 
nonetheless obvious, reference to the loopholes in the 1655 treaty. Not only did 
this article do away with the 1655 concessions, but it also gave a barely concea-
led retort that the High Government now saw Hasanuddin’s appeal to religion 
in 1655 as tactical rather than spiritual.
The barring of Makassarese influence in Ambon was made even more water-
tight by the demand that Makassar officially recognise the Company and king of 
Ternate as the “rightful overlords”19 of Ambon. Thus, Makassar also recognised 
that the Company and Ternate were rightfully entitled to defend and protect 
18 “dat die vande regeringe van Makassar van nu voortaan haer niet sullen bemoeijen offte in eenigen 
delen aenmatigen eenige saecken offte claghten der Amboijnesen onder wat onder pretext het ook 
zouden mogen wesen.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 4, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.171.
19 “wettige souverainen.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 4, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2. 171.
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Ambon.20 Finally, the area of Ambonese overlordship was defined by naming 
each island of the domain.21 Even so, these seemingly watertight treaty formula-
tions were not considered sufficient in and of themselves. Sanctions for breaking 
the regulations were specified, too. This was done in article 5. A break in the 
sailing ban by subjects or inhabitants22 of Makassar, including people from 
Banda, would be met by either killing or enslaving the perpetrators.23 Vessels and 
goods were to be confiscated24 without protest by the Makassarese.25
Comments: A further turn towards treaty formulations 
in the concrete and specific
The regulation on sailings to the Moluccas in the August 1660 treaty conveyed 
a “no-nonsense, no-compromise” insistence that was more encompassing and 
radical than in the 1637 treaty,26 and stood in stark contrast to the 1655 treaty, 
in which the ban was formulated as a request.27 The particularities of the 
August 1660 treaty did not represent a return to European legal thinking or 
terminology. Neither article 4 nor 5 was phrased in “subtle” juridical termino-
logy. The Company’s and Ternate’s joint sovereignty over Ambon was simply 
stated, the area was concretely defined, and sanctions for trespassing were like-
wise clearly and specifically stated.
Securing and protecting the Company’s monopoly in 
the Spice Islands (articles 6 -9)
Articles 6 to 9 were all dedicated to safeguarding the Company’s monopoly in 
the Moluccas in general. Article 6 concerned the handling of smugglers who 
20 “daer met sullen laten omspringen ende gewerden.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 4, Corpus Diplomaticum, 
2.171.
21 August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 4, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.171.
22 “onderdanen offte inwoonderen.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 5, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.172.
23 “doot geslagen off tot lijffeigenen gemaackt.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 5, Corpus Diplomaticum, 
2.172.
24 “verbeurte van de vaertuijgen en goederen.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 5, Corpus Diplomaticum, 
2.172.
25 “zonder dat die van Makassar het zellve sullen aentrecken.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 5, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.172.
26 None of the repetitions or linguistic “safeguards” of “none whatsoevers” etc. were for instance, present 
in the 1637 treaty.
27 Art. 8, of the 1655 treaty.
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had successfully brought their illicit goods into Makassar. In such cases, the 
authorities28 in Makassar were held responsible for punishing the smugglers29 
themselves or handing them over to the Company.30 At the root of these sanc-
tions lay the familiar device of the sailing pass system, treated in article 7, 
which stated that Makassarese authorities were to deny anyone not in posses-
sion of a pass the right to enter and trade. Perpetrators had to be handed over 
directly to the Company.31 Article 8 added no new provisions, but simply defi-
ned what products were considered contraband. The government of Makassar 
was not to tolerate any import or trading in the Company’s monopoly pro-
ducts: cloves, nutmeg and mace, but should punish perpetrators in the hars-
hest way, regardless of where they might have obtained their goods.32
The uncompromising and insistent tone in the formulation of the goods 
enumerated in article 8 was supplemented by legitimising the Company’s 
monopoly as a blessing from God. The formulation went that the Company 
had now come to possess all the respective spices of the Eastern Archipelago 
“by the blessings of God.”33 At the heart of this formulation was possibly a 
similar “conceptualisation” of God’s blessings of the Company’s endeavour 
that we encountered in the mobilising appeals of the General Instructions.34 
But this might also be interpreted as a rebuttal to Hasanuddin’s appeal for 
concessions by appeal to his religious authority in 1655. In any case, in the 
August 1660 treaty, setting the reference may simply be read as: End of dis-
cussion, or, to be more precise: “Any discussion about qualifications is futile 
on this point.” 
Art. 9, was a two-part article, dealing with both the Company’s conflict with 
Makassar over its monopoly rights in the Moluccas but also with the exclusion of 
the Portuguese from Makassar. I shall deal with the former first. A complementary 
28 “Die van de Regeeringe.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 6, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.172.
29 “Lorrendrayers.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 6, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.172.
30 “gehouden wesen … te straffen off aen de Compagnie te leveren.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 6, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.172.
31 “zonder zeebrieven van de Comp.e varende in Maccassar vermogen, (gene) haven offte negotie te 
verleenen, maer zullen gehouden wesen aen de Comp.e over te leveren.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 7, 
Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.172.
32 “de contraventariers rigoureuselijck sullen gestrafft worden, van waer dessellve die ook sullen mogen 
gehaellt offte becomen hebben.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 8, Heeres, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.172.
33 “Dewijl de Compie de nagelen, nooten ende foelie door de zegen Godes nu allen onder haer gewellt 
heft.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 8, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.172.
34 See chapter 3.
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protection against Makassarese infringement on the Company’s monopoly in the 
Moluccas was given by restricting the legitimate legal trading area of the 
Makassarese. They were not to extend their present trading activities, nor settle 
further east than Solor and Timor and their surroundings.35 By way of illustrating 
how the High Government’s policy had changed in 1660, one should remember 
that it had at one point considered surrendering Timor to the Portuguese 
altogether.36
Comment: constructing a defence for the monopoly 
by treaty
Thus, six articles in the August 1660 treaty (articles 4–9) defined and regulated 
Makassar’s position in relation to the Company’s monopoly rights in the Spice 
Islands, whereas in 1655 the High Government had trusted in only one. In 
1655, the High Government had relied on a general recognition of its rights in 
the Spice Islands and a similar general recognition of its right to defend them. 
By acting under pressure, and believing that Hasanuddin’s demands for speci-
fic concessions originated from exclusively religious motives, the High 
Government had accepted a treaty with potential loopholes in its formulation 
on the monopoly. In the August 1660 treaty, these flaws were excised, but this 
was not done by reverting to European concepts of international law. It was 
done by a meticulous hammering out of the concrete specifics of both “mono-
poly” and “sanctions.” The biggest challenge to the Company’s monopoly, and 
the thorn in the side of the High Government, the Portuguese presence in 
Makassar, was dealt with in the same manner.
Power politics and the expulsion of the Portuguese 
(articles 9–12)
The Portuguese in Makassar were the most serious threat to the Company’s 
monopoly in the Moluccas, and the heart of the 1660 treaty was their expul-
sion. In the August 1660 treaty, this was presented as a two-stage operation, 
35 “de Maccasaren hare in de quartieren van Solor ende Tijmor ende de plaatsen daerom her in negotie 
niet verder en sullen vermogen uijt te breiden.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 9, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.172.
36 Arend De Roever, De jacht op sandelhout, (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2002), 216-217.
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first by neutralising any interference from Portuguese in Solor and Timor 
(articles 9–11), and then by an obligation laid on Makassar itself to expel its 
Portuguese population (article 12). Given the importance of the issue, I shall 
go through these articles in some detail.
Articles 9–11: Neutralising the threat from the Portuguese 
in Solor and Timor and making it a general rule
Article 9 and 10 laid down Makassar’s neutrality with respect to the Portuguese 
in Solor and Timor. Whereas, as already noted, the first article defined Timor 
and Solor as the outer boundary of Makassarese legitimate trade, the next arti-
cle brought the strategic dimension of the issue to the fore. The Makassarese in 
Solor were not to “support enemies of the Company wherever they might be,”37 
which included supplying “men, arms, gunpowder, fuses, boats or whatever it 
might be.”38 In article 11, this was all made into a general rule that stated that 
the Makassarese were not permitted to sail to any places with which the 
Company was at war, or where the Company was enforcing a blockade.39
Summing up: Restrictions on Makassar’s foreign 
policy and autonomy in the precautions to protect the 
monopoly
Articles 9 and 10 required Hasanuddin to sign and swear that to assist any 
Portuguese efforts to infringe the Company’s rights would be regarded as a breach 
of treaty, and therefore considered to be a casus belli. Absolute restrictions were put 
on Makassarese intervention in the Company’s military affairs in the archipelago 
by article 11. This meant putting severe restrictions on Makassar’s foreign policy 
and autonomy to protect the monopoly. As for form, one should note the specific 
phrasing and the variants of all-inclusive formulas in these articles, which in the 
37 “dat de Maccassaren in de gemelte quartieren van Solor, waer het ook zoude mogen wesen, de vijanden 
van de Comp’e niet zullen vermogen te adsisteren.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 10, Corpus Diplomaticum, 
2.173. The “enemy” was obviously the Portuguese community on Solor.
38 “met volk, schutt, cruijt, londt, vaertuijgen, vivres offte wadt het zoude mogen wesen.” August 19, 1660 
treaty, art. 10, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.173.
39 “de Maccassaren niet sullen vermogen te varen op eenige plaetsen met welker de Comp.e in vijandschap 
zijn, offte die zij met schepen beset zall hebben.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 11, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.173.
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final analysis reflected the deep distrust of Hasanuddin that had become dominant 
in Batavia at the time. Again, there was no return to a more formalised legal treaty 
model in this, but a turn towards the more specified and concrete formulations. 
The same went for the expulsion of the Portuguese from Makassar.
The expulsion of the Portuguese (article 12)
When the expulsion of the Portuguese was addressed directly in article 12, it 
came as a de facto dictate by the Company, formulated in absolute terms: “The 
Sultan was to ban the Portuguese from all his domains, with all their creatures, 
and followers from now on and forever.”40 In brief, all the Portuguese were to 
leave Makassar and take all their belongings with them, never to return. No 
modifications, no qualifications.
A proposition for a reconfiguration of Makassar–
Company relations following the expulsion of the 
Portuguese
If the expulsion itself was formulated unambiguously enough, another less 
unambiguous feature of the expulsion clause was the manner in which the tou-
chiness of the situation for the Makassarese was counterbalanced by an ideologi-
cal remodelling of Makassar–Company relations. The essence of this 
reconfiguration was that the expulsion came as a necessary consequence of 
Portuguese meddling with a “natural” Makassar–Company bond of friendship.
The expulsion decree itself was ultimately formulated in absolute terms, but the 
article started off by placing the blame for all the recent problems between Makassar 
and the Company on the Portuguese: “as the Portuguese alone must be regarded as 
the only reason for and the sole instigators of all the recent troubles and conflicts 
that for many years have occurred between Makassar and the Company.”41 The 
expulsion was thus legitimised in terms of Portuguese disturbance of an implicit 
40 “Soo zal de coninck van Macassar desselve (the Portuguese) met haere creaturen ende aenhanck van 
nu voor althoos zijne landen ende gebiedt ontseggen.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 12, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.173.
41 “dewijle de Portuguese gehouden moeten warden d’eenighste oorsaek ende aenstookers geweest te zijn 
van alle d’onlusten ende quesstien, die sedert vele jaeren herwaerts tusschen de cronen Macassar ende 
de gem. Companie zij voorgeveallen.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 12, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.173.
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harmony between the Company and Makassar, and was in other words regarded 
as a just punishment for intrigue and deceit by the Portuguese. The reconfigura-
tion of the interrelationship between the Company, the Portuguese, and Makassar 
thus cast the Portuguese as the bad guy against Makassar and the Company, the 
good guys, with the qualification that Makassar had been temporarily misled by 
the bad guy. This may well be seen as an invitation to a Company-Makassar alli-
ance against the Portuguese.42 In any case, the reordering of bilateral ties demon-
strates how contractual formulations were being considered and consciously used 
as elements in constructing relationships. That came to the fore in a number of 
restitution and damage cases described in articles 13–15, 18, and 23–26.
The blame and shame in damages and debt:  
1—Implications of prestige distribution  
(articles 13–15 and 18)
Article 12 concluded the regulation proper of the political interaction regime 
between the Company and Makassar. Four of the six succeeding articles (arti-
cles 13–15 and 18) were all concerned with restitution claims,43 which, in turn, 
all held implications of prestige distribution linked to the political realignment 
outlined above.
Article 13
Article 13 concerns Hasanuddin’s restitution claim on the Dutch for arrest of 
the ship Joan Baptista, and his accusations that earlier agreements on compen-
sation due him had not been fully met.44 Both claims were met with a mix of 
self-righteousness and deflected blame. The treaty stated that the Company 
had in fact honoured its obligations in full, even though the sultan’s claims 
were wholly unjustified. When the Company had chosen to compensate the 
sultan anyway, it had only done so because it wished to preserve good relations 
with him.45 Mimicking the redistribution of blame in article 12, the Dutch 
42 To support this: See the the High Government’s concers about Makassarese worries over the economic 
effects of expulsion of the Portuguese, chapter 8.
43 Arts. 16 and 17 concern the twin issue of run-aways and converts and will be treated below.
44 For the Joan Baptista incident, see Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 54 ff.
45 “De Compagnie het selve geensints schulldigh is geweest maer alleen betaelt heeft om met Maccassar 
in goede vrede te continueeren.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 13, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.173.
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emphasised that the real blame for the whole conflict around the Joan Baptista 
affair lay with the Portuguese, who in a devious manner had shirked their 
agreed obligations and still owed the sultan.46
Comment
If we look at the moral equation in the presentation of the issue here, both 
Hasanuddin and the Portuguese are cast as being in the wrong: Hasanuddin 
for setting forth unjustified claims, the Portuguese for having deviously 
misled him. Still, of the two, Hasanuddin comes out better, having been 
tricked by the Portuguese. In contrast to the Portuguese, the Company 
reigns morally supreme by virtue of its willingness to meet unjust demands 
for the sake of reaching an agreement. This implicit moral equation then 
has a simple lesson for the Makassarese: Switch partners and everything 
will be all right.
Articles 14 and 15
Articles 14 and 15 both concern the Company’s compensation claim for 
the flight of Adrighem, who had embezzled 8,000 reals of eight, in 
Makassar.47 The sultan was held personally responsible and was instructed 
to order the arrest of the Portuguese who abetted the fugitive and hand 
them over to the Company for punishment.48 If he failed to do so, he was to 
pay 8,000 reals to the Company, on the promise that the money would be 
returned on the delivery of Adrighem and his accomplices.49 By holding 
Hasanuddin personally responsible, the High Government may have belie-
ved that he had been a party to the incident. But as it stood, the real villains 
were once again the Portuguese. The subject thus entailed the same pre-
stige distribution as in articles 12 and 13.
46 “Door de listige practijken van desselve naderh.t. niet aghtervolght offte nagecomen; en is bedragende 
[sum not filled in].” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 13, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.173.
47 See Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 60.
48 August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 15, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.174.
49 August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 15, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.174.
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Courting Makassar in distrust: Articles 23–26
After a section of articles regulating the bilateral administrative and judicial rela-
tions between the Company and Makassar in Makassar, including the grant for 
a permanent trading lodge (article 19), another group of articles concerning 
miscellaneous restitution and damage claims were included (articles 23 and 24), 
and article 26 simply confirming that a settlement had been reached. The 
respective issues were, in order: The sultan’s role as guarantor for Portuguese 
payment for damage done to the Company’s lodge (article 23)50 and general 
war damages (article 24).51 Article 25 concerned the terms of the Company’s 
evacuation of Fort Panakkukang and the arrangement for Makassarese hosta-
ges to be held in Batavia until the treaty had been countersigned.52 In these 
instances, we recount a similar pattern of redistribution of blame and praise as 
in the above.
In article 23, the sultan should make sure that the Portuguese pay for the 
repair of damages to some private persons associated with the Company’s 
lodge.53 There can be no doubt that at the time, the High Government held 
the view that the Portuguese actions could never have taken place without 
the tacit consent of Hasanuddin.54 Yet, blame was never laid on Makassar 
explicitly, nor did the treaty explicitly address any settlement for wrong-
doing. The sultan was simply requested to see to it that the Portuguese would 
be held accountable. This definitely fits in with a friend-foes constellation 
where Makassar–Portuguese bonds were to be cut and those between the 
Company and Makassar tied.
The same distribution of blame applied to the compensations for the 
Company’s military expenses in article 24. “The Sultan was to see to it that 
the Portuguese make good and pay damages to the Company for the con-
siderable costs.”55 Although a sanction clause stated that the gold and 
money brought by the Makassarese head negotiator to Batavia should be 
50 August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 23, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.175.
51 August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 24, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.175.
52 August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 25, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.176.
53 “De coninck van Makassar door de Portugesen sall doen vergoeden ende uitkeren de cleijne schade.” 
August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 23, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.175.
54 For the general distrust in Hasanuddin at the time, see Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 59–62, covering 
the period from January 1659 to the decision to go to war in 1660.
55 “de Maij. Van Makassar door den Portugesen aen den Comp.e sall doen opbrengen ende betalen voor 
de sware onkosten.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 24, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.175.
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withheld until the matter had been settled,56 once again the implication of 
the general arrangement was that the basis for friendly bonds between the 
Company and Makassar was prepared by putting the main blame on the 
Portuguese.
Article 25: Evacuation of Fort Panakkukang
The expulsion of the Portuguese in article 19 and the damage claims in articles 
23 and 24 were all conditioned on the Company’s evacuation of Fort 
Panakkukang. The governor-general and Council declared themselves com-
mitted to evacuating the fort and handing it over to the sultan “as soon as the 
restitution claimed on the Portuguese had been made good and the Portuguese 
had been expelled from Makassar.”57 Still another sanction was added: The 
Company would hold prominent envoys as hostages in Batavia until the expul-
sion was complete.58
The conditions and hostage arrangements attached to the handover of Fort 
Panakkukang demonstrate that although there was an element of courtship 
towards Makassar built into the August 1660 treaty, it was one based on condi-
tional trust. That the Company stood for an engagement within reason in 1660 
is amply demonstrated by the calling back of the touchy concessions made in 
the 1655 treaty.
Correcting the mistakes of 1655: Regulations on 
runaways and converts (articles 16 and 17)
Articles 16 and 17 of the 1660 treaty were dedicated to the issue of runaway 
Company servants and how to handle the converts among them. These articles 
thus concerned not only jurisdiction, but the issue of religious co-existence. As 
such, they were ripe with implications for both political and cultural prestige, 
not least because these concerned the issue of religion, which had served as 
56 “hier aen de Comp.e ter handt gestalt ende gelaten het goudt offte getellt dat d’Heer gesant Poepoe.” 
August 19, 1660, treaty art. 24, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.176.
57 “soo haest de bovengeroerde possten gellts door de Portuguesen getellt ende opgebraght. Ende desselve 
voordt uijt Macasar geset zullen wesen.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 25, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.176.
58 “tot haere verseckeringh gestellt zall hebben eenighe gequaliiceerde ostagiers tot genoegen van de 
voorschreven Nederlandsche gesanten.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 25, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.176.
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Hasanuddin’s grounds of appeal for the concessions gained in 1655. The sub-
stance of article 16 was that the sultan was obliged to return all runaway Company 
personnel.59 In essence, the article thus only replicated what had earlier been 
agreed in the 1637 and 1655 Contacts. But the August 1660 formulation of the 
ruling was far more elaborate and specific. First, the category “Company runa-
ways” was defined as “all those who from time to time had run away (from the 
Company) and settled in Makassar itself or its surroundings, and those who 
would defect from the Company from this time.”60 As if this did not suffice, the 
“all” was further spelled out in the specific to include “Dutch as well as blacks, 
slaves as well as free.”61 This added extra specificity is indicative of how the 
decrease in trust had led to an increase in observance of the need to close any 
loopholes in the formulation of treaty clauses. There was more to it, too.
A 1660 convert concession
One qualification was added to the seemingly watertight ruling on the runaways 
in article 16. The Makassarese envoy, Popoe, had reservations about the inclu-
sion of converts in the sultan’s obligation to return runaways. Popoe noted that 
as an envoy he was not in position to decide on the matter without further deli-
beration with the sultan himself.62 The solution to Popoe’s reservation was prag-
matic. It was agreed that a final decision must be postponed until the matter was 
finally settled during the counter-signing session with Hasanuddin in Makassar.63
Article 17
So even in 1660 a partial concession was granted. But the August 1660 conces-
sion was not at all comparable to what had been agreed to in 1655. The Company’s 
principle, uncompromising position on the issue of converts was made clear in 
59 “de coninck van Macassar aen de Compagnie sall doen wederom geven en restitueeren.” August 19, 
1660 treaty, art. 16, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.174.
60 “alle de gene dat die oijt offte oijt van haer zijn weghgelopen ende in Maccassar offte het gebied 
gevonden worden offte die nogh nae dese t eenigen tijde in Maccassar van de Comp.e sullen 
weghgelopen.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 16, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.174.
61 “zoo Nedelanders, als swarte, Zoo lijffeijgenen als vrije.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 16, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.174.
62 August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 16, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.174.
63 “dat de Heer gesant Crain Poepoe daeronder niet en heft geliven te begrijpen den gene die reede de 
Moorsche religie aengenomen ende hebben laten besnijden, maer dat het sellver voor de Koninck 
zoude blijven gereserveerdt.” August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 16, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.174.
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the elaboration of the issue in article 17. Here it was emphasised that henceforth 
no exception was to be made for converts, who were to be “handed over on par 
with the other renegades, disregarding any religious conviction or conversion.”64 
The dominant signal in the 1660 treaty was that so far as the Company was con-
cerned, there were to be no more pretexts by appeal to religion.
Chapter conclusion
The August 1660 treaty had a dual nature. On the one hand it represented a 
body of specific rulings that were meticulously worked out to meet the chal-
lenges as the High Government saw them at the time, namely that the sulta-
nate would continue to pursue its goals in the Moluccas unless prevented from 
doing so. A political framework was laid down with the purpose of containing 
and, if necessary, pacifying Makassar. This contractual framework did not 
represent a variant of European legal sophistication brought overseas. It repre-
sented a pragmatic shift towards a new conception of the overseas context of 
treaty making
The 1660 treaty showed the whip in the Company’s diplomatic hand. Yet, 
there was another open, outstretched diplomatic hand, too. The tenor of the 
comments on moral blame and praise in the articles on restitution claims was 
that the Company, although the wronged party, was also the party trying to 
clear up the mess. By holding up the Portuguese as the ultimate wrongdoers, a 
moral hierarchy was constructed in which the Company reigned at the top, the 
Portuguese at the bottom, and Makassar in between. It is difficult not to inter-
pret this other than as an invitation for a Makassarese–Company bond that 
excluded the Portuguese.
Although this was to prove as illusory as it had been in 1655, my point in the 
above analysis is that both the whip hand and the open hand were part and 
parcel of an pragmatic diplomatic approach towards Makassar that had come 
about partly as a reaction to the disillusionment over the results of the 1655 
treaty. But above all the August 1660 treaty represented a shift in the overall 
conceptualisation of treaty in which the latter had come to take on a stronger, 
politically-instrumental meaning.
64 “Sullen in alle manieren wederom gegeven worden zonder aenschouw van religie offte besnijdenisse.” 
August 19, 1660 treaty, art. 17, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.174.
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Learning to Make Treaties, 
Two Treaties of Political 
Hegemony, 1667-68
Section 1: Chapter introduction
The treaties that Cornelis Speelman concluded during his 1667–68 campaign 
in the eastern quarters can be split into three: The treaties concluded in the 
Moluccas and with Buton before the fall of Makassar in November 1667, which 
established a “security ring” around Makassar; the November 1667 treaty with 
Makassar, which laid down and regulated the Company’s hegemony over 
Makassar; and, finally, the March 1668 treaty with Tello, which secured the 
latter’s commitment to the November 1667 treaty. Taken together, these secu-
red the Company’s overlordship in South Sulawesi and the Eastern Archipelago. 
The way this political hegemony was constructed by treaty forms the topic of 
this section.
Section propositions
Both in the substance of the actual regulations as well as in their textual formu-
lations, these treaties were drafted with a sharp eye to the main challenge of the 
new hegemonic political order, namely how to keep your friends close and 
your (former) enemies under even closer control. In this section, I argue that 
the challenges of establishing a hegemonic political order rejected Eurocentrism 
and were de facto met with hyperpragmatism.
It is a basic assumption in the analysis that neither the treaties with 
the outer islands nor those with Sulawesi polities should be considered in 
isolation, but as integrated parts of the same hegemonic structure. But, one 
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must separate the parts to see the whole. Also, if all the treaties under dis-
cussion here formed integrated parts of the Company’s hegemonic structure, 
variations in their form and content are to be found. These particularities 
reflected variations in local conditions, and thus represented adaptations 
made for the preservation of the hegemonic order. My analysis will shift 
between the general and the specific dimensions of the construction of 
hegemony.
Plan of exposition
The treaty complex that secured the Company’s hegemony over South Sulawesi 
and in the Moluccas, was to a large degree the work of Speelman. As for his 
doings in Makassar and the Eastern Quarters specifically, I sketch the contents 
of the separate treaties concluded by or on behalf of Speelman and the Company 
in Buton and the Moluccas between January 4 and June 25, 1667.1 Here, I ana-
lyse the June 25 treaty with Buton in some detail, as it illustrates how a specific 
local political challenge was tackled by treaty. I then go on to analyse the con-
tracts concluded in Sulawesi, namely the November 18, 1667 treaty with 
Makassar and the January–March 1668 treaty with the Tello, with an emphasis 
on the former. All the quotes and references to the treaty texts are taken from 
Heeres compilations.
Section 2: The outer islands treaties January–June 
1667: Articulation of bonds of vassalage
The treaties between the Company and miscellaneous Moluccan islands con-
cluded by or on behalf of Speelman between January and June 1667 comprise, 
in chronological order, a treaty of surrender to the Company by a Makassarese 
army in Buton on January 4,2 a treaty of Tidorese recognition of Company 
overlordship concluded on March 29,3 a treaty of pacification and alliance with 
the king of Tibor on the north coast, also dated March 29,4 and three 
1 From now on: “The treaties with the outer islands” or “Outer Islands treaties.” 
2 Makassar, January 4, 1667, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.346–48. 
3 Molukken, March 29, 1667, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.193, 348–54. 
4 Makassar, March 29, 1667, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.354–55. 
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successive treaties recognising Company overlordship, by Ternate, dated 
March 30,5 Batjan April 12,6 and Buton, June 25.7
The rationale for all these agreements was to establish a security ring of 
Company allies around Makassar. As such, they were all contracts of vassalage 
to the Company. They typically detailed restrictions on and procedures for 
diplomatic interaction with third parties, stated military alliance obligations 
towards the Company, and gave the Company a veto or final say in the proce-
dure for leadership succession.8 For reasons of economy of space, I shall restrict 
my analysis of these treaties to the issue of vassalage to the Company.
The nature of the political relationship between the Company and the local 
treating party was implied in the preamble and the concluding confirmation 
clause, but was usually explicitly stated in a separate articlermally in the middle 
or at the end of the treaty. 9As a rule, it was preceded by regulations for the 
monopoly regime, restrictions on commercial and diplomatic agreements 
with third parties, and obligations of the treating party in time of war. The 
standard formulation of vassalage to the Company typically contained a 
declaration of recognition of the Company’s overlordship by the local prince 
and his nobles as follows: “Further on the king and his nobles declare that they 
deliver themselves, their domain and their subjects into the hands of the 
Company as their protector and defender.”10
Buton as an exception confirming the rule
Before commenting on the treaty position of Buton, it must be pointed out that 
Buton is practically touching Sulawesi and is closer to Macassar than Ternate, 
5 Molukken, March 30, 1667, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.356–59. 
6 Molukken, April 12, 1667, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.359–63. 
7 Boeton, June 25, 1667, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.363–68. 
8 The January 4 treaty with Buton and March 29 treaty with the king of Tibor were treaties of a predo-
minantly military nature, whereas the four others more extensively comprise regulations in the econ-
omic-commercial and political fields. 
9 In 7th position out of 17 unnumbered clauses of the March 29 treaty with Tidore (Corpus Diplomaticum, 
2.350), 5th position out of 10 in the March 30 treaty with Ternate (Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.357), 6th 
position out of 13 in the April 12 treaty with Batjan (Corpus Diplomaticum, 361). For the June 25 treaty 
with Buton as a special case, see below. 
10 Wijders verclaren opgenoemde Coningh ende sijne Groote hun zelve, hare landen ende onderdanen te 
stellen en over te draagen in handen ende onder bescherminge van de generale Compagnie, dezelve 
mits desen erkennende voor hare schut- en schermheer.” Treaty with Tidore, March 29, 1667, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.350. 
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although, it was traditionally under Ternatean control. As we shall see below, 
the latter was a fact that the Company re- incorporated in its treaty relations 
with the island.
The June 25 treaty with Buton11 presented a different case as there was no 
separate paragraph describing Buton’s vassalage to the Company. The treaty 
followed the standard litany of issues up to and including the ban on receiving 
envoys from third parties. But it then jumped directly to the rules regarding 
the procedure for succession. The reason was simply that the vassalage func-
tion was secured precisely by the regulations on the succession procedure, over 
which the Company and Ternate, which was formally placed on par with the 
Company,12 were accorded joint control.
Securing political dominance and stability in Buton by 
control over succession
Article 7 of the treaty with Buton stated that the nobles of Buton were obliged 
to inform the Company immediately in the case of the death of their king.13 
Delegates from both Ternate and the Company were then to be present for the 
council of the realm’s election of a new king,14 and the new king must in their 
presence swear an oath of obligation on a copy of the June 25 treaty.15 In addi-
tion, the members of the council of the realm were required to swear that they 
would never depose the present king and elect another, unless given permis-
sion to do so by Ternate and the Company.16
The Company’s and Ternate’s rights of interference and control over the 
government of Buton went further still. Both were accorded veto rights with 
11 Treaty with Buton, June 25, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.363–69. 
12 Treaty with Buton, June 25, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.368. 
13 “Indien den coning van Bouton aflivigh wierd, dan sullen de rijxraden daarvan ten eersten kennisse 
aan den coning van Ternata ende de Compagnie moeten doen.” Treaty with Buton, June 25, 1667, 
Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.366. 
14 “van beijder sijde gecommitteerde mogen worden gesonden, die met de Rijxraad een ander in des 
overledens plaatse sullen verkiesen.” Treaty with Buton, June 25, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.366. 
15 “alvoren bevestight te worden, tot onderhoudinge van dit contract aan de coning van Ternata en de 
Compagnie in handen van voorschreven gecommiteerde den eed van getrouwighheijt sullen doen.” 
Treaty with Buton, June 25, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.366. 
16 “en als wanneere oock de Rijxraden aan de nieuwe coningh bij eede getrouwheijt sullen beloven, zon-
der dat de Rijxraden ooijt vermogen zullen een Coningh of te stellen en weder een ander in plaatse te 
kiezen als met toestaan van de coning van Ternate en de Compagnie.” Treaty with Buton, June 25, 
Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.366.
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respect to the sacking of high officials of the realm. Neither the king nor mem-
bers of the council of the realm were permitted to “sack” any prominent minis-
ter without first conferring with the king of Ternate and the Company, who 
would jointly look into the matter.17
So, the Company and Ternate secured an absolute power to intercede for them-
selves with respect to both the king and the upper echelon of the Butonese govern-
ment. But the reach of political control according to the treaty went deeper still: 
fealty to the treaty by new officials in the Butonese government, whether in high or 
low positions, was secured by the inclusion of a paragraph stating that they had to 
swear an oath of loyalty to the June 25 treaty on the Koran.18
In case these precautions for guaranteeing a pro-Company regime in Buton 
were insufficient, it was added that the Company and Ternate in cooperation 
with the council of the realm were accorded the right to depose any Butonese 
king who contravened the treaty, and replace him with one who would honour 
it, without any objection whatsoever.19
Conclusion: Buton and the other outer islands: 
Exception and rule
The elaborate checks on the rulers of Buton must be explained in terms of con-
text. Speelman’s “chain of security” around Makassar depended on the endu-
rance of the peace he had negotiated between Ternate and Tidore.20 To protect it, 
he had to please Ternate, which had claims on Buton.21 Considering the ambiva-
lent behaviour of Buton after the surrender of the Makassarese forces in January 
1667, it could not have been too hard to make Company recognition of Ternatese 
17 “Den goegoegoe ofte andre diergelijcke hooghe officialen uijt hare bedieninge sullen vermogen te 
rucken met instellinge van andre, maar gehouden wesen de clagten, diese tegen een soodanigen heb-
ben, aan de coninck van Ternata ende de Compagnie bekent te doen, om nevens hun daar in en over 
gedisponeert te werden.” Treaty with Buton, June 25, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.366. 
18 “en is te verstaan dat sulcke hooghe officialen, oock andere mindere Rijcxgrooten, nieu in bedieninge 
komende, althoos de getrouwe onderhoudinge van dit contract op den Alcoran sullen besweeren.” 
Treaty with Buton, June 25, 1667, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.366. 
19 “Maar off het geviele, dat den coning van Bouton tegens dit contract of andersints sich quame te buij-
ten te gaan, dan sal de coning van Tarnata ende de Compagnie met de rijcxgroten van Bouton vermo-
gen soodanige coning aff te stellen en in zijn plaatse een ander te verkiesen, sonder eenigh 
tegenspreecken.” Treaty with Buton, June 25, 1667, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.366.
20 See Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 119 ff. 
21 See Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.363, introduction to Treaty with Buton, June 25, 1667, referring to 
Valentijn 83, DRB 1666–67 112, 115. 
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influence in Buton a reward for Ternatese loyalty. In the Buton treaty, this was 
resolved formally by the inclusion of the Ternatese as a party to the treaty at the 
cost of a separate declaration of Butonese vassalage to the Company. Still, if the 
June 25 treaty was not how the Company typically secured political control, the 
outcome was the same. The primary concern in the treaty making was the prac-
tical functionality of Company control, not principled legality.
The meaning of sequence
The fact that the article describing the polities’ vassalage to VOC followed rather 
than preceded those specifying restrictions on foreign trade, diplomatic interac-
tion, and military obligations is illustrative of a practical-overseas contextual 
mode of thinking about treaties. If we were to subscribe to Andaya’s proposi-
tions, the sequence would have been turned around, that is the treaties would 
have started off with a general description of the relationship between vassal and 
overlord, and then deductively gone on to describe the obligations that followed 
from this legalistic relationship. The mode in the outer island contracts was, 
however, to start with the concrete economic, politico-diplomatic, and military 
regulations, and work up to the overarching vassalage commitment that in effect 
provided these regulations their legitimacy. The Company did not “believe” in 
“treaties” in the abstract at the time; it practised treaty making according to a 
casuistic, concrete, and specific approach. This is the impression one gets from 
reading the treaty with Makassar of November 1667, too.
Section 3: Company hegemony in the November 
18, 1667 treaty with Makassar
Presentation of the November 18 treaty
The November 18, 1667 treaty with Makassar numbers 30 articles in all, with 
article 9 and 11 left blank. Article 1 simply stated that all regulations of the 
August 1660 treaty were considered incorporated in the 1667 treaty with 
the standard qualification “in so far as they did not contradict regulations in 
the latter.”22 Article 30 laid down the swearing and countersigning procedure. 
22 “in alle haare deelen en poincten sodanigh naar gevolgt warden, voor soo veel die in desen niet en 
werden wedersproocken.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 1, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.371. 
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Thus, with twenty-six original articles of substance, and the August 1660 
treaty included, the November 1667 treaty was the most comprehensive 
treaty concluded between Makassar and the Company.23 Many of its regula-
tions were but elaborations and amplifications of regulations from the earlier 
treaty. The real originality of the November 1667 treaty lay in its being a 
governmental treaty cementing the Company’s position as Makassar’s overl-
ord and the political readjustments both in Sulawesi and the outer islands 
that followed from it.
Contents by categories
The regulations in the respective articles of the November 1667 treaty can be 
subsumed under the following three main headings: “Restitution and debts” 
(articles 3, 5, 13, 17, and 28), “the commercial regime” (articles 8 and 12), and 
articles that directly or indirectly concerned Makassar’s position in the post-
war political order. The latter can be further grouped into subcategories such as 
“Restrictions on interaction with third-party Europeans,” including the expul-
sion of the English (article 6 and 27), “Restrictions on contact with and rejec-
tion of claims to sovereignty over local states in the archipelago” (articles 10 
and 14–17), and finally a cluster of articles that laid down miscellaneous inte-
raction issues in more specific detail (articles 18–25).
Of special relevance in my context are all the explicitly political articles and 
the political implications of some of the non-political ones, which helped con-
struct and support the Company’s hegemonic position. That goes not only for 
Makassar itself, but for the whole of South Sulawesi and the Eastern Archipelago, 
as all the treaties concluded with the outer islands between January 4 and June 
25 were incorporated as an integral part of the political system given in the 
November 1667 treaty.24
The hallmark of the November 1667 treaty thus lay in fitting a lord–vassal 
relationship between the Company and Makassar into a broader network of 
Company-dominated alliances. Although there were political implications in, 
for instance, the regulation of the commercial regime in articles 8 and 12, 
among others, I shall for reasons of space concentrate on the articles 
23 As we recall, taken in isolation the August 1660 Treaty won the day by one, the 1637 treaty numbered 
twelve articles, the December 1655 eight. 
24 See below. 
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that explicitly regulated the political interaction regime, and those whose 
implications are so special that they need explicit comments. The March 9–31, 
1668 treaty between the Company and Tello mainly confirmed the latter’s 
commitment to the November 1667 treaty. I shall analyse it with a focus on its 
paternalistic tone and form.
Hegemony in the explicit political regulations of the 
1667 treaty: Getting rid of the other Europeans
The first step towards Company hegemony was the expulsion of the Europeans 
from Makassar. Expulsion of the Portuguese had, as we have seen, been 
agreed to in 1660.25 But due to Makassarese negligence or intentional delay 
in carrying out this obligation, it remained an issue in 1667. The formulation 
of the expulsion of the Portuguese in 1667 left no doubt about the Company’s 
insistence that the measure must now be carried out. The Makassarese 
government was “to see to it that the Portuguese with all their following be 
expelled as agreed in the prior treaties, without any exceptions or any excu-
ses that the Makassarese government might come up with.”26 In one stroke, 
the 1667 treaty both reproached the Makassarese for not having followed up 
the expulsion terms of 1660 and made it clear that the terms were 
non-negotiable.
Still, there was the matter of the English, who also had to be expelled. 
Because this was a new treaty issue, it needed to be justified. But the legitima-
tion itself was not new. The rationale for the expulsion of the English in 1667 
was the same as it was for the Portuguese in 1660.27 The blame for the recent 
troubles and war was placed on English. The text started: “as the English must 
be held as the major troublemakers and be held responsible for the 
[Makassarese] breaches of contract,”28 and logically ended up with the conclu-
sion that they must be immediately expelled: “so shall the [Makassarese] 
25 See above. 
26 “Sullen als noch doen vertrecken, in conformiteit van de laatse gemackte contracten, alle Portuguesen 
met haaren aenhang, gene uitgesondert, waar die onder de regeringe van Macassar worden gevonden.” 
November 18, 1667 treaty with Makassar, art. 6, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.372.
27 See above. 
28 “dewijle de Engelse gehouden moeten worden voor de groote aanstookers en voroorsaackeren van het 
breecken van voorschreven contracten.” November 18, 1667 treaty with Makassar, art. 6, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.372. 
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government expel the English and their followers at the earliest possible 
moment from its jurisdiction.”29
Comment: A moral legitimation of politics
Article 6 contained two specific expulsion orders for the Portuguese and the 
English. The wording regarding the expulsion of the Portuguese referred to 
the signed treaty of 1660, and the juridical aspect needed no elaboration. 
Still, there can be little doubt that there was a moral aspect involved, implicit 
blame being put on the Makassarese for not having carried out their contrac-
tual obligations in the first place. Regarding the English the moral blame was 
made explicit, as it had been with the Portuguese in 1660. The English had to 
pay for their deviousness, which, by implication, had ravaged the “harmony” 
that would otherwise have been the normal state between the Company and 
Makassar. This justified the expulsion while putting the Company in a favou-
rable moral light as a more trustworthy partner than the English. These 
kinds of implicit and explicit moral judgments are in fact more characteristic 
of the treaty text than are references to law. Why this is so may well be 
because the former was more relevant to the rearranging of friend and foe 
relations than the latter.
Merely stating the Makassarese obligation to expel the Portuguese and the 
English was not regarded as sufficient, however. It was also added that the 
expulsion of both parties was permanent and incontrovertible. The possibility 
that any persons of these two nations should ever be allowed to traffic or trade 
again in the domain of Makassar was expressly denied.30 Finally, the exclusion 
so outlined for the Portuguese and the English was extended to apply to people 
of all European nations, formulated in the same uncompromising manner. The 
Makassarese government was “never again to allow or permit any trade or 
contact with any other European nations or their representatives whosoever 
29 “soo sal de Regeringe die met haaren aenhang met de aldereerste occasie mede van onder haar juris-
dictie doen wegh gaan.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 6, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.372. At the end of 
the treaty, in art. 27, it was emphasises that “the king should not hinder the Company’s evacuation of 
the English to Batavia,” November 18, 1667 treaty with Makassar, art. 27, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.379. 
30 “sonder dat ymant van de voorschreven natien ofte hare creatuuren oijt of noijt naar desen in enighe 
plaatse onder den Maccassaren gebiet weder tot negotie off anders geadmittert sullen mogen werden.” 
November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 6, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.372. 
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they might be, or in whatever way they might present themselves, with no 
exceptions whatsoever.”31
Comment: form and content in the exclusion articles
Apart from its moral aspect, the exclusion article demonstrates what might be 
regarded as an obsessive determination to make the rulings unambiguous and 
watertight against creative interpretation or claims to have misunderstood 
them on grounds of ambiguity. The linguistic means to achieve clarity were 
simplicity of phrasing, repetition, and pre- emptive amplifiers such as “whoso-
ever,” “whatsoever,” and, last, “with no exceptions whatsoever,” as in the above. 
These features do not necessarily point to a European heritage of treaty making 
any more than does the moral dimension in the article. More readily at hand 
seems to be the need to interpret them as originating from the Company’s 
prior experience of treaty making with Makassar.
Article 10: The regulations for military backup and 
security
Watertight treaty formulations counted for little if one did not hold a military posi-
tion to block any new Makassarese military build-up and support the threat of 
sanctions. The “mistake” of prematurely handing over military positions in 166032 
was not repeated in 1667. Article 10 laid down the specifics of the military system 
to back up the Company’s hegemony. First, the Makassarese were to dismantle all 
coastal forts specified by name, as these were “primarily directed against the 
Company.”33 Only Fort Sombaopu was to remain, but then only to serve as the 
sultan’s residence and stripped of any military function. Second, no new fortifica-
tion work could be undertaken in the future without the Company’s sanction.34
31 “nimmermeer ergens onder haar gebiet nu off naar desen ter negotie off anders mogen inlaaten, admit-
teren of vergonnen eenige andere Europieanse natie of yimant van harent wegen, ‘t sij wie se oock zijn, 
off hoese moghte genoemt warden geen uitgesondert.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 6, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.373. 
32 See above. 
33 “meest reflecteren om te dienen tot versterckinge tegen de Compagnie.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 
10, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.374. 
34 “sonder dat daarnaar desen enige nieuwe daar ter plates off elders weder mogen gemaeckt warden, ten 
ware met gemeen goetvinden van de Compagnie.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 10, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.374. 
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In conjunction with the Makassarese evacuation of Fort Ujung Pandang and 
the Company’s takeover of it as Fort Rotterdam, a “security” zone around the 
fort was made by miscellaneous regulations.35 These measures would guaran-
tee the Company’s security in the bilateral axis with Makassar, but the Company 
also had to make sure that Makassar would not find local allies in South 
Sulawesi or in the outer islands to rally against it. In South Sulawesi, this was 
done by transferring bonds of allegiance from Makassar to the Company. As 
for the outer islands, it was done in the same manner or by strengthening 
already established bonds with the Company. Thus, one alliance structure was 
dismantled and a new one erected in which ties to Makassar were transferred 
into the hands of the Company. It took four articles, 14 to 17, to do this for the 
outer islands. I shall analyse them one by one.
The outer security circle: Bima
The first link in the outer chain of security that the Company built was Bima, 
treated in article 14. The article simply stated that the king and nobles of Makassar 
were “from now on not to interfere with the land of Bima or its belongings.”36 
This would have done for substance, but the position of Bima as an area of non-
interference for Makassar and as part of the Company’s exclusive sphere of inte-
rest was elaborately worked out and repeated in the succeeding phrase, which 
states that Makassar must “let the Company conduct its business there at its own 
discretion and never, in any way, directly or indirectly, in words or deed, acting 
against the Company.”37 Such was the linguistic mechanism of alliance cutting 
and retying. It was formulated concretely yet simply: Makassar was from now on 
not allowed to interfere. The Company must run its business undisturbed. No 
general principles were pointed to. No reference to international law was applied 
to justify it. It was a simple statement of an absolute, watertight rule.
35 Such as regarding inhabitants and local trade close to the fort, transferring jurisdiction in all inter 
Company-village affairs to the Company; November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 10, Corpus Diplomaticum, 
2.374. 
36 “niet sullen mogen te bemoijen met ‘t lant van Bima en resort.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 14, 
Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.375. 
37 “maar de Compagnie daar met late gewerden naar hun welgevallen, sonder de selve nu of oijt na desen, 
op d’een of d’ander wijse, directeleijck of indirectelijck met raadt off daadt te comen tegens de 
Compagnie.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 14, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.375. 
300
chap ter 8
Article 16: Buton
In article 16, Makassar’s claims on Buton were denounced and the island was 
implicitly made an integral part of the Company’s security ring around 
Makassar. However, the arrangement was introduced by a damage claim. The 
sultan was first to give restitution to Buton for manpower taken in a previous 
raid.38 The political arrangement simply read that Makassar was “now and 
never again to raise any claims on the lands of Buton whatsoever, and renounce 
such claims now and forever.”39 This was a slight variation on the renunciation 
clause for Bima, sharing the linguistic hallmark of emphasis by repetition, and 
phrases blocking appeals to exceptions.
Article 17: Ternate
The article respecting Ternate started off, as in the case of Buton, with a resti-
tution claim made on Makassar, which was followed by a renunciation of any 
Makassarese claims to the lands of Ternate. The restitution claims specified the 
compensation, in numbers and types, for men raided and weapons.40 The poli-
tical renunciation part was explicit, too; giving the names of each area and 
island for which Makassar was to forego any claims of sovereignty.41 The pro-
hibition of Makassarese interference in Ternate was covered for the present 
and future: “the esteemed Government of Makassar wholeheartedly pledged to 
renounce [any claims of influence] and never again trouble the king of 
Ternate.”42 It should be safe; at least there was no ambiguity involved.
It is noteworthy that the legitimacy of the claim, as in the August 1660 treaty, 
was justified by an appeal to historical continuity and tradition. The Company’s 
38 “Sullen aen den Coninck van Boeton ten eersten vergoeden en restitueren alle soodanige menschen als 
met laesten in een overval den Maccassaren in dat lant gerooft.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 16, 
Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.375–76. 
39 “sonder nu off oijt nimmermeer naar desen te houden off te hebben eenige de alderminste pretentie op 
op eenige van de landen van Bouton, daar van bij desen renuncierende.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 
16, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.376. 
40 “De geroofde menschen van Xulas, en daar beneven 10 stukken ijser canon, 2 metale prince stucken en 
3 bassen, etc.” November 18, 166, treaty, art. 17, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.376. 
41 “Van alle gepretendeerde eigedommen op de eijlanden Saleijer en Pantsiano, als mede op de gantsche 
Oostkust van Celebes…, d’eijlanden Bangaij en Gapij, als andere.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 17, 
Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.376. 
42 “en de welcke de hooggemelte Regeringe van Makassar opregtelijck afstaat, belovende nimmermeer 
naar desen de coninck van Ternate te turberen.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 17, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.376. 
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recognition of the Ternatese claim was based on that the areas in question had 
“belonged to the king of Ternate from old.”43 By denouncing the legitimacy of 
any Makassarese claims on these areas and supporting the legitimacy of the 
Ternatese claims, the special relation between the Company and Ternate as 
allies in the outer island contracts was obviously reaffirmed, but it was suppor-
ted by reference to the local political order of old.
Summing up and comments: The articles cutting 
bonds of alliance to the Makassarese and transferring 
them to the Company
The formulaic language regarding the severance of Makassarese claims and 
bonds of overlordship in the areas covered in articles 14, 16, and 17 is con-
sistently concrete and specific. No technical terms of law or general princi-
ples or derivatives of general juridical abstracts like “sovereignty” are 
involved. This indicates that these articles were drafted within in a mental 
framework of defining specific, concrete rights more than in terms of dedu-
cing them from general principles of law. Symptomatic of the former empi-
rical, casuistic approach is that two of the three articles dealing with 
Makassar’s renunciation of political ties start off with a damage claim made 
on Makassar to be paid to the offended parties.
Another aspect of the introduction by damage claims on Makassar is that it 
likely helped emphasise the shift in alliances and relative positions of Makassar 
and the Company in the regional hierarchy that was taking place. Any restitu-
tion claim, by definition, involved reconfiguring an original asymmetry. In the 
cases above, Makassar was identified as the original wrongdoer, and the vic-
tims were compensated by Makassar thanks to the mediation of the Company 
as overseer. The restitution claims made on Makassar on the one hand thus 
signified a break in the old master–servant relationship between Makassar and 
its former vassals even as it validated the position of the Company as the new 
overlord. The same kind of logic and arrangements were applied when it came 
to the rearrangement of political relations and Makassar’s new position in the 
political regional system in South Sulawesi itself.
43 “van outs de croone van Ternate in eijgedom compterende.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 17, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.376. 
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Section 4: Restructuring the political geography of 
South Sulawesi by treaty
The alliance with Arung Palakka and the Bugis was what made the victory over 
Makassar and the remapping of the political landscape of South Sulawesi pos-
sible in 1667. It took eight articles—18 to 25—in all to inscribe the new politi-
cal order in the treaty. I shall go through them one by one, with the aim of 
pointing out their case- conditioned, instrumental nature.
Article 18: Rewards to the Bugis allies and 
Makassarese recognition of autonomy for Bone and 
Loeboe
The restructuring of the political map of South Sulawesi rested on Makassar’s 
recognition of full autonomy for the Company’s Bugis allies, Bone and Loeboe. 
It was inscribed in the 1667 treaty with the following wording: “Furthermore 
the honourable (Makassarese) Government renounces all claims of overlords-
hip over the lands of Bone and Loeboe, recognising their leaders as autono-
mous royals and rulers.”44 In addition, the renunciation was reinforced by the 
sultan’s personal oath, in which he committed himself to have “no claims 
whatsoever”45 on those areas.
Article 19: The punishment of Laijo and Bancala for 
siding with Makassar against the Company
If the reward for the Company’s Bugis allies was secession from Makassarese 
overlordship and recognition of autonomy, those realms that had sided with 
Makassar such as Laijo and Bancala paid a price. Both states were required 
to renounce and hand over parts of their domains that the Company had 
conquered during the war. These areas were to be “recognised by the Kings 
of Laijo and Bancala as autonomous parts with autonomous rulers and lords 
44 “Voorts renuncieert de hooggemeldte Regeeringe van alle heerschappije over de lande de Bougijs en 
Loewoe, deselve lantheren erkennende voor vrij geborene coningsprincen ende heeren.” November 18, 
1667 treaty, art. 18, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.376. 
45 “geen de alderminste pretensie op is hebbende.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. art. 18, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.376. 
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… where they themselves from now on and for ever could make no claims 
of authority.”46 In short, the winners, the Company and its allies, took what 
they considered fair to take. The ruling represented an application of the 
rule of the rights of conquest by sword pure and simple. That rule was 
applied to the areas treated in article 20, as well, where the principle was 
made more explicit.
Article 20: Elaborating territorial rearrangements as 
legitimate by rights of war
In article 20, the Company and allies stripped Makassar’s authority over “the 
lands between Boeloe-Boeloe to Turate” and further down to Bonaija” on 
basis of the “rights of conquest in war.”47 These lands from now on were to be 
“recognised as having won their independence and remain autonomous and 
free.”48
Summing up: Transfers of sovereignty and territory
The two cases of redistribution of sovereignty above came as result of the 
Company’s war with Makassar and its allies. Their legitimation by right of con-
quest can hardly be regarded as uniquely European; it is for instance hard to 
believe that such transfers of domain and sovereignty would be incomprehen-
sible to the local actors.49 In other words, the Company’s treaty regulation on 
this issue followed what was probably a universal norm rather than a peculi-
arly European one, and one that aligned with local practices.
46 “De coningen van Laijo en Bancala met het gansch lant van Turata ende Padjingh en al wat daar onder 
hoort, staande den oorlogh tot de Compagnie overgekomen … te erkennen voor vrije soningen, Heren 
en landen, daarse niet ter werelt op en hebben noch en houden te pretenderen, de selve ontslaande van 
alle voorgaande heerschapij en gebied, nu en altoos.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 19, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.377. 
47 “van de Compagnie en haare bondgenoten volgens reght van oorloge.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 
20, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.377. 
48 “Sullen sijn en blijven als eigen vrij gewonnen landen.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 20, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.377. 
49 Compare for one Andaya’s account of wars and dominion transfers in South Sulawesi, in Andaya, The 
Heritage of Arung Palakka, chap. 1, “State and Society in South Sulawesi in the 17th Century,” 9–45. 
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Sanctions against local petty states that had sided 
against the Company and its allies
There was also the challenge of how to handle the states that had sided with 
Makassar against the Company, but which had not actually been conquered 
during the war. This was the case for Wajo, Boeloe-Boeloe, and Mandar, which 
were treated together in article 21.
The article started off with a dose of blame and shame, branding the states of 
Wajo, Boeloe-Boeloe, and Mandar as criminals for having sided against the 
Company and its allies.50 As in the cases of other former foes, the sanctions 
were that their alliances to Makassar were to be cut and transferred to the 
Company.51 Makassar’s abandonment of all claims on and ties to these states 
was further emphasised as valid “from now and henceforth forever, without 
any exception whatsoever.”52 The break was supplemented by an explicit non- 
interference clause that stated that these states “neither directly or indirectly, 
not now nor ever must supply the Government of Makassar with manpower, 
weapons, gunpowder, lead, provisions, or advice or actions, whatever it might 
be called.”53 So, although the petty states took the shame, the weakening of the 
power of Makassar was the aim. However, the point to us is the way it was for-
mulated: Once again, the wording is direct and focused and with repetitious 
language to close any possible loopholes.
Configuring the respective polities into a hegemonic 
system (articles 23–25)
Having forged a new system of alliances and distributed rewards to friends and 
retribution to former foes, it remained to integrate the respective treating par-
ties in Sulawesi and the outer islands into a coherent system, which was done 
in articles 23–25. Numbers should not deceive however: these three articles 
50 “misdadigh aan de Compagnie en hare Bondgenoten.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 21, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.377. 
51 “verklaart de hooggemelte regeringe (Makassar) te abandonneren end ons daar met te laaten gewer-
den.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 21, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.377. 
52 “Nu off oijt nae desen.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 21, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.377. 
53 “sonder deselve (the Government of Makassar) directelijck off indirectelijck, nu off oijt nae desen te 
sullen secunderen met volck, wapenenen, krujt, loot, spijse, raad, daet off andersints, hoe het oock 
genoemt mogte werden.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 21, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.377. 
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made up the jewel in the hegemonic contractual crown. It was through them 
that a coherent hierarchical system, with the Company at the summit, was 
constructed.
Article 23: Reconfirming the Company’s political 
hegemony
Article 23 started with a confirmation of article 6, in which the privileged posi-
tion of the Company, to the exclusion of all third parties, was laid down.54 It was 
but a statement of the basic precondition for the Company’s new political posi-
tion in the area, namely its de facto overlordship over Makassar. The rest of 
article 23 spelled out Makassar’s obligations as a vassal to the Company. It was 
first obliged to help secure the Company’s privileged position by committing 
itself to tracking down and expelling any non-Dutch Europeans who tried to 
settle down in Makassar, “in case any third party against its wish attempted to 
settle down, it must refuse and deny this with all its might and power, according 
to its treaty obligation.”55 The recognition of the Company’s status as overlord 
also carried the obligation to assist it militarily when called upon to do so,56 and 
as was the case with the outer islands the Makassarese were forbidden to engage 
in any diplomatic negotiations with any party being at war with the Company.57 
In short, the vassalage position of Makassar precluded both the means to and 
opportunity of launching autonomous foreign policy initiatives.
As for the formal explication of Makassar’s submission to the Company, it 
was presented as a derivation of Makassar’s obligation to call in defensive assis-
tance from the Company in case of third-party intrusion. When first let out 
however, it was repeated and reaffirmed as a statement of the general lord–vas-
sal relationship between the two: If the Makassarese were not able to fend off 
third-party intruders they should call upon the Company for help, by right of 
54 “belooft in conformiteit van’t seste artikul hare landen voor alle anderen natien gesloten te houden.” 
November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 23, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.378. 1045 
55 “en in cas enige van deselve tegens hunnen danck daar in sich begeerden neder te slaan, deselve met 
alle vermogen en magt te sullen afweren volgens hare gehoudenisse van desen contract.” November 18, 
1667 treaty, art. 23, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.378.
56 “Sullen sij oock gehouden wesen, daartoe geroepen wesende de E. Compagnie te adsisteren met alle 
vermogen tegen sodanige vijanden als hun hier bij of omtrent Makassar tegen de Compagnie moghten 
openbaren.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 23, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.378. 
57 “dat sij in geen onderhandelinge van vreede off andersints treden sullen met enige natie, daar met de 
Compagnie is in oorlog.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 23, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.378. 
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its position as Makassar’s overlord.58 The inscribing of the Company’s overl-
ordship over Makassar in November 1667 was thus neat and simple. One does 
well to notice that the general statement of Makassar’s vassal position is deri-
ved from a specific obligation. A “Eurocentric” approach would have had it the 
other way around.
Article 24: Incorporating Makassar’s vassalage 
position into the new local and regional treaty system
In article 24, Makassar and the other vassal states and allies were incorporated 
into a system of overarching regional alliance. The article simply stated that the 
treaty of “lasting peace, friendship and alliance”59 between Makassar and the 
Company was to be regarded as “also binding”60 for the kings of Ternate, 
Tidore, Batjan, and Buton, as well as for the kings of the other states of Sulawesi: 
Bone, Soppeng, Loeboe, Turate Laijo, and Badjing, “with all their domains and 
subjects.”61 The alliance order was also given a prospective twist in that it 
should be open for “any rulers or princes who would from here on wish to join 
it.”62 Having thus knit the respective contracts into a single unit, it was time for 
the Dutch to explicate its hierarchical structure.
Article 25: The hierarchy of hegemony
Article 25 cemented the Company’s supreme position in the system of alliance 
by declaring it the ultimate source of power and authority. In case of conflict 
between the treating parties, the Company would act as the final institution of 
peacekeeping and arbitration: “If it be the case that some sort of misunderstan-
ding or conflict between the alliance partners should arise, so must the 
58 “Ingevalle sij (the Makassarese) daartoe niet vermogens waaren … als dan de Compagnie als haaren 
schut- en schermheer tot adsistentie soude versoecken also wij verclaren, deselve Compagnie in dier 
qualiteit te erkennen.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 23, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.378.
59 “duurende vreede, vriend- en bontgenootschap.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 24, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.378. 
60 “ook werde begrepen.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 24, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.378. 
61 “met alle haare landen en onderdanen.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 24, Corpus Diplomaticum, 
2.378. Repeated in the final article: “nevens alle de coningen en prince in dit verbont begrepen.” 
November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 30, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.380. 
62 “soodanige andere landheeren en vorsten als naar desen sullen versoecken mede in dit bont-
genootschap te mogen treden.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 24, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.378. 
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involved parties not act or go to war against each other, but present the issue to 
the Captain of the Hollanders for arbitration.”63 If on the other hand, the arbi-
tration proved unsuccessful, and one of the parties refused to accommodate, 
the remaining parties were made collectively responsible for sanctioning the 
uncompromising party. This collective responsibility was formulated in rather 
moralistic terms: “But if one of the parties still after arbitration stubbornly 
refuses to accept and bow to reason, then the other parties should jointly help 
the grieving party to see the just cause.”64 The implicit condemnation was thus 
but a negative complementary of the positive appeal in the preceding para-
graph, where the intention of the arbitration was presented as to “eliminate 
disagreements and to preserve the good brotherhood between the alliance 
partners.”65
Summing up: The Company as hegemon by treaty
Sweet words of harmony and collective responsibility should not fool us. The 
crux of the matter in the political reordering of the November 1667 treaty was 
that all treaty commitments by all the Company’s treaty allies were based on, 
and bound together by, the Company’s position as ultimate “protector and 
defender.” The system was held together by the recognition of the Company as 
overlord. This hegemonic position acquired its character from the fact that 
none of the other partners owed any vertical allegiances to each other, aside 
from being bound together by shared allegiance of loyalty to their overlord, the 
Company. If this was a brotherhood, it was headed by the Company as Big 
Brother. Still, it is well worth noticing that this compound was presented as a 
unity forged by shared interests, although ultimately protected and preserved 
by the Company.
63 “Off het geviele dat tusschen de bontgenoten ende respective coningen het een off ander misverstant 
eenige differentie quame te ontstaen, so sullen partijen niet stracx malkanderen daarom eenigh onge-
mack off oorloge aandoen, maar haar questie de capitain der Hollanders bekent maecken, omme soo 
het mogelijck is, door bemiddelinge van desselve, de oneeigheden uijt de weg te leggen.” November 18, 
1667 treaty, art. 25, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.378–79. 
64 “Maar indien een van de partije naar geen bemiddelinge luijsteren ende hartneckig blijven wilde, son-
der sich na de rede te voegen, als dan sullen de gemeene bontgenoten de andere naar vereijsch ende 
regt van saken te hulpe komen.” November 18, 1667 treaty, art. 25, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.379. 
65 “de oneenigheden uijt de weg te leggen ende goede broederschap te conserveren.” November 18, 1667 
treaty, art. 25, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.379. 
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The language of Big Brother
In the November 1667 treaty, the mode of formulation of the political regula-
tions, even more so than in the 1660 treaty, reveals an almost obsessive pursuit 
to fill in possible gaps and block loopholes for Makassarese evasion by being as 
concrete and specific as possible. Prior experience and lingering suspicions 
that Hasanuddin would try to take advantage of loopholes and bend the treaty 
to his advantage must have lain behind this. Lack of trust also goes to explain 
the endless repetitions of pre-emptive formulations such as “any,” “without 
exception,” “whosoever,” “under what pretext whatsoever,” and so on, at the 
expense of European legal jargon in the November 1667 treaty, as had been the 
case in the one of August 1660. That is easy to explain: Both were contracts 
engineered for low expectations to Makassar as a partner after 1655. But, as we 
have seen, the High Government also had other means than the rational, 
down-to-earth treaty text of securing bonds of loyalty. The treaty with Tello of 
March 1668 was exclusively based on such means.
Section 5: The 1668 treaty with Tello: Paternalism 
as the cement of loyalty
The March 9–31, 1668 treaty between the Company and Tello was a treaty 
between the Company and the raja of Tello and Karaeng Linques, who had 
originally sided with Makassar but were absent from the signing of the 
November 1667 treaty.66 The March 1668 treaty was meant to secure their loy-
alty to the former. In this regard, it completed the hegemonic regime laid down 
in the November 1667 treaty. The crucial and in fact only rationale of the 
March 1668 treaty was thus the explication of the unqualified commitment of 
the raja of Tello and Karaeng Linques to the 1667 treaty and thus the declara-
tion of their total submission to the Company. What is of interest to us regar-
ding the March 1668 treaty is the form that was applied to achieve this. For, 
while the November 1667 treaty was certainly not free of paternalistic implica-
tions, the public abject submission to the Company was the essence of the 
March 1668 treaty.
66 Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.380, based on DRB 1668–69, 7 ff. 
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The treaty was presented in the form of a declaration by the raja of Tello in 
which he explained his decision to declare himself a friend and ally of the 
Company by reasons of the “loyalty and fatherly care that the Company had 
always displayed toward its allies.”67 The praise of “fatherly care and protection” 
was further elaborated. The king of Tello put himself and his heirs under the 
protection of the Company to be recognised as “true friends and allies of the 
Company, which would take care of their needs like a father”68 because the 
Company would protect Tello “from any wrongdoings or injustice that might 
befall it.”69 The king also declared that he had arrived at his decision to offer 
himself as friend and ally “by advice from and consultations with his overlords, 
brothers and subjects.”70 In other words, the act of submission was unanimous 
and uncontested. The submission to the Company was further on presented as 
comprehensive; the king had decided to “commit himself, his whole realm and 
all his jurisdictions to the Company.”71 The bond between Tello and the 
Company was also presented as being irrevocable, binding not only on the 
king himself but on his heirs and successors, as well.72
Hegemony by patrimony
The way in which the March 1668 treaty was framed and phrased in paterna-
listic terms marked it as being distinctively from that of November 1667. But, 
the March 1668 treaty was after all not a treaty of technical regulations, but a 
demonstrative act of submission. When the lord–vassal relation was expressed 
in local idiom by hierarchical family relations, as is the case here, it may well 
illustrate the Company’s willingness to accept or even prefer the local idiom to 
specified and numerated articles in the treaty so long as it did not jeopardise 
67 “mij erinnerende de getrouheyjt en vaderlijcke zorge, waar met de de Compagnie doorgaans en altoos 
is angedaen over hare verbonde vrunden en bondgenooten.” March 9–31, 1668 treaty, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 2.381. 
68 “waare vrunden en verwanten van de Compagnie, die se hout en neemt in haare vaderlijcke bewa-
ringe.” March 9–31, 1668 treaty, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.381. 
69 “opdat ons van niemande ter werelt eenigh leet of onreght mogte overcomen.” March 9–31, 1668 treaty, 
Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.381. 
70 “naar ingenomen advijs van mijne lantsheer en broeders en onderdanen, te raade te zijn gewerden.” 
March 9–31, 1668 treaty, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.381. 
71 “mij en de mijne, oock nevens dien mijn gantsche rijcke en jurisdictie, noch nader en int bijsonder met 
deselve Compagnie te verbinden.” March 9–31, 1668 treaty, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.381. 
72 “en tevens te versoecken dat ik niet alleen in hare bescherminge particulierlijck aengenomen, neen 
maar oock mijne kinderen.” March 9–31, 1668 treaty, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.381. 
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more specific agreements formulated elsewhere. If so, this only goes to demon-
strate that the Company drew on a variety of modes for multiple needs in the 
overseas context. Which to choose was determined by an assessment of the 
local overseas situation.
Section conclusion: The 1667 and 1668 treaties of 
hegemony
The November 1667 treaty was titled an amendment73 to the 1660 treaty, but it 
was more of a political revolution as far as changes in regional power relations 
were concerned. The 1667 “amendments” restructured the entire bilateral inte-
raction regime between Makassar and the Company by excluding or restricting 
Makassar’s bilateral interactions with Europeans and non-Europeans in the 
archipelago. It restructured the political geography of Sulawesi by cutting poli-
tical bonds that had made Makassar a political hegemon and redirecting these 
bonds of allegiance to the Company. The treaty mode and means by which 
these transformations were secured were far from exports of European style 
legal parlance. They represented adapted constructions to meet practical chal-
lenges of given overseas context and situations.
Chapter conclusion
My analysis of the respective treaty texts treated in chapters 7 and 8 shows that 
the formulations and content of the post 1655 treaties were more the product of 
adaptation to assessed needs on site than the transfer of legal ideas from Europe.
The treaty making was not based on a single model. The treaty- record with 
Makassar between 1637 and 1668 demonstrates that there were a variety of 
modes in the Company’s toolbox of overseas treaties, too. Which mode to 
apply was determined by the specific needs it was supposed to serve, and the 
perceived options and constrictions in a given situation or context.
Above all, treaty making was a dynamic learning process. The logic went as 
follows: Appreciation of context was formed by experience. As experience was 
accumulated, so the dynamics of treaty making accelerated. The motor in these 
73 “Naarder artijculen ende poincten.” November 18, 1667 treaty, Preamble, Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.371. 
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dynamics lay in the processing of overseas experience, not in the implementa-
tion of or deduction from legal principles brought from overseas.
Evidence from the treaties reveals a lot of “engineering” in terms of working 
out the constituent parts of the machine as well as the structure of the machine 
itself. Throughout this analysis, I have demonstrated that the design of the 
machine as well as the fitting of its parts bore a prominent “overseas stamp.” 
That was no coincidence. That was the hallmark of how Company diplomacy 
came to adapt itself functionally to the particularities of the overseas context. 
One such change is particularly noteworthy. After the 1655 treaty proved 
counterproductive, the High Government turned to a much more encompas-
sing and detailed mode of treaty. This occurred in two stages; first by a much 
more detailed and regulated interaction system in the August 1660 treaty, and 
then as an even more politically integrated system of hegemony in November 
1667. Contrary to Andaya’s propositions, I have demonstrated that these chan-
ges did not represent a return to European models, but quite the contrary, an 
even closer orientation towards the overseas context.
As for Speelman’s diplomatic performance during the 1667 campaign, some 
specific achievements should also be noted. First of all he managed to keep the 
alliance with Arung Palakka and the Bugis intact, which was vital in bringing 
about the military victory. Second, with the Bongaya Treaty of 1667, he mana-
ged to construct a political order that not only pacified Makassar, but also inte-
grated Makassar and sultanates in the Moluccas into the Company’s hegemonic 
order. Possibly one of greatest of Speelman’s achievements in this connection 
was his successful arbitration and reconciliation between the former enemies, 
the sultans of Ternate and Tidore, manifested in the treaties concluded bet-
ween them and the Company on March 29 and 30, respectively.74
74 Ibid. 39. 
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The Pragmatic, Empirical 
Model of Overseas 
Diplomacy in Cornelis 
Speelman’s Notitie
Section 1: Chapter introduction
The challenge of preserving the Company’s hegemony 
by diplomacy
The Company tactics to stabilise their power in Ambon was to cut local bonds, 
establish equality between the local units and forge new ties with each single 
local unit to itself as overlord. To establish consensus, the tactic was to play on 
the elite by giving the village heads a position in the administration, and make 
them swear an oath to the Company.1 The Company’s hold of power posed 
challenges comparable to those in Ambon, as well as similar, but also somew-
hat different solutions.
The preservation of the Company’s hegemonic regime basically rested on 
keeping the Makassarese at bay; but it depended particularly on the successful 
preservation of the alliance with the Bugis. There is no evidence to support the 
proposition that Cornelis Speelman ever believed that these challenges could 
be satisfactorily solved by treaty alone. The two extra supporting pillars of the 
Company’s hegemonic regime were its military presence in Sulawesi, and the 
pre-emptive use of diplomacy to preserve the loyalty of both original allies and 
former foes.
1 Knaap 2004, 41. 
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For both the original allies and those who had recently become friends, the 
diplomatic challenge lay in continuing to cultivate good relations while at the 
same being on the alert for any signs of a slackening of commitment or inde-
pendent policy-scheming. Thus, in both cases, preserving the Company’s poli-
tical hegemony depended on diplomacy based on good intelligence on political 
intrigues locally. The topic of this chapter is Speelman’s reflections on and 
advice about the challenges of the Company’s hegemony, and the role of diplo-
macy in maintaining it, as put forth in his report to the High Government on 
the completion of his mission in 1669,2 which was praised by Noorduyn as 
going “deep into the history of the Buginese and Makassarese.”3 Before I start 
to analyse it I shall start by giving a brief overview of Speelman’s diplomatic 
career in the Company to put his performance in and reflections on Makassar 
into perspective.
Section 2: Cornelis Speelman, a brief diplomatic- 
military biography
Cornelis Speelman left the Republic for Batavia in 1645 at the age of 17. Until 
his death in Batavia on January 11, 1684, he held a variety of positions in the 
Company’s administration.4 He started out as assistant and climbed upwards 
to become “boekhouder” (bookkeeper) in 1648, “onderkoopman” (junior mer-
chant) in 1649, before he was promoted to “koopman” in 1652. On December 
28, 1655, he was made “boekhouder- generaal,” and on March 24, 1671, he was 
appointed ordinary member of the Council of the Indies. With Maetsuyker’s 
death in January 1678, and Rijcklof van Goen’s succession as governor-general, 
2 “Notitie dienende voor eenen corten tijt en tot nader last van de Hooge Reeeringe op Batavia, tot naar-
rigtinge van den Onderkoopman Jan van Oppijnen, bij provisie gestelt tot Opperhooft en Commandant 
in ‘t Casteel Rotterdam, op Makassar, en van den Capitain Jan Fransz.: als hoofd over de Militie, mits-
gaders die van den Raadt.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fols. 684–1007. 
(Hereafter Notitie.) I have had immense help by comparing the original source with the typed 
manuscript undertaken by W. Ph. Coolhaas and H. J. de Graaf in 1949–50, now at the KITLV (Nr. H 
802). For a brief introduction to the Notitie, see J. Noorduyn, De handelsrelaties van het Makassaarse 
rijk volgens de notitie van Cornelis Speelman uit 1670 (Amsterdam: Verloren, 1983), 99 ff. 
3 Noorduyn, 1955, 6. 
4 The chronology to Speelman’s administrative career in Batava is based on P. C. Molhuysen, P. J. Blok, 
and L. Knappert, eds., Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek, vol. 5 (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoffs, 
1921), 1254–57. The section on Speelman’s military-diplomatic career outside Batavia is is based lar-
gely on F. W. Stapel, Cornelis Janszoon Speelman (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1936). 
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Speelman was made director-general. He ultimately took over as governor-
general on November 25, 1681, in which position he served until his death. 
Speelman was to receive criticism for sloppiness in performing his duties as 
governor-general, so that although formally his appointment marked the top 
of his career, his performance in the position did not.5
Still, whatever the evaluation of Speelman’s performance within the 
Company hierarchy in Batavia was, of greater relevance here is his diplomatic 
and military career and performance outside the colonial headquarters. 
Speelman’s diplomatic experience started with his participation in Councillor 
of the Indies Joan Cunaeus’ diplomatic mission to Persia, September 15, 1651 
to November 12, 1652. In his capacity as secretary, he wrote the whole report 
on the mission, though he is not reckoned to have had any influence over the 
actual proceedings due to his age, and inexperience.6
Stapel credits him for registering events with an observant eye, often recor-
ding local modes of negotiating with humorous comments.7 All in all, Speelman 
must have performed well, as after the mission’s return to Batavia he was pro-
moted from onderkoopman to koopman on Cunaeus’s recommendation.8 In 
this period, and as a glimpse of what was to be his later emphasis on getting to 
know the ways of the local people, it is evident that at least as early as 1655 he 
had acquired a working knowledge of Malay.9
From July 2, 1663 to October 18, 1665, Speelman served as the Company’s 
governor in Coromandel, one of the more important Company positions out-
side Batavia. Considering the number of different parties the Company had to 
deal with there—not just local princes and power holders, but also rival 
Portuguese, English, French, and Danish merchants—the position demanded 
particular insight and competence.10 Adding to Speelman’s challenge during 
his period in Coromandel was that by January 1665 news of the Second Anglo-
Dutch War between the Republic and England had reached Asia.11 Symptomatic 
5 For points of charges brought against Speelman after his death for his ill conduct in office, see Stapel, 
Cornelis Janszoon Speelman, 153. 
6 Cornelis Speelman and A. Hotz, “Journaal der Reis van den Gezant der O.I. Compagnie Joan Cunaeus 
Naar Perzië in 1651–1652 door Cornelis Speelman, (Amsterdam: Johannes Müller, 1908), Inleiding, lxx. 
7 Stapel, Cornelis Janszoon Speelman, 5–6. 
8 Ibid. 7. 
9 Ibid. 8. 
10 Ibid. 12. 
11 Ibid. 21. 
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of Speelman’s direct mode of facing challenges was that he asked permission to 
attack Fort George. Although he received permission to do so, he was asked to 
return to Batavia to answer to allegations of private trade before he could begin 
the campaign.12
Suspicions about Speelman having taken part in private trade had arisen 
among the Heeren XVII already in 1662 because of letters sent by Speelman in 
August that year, in which it was clear that he wanted a diamond stone, origi-
nally meant as a present for his wife, cut and sold in the Republic.13 We need 
not go further into details, except to note that Speelman was barred from the 
Company’s service for fifteen months and fined 3000 florins.14
The private trade allegations are included here for two reasons. First, 
Speelman’s determination to fight the allegations—as exemplified by his letters 
written in self-defence (one in January 1664 and two in December 1665)15— 
gives us an idea of his tenacity. Second, because the affront Speelman must 
have felt over the accusations may well have been a motivating factor in his 
pursuit of personal glory in the Makassar campaign. Andaya, for one, seems to 
regard this as decisive in Speelman’s motivation. “It was perhaps Speelman’s 
desire to vindicate his name,” he writes, “which led him to ‘reinterpret’ his 
instructions and decide to launch an all-out war against Goa. If glory were to 
be gained, it had to be on this mission.”16 Although Andaya’s point is plausible, 
it should be remarked that nothing in Speelman’s behaviour during the 
Makassar campaign is contradicted by his behaviour prior to it.
As Speelman’s exploits during the Makassar and eastern quarters campaign 
is covered elsewhere, I shall only address it briefly here. When the High 
Government decided to declare war on Makassar on October 5, 1666, Johan 
Van Dam, the leader of the 1660 campaign was initially offered the command, 
but when he declined in favour of returning home, the position was offered to 
Speelman.17 It is noteworthy that this offer was made when only nine of 
Speelman’s fifteen months of suspension had passed.18 It seems reasonable to 
take this as an indication of the High Government’s trust in him.
12 Ibid. 25–26. 
13 Ibid. 26. For the whole affair about the charges of private trade, see 26, 34. 
14 Ibid. 31. 
15 Ibid. 30, 32. 
16 Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, 70. 
17 Stapel, Cornelis Janszoon Speelman, 34–35. 
18 Ibid. 35. 
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The Java Campaign
Speelman’s next major campaign as commander was in central and eastern 
Java. In the middle of the 1670s, a state of unrest and rebellion had arisen 
there. It started as a rebellion against the susuhunan of Mataram, Amangkurat 
I, by Trunajaya, the prince of Madura, but in 1675 he was joined in an alliance 
by Makassarese pirates who had originally sought refuge in Banten after the 
fall of Makassar, but later emigrated to and settled in the eastern hook of Java.19
When the High Government received news that the Makassarese pirates 
had conquered Surabaya and Grisse, and had handed over both to Trunajaya, 
the decision was made to fight the Makassarese pirates, but not Trunajaya. 
After a couple of not too successful raids against the Makassarese pirates, and 
when the High Government received a request by the susuhunan to lend him 
support against the Madurese (made in a letter of December 2, 1667, from his 
governor in Japara), it was decided on December 5, in an extraordinary session 
of the Council of the Indies to intervene on the side of Amangkurat I against 
the Madurese, as well.20 Speelman offered himself for the position of com-
mand, and was chosen to lead the expedition. He sailed from Batavia with his 
fleet for the north coast of Java on December 30, 1676.21 He would not return 
to Batavia until April 1678.22
During his campaign in central and eastern Java, Speelman concluded five 
treaties on behalf of the Company with representatives of or with the ruler of 
Mataram in person. The first was with the susuhunan’s governor in Japara, 
February 28, 1677,23 the next two with Amangkurat II on October 19 and 20, 
1677, respectively,24 and another two with Amangkurat II on January 15, 1678, 
by which the susuhunan renounced his sovereignty over Semarang and sur-
roundings in favour of the Company, and guaranteed monopoly rights for the 
Company for all the sugar production in the coastal cities.25 Taken together, 
the five contracts secured the Company’s superiority over Mataram as well as 
its commercial monopoly rights. Although political stability was not achieved 
19 Ibid. 84–85. 
20 Ibid. 85–86. 
21 Ibid. 88. 
22 Ibid. 115. 
23 Ibid. 90. 
24 Ibid. 106. Amangkurat had succeeded his father in July 1677; M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia 
since 1300, 2nd ed. (London: MacMillan, 1993), 75.
25 Stapel, Cornelis Janszoon Speelman, 114.
318
chap ter 9
across all of Java before the treaty of Giyanti in 1755,26 by 1678, Speelman still 
had obtained more than the High Government initially had hoped for, or even 
wanted.27
How did Speelman do it? First there was determination and persistence. 
Already at the initial discussion over the objectives of the Java mission in 
Batavia, Speelman had put forward the idea that one should not miss the opp-
ortunity to see if one could extract monopoly concessions from the susuhunan 
now that he was in dire need of assistance. The High Government opposed this 
position.28 All the same, already the February 28, 1677 treaty accorded the 
Company regulation of its eastern border in the Company’s favour, securing 
freedom from tolls and harbour taxes, and gave it the right to build lodges 
wherever needed, as well as other favours.29 Similar privileges were granted in 
the October 19 and 20 contracts.30
While Speelman was dealt a strong hand by the susuhunan’s desperate need 
for assistance, context alone cannot explain his success. Determination and 
persistence is one part of the answer, but personal charisma must have also 
played a part. Speelman had, after all, built himself quite a reputation during 
his exploits before the Java campaign. For one, he was the conqueror of 
Makassar, and in general, Speelman’s fame and high standing among Asian 
rulers was exceptional.31 That Amangkurat commanded all Mataramese to 
obey Speelman’s orders32 may have been indicative of this standing. Speelman’s 
insistence on getting to know local conditions must also have played a vital 
role in his ability to handle local affairs. His Memorie on Java testified to the 
fact that he had made no exception to the rule of acquiring local knowledge 
regarding Java and Mataram.33
After his return to Batavia and his appointment as director- general after the 
Java campaign, Speelman increasingly came into the foreground in public life, 
and his esteem among local rulers continued to rise. Tellingly, letters from 
local power holders to the governor-general were increasingly addressed to 
26 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 96–97. 
27 Stapel, Cornelis Janszoon Speelman, 106, 107. 
28 Stapel, Cornelis Janszoon Speelman, 88. 
29 Ibid. 90. 
30 Ibid. 106, 114. 
31 Ibid. 157, pointing to examples, 72, 102, 115. 
32 In a letter of March 16, 1677; ibid. 92. 
33 Ibid. 115. 
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Speelman as well, and even to Speelman alone.34 Replies from the High 
Government increasingly came to be signed by the director-general in addi-
tion to the governor-general and members of the Council.35
Although Speelman in his period as governor-general, as already mentio-
ned, came to be criticised, he still earned one final success regarding the 
Company’s relations with local Asian powers in this period, namely the pacifi-
cation of Batavia’s neighbour to its west, the trading sultanate of Banten.
The conquest of Banten
The port-state of Banten was situated on the north-western hook of Java, and 
comprised also parts of Lampung in southern Sumatra.36 Its relationship with 
the Company, apart from being Batavia’s territorial neighbour to the west, was 
comparable to and ran in important ways parallel to the development of the 
Company’s relations with Makassar. If one substitutes pepper for nutmeg and 
cloves, and the English for the Portuguese, we have a similar conflict over trade 
monopolies and interference of non-Company European rivals that made up 
the basic conflict with Makassar. Even cycles of negotiations, war, and treaty 
between Banten and the Company to a certain extent paralleled those between 
the Company and Makassar. Thus, after a period of conflict in 1636, a truce 
was made between the Company and Banten that later was confirmed in a 
treaty in 1639 that in many respects was equivalent to the one concluded with 
Makassar two years before.
After another period of deteriorating relations after 1639, an agreement for 
a ten-year peace was made in 1645; but as Banten supported Makassar, a coo-
ler climate again set in. Their rapport worsened when the starkly anti-Com-
pany Sultan Ageng came to power in 1651, and tensions heightened as the 
ten-year truce agreed in 1645 neared its term. Open hostilities started again in 
1655, and after intermittent negotiations in 1657 and 1658, ended with a new 
treaty in 1659. This is roughly the same period of war and treaty negotiations 
with Makassar between 1654 and 1660. A short while after the 1659 treaty, 
relations deteriorated again until Sultan Ageng declared war on the Company 
34 Ibid. 120. 
35 Ibid. 121. 
36 The general information on Banten is taken from Guillot, Ambary, and Dumarçay, The Sultanate of 
Banten. 
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at the end of April 1680.37 To understand the ensuing chain of events up to the 
peace treaty of April 17, 1684, one has to look at internal conditions and events 
in Banten from 1680 to 1682 and how the Company reacted to them.
Inside Banten, there was a conflict at the outset between Sultan Ageng and 
his younger son, Purbaya, on the one side, and his elder son, prince Haji,38 on 
the other. The conflict was caused by Haji’s jealousy over being side-lined in 
favour of his younger brother, but was also caused by differences over policy 
towards the Company. Haji showed a more accommodating approach than his 
father and brother. On May 1, 1682, there was a palace revolution in Banten in 
which Haji ousted his father from power and immediately sent envoys to 
Batavia to negotiate for peace.39 The Bantenese envoys and their entourage 
reached the roadstead of Batavia on May 8.
Preliminary negotiations: The issue of letters of 
delegation
Negotiations between Bantenese envoys and Speelman and Johannes 
Camphuis, who were chosen for the task, took place with preliminary hearings 
about the arrangements and procedures from May 10 to the beginning of June. 
It is clear from the transcripts of the talks that the Company’s aim was to lead 
Haji’s negotiators into a treaty of alliance that would stand up to any formal 
criticism from rival Europeans, especially the English. Symptomatic of that 
purpose is Speelman’s insistence that the two Bantenese envoys, Sadana and 
Astradjadja, be provided with a valid letter of delegation of powers from Haji. 
The discussion of that issue took place on the first day of negotiations proper, 
May 17.40 It is characteristic of Speelman’s persuasive mode of negotiating, 
which combined a paternalistic reproach with a forthcoming attitude. It is 
worth looking at in some detail.
Speelman opened the session by asking whether the Bantenese envoys had 
written authorisation empowering them to conclude a treaty41 and substantia-
37 The chronology is based on Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië, 239, 261, 277, 287, 350–53, 
and 413–23. 
38 Named so after his pilgrimage to Mekka in 1674, Stapel, Cornelis Janszoon Speelman, 132. 
39 Ibid. 132–33. 
40 The negotiation session is recorded in DRB May 17, 1680, 249–51. 
41 “met een credentiebrief waeren voorsien met qualificatie omme met ons in alles te mogen tracteren.” 
DRB May 17, 249. 
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ted his request by a reference to the fact that “such was the habit with the 
Dutch and other nations.”42
Sadana, who was the only one of the two Bantenese ambassadors to speak 
during the negotiations, replied by saying that the letter from Haji that they 
had brought on their arrival May 8 was meant to serve this purpose,43 and 
added that according to their custom it should suffice well enough for the pur-
pose.44 To this Speelman acidly pointed out that Haji’s May 8 letter may well be 
considered to serve the function of a letter of delegation to the Bantenese, but 
it did not meet the standards adhered to by the Company. It would have been 
better if the actual delegation of powers had been explicitly stated.45 Rather 
patronizingly, he repeated that “for the sake of their own convenience in hand-
ling their mission, it would have been better still if they had been furnished 
with a letter clearly expressing their powers as delegated from both the sultan 
himself and all his nobles.”46
Speelman went on to phrase his demand for an explicit and specific letter of 
delegation as an ultimatum: “with no clear credentials, or assurance of delega-
ted powers on behalf of the sultan, all the negotiations might in the end prove 
to be of no avail and useless.”47 In other words, if a confirmation by Haji that 
his two envoys were empowered to negotiate on his behalf was not produced, 
there would be no negotiations at all. Sadana then had to give in, replying that 
it would have been better if they had brought such a letter with them.”48 Sadana 
offered to return to Banten to get a proper letter of delegation from the sultan, 
to which Speelman replied that Sadana’s rank were credentials enough. 
Although there was no need for a person of such high rank to go, he advised 
the Bantenese to instead send someone of lower rank from their entourage.49 
42 “Gelyck onder ons en andere volckeren waere.” DRB May 17, 249. 
43 “in plaets van dien was dienende.” DRB May 17, 249. 
44 “na haer wyse genoegsam goet en valiede.” DRB May 17, 249. 
45 “dat sulx soo waere, maer dat het niet quat waere sulcx expresser by geschrift ware verclaert.” DRB May 
17, 249. 
46 “en oversulcx, toot haar gesantens eygen gerustheyt ontlastinge niet beter soude wesen dat zy sich van 
den volcomen credentie off volmagt des Conincx en alle de ryxgrooten quamen te voorsien.” DRB May 
17, 249.
47 “sonder hun volle credentie off vollmagt de conferentien en onderhandelingen wederseyts maar voor 
nodeloos en onnut zouyden wesen te agten.” DRB May 17, 249. 
48 “Waarop zy repliceerde sulx mede wel te connen begrypen, dat een volcomen credentiebrieff …voor 
haarzelver beter en geruster waere.” DRB May 17, 249. 
49 DRB May 17, 250. 
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So, at the end of what one must regard as a rather humiliating instruction in 
the proper mode of conducting diplomacy by Speelman, there was also a suga-
ring of the bitter pill by acknowledging Sadana’s rank and status.
One should not mistake Speelman’s insistence on proper credentials for 
dogmatic formalism. There was a real issue involved, but it did not primarily 
concern the Banten–Batavia axis. It primarily concerned the VOC–EIC axis, 
and more broadly, relations between the Company and its European rivals. 
The motive for and intent in obtaining a formal watertight letter of authorisa-
tion was to ensure that any agreement between Haji and the Company could 
withstand challenges to the negotiations’ legitimacy from the Company’s 
rivals. Thus, the agreement had to be made “by the book,” which required that 
the Bantenese negotiators be properly empowered. Paradoxically, this issue 
was but another example of how the context of local interactions imprinted on 
the Company’s mode of approach, although in this case it had the appearance 
of procedural dogmatism.
In the end, nothing binding came out of the negotiations in Batavia, and 
the ensuing negotiations in Banten also ended inconclusively because the 
counterproposals made by the Bantenese were unacceptable to the Company. 
All the same, relations between Banten and Batavia remained peaceful 
through 1681.50
Inside Banten, however, a civil war erupted in the beginning of 1682, as 
Sultan Ageng supported by the English and other Europeans residing in Banten 
sought to regain his power from Haji. As the rebels gained increasing support 
in the beginning of March, and Haji became isolated in his residence in Banten, 
he sent a letter to the Company asking for assistance.
Speelman convened the Council on March 1, when a decision was made to 
assist Haji in order not to miss “this golden opportunity.” At the same time, it 
was also decided that the Company should initially offer to arbitrate between 
Ageng and Haji. As Ageng did not even respond to the Company’s offer, the 
Company engaged itself militarily on Haji’s side.51 We need not go into details 
of the Banten campaign here, except to state that in the end it was a success for 
the Company, and resulted in the treaty between the Company and Banten of 
April 17, 1684 that made Banten a vassal state of the Company in all but name. 
50 Stapel, Cornelis Janszoon Speelman, 133. 
51 Ibid. 134–35. 
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By the time of the signing of this treaty, Speelman had already died, but surmi-
sing that he may have had some influence over the outcome, and because parts 
of the treaty illustrate another aspect of the Company’s diplomatic repertoire 
than we saw in the handling of the delegation of power issue, I shall offer some 
comments on it.
The 1684 contract
The April 17–28, 1684, treaty between Banten and the Company52 consisted of 
ten articles and two amendments: a statement by the sultan about the treaty, 
called an acte van obligatoir (declaration of obligations) and a declaration of 
remission of debts owed by the Sultan to the Company by the governor-gene-
ral and the Council of the Indies called an acte van remissie.53
The two amendments to the 1684 treaty laid down a transaction in which 
the acte van remissie gave the Company a monopoly on the purchase of pepper 
and the sale of Indian cloth in Banten, and in return relinquished its claim on 
Haji for war costs. The acte van obligatoir also stated the background for Haji’s 
debt of gratitude to the Company for its assistance to him during the civil war. 
Additionally, in the way it narrated the story of the relationship between Haji 
and the Company, it sought to make the arrangement between the Company 
and Haji into a solid patrimonial relationship of Company generosity and 
altruism reciprocated by gratitude and loyalty from Haji. This also made the 
relationship impenetrable and immunized the Company against accusations 
of interference by outsiders. This illustrates a constructivist aspect of treaty 
making very well, and I shall analyse it in some detail.
The main part of the text in Sultan Haji’s acte van obligatoir gives a chrono-
logical account of the events from Ageng’s abdication in May 1680 to the Dutch 
intervention in 1682. The background for Haji’s precarious position, his letters 
asking support from Batavia, the Dutch offer of assistance linked to the offer of 
arbitration and Ageng’s rejection of it, and Haji’s rescue by the Company, are 
all recorded true to the basic historical facts. All the same, these facts are 
described in a manner that underscores the patrimonial bonds between Haji 
and the Company.
52 In Corpus Diplomaticum, 3.336–51. 
53 Corpus Diplomaticum, 3.342–46 and 346–47, respectively. 
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The Company as the “Good guy”
Being narrated in the firstperson plural by the sultan, the prominent theme in 
the acte obligatoir is his recognition of his bond of gratitude to the Company. 
The focus is placed on the Company’s assistance to him, which has been “ren-
dered so loyally and proved to be so important.”54 The Company is further 
praised for having “dedicated itself fully, and spared neither their empathy, nor 
money nor men”55 in their support for the sultan’s cause. 
The other foreigners in general and the English in 
particular as the “Bad guys”
The loyal dedication of the Dutch must be understood as all the more prai-
seworthy when contrasted to the devious conduct of the other European nati-
ons at Banten, who had allied themselves with and supported the rebels with 
arms as well as with money from the beginning of the rebellion against Haji.56 
The Dutch thus by both explication and implication stand out as Haji’s only 
true and committed friends. When Haji was still sultan in 1684, it was thanks 
to the Dutch intervention. Haji’s moral obligation to the Company should thus 
be “obvious to the whole wide world.”57
Tokens of gratitude
Given Haji’s bond of gratitude to the Company for its efforts in support of 
his cause and the services rendered to him, the privileges given to the Company 
are to be regarded as no more than tokens of his obligations to the Company. 
The commercial privileges are depicted as an offer of compensation made by 
Haji and not as demands from the Company. They are, in fact, presented as 
Haji’s initial offers. The opening paragraph of the acte obligatoir states that Haji 
had decided “to approach the Company not only with the promise to 
54 “de hulpe, die soo getrouwelijk en soo vrughtbaar bewesen is.” Corpus Diplomaticum, 3.342. 
55 “niet gespaard haar sorg, onkosten en volk om mijn rebellige onderdanen te dwingen en ons te herstel-
len.” Corpus Diplomaticum, 3.344. 
56 “Van den beginne des vyandschap af den vyand geholpen met raad en met daad en met wapenen en 
oorlogengereetschap en met geld.” Corpus Diplomaticum, 3.343. 
57 “opdat onse schuldige beleydenis en dankbarheyt openbaar werde voor de gantsge wereld.” Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 3.344. 
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compensate [it] for the war costs, but also to accord an exclusive privilege of all 
trade on Banten to the Company.”58 Those were Haji’s terms or offer if the 
Dutch would help him keep the throne and establish peace and order in his 
realm.59
It is further noted that the Company is the generous party. Haji’s offer of 
compensation is stated to be less than a fair return for the services rendered to 
him; in fact, the Company could fairly have demanded more in return for its 
services or benevolence.60 An appeal to legal legitimacy is forsaken for the 
benefit of motives of altruism, although implicitly mixed with promises of 
material gain: “Realising the sultan’s precarious situation, the governor-general 
and Council were moved into action by the sultan’s promises and their 
compassion.”61 The noble aspect of the Company’s motives is emphasised.
The Dutch condition that before they could dedicate themselves militarily 
to Haji’s cause, they must first establish whether there were any grounds for 
arbitration with Ageng, fits into this configuration of benevolence and altru-
ism. The offer of arbitration must be understood as an indication that the 
Company was dragged into the conflict against its will. In this scenario, the 
fact that Ageng ignored the arbitration offer is used to present a contrast bet-
ween a moderate, peace-seeking Company and a hardened and uncompromi-
sing Ageng abetted by his European supporters. The Council had decided first 
to see if there was any possibility of Ageng and the rebels agreeing to a peace,62 
but the latter “were neither willing to negotiate nor to enter a truce, nor hear 
any talk of peace, encouraged and supported as they were by other European 
residents.”63 In other words, because Ageng was intent on war with Haji and 
58 “te versoeken de hulp en bystand der Comp.ie, op conditie, dat wy niet en allen souden voldoen de 
penningen en oncosten, welcke door de Comp.ie dartoe verspielt soude moeten werden maar daaren-
boven ook haar te geven octroy van den gatschen handel, met uytsluytinge van alle andre natiën of 
personen.” Corpus Diplomaticum, 3.342. 
59 “Alles met conditie, dat wij maaar alleen souden blyven sultan van Bantam, met rust en vrede.” Corpus 
Diplomaticum, 3.342. 
60 “reeds merder vereyst werd tot vergeldinge van haer dienst (ofte weldaad).” Corpus Diplomaticum, 
3.344. 
61 “Wanneer den Gouverneur- Generaal en de Raden van India … onse uyterste nood sagen, soo sijn sy 
door onse beloften, en haar medelyden bewogen geworden.” Corpus Diplomaticum, 3.342–43. 
62 “dat sy eerst souden ondersoken of den sultan Agon en zijn wederspannig volk niet in der minne te 
vreede konde gestelt werden.” Corpus Diplomaticum, 3.343. 
63 “maar haar rebellie en hertnekkigheyd … was soo vermeerdert en toegenoemen, dat sij weygerden 
aaan te horen eenige redenen of versoek tot stilstant van wapenen of tot vrede gevoed en ondersteunt 
door de Frangise residenten.” Corpus Diplomaticum, 3.343. 
326
chap ter 9
the Europeans residing in Banten conspired with him and encouraged him, 
the Company was driven to intervene to support the lawful ruler and re-estab-
lish law and order.
The Company’s accommodationist approach manifested itself even after 
victory. Although Haji would have liked to see the Europeans who sided with 
Ageng punished more severely, at the Company’s urging he agreed merely to 
expel them from the realm.64
So, not only were the Dutch content to see their European rivals disappear 
from Banten, events had played into their hands to present it a consequence of 
their rivals’ own doing in a course of events that the Dutch themselves had 
done nothing to instigate. On the contrary, they had acted as go-betweens to 
“soften” the attitude of the sultan, to “rescue” their fellow Europeans from a 
more forceful revenge.
For all the explicit and implicit praise of the Company in the sultan’s acte 
obligatoir, the Company’s actions between 1680 and 1682 had another, much 
more narrowly defined dimension of power politics about it. But, the configu-
ration of the Company’s altruism and Bantenese gratitude and obligation had 
a function in power politics, too. They went to provide legitimacy to both the 
Company’s intervention as well as its post-war arrangement with Banten.
Despite their difference in form, the patrimonial altruism in the depiction of 
Company–Banten relations described in the acte obligatoir and the seemingly 
procedural dogmatism in Speelman’s stand in the May 17, 1680, negotiations in 
Batavia were both manifestations of the wide spectrum of pragmatic treaty con-
figurations in the Company’s diplomatic repertoire at the time. A close reading of 
the acte van remissie makes it clear that the altruism was pragmatic and not idea-
listic, because it was stated as a condition of the remission of debt that it could be 
revoked at any time should the Bantenes meet their contractual obligations.65 
Poorly concealed under the Company’s self-praise was, in other words, its insis-
tence on its rights by treaty, and implicitly its will to enforce them if necessary.
As we now move on to the more specific topic of Speelman’s advice on the 
diplomatic approach towards Makassar, my proposition is that in that case too 
Speelman reveals a similar broad-spectered pragmatism.
64 Corpus Diplomaticum, 3.344. 
65 ende so wij ter contrarie in het gebruyk en geniten van het meergenoemde octroy warden verhindert … 
om deselve schult ten allen tijden te mogen eysgen en ontfangen, Ibid. 347 
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Section 3: Analysis, the Notitie On the Notitie as a 
source for Speelman’s thinking about overseas 
diplomacy
After having secured the Company’s power in Makassar, Speelman left for 
Batavia in October 1669. Shortly before that, he had begun writing his instruc-
tions and advice to assistant merchant Jan van Opijnen, who had been left in 
charge in Makassar. During the six-week voyage to Batavia and after his arrival 
Speelman continued working on the manuscript, until it was finally delivered 
to the High Government on February 17, 1670. The original manuscript is 
probably no longer in existence, but the oldest surviving copy runs to 646 folio 
pages in all.66 The analysis below is based on the latter.
The Notitie covers the period from Speelman’s arrival in Makassar in 
November 1666 up to his departure. The text is organised in part chronologi-
cally and part topically. Thematically, it can be divided into two parts: 
Speelman’s instructions for the defence and administration of Fort Rotterdam, 
and a survey of the political geography of South Sulawesi. The latter can in turn 
be further split into sections devoted to the Company’s Bugis allies, the outer 
islands, and former allies of Makassar in Sulawesi. These three parts concern 
respectively, local colonial administration, descriptions of and reflections on 
the Company’s allies, and descriptions of the Company’s erstwhile enemies 
during the campaign. A striking feature of Speelman’s treatment of his subject 
is his detailed and at times intimate description of individual power holders 
regarding both their personal traits and personal and kin relations. Quite apart 
from the political implications, this bears witness to Speelman’s thorough 
knowledge of local affairs.
In addition to information on local political conditions, he also included 
observations on topography, flora, fauna, geography, and history. Some of this 
seems to have been written out of a sheer joy of observation and formulation, 
but most of it was primarily meant to provide relevant information to the 
Company’s residents in Makassar with tacit and explicit advice about how to 
act to preserve the Company’s position.
66 For the chronology and general introduction to the Notitie, see J. Noorduyn, De handelsrelaties van het 
Makassaarse rijk volgens de notitie van Cornelis Speelman uit 1670 (Amsterdam: Verloren, 1983), 
99–101. 
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Propositions
Beginning with Speelman’s reflections and advice on diplomacy in the Notitie, 
I intend to demonstrate that he applied a consistent casuistic approach to 
diplomatic interaction with local power holders, whether they were friends or 
foes. He stressed the need to obtain as precise information of local conditions 
and circumstances as possible, in the evident belief that diplomacy had to be 
based on a knowledge of and willingness to adapt to local conditions. 
Conversely, formal legal considerations receive little if any consideration. I 
shall term this approach “empirical, pragmatic diplomacy.” By its pragmatic 
approach, this also represented a “learning-by-doing” approach to diplomacy. 
At the risk of repeating myself: The mode was dynamic.
The learning presupposed an ability to make meaningful and relevant inter-
pretations of local conditions and situations. I propose that this was what hap-
pened for two reasons: First, the overseas interaction was sufficiently 
commensurable with European standards to make possible a variety of mea-
ningful understandings and communications. As this was the case, relevant 
understanding and actions increased over time.
A methodological reminder
The term “model” may be misleading if it is taken to mean that I suggest that 
Speelman worked out an explicit, general recipe on the “art of overseas diplo-
macy” in the Notitie. He did not. What we do find are descriptive overviews of 
the background and history of friend and foe, as well practical considerations 
and advice on how the Company could uphold the loyalty of its allies and 
maintain control over its former enemies. In fact, the very idea of a “general 
model” of overseas diplomacy runs counter to Speelman’s mode of exposition 
and analysis in the Notitie, which focuses consistently actual cases. All the 
same, I have chosen to use the term “model” in the title because some general 
characteristic features of Speelman’s thinking about and approach to overseas 
diplomacy can be reconstructed from his casuistic and concrete exposition. It is 
this kind of reconstruction that I intend to undertake in the following.
Plan of exposition
I shall start by briefly introducing Speelman’s conceptualisation of the relative 
roles of treaties, military force, and diplomatic negotiations, before I turn to 
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some of his considerations on diplomacy’s role in upholding the Company’s 
hegemony in general. I then point to some of Speelman’s remarks on the 
importance of acquiring precise information on local conditions. The main 
body of the discussion constitutes an analysis of Speelman’s case descriptions 
and assessments of old friends and former foes in South Sulawesi—more spe-
cifically, three of the Company’s main enemies in Makassar, and the Company’s 
principal ally, Arung Palakka. While all these cases have their peculiarities, 
they all highlight a characteristic feature of Speelman’s “method,” namely his 
keen eye on the personal character and human nature of the men of power 
with whom he dealt. Not least was his continuous assessment of how their 
personal characteristics could be used for the benefit of the Company. These 
traits go to illustrate that Speelman conceived of and handled overseas diplo-
macy in more “personalised” than “institutionalised” terms. That is but another 
characteristic of the empirical pragmatic approach.
I shall round off the survey on Speelman to suggest that even some traits in 
Speelman’s physical appearance and personality contributed significantly to 
his diplomatic success, and that these attributes were reinforced by their com-
patibility with local perceptions.
The limitations of treaty agreements in upholding the 
hegemonic regime
Speelman certainly had no trust in treaties as a regulating means of interaction 
by itself. The Makassarese, he believed, would agree to any treaty without 
necessarily having any intention of honouring it. For instance, on the sultan’s 
remark that the “Admiral (Speelman) decides everything and that there was 
nothing he himself could do about it, but to accept it,” Speelman laconically 
remarks that this was “nicely put, but in reality not so intended.”67 Promises of 
support from local allies could be even more confusing and less trustworthy.68
However much these examples seem to support Andaya’s view of a collision 
of conceptions about the nature of treaties, one should first look at the weak 
institutional structure of diplomacy in Europe, and the European record of 
67 “den Admiraal is meester van alles, Soo als hij ordonneert, moeten wij tevreeden zijn. Gunt van die 
zijde wel gezegt, maer niet gemeennt is.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 707b. 
68 See for instance Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, 718b–719b. 
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broken treaties in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.69 More significant, con-
textual factors may do more than local political culture to explain Makassar’s 
breaches of treaty with the Company in the period 1637–66. First there was an 
objective clash of interests in the Moluccas. Second, the terror of distance, and 
thus the Company’s weak sanction power so long as it did not have a territorial 
base in Sulawesi, must have played a part in Makassarese risk calculations.
As it was, the context changed radically with the Company coalition’s victory 
in 1667 and the establishment of Fort Rotterdam as the Company’s colonial 
headquarters in Sulawesi. Speelman’s historical account of the Company–
Makassar interaction between 1637 and 1666 serves to corroborate his view 
that treaties not backed by realistic military sanctions were of limited value.
Speelman’s account of the Company’s interaction with 
Makassar up to 1666—the relative value of treaty 
regulations to military sanctions
Speelman’s description and analysis of VOC–Makassar interaction from 1637 
up to the decision for the campaign on October 25, 1666, proceeds chronolo-
gically, using the three cycles of conflict, negotiations, and war, and treaties in 
1637, 1655, and 1660, respectively, as the structuring principle of his story.70 
The prose is written in a neutral, objective tone with few comments. Thus, 
Speelman’s view of the role of treaties in the Company–Makassar interaction 
can be reconstructed by implication.
Speelman depicts the “settled peace” of the 1637 treaty71 as one that “settled 
all differences and issues between the two, with all conflicts solved and done 
with,” excepting the issue of a permanent trading lodge for the Dutch.72 As for 
the period from the 1637 treaty to the outbreak of war in 1653, and the 1655 
treaty, Speelman merely notes that interactions went on with ups and downs 
69 See for instance, Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, chapter 1, and Black, A History of 
Diplomacy, 43–59. 
70 With the qualification of course that in 1637 there was no war between Makassar and the Company.
71 “vaste vreede” by Speelman consistently dated to 1636, VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 
1671, fol. 820a. 
72 “alle verschillen, verwijderinghe veroorsaackt hebbende, bijgelecht ende vergeleecken.” VOC 1276 OB, 
Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 820a. 
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until 1653.73 The incidents that took place that year, and Makassarese support 
of the rebels in Ambon are given as the reasons that “war came to break out.”74 
The outbreak of war is thus presented as a logical response to Makassarese 
provocations and breaches of the 1637 treaty.
As for the outbreak of the war in 1660, Speelman simply states that the 1655 
treaty was of such a nature that the High Government was displeased with it; 
he refers to its instructions to Van Dam and Truytman in 1660 as evidence.75 
This statement of fact is all that Speelman offers as an explanation for the High 
Government’s decision to go to war in 1660. Makassarese breaches of the 1655 
treaty were by implication what had “led the Honourable Gentlemen to declare 
the 1655 treaty annulled and actions of war begun.”76 The brevity of the nar-
rative needs no further explanation other than to remark that by 1660 the 
belief that a settlement with Makassar could be reached by good faith and trea-
ties alone was a dead letter.77 
Speelman attributes the decision for war in 1666 to continued Makassarese 
harassment,78 which led to Resident Verspreet’s departure from Makassar and 
return to Batavia in 1665, and Wesenhagen’s “unproductive negotiations” in 
February the following year.79
Speelman is hardly any more elaborate on the underlying reasons for the 
outbreak of open conflict here than in his treatment of the background of the 
1655 and the 1660 wars. Although he refers to “the real reasons”80 given in his 
instructions in October,81 in the Notitie the outbreak of the war is again explai-
ned as result of Makassarese provocations, namely the Makassarese invasion of 
73 “sijnde dit soo onder diverse contenties, goede ende quade wederzijtse bejegeninge etc. gecontinueert.” 
VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 820a. 
74 “tot een openbaar oorloch quam uijt te breken.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 
820a. 
75 “soodanich, dat hun Ed. Daervan haar misnoegen thoonden, connende blijcken, bij d’ instructie voor 
d’Heer Van Dam en den Ed. Truijtman 1660 verleent.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 
1671, fol. 820a. 
76 “wat rede Hun Ed.le gemoveert hebben, deselve . aff te breecken, en een aenslach op Pannekoka te 
maecken.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol.820a. 
77 See chapter 6. 
78 “uijt de bedrugtinge van ongemaecq.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, 820a. 
79 “sonder ijets te verrichten.”, VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 820a. Speelman 
seemed to have the correct dates confused, Wesenhage left for Makassar February 16, 1666, see Stapel, 
Het Bongaais Verdrag, 85, referring to DRB. For the events see Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, 82–85.
80 “de eigentlijcke oorsaecken.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 820a. 
81 VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 820a. 
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the Sulu Islands and the murder of Company personnel on Saleijer, and the 
plunder and murder in connection to the wreckage of the ship De Leeuwin.82
Summary: The limitations of treaties
In Speelman’s historical survey of Company–Makassar interactions, these 
are represented as a continuous story of broken treaty terms by the 
Makassarese. The implicit lesson is that treaties unsupported by political 
control and a realistic recourse to military sanctions, were worth next to 
nothing. The functional treaty was one that could be protected and defended 
within the framework of a hegemonic political and military structure. In the 
post-1667 order, the alliance structure of the Bongaya treaty and Fort 
Rotterdam filled that function.
On diplomacy’s role in upholding the Company’s 
hegemony in general
Speelman ends his historical narrative of Company—Makassar interactions 
with a note of pride in the Company’s achievements. With victory and the 
Bongaya Treaty, not only was peace restored in the land, it was restored with 
added glory and an enhanced reputation for the Company.83 Taking into 
consideration that the Company’s hegemony rested on the various parties’ 
loyalty to it as their supreme overlord, a boost to reputation was beneficial, 
and a main diplomatic challenge lay in protecting it. But the hegemonic sys-
tem also rested on the preservation of peace among the local signatories of 
the Bongaya Treaty. In other words, as hegemon the Company had not only 
to oversee and keep the allied parties loyal to itself, it also had to concern 
itself with, and be prepared to interfere in, regional and local conflicts to 
preserve peace and order. I shall analyse Speelman’s presentation of typical 
challenges in some of these axes and the respective means he recommended 
for handling them.
82 VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 820b. 
83 “in ‘t gantse land nu weder vreede, met veel meerder reputatie als te vooren.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen 
Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 820b. 
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Bugis–Makassar relations
The approaches towards the Bugis allies, on the one hand, and the erstwhile foe 
Makassar, on the other, had different ends at the outset. During the campaign 
and before the conclusion of the 1667 treaty, the challenge was to keep the 
alliance with the Bugis intact to crush Makassar. In the post-Bongaya order, 
the challenge regarding the Bugis was essentially to keep its loyalty intact and 
transfer it into the post- conflict order. For Makassar, the challenge was still to 
check and eventually pre-empt any ambitions of regaining its former power.
Balancing the power of the formerly dominant Makassar against the rising 
power of the Bugis proved a challenge. Speelman confided to the High 
Government that he was well aware that, after the fall of Sombaopu, the Bugis 
had started to feel uncomfortable about being tied too closely to the Company,84 
and had from time to time approached Makassar.85 Contact had taken place in 
secret, without either asking for the Company’s presence or informing it of the 
initiative.86 Although never explicated by Speelman, the Bugis initiatives not 
only represented a breach of loyalty, but also of the treaty, particularly article 
25, which stated that all such contacts should take place with the knowledge of 
and in the presence of the Company’s representatives.87 The High Government 
need not worry unnecessarily however over these secret negotiations,88 conso-
led Speelman, as nothing seems to have come of it.89 His advice on the matter 
is that one would do well to stick to the agreed articles of the treaty as far as 
possible and enforce them with discretion and firmness.90
It seems fair to suggest that although not explicitly proposed, what Speelman 
had in mind was a pre-emptive strategy based on balance-of-power thinking. 
The alliance with the Bugis should be maintained while keeping their ambi-
tions in check. At the same time, it was important to not weaken the Makassarese 
84 “De Bougijs in dees tijdt haer onder Comp’s ontsach wat gevreest en geviert siende.” VOC 1276 OB, 
Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 821a. 
85 “hebben nu en dan al meer met de Maccassaren genegotieert.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek 
Makassar 1671, fol. 821a. 
86 “sonder van ons ijmant present te roepen off daer van kennisse te doen.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen 
Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 821a. 
87 Particularly art. 25 of the Bongaya Treaty. Corpus Diplomaticum, 2.378–39, see chapter 7. 
88 “hoedanich negotiatie U,E. haer niet hoeve aen te trecken.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek 
Makassar 1671, fol. 821a. 
89 “soo der dispuijt over viele.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 821a. 
90 “maer de bekende poincten dienen naer vermogen en met discretie in vigeur gehoude te werden.” 
VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 821b. 
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too much. If so, a balance of power among the local powers, presided over and 
regulated by the Company, was to be a governing principle of Speelman’s hege-
monic order.
Implications
I regard Speelman’s pragmatic reaction to the Bugis breach of contract and 
his trust in a balance of power to keep both the Bugis and Makassar pacified 
as illustrative of his pragmatic thinking. Power relations took precedence 
over insistence on legalisms. One does well to note that this pragmatic 
approach meant that an observant eye had to be kept on events at the two 
courts to identify any increase in dissatisfaction and opposition, but at the 
same time provocative action, which would result in unnecessary aggressive 
reactions on the part of either the Bugis elite or at the court of Makassar, 
had to be avoided. If that was true for the main ally and former main enemy, 
it was also true for the smaller political entities as well. In short, the hege-
monic system was built on information and the interpretation of local poli-
tical activities.
The importance of acquiring precise information 
on local conditions as the general foundation of 
the Company’s diplomatic performance
In the introduction to the section headed “Description of the allies,”91 Speelman 
makes the limitations of his effort clear. His ambition is “not to give genealogi-
cal tables of rulers nor account for the precise jurisdiction and authority, or the 
military strength of their realms,”92 as that would have taken more time than he 
himself had at his disposal.93 Drawing an encompassing political geography of 
South Sulawesi with the aim of organising the required political order among 
91 “Beschrijvinge der Bontgenooten.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 708a ff.
92 (ick) “ben niet van sinne daer bij te doende geschlaghtreckeningen, eigelijcx jurisdictie van landen 
en heerschappijen, nogh sterckte van vermogen.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, 
fol. 708a.
93 “want dat een en andere vereijst wat meer tijdt, als ick nu over hebbe.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen 
Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 708a. 
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the local allies had to be left to his successors94 who would be able to assess the 
situation more accurately,95 Speelman seems almost to lament this.
In any case, for Speelman, the increase of knowledge based on experience 
or the accumulation of information on local conditions had to form the basis 
of the Company’s power in South Sulawesi. And one should add that he was 
far too modest about his own contribution to it. The Notitie is full of informa-
tion about political fissures, power factions, and the personal qualities of 
rulers and pretenders in South Sulawesi. This information is not a neutral 
survey, but a systematic political mapping necessary to preserve the 
Company’s power.
Information about local power is typically presented at two levels of ana-
lysis in the Notitie, namely as an analysis of relations of power seen from an 
historical-contextual point of view, and from the level of personal agency. Of 
the two approaches, the latter takes primacy in Speelman’s analysis. At the 
end of the day, from the Company’s point of view the questions were who to 
approach because of their position and influence in the power hierarchy, and 
how to approach them to deter them from scheming against the Company, or 
how to win them over to the Company’s side and make them useful to the 
Company.
The need for detailed information on local political conditions thus went 
with the institutional order of hegemony as such, but might have been enhan-
ced by an appreciation of the fluid nature of the overseas context, where perso-
nal bonds were stronger than institutional ones. The latter called not only for 
accurate information on local political conditions, but for intimate knowledge 
and information about personal character to either bar unwanted persons 
from power or forge or renew bonds with desirable ones. If information on 
both context and agency prospects was equally indispensable, it was at the 
agency, or personal, level that the “art of diplomacy” was practised. The rest of 
this chapter is dedicated to an analysis of Speelman’s performance and advice 
in four cases that concerned three of the Company’s main adversaries in 
94 “meest te staade sal comen voor den geenen, die het zijn wercq sal worden onder de bontgenooten 
selve de gerequireerde orde stellen.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fols. 708a.
95 “wanneer oocq de perfectheijt best en claerest te ondervinden sal wesen.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen 
Briefboek Makassar 1671, fols. 708b. 
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Makassar—Karaeng Karunrung, the “young king” of Makassar,96 and the “king 
of Tello,”97—as well as the Company’s main ally in South Sulawesi, Arung 
Palakka.
Considerations with respect to the foe: Karaeng 
Karunrung
References to Karaeng Karunrung are scattered throughout the Notitie. In the 
description of the 1667 campaign, he appears for the most part as a secondary 
figure, but in the section on Makassar98 he is the subject of a lengthy and syste-
matic treatment. In brief Karaeng Karunrung and his brother Karaeng Sumana 
fell in and out of favour with Sultan Hasanuddin from the 1660s and up to the 
fall of Makassar. The two represented a hard and an accommodating approach 
towards the Dutch. In 1660 Karunrung been replaced as chief minister by the 
more moderate Sumana, and in 1664, Hasanuddin pressured the banishment 
of Karunrung from Makassar, whereupon the latter went to Banten and then 
Passir in Borneo. But in 1665, after the failure of a Makassarese embassy to 
Batavia in 1664, the peace party led by Sumana was discredited, and 1665 saw 
the return of Karunrung to the Makassarese court.99 Speelman’s relation of 
Karunrung starts with a chronology of his falling in and out of favour at the 
Makassarese court.100 Speelman also offers a description of Karunrung’s vices 
and virtues, and ends up with an account of his own abortive attempt to make 
Karunrung a Company ally. For economy of space, I shall limit my analysis to 
Speelman’s characterisation of Karunrung’s personality, and give some com-
ments on the implications of Speelman’s plan to make Karunrung an ally.
On Karunrung’s vices
Intelligence and cunning in a cynical quest for power are the characteristic feat-
ures of Speelman’s depiction of Karunrung’s political manoeuvring. Relating the 
96 This must be Hasanuddin’s son, I Mappasomba, in favour of whom Hasanuddin abdicated after the fall 
of Sombaopu, June 1669. See Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, 134, I shall be using Speelman’s 
term. 
97 This must be Karaeng Tello. Ibid. 121–22. I shall be using Speelman’s term. 
98 VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 816b-819a. 
99 Basset 1958, 34-35. 
100 VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fols. 817bf. 
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story of Karunrung’s return to power in the court of Makassar, Speelman holds 
nothing back in depicting him as having a totally amoral and cynical persona-
lity. Karunrung’s re-entry into court opened a Pandora’s box of evil. He was now 
once again in position to “go on with his daily base deeds and ill-doings of mur-
der, provocative behaviour and various sorts of black magic, just as before.”101 
This is a tale so horrifying Speelman goes on, “that it would be inappropriate for 
decent ears, as it would fill the listener with nausea, and if written down, would 
take piles of paper.”102 Speelman then denounces Karunrung’s base womanizing 
and lack of sexual morals: “No one can keep count of his numerous broken mar-
riages, not to mention his concubines.”103 This went together with numerous 
murders of innocents initiated or committed by him.104
Speelman similarly condemns Karunrung’s political machinations and 
motives as amoral. The recklessness of Karunrung’s exercise of power is gene-
rally recognised by the Makassarese, states Speelman, yet no one dare speak 
out openly against him.105 Karunrung’s motives are recognised as base too. All 
agree that he was out to ruin the realm for no other reason than to avenge 
himself on the kings of both Goa and Tello for their prior ostracism of him.106 
In other words, if Karunrung was a base man as far as personal conduct is 
concerned, his political conduct and motives were no better.
A special case in which Karunrung’s cynical politics and womanizing intert-
wined was his disgraceful abduction of Karaeng Saderbone’s wife, a plot for 
which he recruited the king of Tello. Although rumours had it that Karunrung’s 
intention was to marry his captive, there can be no doubt, states Speelman, that 
101 “gaande voort alle sijne vulgaire dagelijcxe misdrijven, en quade comportementen van moord, (onge-
schickte vertooningen, bemoeijenisse met tooverijen en anderer dergelijcke, dewelke superstitien, soo 
wel nogh in den jegenwordigen als in den voorganghe tijdt.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek 
Makassar 1671, fol. 818b. 
102 “als sullende de vertellinge daervan voor eerbare ooren onbetamelijcq en met een affgrijselijcq wesen, 
behalven datter vellen papier met soude gevult worden.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 
1671, fol. 818b. 
103 “sijn getroude en weder verlaten vrouwen can hij selve niet mer tellen, ik swijge van sijne bijwijven.” 
VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 818b.
104 “Noch veel minder can hij opreeckenen de moorden, door hem selve gedaen, en door de sijne ten 
sijne  bijwesen doen, sonder oorsaecke off waerom.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 
1671, fol. 818b.
105 “de Maccassaren groot en cleen, siende en observerende sijne directie tot hiertoe stellen vast, maer 
derven het niet openlijck uijtseggen.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 818b.
106 “dat hij geen ander opsigt heeft, also om door een totael bederff van het gantse lant sich te wreecken, 
en te resenteren tegens de beijde coningen over sijne uijtbanninge.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek 
Makassar 1671, fol. 818b. 
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he had no other intention than bringing her into disrepute and mistreating her.107 
The political rationale seems to have been that the act of abduction itself not only 
brought the abducted wife into disrepute, but her husband, one of Karunrung’s 
adversaries as well. In Speelman’s eyes, Karunrung was thus a man in whom 
deviousness and evil in private and political affairs went together.
Yet, Speelman presents another perspective of Karunrung, viewing him in 
terms of his strategic use in maintaining the Company’s power in Sulawesi. In this 
light, Karunrung comes out very favourably because of his strategic and cultural 
competence, which in actual fact may be viewed as an alternative, more positive, 
way of looking at some of the qualities we have seen Speelman condemn above.
Karunrung’s virtues
“Putting his vices and dubious nature aside,”108 Speelman opened his descrip-
tion of Karunrung’s virtues, “on the other hand one does well to appreciate him 
as a man of intelligence, well-informed about the world around him, and well 
experienced in both political and military strategy and tactics.”109 Speelman 
further praised Karunrung’s ability to keep calm and not easily be taken by 
surprise by unforeseen developments and events.110 He is bright,111 possesses a 
good memory,112 and has a sharp eye for observation.113 When circumstances 
demanded, he could also act with the required leniency and forgiveness to tie 
bonds of allegiance with his people.114 In addition, Speelman holds forth that 
Karunrung has been taught in many trades115 and is well spoken.116
107 “Dat hij nu met de novo na ons vertrecq sal ten wijve nemen, ongetwijffelt met intentie om desselve 
dan daernaer in verachtinge te brengen, en met quaet tractement te beswaeren.” VOC 1276 OB, 
Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. fol. 818b. 
108 “Sijn boosheeden en quade nature aen een sijde geset.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 
1671, fol. 818b. 
109 “men mach hem aenhouden voor een heer van goet verstant, wereldkundich en gauw ervaren, soo wel 
in politie als oorlogsdirectie.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol.818b. 
110 “Assurant en niet licht verset over onverhoetse toevallen.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 
1671, fol. 818b. 
111 “Scherpsinnich.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 818b. 
112 “groote memorie.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 818b. 
113 “naeuwkerig observantie.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 818b. 
114 “oock near gelegenheijt door miltheijd ‘t volcq hem aenhangigh te maeken.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen 
Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 818b.
115 “onderwesen in veel fraije exercetien.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 818b. 
116 “seer wel te tael.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 818b. 
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Speelman went on to stress that one also had to take into account the cultural 
competence of Karunrung’s upbringing and education. Karunrung’s father had 
for instance let his son be taught by the Portuguese.117 Thus, not only did 
Karunrung speak perfect Portuguese, in addition to several local languages, he 
read and wrote them, too.118 All in all, concluded Speelman, Karunrung stands 
out as “the most competent of all the people of power in Makassar: none more 
so than him, none his equal, all of them below his standard.”119
Significantly, Speelman’s praise of Karunrung is in terms of diplomatic and 
political strategic capability and not in terms of personal moral assets. 
Furthermore, Speelman’s profile of political admiration for Karunrung comes 
close to a self-portrait; at least it is hard not to recognise qualities in Speelman’s 
praise for Karunrung that he himself would not have taken pride in. But there 
was a more immediate practical dimension to Speelman’s praise. Despite all his 
moral flaws, Karunrung was a man of political competence that could become 
very useful for the Company. In his virtuous aspects, Speelman considered 
him a “perfect partner,” and so had moved to seek out the possibility of luring 
Karunrung over to the Company’s side.
Luring Karunrung over to the Company’s side
Immediately after the conclusion of the peace of Bongaya, Speelman had 
approached Karunrung to establish bonds of confidence with him.120 But alt-
hough the prospects looked good in the beginning, in the end it did not work 
out.121 Speelman blames this on Karunrung’s initial lack of confidence in him, 
which he attributed to his generally suspicious and conspiring mind.122 
117 “door de bestel van de vader sijn meeste onderwijs en de instituatie bij de Portuguesen gehadt.” VOC 1276 
OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 818b.
118 “spreeckt hij perfect haere en versceijde anderer hierlandsche taelen, leest en schrijft se mede.” VOC 1276 
OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 818b.
119 “Summa boven alle regenten in Maccassar de bequaemste, dies noch in effect meester van sijne 
meesters.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 818b.
120 “waerom icq oocq al ten eerste near de vreede van Bonaeije gepooght hebbe, met denselven in ver-
trouwe te comen.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 818b. 
121 “maer offschoon geleecq, dat het sich wel soude schicken, soo echter viel het naar mijnen sin niet uijt.” 
VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 818b. 
122 “want gelijck hij was vol alderhande quade machines sulcx beswaert van gemoet, stacq hij oocq vol 
achterdocht, en dorffte sich darhalven aen mij niet vertrouwen.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek 
Makassar 1671, fol. 818b-819a.
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Karunrung’s inherent devious nature thus aborted Speelman’s scheme to make 
use of his virtues in the service of the Company.
That Speelman considered recruiting Karunrung to the Company’s side des-
pite his vices is still telling of Speelman’s view of overseas diplomacy. Karunrung’s 
personal vices were outweighed by his extraordinary political capability. One 
might even suspect that some of his vices, or at least his cynicism, might have 
counted as a politico- tactical asset so long as they were used in the service of 
the Company. In any case, Karunrung’s political talents taken into the balance, 
the benefits were too tempting not to try to secure his cooperation. As such, the 
effort well illustrates the pragmatic nature of Speelman’s overseas diplomacy.
The young king of Makassar
In Speelman’s eyes, the “young king” of Makassar matched Karunrung’s base 
morals. Inclined towards drinking and gambling in his youth,123 he continued 
these habits after coming into power.124 He also demonstrated little interest in 
more serious matters (of state)125 for which he had received little training in his 
youth.126 The lack of education in affairs of state as a youngster probably would 
not have made much of a difference anyway considering that the king “should 
not be considered of the brightest kind” at the outset.127
In addition to his lack of moral standards, training, and intellectual capacity, 
Speelman also finds weaknesses of character in the sultan. He is a man of “no 
direction,”128 “nor resolution,”129 but “self-absorbed.”130 The young king was, in 
short, a man badly qualified to handle a crisis.131
Speelman’s judgment of the young king’s character flaws with political implica-
tions extended to a more personal, private level. He declared him extremely 
123 “in sijne jonckhejt is hij genegen geweest tot drinken en speelen.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek 
Makassar 1671, fol. fol. 819a.
124 “sedert in emplooij comende, is dat naer gebleven.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, 
fol. 819a.
125 “heeft sich weijnig becommert in observatien van wightige saecken.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen 
Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
126 “clein onderwijs ontfangen in sijn minderjarighheijt.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 
1671, fol. 819a.
127 “van deselve ‘t verstant niet groot sijnde.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
128 “geen man van directie.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol.
129 “noch van resolutie.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
130 “disponneert van sich selve.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
131 “niet vervaert en verset in tegenspoet.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
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petty,132 never rewarding any services, not even those of his house staff,133 and 
being inclined towards womanizing as well.134 In matters of religion, Speelman 
depicted him as a hypocrite, being outwardly demonstrative in his pious obser-
vances135 while his real concern was for personal enrichment only.136 No moral 
standards seem to have restricted his quest for more money; any means sufficed 
for him137 to the extent that he would (even) consent to do business with a street 
slave if he thought he could make even a marginal profit from it.138 In short, by 
Speelman’s standards the king was more a petty peddler than a worthy ruler.
In addition, the sultan had a vengeful nature and was filled with hate for his 
foes,139 while he considered all his own faults and misdeeds as pardonable.140 
He was “In all truth a mock king to serve as a Company king,”141 Speelman 
concluded. The young king was but a Company puppet, in other words.
This “caricature king,” with all his faults and follies, was one that the Company 
could live well with. Tellingly, after his character assassination of the sultan, 
Speelman went on to speculate that the break of the Bongaya Treaty and the 
war that followed142 would probably not have taken place, if the real power had 
lain in the hands of the king instead of, as had been the case, with Karunrung.143 
The implication is a familiar one, namely that one had to keep good intelli-
gence about which individual or faction held actual power at the court, and to 
132 “gierich boven mate.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
133 “loont gene diensten, sijne domestiquen selve krijgen niet.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek 
Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
134 “genegen tot vrouwen.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
135 “naer ‘t uiterlijcq, fijn in het gelove.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
136 “op sijn getijen, heel overgegeven tot geld conquestie.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 
1671, fol. 819a.
137 “‘t sij op welcke wijse ‘t oocq wesen magh.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 
819a.
138 “sullende een slave van de straet bij hem ter negotie admitteren, soo der een weinich winst bij is. VOC 
1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
139 “Wraeksuchtigh en haetdragent.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
140 “evenwel sijn alle misdrijven bij hem voor gelt vergeffeelijcq.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek 
Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
141 “echter spuls genoch, om een Comp’s coninck te wesen.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 
1671, fol. 819a.
142 See chapter 8.
143 “Dat de vreede van Bonaeije niet en soude sijn vervallen, soo hij sich selve meester waer geweest, en 
sijn eijgen sinlicheit opgevolgt ware, hebbende het oocq niet an hem geappert, onse successive aenma-
ningen van herten te amplecteeren, om een eijnde van ‘t oorloch te maeken. Dan gelijcq hij sijn macht 
langer onmactig was, soo en dorffde hij sijnen inentie niet te kennen geven, indien se was contrarie de 
opinie van Cronron.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
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support Company-friendly rulers however stupid they might be, following the 
principle that better stupid and friendly than smart and unfriendly.
A shared implication in Speelman’s characterisation 
of Karunrung and the young sultan of Makassar
Although Karunrung stands out as the chief villain in the history of Makassar–
Company relations, there can be little doubt that in Speelman’s hierarchy of 
qualities in a ruler, Karunrung ranked well above the young king. For one 
thing, whereas Speelman kept a balance sheet between vices and virtues for 
Karunrung, he recorded no virtues for the young king at all. Some of what he 
found is detestable, but mostly he found harmless mediocrity. Karunrung’s 
vices seem to imply a certain “grandeur” when compared to the sultan’s 
mediocrity, and to reflect a complementary side of a man of great intelligence, 
strategic insight, and the ability to act wisely.
I suggest this contrast in depiction reflects that Speelman felt he shared 
more with the cunning politico-military Karunrung than with the ruler 
who cared more about satisfying his own lusts and greed than to rule. In 
this configuration, Karunrung represented a “worthy opponent” whom 
one should try to lure over to the Company’s side. The small- minded, 
money-seeking sultan, the Company’s “mock king”, represented but a 
comical figure of nominal power who the Company could manipulate for 
its own ends.
The king of Tello
In the introduction to the characterisation of the King Tello we are, as in the 
case of the young king of Makassar, presented with the picture of an untrained, 
incompetent, and spoilt man of power. Only seven months old when recogni-
sed as ruler following the sudden death of his father,144 the king of Tello’s trai-
ning as a political leader was totally neglected during his childhood. He was 
not instructed in political matters, but simply left free to follow his personal 
impulses, whatever they might be.145
144 VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
145 “maer heel niet geinstrueert, noch in eenige saecken onderricht, volgende onbecommert sijne begeer-
lijckheijt, ‘t sij dan goet off quat.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
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Still, Speelman is less critical of his personal vices than he is of either the 
young king of Makassar or Karunrung. There are no tales of big scandals 
and excesses told about him,146 but neither was there much to praise him for.147 
The king of Tello stood out in Speelman’s description as a grey man of little 
significance. He was not of evil temperament,148 but he does not seem to have 
been particularly keen on amassing riches for himself either.149 Of the exten-
sive means left to him by his inheritance, a lot had been squandered in gifts to 
women whom he consecutively married and then left.150 Apart from this, he 
seems to have been preoccupied with nothing other than sleeping, eating, and 
pleasure seeking.151
Besides showing little interest in politics, the king of Tello also seems to have 
felt uncomfortable with the attendant responsibilities.152 Still he was not a devi-
ous man,153 though he seems not to have possessed a lot of courage.154 A man 
of little significance, and so seemingly harmless, one would conclude. Still, 
Speelman noted that after the “last peace” a change could be spotted in the 
king in that he seemed to have become more observant of political matters, 
and had started to look behind his back.”155 This called for an intensified 
courtship by the Company as it might open the opportunity to bind the king 
closer to it.
Advice on how to approach the king of Tello
The political message from Speelman to the High Government and his succes-
sors in Makassar was that although the king of Tello seemed to represent 
146 “Heele groote uitjspoorigheden ofte quade comportomenten worden van hem niet vertelt.” VOC 1276 
OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
147 “veel loff en wert hem oocq niet toegeschreven.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, 
fol. 819a.
148 “quaetaertigh is hij niet.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
149 “onbequam om schatten te samelen.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
150 “De middelen hem naergelaeten sijn veele, vermindert met begiftinge van vrouwen, die hij al eenige 
getrout en weder verlaeten heeft.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
151 “bemoeijt sich nergens met als met slaepen, eten en vermaeck te soecken. VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen 
Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
152 “onbequaem tot het bestier van saecken.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
153 “maer niet valsch off bedrieghlelijck.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
154 “Sijn couragie wert niet seer gelaudert.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819a.
155 “Evenwel schijnt hij sedert de laetse vreede wat andachtiger te sijn geworden, beginnende oocq wat 
achterrugge te sien.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819b.
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neither a potential threat nor a particularly useful ally to the Company, one 
would do well to look out for his “political awakening” or if he should start to 
harbour political ambitions of his own that could be turned to the benefit of 
the Company. In view of the king’s recent political reorientation, he might be 
drawn over to the Company’s side. But that would take planning and due 
caution. The task of pursuing the switch of loyalty had to be put in the hands 
of a “trustworthy agent,” and one had to take care to isolate the king from 
“agents with bad influence.”156
Working in favour of this scheme was that the king of Tello stood in higher 
esteem among the population in Makassar than, and was clearly preferred as a 
ruler to, both the king of Makassar and Karunrung.157 So, all in all, prospects 
did not look bad; at least they were presented as  being well worth pursuing. 
What it would take was clever diplomacy. In Speelman’s conceptualisation, and 
in Company’s conceptualisation generally I would say, that meant a man with 
knowledge of and competence in local thinking and modes of behaviour. If 
“clever diplomacy” had to be performed by agents well versed in local ways 
and manners of doing things, the discovery of opportunity for increased 
Company influence had to be based on assessments of the local situation. 
Company self-sufficiency and Eurocentrism would have been counterproduc-
tive in both cases.
Summing up: The implications of Speelman’s 
assessments of the Makassarese foes
There can be no doubt that for Speelman, the major flaw in the king of Tello’s 
character, as it was in the case of the young king of Makassar, lay in his lack 
of interest and training in matters of state. Speelman’s harsh judgement of 
both in this respect represents a complement to his admiration for 
Karunrung’s political competence and abilities. By implication, Speelman’s 
condemnation also demonstrated his own political credo, namely that one 
must know about affairs of state to take part in them successfully. By 
156 “Men sal hem genoeghsaem near Comp’s intentie connen leijden … als men door ijmaent, die men 
vertrouwen magh, quade instrumenten van hem weert.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 
1671, fol. 819b. 
157 “Bij het volcq van Goa en Tello is hij verre veel getrocken en bemint, boven den conincq van Goa ende 
Cronron.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819b. 
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implication, for the Company to take part in local politics, it had to learn 
about their workings, not to speak of what it took to protect and defend its 
hegemon position.
It goes for all three of these character assessments that although some of 
Speelman’s observations might resemble gossipy journalism, the gossip in 
the final instance served a political purpose as part of an assessment of how 
to act towards these men of power to gain maximum Company influence. In 
the case of Karunrung, Speelman tried to win him over to the Company’s 
side because of his exceptional abilities; in the case of the young king 
Makassar, one was better off leaving him be and not provoking him, harm-
less as he is in his indulgence in private pleasures, and use him as a “mock 
king.” In the case of the king of Tello, one could well have left him be too, if 
it were not for the fact that his new interest in politics might open new opp-
ortunities. It was better to explore and pursue that possibility. Speelman’s 
“gossip” was not “gossip” per se; it was an essential part of his political survey 
for defending the Company’s political hegemony.
A return to the information dimension
A nicer word for “gossip” is “information.” As for Speelman’s information 
about local affairs, he makes explicitly clear that it was based on his personal 
experience of the kings on site, both friends and foes.158 But he also made it 
clear that he might have gotten some facts wrong, or that facts might emerge 
that would be contrary to what he had related.159
It is beyond my ambition at present to point out what Speelman might have 
missed or even gotten wrong. What should be noted, however, is that both the 
implications of Speelman’s analysis of local power and his own self-proclama-
tion of their inherent shortcomings point towards a critical approach that is 
diametrically opposed to a dogmatic Eurocentrism.
158 “Dit sij geseght van de voors. 3 princen naer de presenten tijdt, soo uitgenoome informatie, als eijge 
bevindinge, staande mijn aenwesen hier omtrent, dat icq deselve als vriend en vijant gefrequenteert 
hebbe.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819b. 
159 “connende niet te min wel sijn date er ergens in mijn voorgaende schrifturen wel iets contrarie desen 
gevonden wierde.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 819b. 
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Three aspects of keeping the alliance with Arung 
Palakka
In the case of Arung Palakka, the situation was inverted compared to 
Karunrung and the other foes. It was the task of keeping Palakka as the glue 
that held together the alliance with the Bugis states that constituted Speelman’s 
overriding challenge and concern. However, his diplomatic approach towards 
Palakka remained the same as it was in the case with Karunrung; a personali-
sed, pragmatic approach.
Speelman’s point of departure in his analysis of Arung Palakka was that both 
the Company’s political hegemony and political stability in Sulawesi depended 
on his position as uncontested leader of the Bugis. It was not merely important, 
it was vital; the success of the campaign and the integrity of the Company’s hege-
mony depended on it. There were two potential obstacles to reaching that goal; 
that Bugis unity would fall apart with the death of Palakka, or that Palakka would 
lose his hitherto uncontested position as leader of the Bugis. Speelman sought to 
pre-empt these threats by appealing to both local and non-local traditions.
I have selected three cases that illustrate the composite nature of overseas 
diplomatic challenges as well as Speelman’s pragmatic approach to handling 
them: his use of Palakka’s claim to Soppeng and Bone on the grounds of dynas-
tic rights and heritage; his handling of the succession issue in the event of 
Palakka’s premature death; and the issue of Palakka’s speculations on religion 
as a possible threat to his position should his speculations be known. The first 
and last were argued in terms of local tradition, the second reflects the institu-
tional difference between the South Sulawesian polities and the Company.
Legitimacy by dynastic claims and historical tradition
Speelman began his description of Arung Palakka160 by laying down the legiti-
macy of his claims to kinghood in the Bugis realms of Bone and Soppeng. It 
was a claim based on dynastic legitimacy: Palakka was connected by family 
ties to both the ruling houses of the Bugis.161 Palakka’s claim to Bone needed 
160 For Speelman’s description of Arung Palakka in the Notitie, I build on VOC 1276 OB, Inkomend 
Briefboek Makassar 1671, fols. 708b ff. and 746a ff. 
161 “vermaghschapt aen de beijde hooge huijsen der Bougjis.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek 
Makassar 1671 fol. 708b.  
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no extra argument, considering that he came from one of the highest-ranking 
families there;162 but for Soppeng, the situation was more complicated, as 
Palakka was only indirectly related to its royal house.163 Speelman’s approach 
to arguing for Palakka’s right to Soppeng was thus made primarily in historic 
and only indirectly dynastic terms. The logic of the legitimacy of Palakka’s 
claim was that as Soppeng was a dependency of Bone,164 so by his dynastic 
rights to Bone Palakka was in fact a legitimate pretender to the throne of 
Soppeng, too. He was, claims Speelman, a legitimate pretender to both the 
royal houses of Bone and Soppeng, by force of traditional custom as well as by 
legal rights.”165 The point here is that whereas neither the dynastic nor the his-
torical claim to sovereignty was foreign to European tradition, one would have 
to know something about local South Sulawesian affairs to discover Palakka’s 
claims to the lineage as Speelman does. That Arung Palakka must have been 
one of his main sources here does not detract from the fact that Speelman 
regarded this information as vital to an understanding of the political structure 
and workings of the political system.
Surveying local political power relations
Speelman also analysed the political implications of not only dynastic heritage 
but of current marriage alliances as a source of power. In his account of the 
quality of Bugis leaders under Palakka’s command166 is, for instance, one Arou 
Vacqua, who was married to Palakka’s sister.167 The marriage tie was obviously 
seen as leveraging Palakka’s “alliance capital,” as Vacqua was a lesser prince of 
Soppeng.168 This is but one instance of how Speelman surveyed constellations of 
local power relations. His listing of genealogical records and marriage alliances, 
as well as his surveys of local lord–vassal relations and dependency relations all 
162 “en onder die voor eene van de hooghste rangh.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, 
fol. fol. 708b. 
163 VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 708b. 
164 “eijgelijck te reeckenen voor en steende en onderhoorigh Koninckrijck van Bone.” VOC 1276 OB, 
Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 708b. 
165 “de een en ander soo na is dat hij buijten infractie van outheden couthumen en wetten sustineert, soo 
wel tot conincq van Soppingh als tot coninq van Bone te comen en te mogen gecooren worden.” VOC 
1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 746a.
166 VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 709a ff.
167 VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 709a.
168 VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 709a.
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constitute specific aspects of a mapping of local power in South Sulawesi; and 
that mapping was an indispensable element in the Company’s diplomatic 
structure.
Two questions still arise: Was Speelman’s information reliable? And was 
Speelman capable of interpreting the information he received reliably? A lot of 
his information must have come from Palakka himself, the rest from local 
sources, so at least most of it must have been factually correct. And even if such 
was the case, was Speelman in a position “understand” its deeper implications? 
According to Andaya, as a European, Speelman was “culturally blocked” from 
acquiring a deeper understanding. I have two counterpropositions. First, inso-
far as the interactions between the Company and local powers are concerned, 
the political cultures of Western Europe and Southeast Asia were sufficiently 
compatible for a pragmatic transcultural, if still not “perfect,” understanding.
None of the cases of legitimacy claims that Speelman explored in detail 
needed “cultural translation” to achieve a workable understanding in the first 
place. All were compatible with seventeenth-century Western European poli-
tical culture. The dynastic principle was the main source of power legitimation 
in Western Europe, to the degree that even if one considers the Dutch Republic 
as something of an exception, it still applied to the power position of the House 
of Orange.
Second, one should note that Andaya’s argument rests on the assumption 
that locals had only one model of political communication at their disposal, 
their own. But why would they apply that without modifications in transac-
tions with outsiders? The evidence both in the Makassarese use of the 
Portuguese and in their dealings with the Dutch suggests, to the contrary, 
that they “imported” what they thought useful, and tried to fend off whate-
ver threatened their freedom of action and autonomy from the outsiders. 
This points towards a quite different and dynamic interaction logic than 
that allowed for by the proposition of static mutual misunderstanding. 
Speelman’s cultural competence acquired from his long overseas experience 
and his fluency in Malay also seems to suggest that he would not have con-
sistently been blocked from understanding local conditions and 
structures.169
169 See, for instance, Stapel, Cornelis Janszoon Speelman, ix. 
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The concern over Arung Palakka’s lack of legitimate 
heirs
After laying out Palakka’s genealogy and its political implications, Speelman 
went on to comment on Arung Palakka’s four (official) wives. His “first wife,” 
long a resident in Batavia when Speelman wrote, descended from the kings of 
Gowa and Saderbone on her father’s side and was thus, remarks Speelman, 
generally to be regarded as of Makassarese descent.170 Putting aside Speelman’s 
personal characterisations of her, based on second-hand opinion and on pri-
vate conversations with Palakka,171 the issue was basically political, although 
there seems to be some disagreement over the role of heredity in the Bugis 
tradition. Noorduyn for one stresses that the Bugis kingdoms, were “strictly 
hereditary in character”,172 although he also admits an aspect of pragmatism, 
or “pragmatic opportunism” as he calls it in the fact that “people oriented 
themselves to the person who manifested the greatest concentration of 
power.”173 On the other hand Pelras holds that in the Bugis kingdoms no 
office was properly speaking hereditary, although it was not uncommon for a 
son or daughter to succeed a parent. 174 Whatever difference of opinion, there 
still can be no doubt that for Speelman and the Bugis nobles who he was dis-
cussing the matter with, the issue was who should succeed Palakka if he 
should pass away.
By right of his first wife’s descent, Arung Palakka had a legitimate claim to 
the throne of Makassar. In this regard, his first wife represented both a political 
asset and a liability. Apart from the prestige inherent in her dynastic heritage, 
she was regarded with high esteem at the court of Makassar.175 But her status 
also represented a potential danger. This came to the surface in Speelman’s 
response to Palakka’s raising the issue of the return of the first wife to Sulawesi. 
Palakka had put the request gently by asking Speelman “whether he thought 
170 “Sulcx in ‘t generael van Maccassarse affcomste.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, 
fol. 747a. 
171 “gelijck oocq Sijn Hoogheijt daer van mij betuijcht heeft.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 
1671, fol. 747a 
172 Noorduyn, 2000, 113, 
173 Noorduyn, 2000, 116. 
174 Pelras, 1996, 179, 184. 
175 “onder de eersten spraecken de Maccaarse coningen seer met groote genegenheijt van desselve.” VOC 
1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 747a. 
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the High Government would object to it.”176 Speelman recorded that “he had 
laughed it away as if that was no issue at all.”177 But Speelman’s laugh in this 
instance was tactical. On this issue, there is reason to believe that Speelman 
was double-playing Palakka, or at best was not being totally open with him.
The Company’s hegemonic position rested on preserving a relative strength 
compared to its Bugis allies. The possibility of a Bone– Makassar union, which 
Palakka’s marriage to his first wife made possible and which a return of her to 
Sulawesi would actualise, could possibly have jeopardised the Company’s 
hegemony in South Sulawesi. Tellingly, after having related his reply to Palakka 
on the issue on the repatriation of the first wife, Speelman addressed the High 
Government directly, revealing that he himself had done nothing further to 
push the matter.178 The final decision on the issue he left to the Council,179 but 
he himself was of the conviction that it would be wise to keep an eye on the 
first wife’s association with the Makassarese, “as she is said to possess bold 
ambitions.”180 Speelman’s fear was that the presence of the first wife in Makassar 
might well prove a distracting factor in Palakka’s war effort and that she may 
well harbour political ambitions of her own. Concerns of political strategy held 
primacy over personal friendship at the cost of feeding Palakka with false 
expectations.
On the other hand, Speelman made a detailed “tour de force” of personal 
intimacy when describing Arung Palakka’s three other official wives. On the 
one hand, this goes to illustrate the fact, often overlooked or understudied in 
the historiography, that there were personal friendships and emotional bonds 
between Company commanders and local allies. After all, Speelman and 
Palakka were brothers in arms who fought together and drank together, and 
thus knew each other’s personal weaknesses, faults and, not least, emotions. In 
176 “off dan de Hooge Regeeringe wel toelaten soude, dat sij met hem ginge.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen 
Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 747a. 
177 “daer icq doorgaens om lachte, in sulches schijn, als off dat geen vrage waert was.” VOC 1276 OB, 
Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 747a. 
178 “Tot nogh toe heb ick althoos daer geene geinclineert, van deselve ginder te doen verblijven, dat met 
fatsoen, staende het oorlogh, conde geschieden.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, 
fol. 747a. 
179 “Wat hun Ed.le nu voorts daerinne disponeren sullen, staat te besien.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen 
Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 747a. 
180 “benick van gevoele, dat het niet onnoodigh sal wesen soo se hier coomt, op hearer ommegangh met 
die van Maccassar goede acht te geven, zijnde, near ick hoore, oocq seer ambitious en grootshertigh.” 
VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 747a. 
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short, it was human beings, not cultures or legal systems, that were interacting. 
But if the human factor should not be underestimated in the study of diploma-
tic practice, Speelman’s basic issue concerning Palakka’s wives was still basi-
cally about power.
The political dimension comes fully to the fore when Speelman rounded off 
his survey of Palakka’s marriage alliances with a brief conclusion on his many 
by-wives, whom he did not really consider “proper wives.”181 Official wife or 
by-wife is not the issue, however. The issue is the lack of legitimate heirs to 
Palakka, and who should then succeed him in the event of his premature death.
As for the by-wives, they could be dismissed or treated more lightly than the 
four “official” wives because the former could not produce legitimate heirs 
comparable to the ones produced by the “official” wives.182 The problem was, 
however, that none of Palakka’s official wives had yet produced any legitimate 
successor either.183 The closest in the line of succession were thus Palakka’s four 
sisters, all of whom at the time resided in Batavia.184
This situation left the matter of the succession of Arung Palakka with all its 
implications for the political stability and preservation of the Company’s hege-
mony hanging in the air. And Speelman could not let it hang there, the issue 
was too pressing. The alliance with the Bugis with Arung Palakka as king of 
both Bone and Soppeng formed the cornerstone of Speelman’s plan for 
Company hegemony in South Sulawesi. An unsolved succession procedure 
thus represented a potential obstacle for Speelman’s venture and the Company’s 
cause in Sulawesi as such. It therefore posed an immediate challenge.
Establishing an agreed succession procedure
During the campaign, writes Speelman, he had often discussed the matter of 
succession in the case of Palakka’s sudden death with other Bugis leaders.185 The 
key questions were who might be trusted to fill his position as leader of the 
181 “nu niet veel in aensien als eijge wijven werden gehouden.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek 
Makassar 1671, fol. 747b.
182 VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 748a.
183 “Geene kinderen heeft sijn Hoogheijt van al sijne wijven, nogh bijwijven geprocureert, oocq bij gene 
van de affgaende en aengecoomende soorte, soodat hij is sonder eenigh wettige eerffgenaem.” VOC 
1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 748a.
184 VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 748a.
185 “geconfereert.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 748b.
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Bugis peoples, and how it would be possible to go on fighting the war with 
undiminished stamina.186 The response, according to Speelman, had been eva-
sive and inconclusive on all occasions. The Bugis commanders neither wished 
to discuss the matter,187 nor had they been willing to point out any likely succes-
sor candidates.188 All the same, both parties had agreed that it would be neces-
sary to have a plan in place in case Palakka should be indisposed or pass away.189
As can be seen from the effort that Speelman put into it, the issue represen-
ted a pressing problem of the highest priority, but it was a difficult challenge 
that required considerable tact. In a meeting where the most prominent Bugis 
leaders were present, Speelman relates that he had once again put forward the 
issue in the most “discrete manner”190 at the end of the session. The response 
from the Bugis leaders left much to be desired. All of them declared that they 
were willing to die with the prince if he were to be killed by the enemy.191 
Speelman put little faith in this declaration, however, cynically adding in 
parenthesis: “words come easy, but deeds had already proven differently to 
our men.”192
Speelman, then, obviously pressing for a more decisive solution, collective 
suicide would hardly solve the problem, presented a scenario in which Palakka 
had died of illness, that is a situation in which demonstrative self-sacrifice 
made no sense. The Bugis leaders’ response to this scenario was that in such a 
case they would have no alternative but to turn to the Company.193 Still, they 
refrained from any commitment to identify Palakka’s successor.194 By implica-
tion, the Company was made an integral component in the appointment of a 
186 “waeraen men in cas van Radjas verongelucken offte affsterven het gesagh, aen hem over de Bougijse 
volckeren gedefereert, weder met gerustheijt toevertrouwen ende overgegeven mochte, tot vermij-
dinge van ‘t oorlogh derselver.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 748b.
187 “daer zij evenwel niet geerne spraecken.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 748b.
188 “en nogh veel minder om verklaeren van ijmant te doen.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 
1671, fol. 748b.
189 “hoewel zij selve oordeelden heel nootsaeckelijcq, dat het diende te geschieden.” VOC 1276 OB, 
Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 748b.
190 “op een gevoelijcque wijse ten tapijte gebraeght.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, 
fol. 748b.
191 “Ijgelijck woude sterven met sijn Hoogheijt, soo hij stierff van ‘s vijants hant.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen 
Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 748b.
192 “woorden sijn dogh niet duijr, ‘t contrarie van dit opgeven was ons volck al gebleven.” Ibid. fol. 748a.
193 “maer van sieckte, daer niets tegen te doene was, zij hadden geen andere toevlught als aan de Comp.e.” 
VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 748a.
194 “en conden derhalven niet seggen, wie in sulcken cas van hun des coningx plaetse hoorde te beclee-
den.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 748a.
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successor to Arung Palakka. But, this was by implication only. The Bugis lea-
ders’ response to the succession issue confronted Speelman with a situation in 
which he neither got any explicit proposals for a plan of action nor sugges-
tions for a procedure to which the ally was totally committed. This was unac-
ceptable for him.
At the same time, the situation might have struck Speelman as ironic, 
because he was confronted with a situation that would have appeared ideal, 
given that the Company wanted to establish a kind of direct hegemony over 
the Bugis. All it would have taken would be to wait for, or even arrange, 
Palakka’s death in battle or otherwise at a convenient moment when control 
over Makassar had been secured. After all, a situation of political paralysation 
or conflict in conjunction with a succession crisis was normally viewed as a 
“golden opportunity” for political intervention in local affairs.195 But in the 
case of Palakka, the conditions were the other way around. Palakka was the 
indispensable ally without whom the campaign stood to lose its impetus and 
pace, or fall apart altogether. The plan for his succession was an emergency 
plan, to secure the success of the whole venture of establishing and upholding 
Company hegemony in South Sulawesi in case of his premature death.
If Palakka should die on campaign, Speelman could hardly hope for a repla-
cement by a man of comparable status and standing among the Bugis. But he 
could at least hope for a replacement process in which the Bugis leaders them-
selves took part, and dedicated themselves unanimously to one and the same 
candidate. A candidate anointed by the Company alone could hardly expect to 
be met with the same recognition. So, in this case Speelman was confronted 
with a situation where he had to take on the role of mediating and arbitrating 
positions within his local ally camp.
As it was, a plan of action in case of Palakka’s premature death was finally 
agreed upon between the Bugis leaders and Speelman. The nobles declared 
that they would have no other choice than to turn to the Company, and would 
therefore not be in a position to declare who should succeed Palakka. They 
would, however, comply with whatever the Company recommended. And, as 
they recognised the king of Soppeng as their legitimate overlord, they would 
also be loyal to his choice for Palakka’s successor, which he and the Company 
195 Banten 1682 is a classic case, also with Speelman as the executor for the establishment of Company 
hegemony. See De Jonge, Opkomst, 4.clvi–1clxxi.
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would come up with together.196 There then followed a discussion about who 
would be the least controversial and most competent ruler, about which no 
conclusion was reached. The matter was finally resolved when the lord of 
Soppeng and Palakka without further ado simply declared the princes of Craijo 
to be the primary of the candidates, and thus the group from which the 
Company should make its selection.197
So, even if postponing the actual selection of a specific candidate, the agreement 
at least produced a procedure with a built-in guarantee of legitimacy by involving 
the Bugis directly. It was probably the best Speelman could get at the time.
Two preliminary lessons can be learnt from Speelman’s tackling of the chal-
lenge of securing a succession procedure with the Bugis leaders. Accepting for 
the sake of argument that Speelman had a deficient understanding of cultural 
perceptions of power underlying the Bugis unwillingness to name a successor 
to Palakka, in the end he did reach a solution that both parties could accept. 
That must have taken at least some cultural competence. Second, the discus-
sion about the succession procedure illustrates an important aspect of what 
overseas diplomacy was about in general, namely negotiations with local lea-
ders on ad-hoc issues as one went along.
No one even remotely sane would do that without taking into consideration 
the mode of thinking of the local negotiation partners. The baffled way in 
which the scenario of Palakka’s sudden death was received and tackled by the 
Bugis leaders might be taken as an indicator of a political environment with a 
low degree of institutionalisation. In contrast, Speelman’s insistence on a ratio-
nal, predetermined solution to the succession issue might be taken as indica-
tive of a political tradition in which the impersonal took primacy over the 
personal. But such a structural contrast in which Speelman’s positions are 
taken to have been “dictated” by a pre-imported notion of the institutional 
holding primacy over the personal misses the mark or is incomplete at best.
As we have seen in other instances, Speelman’s reflections on diplomacy 
towards his Makassarese foes and his Bugis friends demonstrate a tuned appre-
ciation of the “personality factor.” A better way of explaining Speelman’s pres-
sing for an institutional solution to the succession of Palakka than as an 
196 “Sij soude alles doen ‘t gene wij haer deden aenbevelen en erkennende sij hem ook in alles gehoorsa-
men, insgelijcx dengeene, die hij daer met ons soude goetvinden in plaetse van sijn Hoogheit te laten 
succederen.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 748a.
197 VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 748b. 
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overreliance on familiar institutional Procedures, is that it was conditioned by 
context. While predictability as in this case was crucial, Speelman reverted to 
institutional arrangements because it came closest to insuring the Company’s 
situation. One should also bear in mind that it was partly the charismatic 
dimension of Palakka’s political power that made it so crucial for Speelman to 
construct an institutional safeguard for a continued alliance between the Bugis 
and the Company should he pass away. The established institutional solution 
then represented a pre-emptive device made particularly pressing because of 
the lack of, or weak, local alternative, an example of a pragmatic approach, 
although one with a familiar European outcome.
I shall conclude with a discussion of Speelman’s pragmatic handling of a 
totally different issue, namely the threat to Palakka’s personal prestige and stan-
ding with the Bugis, should he make his personal speculations on religion public.
Arung Palakka’s personal charisma and the hazards of 
going public with his religious speculations
To a large degree, Palakka’s political capital rested on the popularity he held with 
his men, which did not go unnoticed by Speelman. Illustrative is the latter’s 
recording of an instance in which many of Palakka’s men, at a time when they 
thought him dead, were brought to tears of joy and affection to see him alive and 
well.198 This is another example in Speelman’s text in which he comments on 
emotions. But once again, his objective was to accentuate the political considera-
tions. Not only did Arung Palakka’s dynastic heritage identify him as legitimate 
king of Bone and Soppeng, his personal charisma secured his place as the undis-
puted leader of the Bugis. This must be upheld. Yet, the prince was in danger of 
jeopardising his personal prestige by making his thoughts on religion public.
On several occasions, states Speelman, Palakka had confided in him about 
his animosity towards Islam and announced that he was inclined to renounce 
his faith, having become more sympathetic towards Christianity.199 The only 
198 “In desen generale toeloop bleecken actien van lieffde niettemin, die veele Bougijs over vreughde van 
sijn Hooghheijt in sulcken state te recontreeren, met tranen beteughden.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen 
Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 710a. 
199 “Bij verscheijdene gelegentheden heft sijn Hooght. In particuliere bijeencomste mij zijne adversiteijt 
getoont tegen de secte der Mahumetanen, amplecterende onse religie.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen 
Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 748a. 
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obstacle to Palakka’s acceptance of Christianity was the doctrine of monogamy. 
It would be unsuitable for a king to have but one wife.200
As we have seen above, Speelman refrains from any moral judgements on 
the Arung Palakka’s polygamy in the survey of his four wives, and the issue of 
polygamy does not concern Speelman in this context. But he accords a rather 
lengthy passage to the political implications of Palakka’s speculations about 
Islam and Christianity with evident concern.
In addressing the High Government on the issue, Speelman is quick to 
dismiss any profound religious conviction in Palakka: “However much he 
[Palakka] professes his sympathies for Christianity, he understands next to 
nothing of it.”201 Speelman had tried to enlighten Palakka, but with little 
success: “Much as I have, to the best of my ability, and in Malay too, from 
time to time tried to inform him of the general principles of it.”202 It has all 
been to no avail, however, as Palakka in Speelman’s eyes has problems with 
his attention and focussing, as often as not diverting the discussion to other 
topics.203 The argument is elaborated further: Palakka is distracted, and wit-
hout an ability to differentiate between issues of relevance and irrelevance, 
with a preference for discussing matters of minor importance.204 Speelman’s 
judgement of Palakka’s intellectual capacity thus stands in stark contrast to 
his positive judgement of Karunrung’s. But it is not primarily in intellectual 
terms that Palakka’s religious concerns are viewed. If Palakka’s thoughts on 
religion are superficial, a whim that should not be taken seriously in 
Speelman’s eyes, what should be taken seriously is that if Palakka’s religious 
thoughts came to light, they might jeopardise Palakka’s prestige and position 
among his own people.
200 “allenlijcq wat swaermoedigh valt aensiende op het Christen huwelijcq, meenende, dat het voor een 
conincq te hard was een vrouwe te mogen hebben.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, 
fol. 748a.
201 “Dogh evenwel, en schoon hij (als geseght) ons Christen gevoele wel beaengenaemde, soo noghans en 
verstaet hij daervan niet.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 748a. 
202 “hoewel ick nar vermogen, en voor soo veel ick dat in ‘t Maleijts zeggen ende hem te verstaen conde, 
nu en dan in generale termen hem wel eenigh onderright hebbe gedaen.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen 
Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 748a. 
203 “Dogh hij is seer niet attentiff ofte opmerkende, niet alleen darin, maer aen voorts alle andere saecken.” 
VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 748a. 
204 “seer vergeetelijcq, maer genegen tot discoersen van cleen belang.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek 
Makassar 1671, fol. 748a. 
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Speelman makes it clear to the High Government that on several occasions 
he tried to warn against and lead Palakka away from his “path of folly.”205 His 
advice and instructions to Palakka was, he goes on, that Palakka keep his dis-
like of the Muslim faith a closed subject.206 Then, introduced first by what I 
take as a conventional concession to piety, in which Speelman holds forth that 
the spreading of the Christian faith is an ultimate duty,207 he goes on to stress 
that it was of still greater importance that the religious issue in the case of 
Palakka be handled with absolute discretion.208
In the actual communication between Speelman and Palakka, this message 
must have taken the form of a non-negotiable order rather than as friendly 
advice. Speelman’s account of his final instructions to Palakka on the matter 
cannot be understood in any other way: “bordering on the offensive, Palakka 
has been instructed not to talk to nor discuss such matters with anyone, to pre-
empt any conflict.”209
The consideration in Palakka’s reflections on religion is that a local Company 
ally should not reveal thoughts that might be interpreted as contemplating 
converting to his European ally’s religion. For his part, Speelman, tried to block 
any conversion out of considerations of political stability and preservation of 
an invaluable alliance. Speelman’s handling of Arung Palakka’s thoughts about 
conversion thus demonstrates an example of how secular political concerns 
took priority over religious missionary ones, which conforms to the Company 
rule. But the case also demonstrates a point of methodological significance in 
overseas diplomacy, namely that one should not underestimate the factor of 
agency.
For, from a counter-factual, hypothetical point of view, a disclosure of 
Palakka’s toying with the idea of conversion might well have had the disastrous 
effects that Speelman feared, and broken the alliance with the Bugis. If the 
205 “hoe dickmaels ick hem van die vodderij aff getrocken en vermaent hebbe.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen 
Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 748a. 
206 “dat hij best onthielde, ‘t geene tot naedeel van de voorsz: secte tusschen ons beijde werde bijgebraght.” 
VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 748a. 
207 “en off wel ten hooghsten plicht zij, ‘t gelove Christ uijbreijden.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek 
Makassar 1671, fol. 748a-b. 
208 “dat alsnogh sal moeten geschieden, want de saecke veel te teer om niet heel voorsightigh gehandelt 
werden.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 1671, fol. 748b.
209 “Niettemin is hij daerin althoos geconfronteert benevens insinuatie, sich selve in dien deele aen nie-
mant te verclaeren, tot vermijdinge van alle revolutie.” VOC 1276 OB, Inkomen Briefboek Makassar 
1671, fol. 748b. 
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alliance had broken, it might have changed the outcome of the campaign. 
Speelman’s delicate handling of the  problem was probably decisive in keeping 
the Bugis from falling out over this issue, and thus of equal importance to the 
success of the Company’s venture. The incident at least goes to illustrate how 
delicate overseas diplomacy was, and how much instinct it took to conduct it 
successfully. This is not to say that all the Company’s agents possessed 
Speelman’s abilities. But to suggest that none of them did, or that cultural dif-
ferences prevented all of them from acquiring such an intimate understanding 
of indigenous culture in South East Asia is wide off the mark and leaves the 
Company’s diplomatic successes unexplained.
Speelman’s handling of the two obstacles and the 
diplomatic mode of empirical pragmatism
Speelman’s tackling of the succession procedure and Palakka’s religious specu-
lations form striking illustrations of how “big models” sometimes are inade-
quate at best when confronted with empirical facts at the level of micro-action. 
Both issues illustrate the kind of practical challenges that Speelman had to 
grapple with when dealing with his main ally. Even on a more general level it 
could be argued that this was what overseas alliance diplomacy was about, 
keeping an observant eye on seemingly trivial “details” that beneath the sur-
face were of crucial importance.
Palakka stood in danger of losing his standing and prestige among the Bugis 
if his personal speculations on religious issues were made public, with poten-
tially disastrous consequences. When Speelman managed to find a solution to 
the potential hazards, of both the succession and the religious conversion 
issues, and managed to manoeuvre himself into a clandestine personal nego-
tiating position with Karunrung (although the outcome was unsuccessful), 
these achievements were definitely the result of Speelman’s “cultural compe-
tence” and personality. Qualities that he somehow managed to “fit” into the 
local cultural matrix of politics.
Section 4: The personal prowess argument
Finally, there is one factor that in my mind probably was one of the most 
important in explaining Speelman’s diplomatic success, regardless of how he 
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acted towards friend or foe. If we keep in mind Speelman’s admiration for 
Karunrung’s positive attributes as well as his admiration for Arung Palakka’s 
courage, we can establish a basic motto of Speelman’s own values which may 
be summarised as: “Bold action by good sense.” Bold action as an ideal would 
be compatible with local standards and it seems reasonable to argue that the 
indigenous elite understood Speelman as a man of extraordinary personal, if 
not charismatic power. If so he would fall in line with what O. W. Wolters has 
designated as typical of South East Asian conceptions of power-legitimacy, 
namely charisma,210 and then understood as an ideal type in opposition to 
European “rational power legitimation.”211
If, however, Speelman’s reputation as a “man of prowess,” was one of his 
greater assets in his diplomatic performance in Sulawesi, which there is rea-
son to propose, such a proposition spoils the schematic simplicity of the 
Europe–South East Asia dichotomy of charismatic as opposed to “rational” 
conceptions of power. I have argued consistently in this chapter, and in this 
thesis in general, that this dichotomy is generally too simplistic. But, retur-
ning to the case in point here, if charisma was one of Speelman’s assets, it was 
also put in force by his recognition of the nature of indigenous conceptions of 
state power and diplomacy. The two went together in Speelman’s pragmatic, 
empirical diplomacy.
Chapter conclusion
Negotiations with local power holders on concrete issues formed the founda-
tion of the Company’s diplomatic edifice. The diplomatic treaty formed the 
top floor, the institutional formal level where specific negotiated agreements 
could be inscribed in writing and presented to the world as “forever binding.” 
But a preoccupation with this level may delude us into drawing mistaken con-
clusions about “legal formalism,” “Eurocentric bias,” and the like as the predo-
minant characteristic of the Company’s overseas negotiations with local power 
holders, by overlooking that the basis of these respective treaty agreements 
was always personally conducted negotiations between local rulers and 
Company representatives. As we have seen, Speelman did not trust the 
210 O. W. Wolters, History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives (Singapore: SEAP, 1982), 
9–10. 
211 Ibid. 13. 
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institutional arrangement by treaty to support the Company’s hegemony in 
South Sulawesi alone. It had to be backed up by a military presence and the 
threat of sanctions. But still more important was the personal diplomacy that 
underlay alliance building.
Speelman’s evaluation of his former Makassarese foes and Palakka and the 
Bugis allies gives us a glimpse into this agency level of overseas diplomacy. It 
demonstrates that the cornerstone of Speelman’s diplomatic method was the 
personal bonds that could be established with potential or actual power hol-
ders. It also demonstrates that Speelman was working from a realist assump-
tion in which personal ethics and moral standards were viewed as secondary 
compared with the Company’s politico-diplomatic use-value. Establishing col-
laborative bonds with Karunrung was deemed “good,” despite his moral defi-
ciencies because the Company considered his political talents useful. 
Establishing a fixed procedure of succession in the event of Palakka’s prema-
ture death, and preventing him from undermining his own legitimacy by going 
public with his religious thoughts, were “good” in the sense that they were 
necessary to pre-empt a problematic situation for the Company. Adequate 
reaction to such challenges had to be based on relatively precise assumptions 
and assessments of the personal qualities of rulers and members of the local 
power elite alike, as well as of the local political context and situation. Empirical 
pragmatism seems to be a relevant term for this kind of approach.
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Thesis Conclusion
In the introductory chapter, I pointed to positions that I held to be either mis-
leading or incomplete when characterising the nature of the Company’s diplo-
matic practice. In particular I disagreed with the proposition that VOC 
overseas diplomacy was structurally fixed in typical European conceptualisa-
tions. The General Instructions, not only those of 1650, but all of them bear 
witness to a sensitivity to the particulars of the overseas context, and the need 
to take these into account when interacting with local parties. The tenor in the 
general advice issued by the Directors in the Netherlands to the Company’s 
agents overseas was thus not that one should follow European standards auto-
matically, but that one should negotiate and accommodate on basis of pragma-
tic appraisals of the situation at hand.
The tripartite system of the Directors’ manual for the Company’s mode of 
interaction with Asian rulers built on a similar kind of pragmatism. It set up 
two general principles, first that the Company’s monopoly in the Moluccas 
had to be protected at all costs, which in effect excluded symmetrical diplo-
matic relations with the smaller Moluccan polities. They were either subser-
vient defenders of the Company monopoly, or enemies who had to be 
brought under control. But looking at the rest of the charter area, we find a 
second principle in which the choice of diplomatic mode was built on the 
Company’s relative strength in relation to its respective Asian partners. 
Where there was parity of strength, or where the Company remained the 
weaker part, a rule of pragmatism and accommodation reigned as long as 
this approach did not compromise the Company’s interests to an unaccepta-
ble degree.
My analysis of Batavia’s diplomatic interaction with Makassar in its various 
aspects reveals pragmatism as key to the Company’s diplomatic mode on site. 
Van Diemen got what he could get into the 1637 treaty not by dictating terms 
from the European legal canon but by bargaining with the Makassarese with 
the objective of setting down rules that would protect the Company’s interests. 
In that respect, the two treating parties shared some basic understanding of 
what they were doing. The 1637 negotiations represented a bargaining over 
specific contract clauses, a tug of war over shared issues.
362
the s is  conclus ion
The internal disagreement on whether to continue the war or conclude a 
peace in 1655 demonstrates that the Company was not a monolithic body 
as far as decisions over policy was concerned. Opinion was split in Batavia, 
and opposing political positions were argued, but the opposing positions in 
the Council of the Indies were both argued in terms of practical cost-bene-
fit calculations that sought to assess the Company’s best interests. The ends 
and framework of reasoning were shared; what the parties disagreed on 
was the means to achieve the optimal outcome for the Company. It should 
also be noted that legal aspects were considered secondary in these 
discussions.
This points towards principled pragmatism as the core characteristic of the 
Company’s diplomatic practice. The break away from “soft diplomacy” that 
occurred with the disillusionment over the 1655 treaty signified a shift to a 
consistent realist conceptualisation of power politics that came to dominate 
Batavia’s approach towards Makassar after 1655. All the same, there is an 
element of continuity involved. Both before and after 1655, the determining 
factor in policy decisions on Makassar lay in assessments of the Company’s 
contextual opportunities and constraints. The shift after 1655 was determi-
ned by an appreciation of context, not by a pre-ordained structural mode of 
thinking.
Except for the 1655 treaty, with its particular background the formulations 
and contents of the respective contracts concluded with Makassar are all symp-
tomatic of the pragmatic empirical approach: The clauses are consistently 
phrased in concrete and specific terms. The model of the form and contents of 
the treaties is more akin to a merchant contract than to a formal diplomatic 
treaty. It is also noteworthy that the treaties became increasingly detailed and 
specific after 1655. This serves to underline the fact that if the Company’s 
approach was empirical and pragmatic at the outset, it became increasingly 
more so as contact with Makassar intensified. It is thus simply wrong when 
Andaya, for one, argues that the treaties were unintelligible to the locals 
because of their abstract form; the reality was quite the opposite. The treaties 
were made concrete and specific so that the locals could not find loopholes or 
ambiguities to exploit.
With its compendious information on local affairs, political and non-politi-
cal alike, which supplied the Company with useful information that could help 
it preserve its dominance, Speelman’s Notitie is an example of the Company’s 
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reliance on empirical data in the service of diplomacy, but by its case-specific 
and bottom-up mode of exposition it is also typical of the Company’s empiri-
cal approach in general.
Another notable characteristic of the Notitie is Speelman’s focus on persona-
lity traits as factors in diplomatic interaction. This might reflect an apprecia-
tion of a difference in the balance between the institutional and personal 
dimensions in Western and Asian diplomatic practice. If so, the emphasis on 
the personal dimension represents an accommodation of diplomatic strategy 
to the realities of the overseas context. Yet there are broader implications in 
Speelman’s mode of exposition and perception.
Speelman’s “diplomatic method” centres on his evaluation of the personal 
qualities of persons in power basically to know whom one should be on guard 
against or with whom one could form friendly ties. Sometimes, as in the case 
of Karunrung, both focuses applied. Considerations of context are subsidiary 
to an appreciation of personality traits, as his treatment of context focuses on 
which groups and dynamics in local hierarchies of power might be favoured or 
not. “Structure” understood as “political culture” or analyses of modes of 
power articulation in more generalised forms are nearly absent in Speelman’s 
text, which is dominated by concrete and specific descriptions at the local poli-
tical level. Read as a manual of overseas diplomacy, the Notitie is thus basically 
a case-focused, bottom-up, and agency-centred deliberation on alternative 
routes of diplomatic action. It is to a large degree a method I have applied in 
this thesis. How does it stand in relation to the historiography, and what is to 
be gained from it?
I started out by numbering five approaches to the understanding of the 
nature of seventeenth-century VOC diplomacy and the nature of the Company’s 
interactions in Asia: the classical approach of the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, characterised by a bias towards the political and military dimen-
sion of overseas expansion; Alexandrowicz’s “system compatibility approach,” 
which focuses on structural similarities between systems of international law 
in early modern Asia and Europe; and Andaya’s opposing proposition of 
incompatibility advocated in his structural cultural approach, an idea that also 
popped up in Arasaratnam’s refutation of Paulusz. I also included Somers as a 
forth type, a “legalist-pragmatic approach” because of his stress on both legal 
and pragmatic considerations in the Company’s diplomacy. Finally, I included 
Van Ittersum because she represents a broadening of the perspective by 
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consistently putting the Company’s diplomacy and treaty making in a wider 
historical and political context, and her proposition about the cynical nature of 
the Company’s diplomacy.
I have primarily concentrated on refuting Andaya’s propositions about the 
nature of VOC diplomacy as Eurocentric, and his propositions of structural mis-
understanding in communications between Makassar and the Company. My 
counter-argument regarding the nature of the Company’s diplomacy rests on a 
demonstration of the pragmatic orientation found in both the General Instructions 
from the Heeren XVII and in the Company’s practice towards Makassar. As for the 
Makassarese, I have partly argued that Andaya’s proposition rests on the assump-
tion that they would apply the same model and approach towards an outsider like 
the Company as they would to a local ruler or state. The illogical assumption of this 
proposition is that it implies that the Makassarese accepted the Company as an 
integral part of the South Sulawesian states system, and all evidence points to the 
contrary. Neither does the  evidence point towards an interpretation of Company–
Makassar communications as a structurally determined misunderstanding. 
Although their motives may have been different, the Company and Makassar were 
taking part in a communication in which they did understand each other’s posi-
tions. Functional communication did take place.
Having rejected Andaya’s structural approach and propositions, where does 
that leave me in relation to the other positions in the historiography? First of 
all, it almost goes without saying that I find the classical approach of the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries too narrowly focused on the formal 
aspects of international law and the legal dimension of treaty making. This is a 
criticism that to my mind also partly applies to more modern scholars like 
Somers. In these cases, it is not so much the arguments advanced that I object 
to, but the restricted perspective of the analysis. I propose that the picture 
needs to be filled in with more reflection on the Company’s diplomatic prac-
tice in its extra- legal dimensions. One line of research that seems to offer itself 
from such an assumption is a complementary proposition to Alexandrowicz’s 
thesis about the increasing similarity of Asiatic and Western modes of diplo-
macy because of a tendency towards “westernisation” in Asia, namely that one 
should also look for incorporations of “Asian elements” or modes of accom-
modation to local Asiatic modes in the Company’s diplomatic practice. Within 
this line of research, one should specifically look for the Company’s mode and 
criteria of selection for the incorporation of local features.
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As for propositions about the cynical nature of the Company’s diplomatic 
mode as formulated by Van Ittersum, I suggest that she overplays her hand. 
Her evaluation must be modified because it neither heeds nor covers the com-
plex nature of the Company’s approach as a whole. For one, such elements as 
the role of emotional factors such as pride and prestige are neglected. Besides, 
if we claim that the Company acted cynically in the case of Makassar, it did so 
for a reason. Cynicism sprang from the High Government’s diminishing trust 
in Hasanuddin’s sincerity in honouring the terms of the treaty and in its obser-
vation that the king of Makassar continued to harbour aggressive plans for the 
Spice Islands. Perhaps “contextual cynicism” might be a more precise term for 
the High Government’s attitude after 1655. But the cynicism was not there 
from the beginning. The negotiations for a treaty in 1637 took place within a 
symmetrical framework, and, judged by the evidence, with serious intentions 
on both sides. As for Maetsuyker’s rationale for favouring negotiations instead 
of continuing the war in 1655, his attitude seems to have been more idealistic, 
understood as having “good faith in,” than cynical, given his sincere belief that 
the new treaty would guarantee stable relations with Makassar once and for all. 
Cynicism only increased as this belief waned. And even then, to my mind, it 
was not cynicism pure and simple.
Batavia’s diminishing trust in Hasanuddin went hand in hand with a change 
in its appreciation of negotiation and war as instruments of diplomacy. 
Relative emphasis and preference were reversed and inverted. Negotiations 
were perceived in increasingly tactical terms, and treaty terms were formula-
ted in increasingly practical detail. Possibly this move could be regarded as a 
general trend that paralleled the Company’s increased power in the sevente-
enth century. But there is one factor that should not be overlooked in this 
context, namely that there might have been an element of idealism, here 
understood as the “pursuit of higher goals and ideals” involved in this develop-
ment, as well.
As we have seen, a sense of pride and concerns of prestige were already evi-
dent in the General Instructions. If there was a sense of self- confidence and 
pride in the Company and its achievements, pursuing the Company’s interest 
with uncompromising faith may also have contained the belief that it should 
be done by fair means, or be conducted according to certain moral standards. 
“Sticking to your promises” might well have been part of this “moral package,” 
and not just a tricky means of extortion. If so, we are close to a moral idealistic 
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perception of diplomacy. In such a perspective, the belief that pacta sunt ser-
vanda acquires moral-idealistic qualities.
Another weakness of Van Ittersum’s work is its limited relevance for genera-
lisations about the Company’s mode of diplomacy. Van Ittersum’s case is the 
Moluccas, an area in which the Company held a special position and followed 
a special policy necessitated by its commitment to defend and protect its policy 
positions. She also focuses on the legal “child prodigy” Hugo Grotius, who was 
enlisted as a lawyer to defend the Company to the extent of setting even croo-
ked affairs straight. He was the outstanding example of a legal nit-picker. But, 
as the Makassar case shows, in places where the Company neither could dic-
tate nor manipulate outcomes, diplomatic interaction was a much more com-
plex affair than could be conceived of in legal terms alone.
If this was true for Makassar up to 1667, it was all the more truer for the 
larger mainland states outside the Indonesian archipelago. In fact, the area 
outside the Spice Islands proper, an entity that falls outside Van Ittersum’s 
selection of cases, forms the larger mass of the Company’s contact and interac-
tion points. Here one-sided Company manipulation and legal trickery did not 
offer itself as a viable option. Diplomacy had to be more complex by virtue of 
the complexity of context, and the Company’s weaker position in it.
It follows from the above that I believe one does well to steer clear of abso-
lute dichotomous propositions like Andaya’s regarding the Company’s and 
local modes of diplomacy. One does better in looking for where there seem to 
have been compatibilities and where there were contrasts at a lower level of 
analysis. Grand models tend to reify themselves instead of offering historical 
explanation. On the other hand, analysis at the level of agency might offer 
more solid ground for constructing analytical models. Have I offered such a 
model here? If I have, I stand in debt to the historiography. If there hadn’t been 
Stapel’s thesis on the Company and Makassar, I could never have written this 
study. Likewise, if Andaya had not formulated his original propositions, I 
would not have been able to formulate my own angle of approach.
I even probably could not claim full originality to my tentative formula-
tions about how to proceed with further research in the field, because my 
propositions to a large degree are in line with Speelman’s mode in the Notitie, 
namely to analyse the diplomatic interaction bottom- up from an agency per-
spective, and to point out how the actions were conditioned and modified by 
context. Only on this foundation will it be sound to infer structural 
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implications that Speelman himself admittedly avoids. I have only argued a 
middle ground proposition, namely that the Company’s mode of diplomatic 
 interaction towards Makassar basically seems to have been determined by a 
principled pragmatism.
One fundamental question must be addressed at the end. Based as my dis-
cussion is on one particular case, Makassar, how can I argue that it also serves 
to tell us something about the general nature of the Company’s diplomacy? On 
the one hand, it can be argued that to advance a general proposition I should 
point to a selection of cases, and not restrict myself to only one. On the other 
hand, general propositions can be, and are, supported by my one case. I shall 
demonstrate this by my proposition about principled pragmatism.
Pragmatism as the general key to diplomatic performance outside the 
Company’s possessions in the Moluccas is laid down in the General Instructions. 
As I have shown, it is also a common denominator in Batavia’s performance of 
diplomacy towards Makassar. Why may we assume that this was a general trait 
in the Company’s diplomatic practice towards Asian princes and rulers in the 
charter area? Simply because the Company’s pragmatism rested on the over-
seas context, or more precisely, the realisation by the Company from the 
Directors to the Council of the Indies that they could not go about as they 
pleased regarding relations with most of the Asian rulers. It would neither 
work nor pay, neither politically nor commercially. Practical considerations 
meant that the Company could not behave like an idiot abroad, as it knew it 
could not afford to. This logic worked for the Company’s approach towards 
Makassar until the Company realised that it could no longer afford not to 
intervene decisively. But when it did, it was because circumstances offered an 
opportunity to do so. The underlying logic of pragmatic considerations of opp-
ortunity as a guide to action was the same for the other states and rulers in the 
charter area. Mistakes and corrections were made within this general approach, 
as we have seen in the case of Makassar, but this does not alter the fact that the 
pragmatic approach constituted the general rule outside the Moluccas. 
Makassar constitutes a somewhat special case in that sample, but still a case.
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